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                                               Abstract 
 
The CARIFORUM States in signing the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 
the European Community on the 15the October, 2008 in Bridgetown Barbados have 
demonstrated a bold step by a group of Small Developing Island States (SIDS) on the 
trail of the emerging global trade regime because, notwithstanding the levels of 
economic disparity between the two sides, the Caribbean accepted the unequal nature 
of the partnership in a pragmatic and constructive sense. The region’s negotiators 
skilfully used the asymmetry of power dynamics of the European Community and the 
global trade inertia to craft a deal and carved a way forward for themselves which gave 
practical application to the realist theory of International relations in the context of 
international bargaining with domestic constraints. They have illuminated a paradigm 
shift towards a new era in which small vulnerable developing states can become 
proactive in order to protect their vital commercial interests. 
 
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership is one of the most innovative and far- 
reaching Free Trade Agreement ever entered into in the context of North-South 
relations. So unique and innovative are the arrangements that they now evidenced the 
new paradigm and a model for future Free Trade Agreement, not just between Europe 
and the rest of the developing world but, among developing countries themselves. It also 
has implications for the multilateral system in the context of the Doha Round of 
negotiation. The research contributes to knowledge by illustrating the application of an 
adapted combination of the classical co-operative and non- cooperative models of 
coalition bargaining developed by John Nash and the Thomas Schelling’s model 
analyzed in the context of Robert Putman’s games theory are very relevant in explaining 
the Paradigms in Caribbean trade diplomacy and how the regions succeeded in 
leveraging concessions in negotiating the CARIFORUM–EC Free Trade Agreement. The 
work places the asymmetric problems of the CARIFORUM States in the context of their 
need for a specific outcome in light of their national interests  and the EC’s desire to 
negotiate a new trade arrangement in keeping with the demands of its own domestic 
constituents and their wider international trade agenda. Finally, the work challenges the 
assertions that the EC in International Trade Negotiations uses its superior negotiating 
machinery and strength of its markets as secured vehicles to influence and impose its 
external trade policies on developing countries and further that the ACP States are 
reactive in character. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The CARIFORUM1 Group of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states has signed a 
Free Trade Agreement with the European Community 2(EC) and its Member States on 
the 15th October, 2008 in Bridgetown Barbados.  
This study explores the diplomacy of the CARIFORUM states in their trade and 
cooperation relations with the EC within the wider context of the ACP Group of States. 
The Caribbean States were first exposed to international trade negotiations when they 
engaged the Europeans in the negotiations for the first Lomé Agreement between 1973 
and 1975 in which they played a very significant role. When the ACP States and the 
EEC negotiated the first Lomé agreement the parties confronted each other from two 
different philosophical and ideological positions. The ACP states had been exposed to 
different trade regimes with Europe; there was the Yaoundé Accord with the 
Francophone African states, the Arusha Agreement which included Tanzania and other 
Anglophone States, there was also an agreement with Nigeria which was never 
implemented and in the Caribbean there was the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of 
1925 with the United Kingdom under which sugar was supplied by the Caribbean.  
The negotiations in 1973 were the first for the region undertaken at a time when the 
Caribbean Community was building its own integration movement. Europe was also 
building its Community but had gone much further than the Caribbean. In reality, what 
                                                        
1 The Caribbean Forum Group of ACP states is a European construct of the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community  (CARICOM),  Cuba  and  The  Dominican  Republic  (DR).  Cuba  is  not  a  party  to  the  Free  Trade 
Agreement.  The  Caribbean Community was  established  under  the Treaty  of  Chaguaramas  1973  and  is  the 
successor  organization  to  the  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Area  (CARIFTA)  which was  established  in  1968.  The 
Dominican Republic is not a Member of CARICOM. 
 
2   The European Community was established under the Maastricht Treaty signed on the 7th February 1992 
which came into effect on the 1st November 1993. The Treaty established three pillars of the union: (1) The 
European Community (2) Justice and Home Affairs and (3) The Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
    
2 
 
 
the Lomé negotiations demonstrated for the Caribbean States was the extent of the 
cohesion and unity which they had achieved, a factor which had eluded them during 
their attempt to federate in 1958. 
Britain by the 1960’s had realised that its future rested within the EEC and not with the 
former colonies because with the declining purchasing power of these colonies, British 
exports declined and its imports increased. Therefore, it had to seek new and more 
lucrative markets as the burden of special arrangements with its former colonies could 
not be sustained3. So, while Britain and the EEC were making arrangements to combine 
their markets, the Caribbean was putting its own arrangements in place because in the 
latter half of the 1960’s the region began to place emphasis on putting structures in 
place and developed processes for Caribbean integration mainly at the economic and 
functional levels4.  
During the Lomé negotiations the Caribbean region had achieved a level of unity that 
was greater and deeper than the unity achieved within the EEC at the time. However, 
this was an element of the EEC’s functioning of which the Caribbean States were 
unaware until the parties were deep into the negotiations for the Lomé agreement5. The 
level of unity achieved in the Caribbean was transported into the body construct of the 
ACP Group as a deliberate strategy to confront the EEC6.  The CARICOM Member 
States were not only active in the Caribbean region because they also played a leading 
role in organizing a large number of former European colonies in Africa and  the Pacific  
to form the bargaining coalition to collectively negotiate the Lomé Convention in 1975 
                                                        
3 Babarinde Olutemi A. The Lomé Conventions and Development. An Empirical Assessment. Avebury. Ashgat 
Publishing Limited (1994) p. 3. 
 
4 Emmanuel, Patrick A.M. Approaches to Caribbean political integration. Occasioned Paper No. 21 Institute of 
Social and Economic Research (Eastern Caribbean) UWI. Cave Hill, Barbados (1987). p. 1. 
 
5 Interview‐ Sir Shridath Ramphal. January 8, 2009. Barbados. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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for preferential trade and economic cooperation with the EEC 7. Indeed, it was Shirdath 
Ramphal of the Caribbean delegation who first referred to the troika of the bargaining 
coalition as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States8 and who later pressed the 
EEC to apply some of the unutilised funds from previous European Development Fund 
(EDF) to purchase the building which now houses the ACP Secretariat in Brussels9. But 
while Shirdath Ramphal was quick to support the acceptance of an EC’s late offer to 
make the Lomé arrangements permanent, the rest of the ACP Group felt that they did 
not want such arrangements because it would not be in their best 
interests10.Undertaking the negotiation for Lomé was a very ambitious initiative 
advanced by the Caribbean as it was they that went in search of the Africa States to 
forge a unity with them and invited the Pacific States to join in order to achieve the wider 
objective of the Group of 77 which was to change the global economic structure through 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Caribbean’s position was well 
articulated by P.J. Patterson in the Jamaican Parliament in June 1978 when he stated 
                                                        
7  Evisman  ,  Michael  H  in      Hillman,RS  and  Thomas  J.  D’Agostino  ed.  Understanding  the  Contemporary 
Caribbean, Lynne Rienner Publisher (2005) p. 150. 
 
8 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal. January 8, 2009. Barbados. 
 
9 Interviews‐ Ambassador Owen Singh, May 13, 2009. London. 
 
10 Interviews‐ Shirdath Ramphal, June 8, 2009 and P.J. Patterson, March 3, 2009. 
 
11 Mills, Don: Readings on the New International Economic Order. Jamaica National Commission (1978) p. 70. 
In 1978 Jamaica became the Chair of the Group of 77 and it spoke for the group whenever they confronted the 
developed world  at  the negotiation.  Jamaica  also became President of  the Economic  and Social Committee 
(ECOSOC).  Further,  Jamaica’s  Permanent  Representative  in  Geneva  was  President  of  the  United  Nations 
negotiating Conference on the Common Fund while its delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference was the 
rapporteur of that Conference. 
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that Jamaica was “…totally convinced that the establishment of a New International 
Economic Order”11 of necessity was a fundamental part of Jamaica’s foreign policy 
objective. Part of Jamaica’s foreign policy objective was to see to the implementation of 
the UNCTAD agenda agreed in 1964. So, while the Non-Aligned Movement and the 
Group of 77 were very influential in the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
Jamaica took “center stage” in Third World politics12 and defended the stance of the 
South on the question of South-South development within the context of the North-
South dialogue. The strategic objective of the Caribbean was to place the Lomé 
Convention and the Group of ACP States as a microcosm of the South to confront 
Europe which was itself the symbol of the North13 . 
The EEC wanted reciprocity as the central focus of the Lomé trade regime but the 
Caribbean did not. Indeed, reciprocity was at the heart of the European negotiation 
thrust but for the ACP it was totally unacceptable. Therefore in order to achieve their 
objective, the Caribbean which had the lead to negotiate trade, had to craft credible 
reasons to justify its call for non-reciprocity. Their success in this area was based on the 
strong philosophical argument in Aristotle’s ethics which argued that reciprocity has 
validity with equals but as between un-equals, it made things worse, so as between UN 
-equals, equity requires non reciprocity14. This reference was used to great effect in the 
negotiations as Shirdath Ramphal demanded non- reciprocity for the ACP to which 
                                                        
 
 
12 Levitt, Kari: From Decolonization to Neo­liberalism: What have we learnt about Development in the Critical 
Tradition of Caribbean Political Economy. (Eds.) Kari Levitt and Michael Witter (Ian Randle Publishers, 
Kingston, Jamaica, 1996). p. 213. 
 
13 Interview‐ Sir Shridath Ramphal. January 8, 2009. Barbados. 
 
14 Interview‐ PJ Patterson, March 3, 2009 & Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 6, 2009. The reference to Aristotle’s 
ethics was provided to the group in a review and Strategy meeting of the Caribbean delegation by the 
Barbadian Minister, Cameron Tudor. 
 
15 Interviews‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 8, 2009, Barbados & P.J. Patterson March 3, 2009. 
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Europe strenuously objected. He posed the question to the Europeans thus: “have you 
not read your own philosophers?”15 and quoted from Aristotle’s ethics and rested his 
arguments there. This, it is suggested took the Europeans by surprise and brought the 
discussions to a higher level which created the avenue for the ACP to defend their 
demands for non-reciprocity and caused the Europe to move away from their core 
position on reciprocity16. 
Since then, Europe was always keen or returning to reciprocity17 and so the 
negotiations for the Uruguay Round became a major corner stone in achieving that 
needed breakthrough. The conclusion of that round left the non-reciprocity arrangement 
between the ACP States and the EC very exposed to extinction.  
The opportunity to return to reciprocity was seized by Europe during the 1996 mid-term 
review of Lomé IV at which time the European Commissioned Green Paper proposed 
the dismantling of the non-reciprocity regime. So, by the time the parties came to 
negotiate the Cotonou Agreement, the ACP realised that Europe was determined to end 
the old regime in order to advance its global agenda because Lomé no longer stood at 
the apex of  its relations with the developing South.  
The Cotonou Agreement was therefore meant to be the last such non- reciprocal trade 
agreement in the context of the European global design because Europe had decided 
not to seek any new waiver to extend the regime which was scheduled to expire on the 
31st December, 2008. The negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
to replace the old regime with Europe was therefore directed by the Cotonou Agreement 
and had to be undertaken within the ambits of Article XXIV of GATT 1947.  
                                                        
 
16 Ibid,  
 
17 Interview‐ Ambassador Owen Singh May 13, 2009. London, UK.  Ambassador Singh represented Jamaica in 
negotiating Lomé II & III. 
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The Caribbean  realising the importance of maintaining cohesion within the troika of the 
bargaining coalition of the ACP States, pushed to negotiate the EPA under the all ACP 
umbrella but in 2003, the all ACP phase failed to produce the desired outcome for the 
ACP and the regions were forced to negotiate singularly and frontally with Europe. The 
Caribbean knew what it wanted from those negotiations and what it did not. It also had a 
fair idea of what Europe wanted, so also what was expected of the region at the 
mutilated level and in the Group of 77.However, as the region sat at the negotiating 
table with Europe it had to protect its own interest and has therefore negotiated the EPA 
in the classic non-cooperative bargaining model.  
Placing the research within the existing literature. 
The current Cariforum EC relations were born out of the wider ACP-EC trade and 
cooperation arrangements which have been deeply rooted in the historical experience 
and associations of both sides. There is a large body of literature on the relation 
between the ACP and the EU most of which argue the merits and other aspects of the 
relationship, but seems limited in terms of the specificity of the Caribbean’s role. The 
literature examines the history, development and implementation of the various 
conventions and the theoretical considerations of the negotiations.  
The uniqueness of the Lomé Convention and it value to North- South relations in the 
1970s has been argued by the early writers who put the relationship in the context of 
the post colonial global economic regime(Schiffman1975,Friedeburg1975, 
Ramphal1975 &1985, Mayall 1979&2005, Cable1980,Cosgrove Twitchett 1976 &, 1981, 
Gandia 1981,  Marable 1987, Payne & Sutton 1984, Mills 1991, and Brown, 2002,).The 
history of the relation is extensively presented by (Brown, 2002) who examined the 
relations from 1957- 2000 and placed the Conventions in the context of a response to a 
pattern of North-South relations and argued that the relation was founded on the ACP 
States’ demand for a change in the relationship in the international political economy. 
He also argued that the North-South dialogue is important in explaining the failure and 
shortcomings of the relationship in the dynamics of the global political economy. This 
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thesis finds support and alignment with the basic tenets of the historical arguments, but 
makes the additional arguments which define and expose the contribution which the 
Caribbean States have made to the processes and development of the group. 
Also, there are strong academic arguments on the technical and developmental 
dimensions of the relationship, for example Stevens1985, McQueen and Stevens 1989   
argue the weaknesses of the regime and the policy failures with respect to the 
implementation of the various development packages and initiatives of the regime. 
The findings of this thesis support these academic and historical analyses in the main, 
but add two dimensions which have not been addressed by the existing literature. 
Firstly, that the use of the instrument of Part 1V of the Treaty of Rome to create 
development policies and strategies for newly independent states by the EC without a 
concomitant redesign of the instrument to depart from its original intent,  is part of the 
reasons for the failure of the Lomé regime to provide the expected improvement in trade 
and development and secondly, it argues the case of the emerging paradigms of 
Caribbean diplomacy within the context of the ACP Group and the multilateral  regime. 
The long running debate as to the equality of the ACP-EC partnership still persists 
because even though most writers have settled the question of equality of partnership in 
the relations, this thesis argues that the finality of the positions for or against rests in the 
perception of sovereignty on the one hand and economic power on the other hand. The 
actual responses are by and large based on a perception in a divide depending on 
whether one takes a pro European or indeed an ACP view point18. However, what 
seems beyond dispute which also highlights the unequal nature of the partnership is the 
extent to which Europe has unilaterally changed its position, strategies and policies with 
respect to the application of aid funding for ACP States without any consultation with 
those States, notwithstanding the agreement that decisions relating to the application of 
                                                        
18 This position is derived from an analysis of the views expressed in the structured interviews conducted for 
this thesis.   
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the allocated funds are to be made jointly. Nowhere is the unequal nature of the relation 
more pronounced that in the area of development cooperation and the EDF 
discretionary spending. Grynberg and Clarke & (2006) and Matheson(1997). Because, 
even though the Joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers is required to approve the various 
changes to the EDF funding for  various initiatives, it is the EU that has dictated the 
initiatives for which funding will be made available, for example the use of funds for debt 
relief, HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB, African Security, Water, and  Energy Facilities.    
Cosgrove-Twitchett (1976, 1981)  and Zartman (1976, 1995)  have argued the merits of 
the ACP-EC relationship stressing “equality” of partnership among politically 
independent states and aligned their arguments with the liberal thinking of international 
relations and the more general construct of the theories of state relations and 
interdependence. These theoretical perspectives of the relation seemed to have 
changed however, because by 1981 both writers agreed that the relationship was 
indeed unequal.  
Gruhn (1975, 1985) also has retracted on the issue of “equality” of partnership as the 
questions of the asymmetry in the power relations began to emerge during 
implementation of the various Conventions as the EC started to assert its dominance, 
equality in partnership began to lose credibility among academic writers.  
This thesis argues the case that the issue of unequal partnership had always existed 
and is even more pronounced now than in the early period of the Lomé regime. It 
balances the views expressed from the European side which still hold fast to the neo-
liberal thinking of political equality and those from the Caribbean and wider ACP States 
which assert the existence of an unequal partnership in economic strength. 
The theoretical  analysis of economic diplomacy examines the underlying issues that  
affect the decision making processes by linking the areas of negotiating theories. 
However,  it seems that the precise and full acceptance of the application of the theories 
is inconclusive in addressing the bargaining concept in the power relations. The 
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acceptance of that realism by developing countries usually caused them to react by 
stone walling or delay negotiations in their effort to gain preferential arrangements 
(Mbirimi, 1988). However (Narlikcar & Odell, 2006) argue that in order to gain more from 
a stronger state, it is better to approach the negotiations by adopting a missed 
opportunity strategy and develop the coalition bargaining around that strategy than to 
follow a strict distributive strategy. This, therefore requires that coalition members must 
negotiate among themselves over priorities and agree their joint defensive positions. 
The CARIFORUM States seemed to have applied this principle off coalition bargaining 
in the combination of strategies while negotiating with Europe because of the intensity 
of the negotiations.  Firstly at the national level and even more importantly at the 
regional level to get consensus on their priorities and defensive positions19.This 
paradigm shift in the context of the CARIFORUM States negotiating processes is 
facilitated by the Cotonou Agreement which envisages the broad involvement of 
stakeholders in those processes. 
The question of the asymmetrical power relations is critical to the hypothesis  which 
argues the extent to which the type of relationships which exists between the ACP 
States and the EC has impacted the outcome of the negotiation for  previous trade and 
cooperation agreements, but even more so, the negotiations between CARIFORUM 
States and the EC for the current EPA in the context of the non-cooperative bargaining 
theory and further argues that the trade diplomacy of CARIFORUM States in their 
relations with the EC is not reactive. Their approach to these  negotiations has 
extricated them from the overall pattern of negotiation of the wider ACP Group and   had 
unravel the paradigms in Caribbean’s diplomacy from the generality of the findings of 
Mgbere, (1994) that the diplomacy of the ACP States is reactive. 
Caribbean diplomacy had evolved, both within the Caribbean basin itself and 
internationally. It is deeply rooted in an historical context of resistance to domination, 
                                                        
19  Interview –Ambassador Henry Gill, June 10, 2009, Bridgetown,Barbados. 
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rooted in their belief in self determination, political and economic development and the 
desire to carve its own identity and shape its future, (Ramphal 1971, 1985, Demas 
1972,  1976 &1986, Levitt 1996, Sutton 1984, Hope 1986, Marable 1987, McAfee 1991, 
Mills 1991 and Courtman 2004). 
So while this thesis raises no great issue with the generality of Mgbere’s arguments 
from an all ACP historical angle, it takes the question one step beyond the Mgbere 
findings and examines the negative diplomacy of the all ACP Group to determine to 
what extent the paradigms in Caribbean diplomacy in negotiating the Economic 
Partnership Agreement was driven by an intrinsic desire to be proactive in defining and 
protecting CARIFORUM’s self-interest within a narrow pathway between the construct 
of the  realist and constructionist theories of diplomacy and therefore further exposed 
the negative diplomacy of the ACP States as a collective (Byron 2005, Hall & Chuck-A- 
Sang 2007, Bernal 2008, Stevens 2008, Girvan 2008, Arthur 2008 and Thomas 2008). 
Barston (1988) defined diplomacy as the management of relationships between states 
and other actors and it involves an interaction where parties try to forge a position most 
advantageous to its interests. This usually involves bargaining either bilaterally or 
multilaterally. The negotiation processes is an exploration of ways to reconcile different 
positions to produce mutually acceptable outcomes or compromises and narrow 
difficulties. Bargaining is therefore an essential aspect of real life situations which must 
be faced practically through the negotiating processes once there exists the incentive to 
negotiate (Carraro, Marchiori and Sgobbi 2005, Iklé 1964) and Brady (1991) argue the 
importance of the historical relations, knowledge and familiarity in the negotiating 
process. Hirschman (1945) argued the importance of market size in gaining leverage in 
negotiations a position which is widely embraced. Therefore, the argument advanced by 
William, Duchesne & Meunier (2000) while cannot be ignored, the phenomenon of 
market size  is not necessarily  the most decisive factor influencing the outcome of a 
negotiation. For example, In the case of the negotiations for the CARIFORUM EPA with 
the EC, the size of the EC market seemed not to have been a grave factor for either 
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side. Nor, was the size of the CARIFORUM’s market of great importance to Europe. 
However, the Europeans used the relative insignificance of the Caribbean Market to the 
European commercial interests as a reference point to make the argument that their 
crusade in promoting the EPA was not about a mercantilist approach to market opening 
by Europe20. 
The CARIFORUM States were offered duty free quota free access to the EC market, an 
offer which did not create any new opportunities because to a large extent these had 
existed under Lomé and Contonou. However, for the CARIFORUM States continuous 
access to the European market on the most favourable terms was more important than 
the size of the market, while for the EC, getting their global agenda moving forward on 
the so called Singapore Issues was very important.  
In this regard, the approach to negotiations adopted by these small states is best suited 
in the negotiation models advanced by, Nash(1950 &1953),Schelling(1960) and Putman 
(1988). The CARIFORUM’s position in the EPA negotiations seemed to have followed 
the Nash, Putman and Schelling approaches. Because, the Caribbean States used their 
own shortcomings and vulnerabilities to avoid making certain concessions and 
strategically to extract gains... 
 Zartman (1975) posited the view that the idea in negotiations is to seek compromises 
and his argument is reinforced by Brady (1991), who argues the importance of the 
history and culture of parties to a negotiation because where parties have a history of 
negotiating with each other, there usually exist a body of common interests which are 
well defined and which have brought the sides together.   
On the question of market access, Meunier (2007) pointed out that the European Union 
has had a very formidable position and in their negotiations for market access, they use 
the size of their markets to leverage concessions and therefore maximize their gains. 
                                                        
20 See bibliography for various speeches of Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner during the negotiations 
for the EPA. 
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However, this thesis argues that while the importance of their domestic markets and its 
value to exporters cannot be overlooked, the CARIFORUM States placed great 
emphasis on Rules of Origin (RoO) more so than the size of the EU’s market as it was 
felt that this is an area which could bring better benefits to is manufacturers and food 
processors, because market access without commensurate changes in the RoO would 
not benefit the region any more than what had existed prior. McQueen (1982) argues 
the critical importance of the RoO to the industrialization for the ACP States.  
This thesis while embracing the positions argued by Barston (1988) and Zartman 
(1975), has however questions the applicability of the generality of Meunier’s assertions 
by applying the principles and theoretical concepts of non-cooperative bargaining in the 
context of the paradigm of the CARIFORUM States in the EPA negotiations and argues 
the findings that the agreement reached represents the optimization of what the 
CARIFORUM States could have bargained Bernal (2008),because, while the 
CARIFORUM States relied upon defensive and an offensive strategy they had very 
limited tactical options. However, the EC’s strategy was one dimensional based on their 
global agenda, but it had a great arsenal of tactical options. Odell (2000) argues the 
value of employing tactics in forming and splitting alliances to gain concessions in a 
negotiation. But although the CARIFORUM States were limited in tactical options, 
during the negotiations they used every avenue at their disposal to form alliances and 
split support for the EC negotiators who appeared tentative at times, because even 
though the EC negotiators were confident as to their mandate, they were not oblivious 
of the power of public suasion and the parliamentary influences on the directions of the 
negotiations. The CARIFORUM complained heavily against the approach to the 
negotiations being pursued by the EC during the process, and relied on key players in 
the European Parliament and the “court” of public opinion to keep the EC negotiators in 
check21. 
                                                        
21 Interview‐ Sam Chandler, Barbados, June 10, 2009. 
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Methodology and definition of scope of research 
The scope of the study covers the early period of the relations between the ACP States 
and the EC beginning with the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 up to the recently 
concluded CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement with the European 
Community, 2008. 
The collection of data and information was done through structured and unstructured 
interviews to include taped face to face and telephone interviews, questionnaires. Also 
research of primary and secondary material to include electronic sources.  
Further, the Author of this document was involved in monitoring the negotiations for the 
EPAs since the launch in 2002 at the all ACP level, first in the capacity of advisor to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Jamaica between 2001-2002 and later 
in the Senate of Jamaica with speaking portfolio in the area of trade, justice and general 
governance issues. The Author also followed the negotiations closely while serving as a 
diplomat at the Jamaican High Commission in London, United Kingdom where his 
responsibilities included, but not limited to developing commercial links and businesses 
opportunities through the Jamaica Diaspora and the wider British business interests.  
The questionnaire used as part of the field work were designed not only to capture the 
knowledge and views of those persons from the Caribbean who were involved in the 
early negotiations for Lomé and the recently concluded Economic Partnership 
Agreement, but also journalist, members of civil society, academics and persons from 
the business and commercial sectors throughout the CARIFORUM regions and to a 
lesser extent, the wider ACP and Europe.22 
                                                        
22 For details of persons interviewed see bibliography.  
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A qualitative method of analysis is applied to the data and information in determining 
findings and presentation of arguments in the context of the theoretical considerations. 
The analysis of responses from interviews and paper based research indicate the 
following findings which are the basis of the arguments in support of the thesis. 
Firstly, it is the commonly held view that ACP-EC partnership which stated in 1963 
under the first Yaoundé Agreement and continued through Yaoundé ll (1969-75), the 
Arusha Agreement (1969) Lomé l-lV (1975-2000), Cotonou Agreement (2000-2007) and 
the current Economic Partnership Agreements was never an equal one23. As if in a 
paternalistic and gratuitous manner the absence of progress in other international trade 
arenas was used by the Europeans as an argument against the ACP by consistently 
reminding them of the unique position they enjoyed under the EEC24.  
The two first agreements were never really negotiated instead they were handed down 
as part of the colonial arrangements with France and the EEC for its former Colonies 
and the Overseas Territories and Countries25 as negative diplomacy was encouraged 
and embraced by the Francophone African States. However, while not discounting the 
value of the unequal nature of the relative economic strength of the EC in the 
relationship, some argue from a Sovereign Political position that there is equality at all 
levels26.The theoretical strength of the argument is that the sovereign cannot be made 
                                                        
23 Interview– Junior Lodge, November 11, 2008. WTO Geneva.  Ambassador Owen Singh, London, UK 
May13,2009,  P J Patterson March 3,2009, Kingston, Jamaica,  Sir Alister McIntyre, Nov.14,2008, Kingston, 
Jamaica, K. D. Knight, Nov. 14,2008, Kingston, Jamaica, 
 
24C. H. KirkPatrick   “Lomé I” Journal of World Trade Law Vol. 14. No. 4. (July –August 1980) p. 392. 
 
25 Interviews‐ PJ Patterson March3, 2009 & Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 8, 2009. 
26  From the interviews conducted, a significant percentage of respondents (80+ %) have held the view that 
the long standing partnership between the ACP States and the EU has not been equal. The following 
respondents share such views: P.J Patterson, Sir Shirdath Ramphal, Sir Alister McIntyre, K.D Knight, Dr. 
Marshall Hall, Dr. Kusha Haraksingh, Prof. Norman Girvan, Anthony Hylton, David Prendergast, Ambassador 
Derrick Heaven, Ambassador Owen Singh, Ambassador Edwin Laurant, David Jessup, Gregory Downes, Junior 
Lodge, Dame Billie Miller, Branford Isaacs, Carl Grenidge, Mr. Greyory Downs, Ambassador Errol Humphrey, 
Clement Imbert, David Hayles, Ricky Singh, Greg Lockley, Phillip Williams, Nan Persaud, Ambassador Ellen 
Bogle, Joel Richards, Dav‐Evnan Kowlessar,, Sam Chandler, Ambassador Henry Gill, Dr. Anthony Gonzalves, 
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to negotiate and it will exercise the sovereign right whether to negotiate. This fine, but 
important distinction underscores the political question of sovereignty, however that 
view seemingly rests in the narrow confines of the theoretical foundations of state 
relations, but as was pointed out and argued by many respondents, the realist views 
prevail at all times when dealing with the cut and thrust of international trade 
negotiations, where the need to advance and protect the vital interest of each party is 
paramount. Therefore, it seems that for ACP States, their equality in a sense seemingly 
rest only in the power of their  numbers at the multilateral level 27and nowhere else. 
There are three main dimensions to the relationship namely; trade and economic 
cooperation; political dialogue and development cooperation. But, while the EC is the 
more powerful partner in all spheres of the relationship, the Cotonou Agreement seems 
to have infused some balance and provided legal certainty as to the future of the 
relationship. It ensured to some extent that “the relationship is not one of dominance but 
partnership among unequal partners”28. 
The general view across a wide spectrum of the respondents is that colonial attitudes 
are evident on both sides, because while the EU is inclined to assist the ACP due to its 
colonial linkages, with the expansion of its membership, the weight of the colonial 
affinity has been dwindling. However, some ACP States seemingly remain captivated 
within a colonial mindset while Europe has moved on. The quality of the relationship 
and the wider ACP’s approach to it is evidenced by their expectation of European 
political leadership to hold on to a non-reciprocal trade arrangements which the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Ambassador Fredrico Cuello, Neville Tataram, Achille BASSILEKIN III, Mrs Hélène Massan FIAGAN and Dr. 
Henry Jeffry, Those who took the view that the partnership was equal are in the  minority, these  include the 
follows: Mr Viwanou GNASSOUNOU, Elsa Fenet, John Caloghiro, Americo Beviglia Zampetti,Thomas Millar 
while Nigel Durant and   Mr Morgan GITHINJI argued both sides.         
         
27 Carrington, Edwin: “The ACP Group and its future in the wider international context”. The Courier No.93 
(September – October, 1985) p.73.  NOTE. The ACP States and other developing countries banned in Seattle in 
1999 and again in Cancun, 2003 to stop the developed countries in their efforts to move the trade agenda at 
the multilateral level which would not have benefit the developing countries. 
28 Interview‐ Junior Lodge, November,11, 2008. 
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Europeans never wanted  in the first place, but acceded to the demands of the ACP 
States in light of the prevailing global political economy of the early to mid 1970s. 
For example, most ACP countries still export raw materials to Europe that are then 
processed into high value agricultural products, garments or capital equipment. After 
more than 300 years of trade, the Caribbean exports of rum is still dominated by bulk 
rum supplies which is then mixed with other rums, bottled and sold in Europe where the 
economic value is captured by EU based firms. Similarly, the ACP sugar industry is 
dominated by the production of raw sugar which is shipped to the EU where the refining 
capacity resides. By the same token, Caribbean sugar refining capacity is rather very  
limited or indeed, non-existing. This is due in part to some inherent contradictions of the 
Lomé and Cotonou preferences; because all non-agricultural ACP exports attracted 
duty-free in order to encourage diversification of exports but ACP agricultural exports 
cannot compete due to the EU’s above world market prices for sugar caused by the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Therefore, to export refined sugar to Europe under Lomé 
was not encouraged. 
On the issue of ACP cohesiveness and solidarity, it is the view that the arrangements 
with the EU to negotiate the EPA with the ACP States in regions have impacted the 
ACP cohesiveness, unity and solidarity in some material respects. This seems to be an 
unassailable argument which is rarely challenged because what the EPAs have done is 
to remove the cover from the veneer of ACP solidarity in that while the EPAs were 
designed with the objective of promoting ACP regional integration, a number of ACP 
regional configurations did not make economic sense29. For example, SADC included 
Tanzania a country that was part of a customs union (EAC) with two other countries that 
were negotiating as part of ESA. 
 Part of the problems which the EPA negotiations have exposed is an intellectual 
currency which left some ACP States not fully appreciative as to the extent that trade 
                                                        
29 Interview‐ Junior Lodge. November,1, 2008. 
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negotiations with a powerful partner that is also a major donor can in fact become a 
powerful factor in implementing the requisite economic policy reform necessary which 
the recipient beneficiary may not be either ready or indeed equipped to implement. For 
example, in the case of the CARIFORUM, the region is split between CARICOM States 
and the Democratic Republic  both of which are joined by an FTA that remained in a 
comatose state. While, the Bahamas remains outside of the CSME, but is a Member of 
CARICOM. So also, there is the CARICOM-DR Free trade Agreement which has not 
been implemented and the OECS which is a regional sub-group of the CARICOM which 
benefits from special and differential arrangements under the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. This there will makes it very difficult for the region to implement the EPA. 
Notwithstanding its own challenges the CARIFORUM Group made several attempts at 
technical, ambassadorial and Ministerial levels aimed at developing common 
negotiating strategy or sharing intelligence and analysis among ACP regions. However, 
the unwieldy number of the ACP Group made this challenging.30 The disconnect was 
long in coming, because it is the view that  too often the Caribbean’s engagement with 
the ACP was mired in the other Group’s determination to revisit the philosophical basis 
of the EPA negotiations as adumbrated in the Cotonou Agreement. The Caribbean 
region had to take a more pragmatic view because they had endured an FTAA 
experience that served as a powerful reminder that the philosophical tenets of trade 
relations between developed and developing countries were being altered in large 
measures. 
It has been long held, but open secret that the EPA negotiations merely exposed 
existing cracks within the ACP that were always there. For example, the Group spent 
one year trying to maintain a cloak of unity vis-a-vis the EC, while there were some 
regions which wanted to start negotiations early these being: the ECOWAS (West 
Africa) and CEMAC (Central Africa) even though as events unfolded they were the ones 
                                                        
30  Interview‐ Carl Greenidge, June 22, 2009.Bridgetown Barbados. 
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where negotiations had been the slowest. It is further suggested that the Europeans had 
gleaned that the ACP Group was not united during the all ACP phase which created the 
opportunity for the EC to bring the negotiation to an early end without the ACP 
achieving the desired framework agreement. 
It is now a settled position that the Uruguay Round of GATT which instituted the WTO 
has seriously exposed the vulnerability of ACP economies in global trade. However 
notwithstanding the existence of the trade arrangements between the ACP and the EC, 
European  in negotiating GATT/WTO acted in its own self interest31 and understandably 
so32. The EC seeking a reciprocal trading arrangement with the ACP while the ACP 
wanted to keep the colonial trade relationship that was built on non-reciprocal market 
access. However, every new trade arrangement required a waiver from the WTO, a feat 
that proved increasingly more expensive to both preference recipient and preference 
granting Members. More importantly, both the CAP and EU made a collective 
assessment and concluded that unilateral preferences were not successful in 
addressing the supply side constraints of the poorer countries. This was the orthodoxy 
of the World Bank and some international donors and which also is enshrined in the 
WTO. In addition, the EC had an interested in exporting a model that was instrumental 
in its own economic development. Hence, one of the major focuses of EPA was to 
support ACP regional integration processes. 
The ACP States had placed no reliance on the EC to protect the integrity and future of 
Lomé Agreements with the ACP States during the negotiation of the Uruguay Round of 
                                                        
31 Interviews‐ : P.J Patterson, Sir Shirdath Ramphal, Sir Alister McIntyre, K. D Knight, Dr .Marshall Hall,Dr. 
Kusha Haraksingh, Prof. Norman Girvan, Anthony Hylton, David Prendergast, Ambassador Derrick Heaven, 
Ambassador Owen Singh, Ambassador Edwin Laurant, David Jessup, Gregory Downes, Junior Lodge, Dame 
Billie Miller, Branford Isaacs, Carl Grenidge, Mr. Greyory Downs, Ambassador Errol Humphrey, Clement 
Imbert, David Hayles, Ricky Singh, Greg Lockley, Phillip Williams, Nan Persaud, Ambassador Ellen Bogle, Joel 
Richards, Dav‐Evnan Kowlessar, Sam Chandler, Ambassador Henry Gill, Dr. Anthony Gonzalves, Ambassador 
Fredrico Cuello, Neville Tataram, Achille BASSILEKIN III, Mrs Hélène Massan FIAGAN and Dr. Henry Jeffry,  
Mr Viwanou GNASSOUNOU,Nigel Durant and  Mr. Morgan GITHINJI .            
          . 
32 Interviews‐ Elsa Fenet, John Caloghiro, Americo Beviglia Zampetti, and Thomas Millar also, Nigel Durant 
and Mr Morgan GITHINJI, PJ Patterson and Anthony Gonsalves shared the view that the EU had to protect its 
interest in respect the Major Trading Partners.                          
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GATT/WTO. But, in many ways the ACP States failed to protect their interest. They 
participated marginally during the negotiations hoping that there would be some special 
development provisions for developing countries from which they could benefit while 
keeping the preferential arrangements with Europe. Indeed, there had existed an 
ambitious idea which sprung- up during the negotiations in terms of a development 
agenda for the ACP Group. The idea of an all ACP trade zone was being considered 
arising from the Uruguay Rounds to make ACP industries more competitive, however 
with the imposition of conditionalities, this idea was stillborn33. Indeed, the imposition of 
conditionalities in the agreements which formed the basis of the relation between the 
ACP and the EC further explains the degree of imbalances in the relationship. So Also, 
the Aid package was always a main feature of the relationship with Europe. However, 
since the fall of the Soviet Union, a system of structured conditionality   in aid policy34 
has been implemented by the EC for developing countries. The ACP States having 
committed themselves under the WTO could do very little to protect and advance the 
integrity and preservation of the Lomé or Cotonou Agreements under the GATT/ WTO 
Regime35. They had committed to follow the rules of the WTO and adhere to the broad 
tenets of GATT. This was as essential feature of the waiver from the WTO which the EC 
received at the November 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha. Under the terms of that 
waiver (from Article I of the GATT), both the EC and ACP committed themselves to 
have a WTO compliant trade regime in place by 1st January, 2008. This WTO waiver 
                                                        
33 Interview‐ Ambassador Achille  Bassilekin III, May 5, 2009. Brussels. 
 
34 Matheson, James, ‘Institutional Capacity and Multiple Conditionality in ACP –EU Development’ (PhD. Thesis, 
London School of Economics, 1997) p.101. 
 
35 Interviews – Anthony Gonsalves &  Junior Lodge op. cit 
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was itself consistent with Article 37.1 of the Cotonou Agreement. Therefore, there was 
not much that could be undertaken to protect the  regime as both sides acknowledged 
that these arrangements were temporary. Further, having signed Cotonou, it was 
virtually inescapable that the life of the one- way preferential trade was compromised 
beyond redemption. Indeed, the ACP had sent a clear signal on this issue when they 
amended the  Georgetown Agreement in 200336.  
The CARIFORUM States had faced serious challenges during the negotiations, 
challenges of resources, both technical and financial, logistics and institutional. 
However, the biggest challenge was that of forging a common CARIFORUM position. 
For example, the region held 14 meetings of the Technical Working Group on Market 
Access during the period November 2004 to December 2008 all aimed at reaching a 
regional position. Furthermore, EPA represented a major shift from Lomé and Cotonou 
arrangements. This proved most challenging for the region’s political leadership and 
officials. The slow pace of implementation of CARIFORUM regional integration 
initiatives did not help in facilitating a  smooth negotiating process, as the region was 
unable to resist the EC’s arguments that it need to be more committed to the processes 
that the region itself had deigned but has failed to implement37.  
The success of the CARIFORUM States in negotiating the EPA can only be measured 
by the extent of the negotiating mandate. The mandate was to secure a trade and 
development agreement that would (a) support CARIFORUM regional integration 
processes while respecting the region’s sovereign choices; (b) secure special and 
differential treatment that protects sensitive domestic production and government 
receipts; (c) secure long-term EU developmental assistance in order to adjust 
                                                        
36 See Appendix lll for the full text of the amended Georgetown Agreement. 
 
37 Interview‐ Junior Lodge, November 11, 2008. 
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Caribbean economies, advance competitiveness and be able to implement the 
Agreement in a pro-developmental manner. 
While the CARICOM Secretariat did not play a lead role in the negotiations, it provided 
technical and diplomatic support. The secretariat had been an institutional member of 
the EPA College of Negotiators. Furthermore, the organization contributed four 
members of the 20 member college of negotiators who were alternate negotiators, but 
also as special advisor on Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). 
Furthermore, the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) was co-chaired by the 
regional Authorizing Officer. In addition, the negotiations were overseen by Council for 
Trade and Economic Development (COTED), Council for Finance and Planning 
(COFAP) and the CARICOM Heads of Government all institutions where the CARICOM 
Secretary-General also sits and gives advice.  
The data from the ACP Secretariat, Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
(CRNM), CARICOM Secretariat and the European Union are presented in format that 
does not address individual or country proposal in the main, but give the collective 
decisions. However, during the negotiation of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic 
Partnership Agreement, the actual discussions were kept quite confidential among the 
parties involved at the political level. Indeed, the political discussions at the level of the 
Heads of Government have remained classified and inaccessible to the public. The 
incumbent Heads of Government who participated in direct talks are excluded because 
of incumbency. Some of the political leadership that participated in the negotiations but 
who have since left office have been elusive. But the problem of access to the 
information has been overcome through access to submissions made to them by the 
principal negotiators and the directives provided to the technical negotiators as 
decisions taken by the political directorate. The interviews given by persons directly 
involved with the negotiations have also helped to elucidate an understanding of 
decisions taken at the political level. 
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It is quite early in the processes of implementation and the advances in the process are 
very slow. This phase of the agreement extends to the year 2033, and therefore is a 
work- in- progress. Many issues are still not yet settled and so very little information is 
available. The main institutions to oversee the implementation and management of the 
EPA have not yet convened. 
 Government official across the regions who were involved with the negotiation and are 
preparing the implementation phases are now more open to speak on some aspects of 
the negotiation and also the enormity of the implementation. So, apart from the 
published works of the CRNM, the literature on the negotiations and the implementation 
of the CARIFORUM EPA is very limited. Since the agreement has been signed all the 
signatory states have gone through the ratification processes. 
The research is primarily based on primary sources which are analysed subjectively in 
this regard therefore it became quite imperative to rely on secondary sources including 
opinions and insights from eminent personalities to supplement and provide the 
contextual framework to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the primary 
sources. These personalities who were involved with the negotiations both at the 
technical and policy levels had no interests to serve other than to seek to carve the very 
best deal they could for their respective states and regions. 
Contribution of research 
The study of CARIFORUM’s trade diplomacy with the EC contributes to the very limited 
academic work undertaken in this area of the region’s external relations. The work 
exposes an avenue for Caribbean academics and scholars to begin to examine more 
critically the empirical data presented in this thesis and encourage further scholarly work 
on the region’s commercial diplomacy. 
The research further contributes to knowledge by the application and adaptation of the 
theoretical models of negotiation and coalition bargaining in international negotiations 
and explains how the CARIFORUM States negotiated the Free Trade Agreement with 
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the EC by an adaptation of the classic bargaining theory in international negotiation 
where one state or a group of states involved in a negotiation posses superior power 
asymmetry.The theoretical premise outlined in the study draws on two approaches to 
negotiations, the cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining theories first expounded 
in the 1950’s  by John Nash as approaches to negotiations and coalition bargaining. 
The work also contributes to knowledge by analysing the ethical dimensions of trade 
negotiations and exposed for the first time in a practical way, how small developing 
countries can in fact negotiate trade agreements with more powerful states and use 
issues of ethics, moral authority and fairness to gain concessions from a more powerful 
state or group of states. 
John Nash(1950,1953), in explaining the cooperative approach, defined bargaining as a 
situation which is created when two or more parties have engaged with a possibility of 
concluding a mutually acceptable and beneficial agreement and the parties have sought 
to resolve conflicts of positions on the assumption that no agreement can be imposed. 
He premised that in non-cooperative bargaining, cooperation cannot be ensured and 
only through negotiations that an agreement can be reached38. It is argued that non-
cooperative bargaining among states are more in keeping with the realist approach to 
international relations. In this regard, the CARIFORUM States had to adopt a two tier 
approach to the negotiations. Firstly, it had to negotiate within the coalition at the 
regional level to secure consensus by applying the cooperative negotiating approach in 
order to minimise conflicts which could be used by Europe to split the coalition (Bernal 
2008) and then to adopt the non- cooperative approach to the negotiations with the EC.   
                                                        
38 Carrere, Carlo, Marchiniori and Sgobbi, Alessandra. ‘’Advances in Negotiation Theory”, World Bank working 
paper 3642, The World Bank Development Research Group. (June, 2005) p. 3. 
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But, there must be a desire to negotiate based on an anticipated outcome which 
precipitates proposals as the parties try to define difficulties and identify common 
interests Iklé (1964). Zartman (1975) shares the view that in the basic model 
negotiations, there is the conceptualization which leads to the setting of agenda, 
outlining of the issues and an exploration of positions in an effort to narrow the gaps and 
get convergences in order to form the basis of substantive agreement. 
The culture of the parties and to a lesser extent individual personalities are important in 
the process, though not operating at the same level of  knowledge based on their 
history of negotiating with each other (Brady 1991). However technical competences 
play a significant role in the process, so also is the issue of research and mastery of the 
facts and their implications to the outcome of an agreement, so constant thinking and 
reviewing of approaches is an indispensable aspect of the negotiating processes 
(Watson, 1982). In the EPA negotiations, both the EC & CARIFORUM States had a 
long history of negotiations between each side and their colonial experiences. Indeed, 
these were the very foundation of the negotiations in the first place.  
Negotiations at the Multilateral level are usually thwart  with protection of self interests 
which are in most cases conflicting and therefore trade negotiations are about 
protecting domestic markets while seeking to maximise access to the markets of others 
through the principle of bargaining leverages . Therefore in trade negotiations the 
objective is to seek to gain the most by giving up the least and in this regard power 
relations are very crucial to the outcome of the negotiations (Hirshman 1945 &Sutton 
1986). The side with the greatest bargaining leverage or the highest level of preference 
power is a defining element in the distributional out come(Wagner,1988). However, it is 
argued that the extent of bargaining leverage cannot be limited to the sheer  economic 
power of one side vis a- vis the other, because in the dynamics of negotiations 
economic power is tempered by the wider desire to promote other interests of a greater 
magnitude that the power leverage in the particular circumstances. In the CARIFORUM-
EC negotiations, the CARIFORUM States knew that Europe needed an agreement to 
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further its international agenda in promoting the   “Singapore issues” which no other 
group was willing to negotiate and the value these could achieve for them. Therefore, 
the opening up of the trade regimes to the idea that government procurement is the way 
of the future in trade and secondly, and that it is a value added to even small developing 
countries .It was very crucial that the EC made such break-through with a group that did 
not have the capacity nor market share to affect Europe’s domestic markets. This 
created the leverage which the CARIFORUM States used to get the EC to make 
concessions even in areas where they were very hard pressed because of domestic 
concerns and international implications. The CARIFORUM, by applying an adaptation of 
a combination of Nash’s and the Schelling’s models and the two- level  game theory 
expounded by Putman in international bargaining, explained the negotiating strategies 
of the CARIFORUM States and exposed their understanding of the region’s integration 
processes and a ‘two-sided’ domestic constraint. It challenges the assertions of Meunier 
(2007) and qualifies the conclusions of (Mgbere1994). In this regard,the work places the 
asymmetric problems of the CARIFORUM States in the context of their need for a 
desired outcome of the negotiations in the light of their national interests. It further 
argues the need for the EC to negotiate a new trade arrangement in keeping with the 
demands of its own domestic constituents and their wider international trade agenda.  
Finally, the study contributes to the research of the influence of the EC in international 
negotiations and refute the argument that the EC superior negotiating machinery and 
strength of its markets are secured vehicles to influence and impose its external trade 
policies on developing countries and further that the ACP States are reactive in  
character( Mgbere 1994).   
 
Assumptions and hypotheses 
Contemporary writers such as (Meunier (2007) argues that the EC strength in 
negotiating trade agreements rest on its superior negotiating teams supported by the 
strength and size of its markets.  
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The study is based on two assumptions and a hypothesis, which are tested by applying 
an adopted combination of the cooperative and non-cooperative models of bargaining 
theory. 
The assumptions are: 
(1) The EC decides what it wants from a negotiation and  imposes it’s positions on the 
other weaker party and 
(2) The relationship between the parties is characterised by opposing preferences and 
asymmetry in economic power relations. 
The study argues that notwithstanding the asymmetry between the parties, the EC 
negotiated an agreement in which the CARIFORUM States gained significant 
concession from the EC as pressure mounted for a conclusion within the stated 
deadlines. 
The hypothesis states that the influence of the EC on the negotiations increased as the 
agreed deadline for completion approached, while the test determines the extent to 
which the EC’s influenced the outcome of the negotiations by applying pressure towards 
the end and how the CARIFORUM use that pressure to gain concessions from Europe.  
The guiding literature on this aspect of the negotiations of the CARIFORUM-EC 
Partnership Agreement is very limited, except for official documents and statements 
from both sides, reports of meeting and interviews given.   
Arrangement of the study  
Chapter One: Growth and development of ACP-EC Trade Diplomacy. This covers: 
Introduction, European Colonial Interests and Part 1V of the Treaty of Rome, British 
Interests and its accession to the Treaty of Rome, Africa preparing to negotiate with 
Europe, West Indian first attempt at organising, The establishment of CARIFESTA and 
CARICOM, The Caribbean engaging the African and Pacific States, Final preparation 
for the negotiations with the EEC, Negotiating the Lomé Convention 1973-1975, 
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Formulating the Institutional Framework of the ACP, Establishment of the Lomé 
Regime, Cotonou and the Dismantling of the Lomé Regime and Conclusion. 
Chapter Two: Negotiating the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement. This 
covers: 
Introduction, Establishment of the CARIFORUM Group of States, All ACP Launch 
September 2002, CARIFORUM Regional Launch April, 2004, Structure of negotiations: 
Ministerial, Principal negotiator and subject specific negotiators, Mandates, 
Divergences, The negotiating processes, The commencement and phases (1) 
Establishing priorities, (2) Convergence on strategic regional approach to regional 
integration (3) Structuring and consolidating the EPA and finalisation of agreed draft 
agreement, Initialling and final signing of the Agreement and Conclusion. 
Chapter Three:  A critical analysis of the provisions of the Economic Partnership 
Agreement. This covers: 
Introduction, Reviews of the main provisions of the Agreement in the context of Free 
Trade Agreement and discuss the merits and potential difficulties of these provisions, 
Cooperation for development, Trade and trade related matters to include: trade in 
goods, investment, services and e-Commerce, Current Payments and Capital 
movements, Competition, Public Procurement, Intellectual Property, Public 
Procurement, Dispute Avoidance and Settlement, The Institutional Provisions and 
Conclusion. 
Chapter Four: Addresses the problems of implementing the EPA. This covers: 
Introduction, Review of the implementation processes and analyses of the main 
challenges to the implementation of the EPA to include capacity building and 
adjustments, custom measures, regional integration and the Caribbean Single Market 
and Economy (CSME), Harmonization of Competition Policies, building regional 
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institutions, the role of the Regional Trade Court (CCJ) and Recommendations for 
implementing the Agreement. 
Chapter Five: Assesses  the Ethical Issues in the Negotiations of the EPA. This covers: 
Introduction, Exploration of the ethical issues arising from the negotiations, Involvement 
of NGOs’ and Private sector interests, the EC stance and strategies, fairness and  
respect for the principles of Sovereignty and Conclusion. 
Conclusions. This covers: Review of the arguments, findings, assumptions and 
hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
The Growth and Development of CARIFORUM-EC Commercial Diplomacy and 
Trade Relations 
1.1 Introduction 
The CARIFORUM-EC diplomatic and trade relations have their foundations in the early 
European colonial expansion and its underlying political economy and mercantile 
system of trade which are the embodiment of the Part lV of Treaty of Rome.  The 
relationship has traversed and is intertwined with the establishment of the Africa 
Caribbean and Pacific group of States (ACP) under the Lomé Regime of 1975. 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome has preserved the colonial linkages between Europe and 
its former Colonies. The inclusion of those colonies into the Treaty created the opening 
for the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969 between the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the newly independent Francophone African States. The Lomé 
conventions, Cotonou Agreement and the current Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA) are successors to the Yaoundé Conventions. The CARIFORUM States 
diplomatic and trade relations with the European Union (EU) are the outcome of 
France’s intervention which gave rise to Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and so the 
relationship is therefore a creature of historical and mercantile trappings. 
The ramification of France’s intervention and insistence to have its Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCTs) included in the Treaty Of Rome is the alignment of the 
contextual framework of the major post World War II developments that undergird the 
global political economy and trade architecture which have facilitated the viability of the 
European System as a policy making and enforcement institution. The alignment 
exposed two parts. 
Firstly, external linkages to the United Nations(UN) and the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF),the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD- World Bank), and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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(GATT)  to which, all of  the original six signatory States of the Treaty of Rome  
subscribed  and the roles the latter three institutions played in facilitating the Lomé 
regime in the first instance and also in the eventual demise of that System and 
secondly, the internal linkages which inextricably bound the economies of the African 
States to the economic structures of the European mercantile system.  
During the discussions to set up these global governance institutions, none of the 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) of France or any of the European powers 
participated as those countries and territories had no competence in international law. 
The United Nations (UN) was established to preserve world peace and stability through 
dialogue and joint action, a further remit of the United Nation (UN) was to usher the new 
era of decolonization, beginning with India and Pakistan39 while the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has responsibility to oversee the global financial system and its 
sister organization the (World Bank) was to undertake reconstruction and development. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has the responsibility for ordering 
the global trade regime.  
In light of these development and the various nationalist political liberation movements 
which were gaining currency in the colonies, France wanted to hold on its colonies by 
extending Associate Membership of the European Community (EC) to them at the very 
last moments of the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. It is further contended that the 
establishment of Part IV was a hurriedly assembled instrument created for the specific 
and singular purpose of the French Colonial interests, which   has now evolved and 
come to be used by Europe to incorporate other developing countries.  
The purposes for the extension of the Part 1V Regime in 1969 was firstly, to engage  
and facilitate British entry into the EEC40, a political policy decision that had 
consequences not just for the political configuration of African economies, but also 
                                                        
39  Pakistan  gained  political  independence  from  Britain  on  the  14th  August,  1947,  one  day  before  India. 
 
40 Schiffman, Charles: A Negotiation and a Convention. The Courrier No. 31, Special issue (March 1975), 3.  
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those of the Caribbean and the Pacific States in the EC’s development mechanisms. 
These decisions were taken in a manner reminiscent of how the World came to be 
divided under the Treaty of Tordesillas in 149441 and secondly, to quell old rivalries 
among European colonial powers which had existed for many centuries which was been 
played out in the first stages of Britain’s application to join the EEC.  
The manner in which Part IV of the Treaty of Rome was created and then extended is a 
classic case of how existing colonial attitudes had been transported into a reconstructed 
global political, economic and trade landscape. The instrument of Part 1V of the Treaty 
of Rome became the substratum of the political economy of the ACP States and hence 
an integral part of their current difficulties, because the Treaty of Rome in its wider trade 
contextual frame work falls within the governance structure of the GATT regime. In 
essence therefore, as Europe evolved so did it impacted the GATT/WTO regime, and 
as the global trade structure and institution evolved the ACP States have been 
impacted.  
It seems that Part IV of the Treaty of Rome was conveniently used as a response to 
create a development policy for former European colonies, thereby extending the 
instrument to cover the type of cooperation for which it was never designed or intended. 
So, as Europe grew in stature, confidence and sophistication, it reformed and build its 
economies and internal markets while creating a large network of bilateral trade and 
cooperation agreement with other developing countries using under Part 1V of the 
Treaty while whittling away at the Lomé regime, quite cognisant of their experiences 
and the quality of the regime, its implementation and the process that brought the 
parties together in 1975. Lomé had never been consistent with Europe trade design and 
the direction in which Europe had wanted to go with its former colonies in the first place, 
but for the insistence of France for its own self interests. 
                                                        
41 The Treaty of Tordesillas divided the New World in two geographic zones by decree of Pope Alexander 1V 
on May 4th 1494 by establishing an imaginary line running North to South through the middle of the Atlantic 
that divided the East and West. Spain took possession of all unclaimed land to the West of the line and 
Portugal took possession of lands to the East. 
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The Lomé regime was created in 1975 with both sides quite cognizant as to what each 
was trying to achieve. So, Europe conceded to the demands of the ACP States 
reluctantly but soon after, it systematically started to whittle away at what it had 
originally offered in Lomé given the existing threats to the geopolitical and global 
economy between 1973 and 1975. For Europe, Lomé was always a temporary 
arrangement and a “window” of opportunity for the ACP States to adjust their 
economies and determine their course of development while guaranteeing Europe’s 
source of raw material and energy and markets for its manufactured products. 
The ACP States also had their own global agenda to use the Lomé regime as a “litmus” 
to advance its cause for the re ordering of the existing global economic and trade 
regimes. So, while the 1980s was a period when the process of Europe’s reclamation 
commenced with the debt crises coupled with the failure of United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to resolve the trade issues for which it was 
established, the launch of the Uruguay Round of GATT coupled with the United States 
opposition to the Third world initiatives to re order the global economic structures   
sounded the “death knell” of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The 
ascendance of the Washington consensus and the introduction of conditionalties 
through the IMF and World Bank followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, allowed 
Europe to seize the first real political opportunity to revamp the Lomé regime and 
created another regime more reflective of the new Europe and its global reach.  
So, by the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the completion of the reform of 
the European internal market, coupled with the establishment of the new GATT/WTO 
regime, the Lomé regime had effectively ended. Europe over time had moved on and 
Lomé had served its purposes and a new relationship had to reflect the conditions and 
thinking of the reformed Europe. Therefore, WTO Ministerial42 in Seattle in1999, failed 
to reach consensus to liberalise world trade for the Millennium Round of trade 
negotiations. So, Europe, in 2000 replaced the Lomé regime with the Cotonou 
                                                        
42 Seattle Ministerial held November 29th to December 4th, 1999. 
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Agreement43. This new Convention sought to align European external trade policy with 
the GATT/WTO, a global regime in which processes and development had very little to 
do with the input of the ACP States notwithstanding their larger numbers in the 
Organisation. This alignment is consistent with where Europe had intended to go with 
the principles of reciprocity when it negotiated Lomé in 1975.  
Twenty-five years after the establishment of the Lomé Regime, the ACP States had 
been effectively circumvented and North-South relations took on new dimensions and 
direction as the Doha Development Round of GATT/WTO was launched. Therefore, the 
processes by which Europe got the ACP States to commence negotiations for the 
Economic Partnership Agreements within regions of the ACP Group have exposed the 
fundamental character of the Lomé regime as a temporary measure more in the order of 
a holding position which explains the construction of the regime as a trade “pause” 
diplomatically crafted for its time. This, it is argued, is the essence of the long-term 
effect of Part lV of the Treaty of Rome, an instrument which was designed specifically 
for the purposes of French colonial interests, but later extended to the ACP State at 
their insistence without any meaningful change to its original construct. Part IV of the 
Treaty of Rome was never intended to foster industrialisation of the South and has 
therefore not done so. 
This Chapter analyses the development of ACP–EC diplomatic and trade relations in 
the context of the architecture of European political economy through an examination of 
the economic, historical, ideological and legal underpinnings. The focus is not to argue 
the contents of the various conventions, but instead to critically examine the 
fundamental construct of the Lomé regime in its contextual and conceptual framework, 
its merits, processes and weaknesses.  
Further, to argue the regime as part of the preserve of Europe’s political economy and 
global profile which remained the cornerstone of the relationship and to make the case 
                                                        
43 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between ACP States and the European Union was signed in Cotonou, 
Benin 0n the 23rd of June 2000. It replaced the Lomé Convention.  
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that the Declaration of Intent 1963 was a politically calculated initiative designed to end 
the vestiges of the Yaoundé model, but instead has served to extend them to the British 
in the main and by extension to other European Countries as a short-term response to 
move the EEC processes forward. And also, to highlight how the ACP States, but more 
particularly, Anglophone Africa and the Caribbean States took advantage of those 
calculations, to question Europe’s role in international trade and development 
cooperation and further to pressure Europe into embracing an agenda born out of their 
desire to redress the imbalances in the global economic architecture which was 
designed to benefit the North and to preserve the status quo.  
Additionally, to argue the extent to which the principles of mutual respect, fairness, 
solidarity and equality in partnership were evident in the exchanges and responses to 
the Lomé regime, which was unprecedented and bold, but  a convenient trade ‘pause’ 
which is now spent and finally to explain the characteristics of the regime as a ‘pause”, 
suited and diplomatically crafted for its time. The agreement was meant to change the 
level of inequities of the past through cooperation and mutual dependence44. But has 
failed in those regards. 
The chapter addresses the relationship in two phases. Firstly, the early years and argue 
the impact of colonial interests and attitudes on the outcome of the negotiations, ACP’s 
preparation and the negotiations of the first Lomé Convention emphasizing the 
emergence of Caribbean diplomacy and its contribution to the establishment of the ACP 
group, its cohesiveness, solidarity and unity. Secondly, the Lomé regime, its 
philosophical construct, intent, and actual implementation and argues the rise and fall of 
the regime within the power dynamics of Europe’s internal transformation and the global 
political economy and trading system. 
 
                                                        
44 Patterson, P.J ‘Major challenges face the ACP” The Courier No.93 (September – October, 1985) p.79.   
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1.2 European colonial interests and Part 1V of the Treaty of Rome      
Articles 131-136 under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome established the Associated status 
for the Overseas Countries and Territories of Belgium, France and Italy.  These articles, 
when read in conjunction with the enabling intent of Article 238 of the Treaty which 
empowers the community to enter arrangements with third countries or unions or union 
of states or international organizations creating Associations with reciprocal rights and 
obligations. 
France argued for the inclusion of the OCTs because of the following reasons; (1) a 
central theme of the model is that it treaded the OCTs as part of France and its 
Caribbean Territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe as overseas departments. The 
inhabitants of these territories were seen as French and (2) the OCTs were excluded 
from trading outside the Franc Zone which was a protected area against foreign 
competition. So important was France’s interest in its colonies and former colonies that 
it pressed for their inclusion in the Treaty of Rome as a quid pro quo for its signature45.  
Three years after the establishment of the EEC the decolonization process provided for 
under Charter of the United Nations to which the six signatories of the EEC had 
subscribed took a quantum leap and French colonial holdings began to be impacted. 
Britain which at the time was not a member of the EEC had by then started to give up 
her colonial holdings commencing with Pakistan and India. A wind of anti-colonial and 
imperial domination was blowing through Africa in which Dr. Kwame Nkrumah46 played 
a key role in achieving political independence for Ghana from Britain in 1957. That 
experience opened the window of possibility for Independence movements in other 
                                                        
45Akosa, Mabel, Ogechukwu, ‘The Diplomacy of the ACP States in their relations with the EEC 1972‐1980’. 
(PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1985) p. 21. 
 
46 Dr Kwane Nkrumah was a leading Proponent of Pan‐Africanism and a critic of Colonial Europe and 
Imperialism. He became President of Ghana in 1952. 
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African Countries, so Nigeria followed in 1960 and the nationalist movement continued 
spreading across Africa and into the Caribbean47. The French Colonial Empire had 
been seriously threatened48 and by extension its economy and trade arrangements.  
1.3 British  accession to the Treaty of Rome  
While six European States went ahead and established the EEC, Britain which held 
over two thirds of the existing colonial territories globally, did not see itself as part of 
Continental Europe and was not involved in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome. 
Britain felt that it could rely on the Sterling area to rebuild is economy. Britain had the 
Commonwealth which predated the Treaty of Rome, but it was beset by problem. South 
Africa, had threatened that if Ghana was allowed to join the Commonwealth after 
independence it would withdrew membership. That threat was challenged by the other 
African Commonwealth States which by then had grown in numbers. It was South Africa 
instead which suffered as its application to re-enter the Commonwealth had to be 
withdrawn in light of very strident opposition at the Commonwealth Conference in 
196149. 
Britain’s decision to join the EEC under Harold MacMillan’s government came shortly 
after. It had been a commonly held view that the Government’s decision to take Britain 
into the EEC was precipitated on the power base of independent African States that had 
began to influence decisions in the organisation50. Whether Britain’s application to join 
the EEC was in fact based on Commonwealth issues or on matters of economics, the 
decision to look to Europe was destined to create some dislocation both in Europe itself 
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and among its former and existing colonies. Prime Minister MacMillan assessed the 
problem when he observed that the issue was not one as between the Commonwealth 
and the Community but how to reconcile the institution of the Commonwealth with the 
new and expanding Europe. Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, being the only two 
independent Commonwealth States in the Caribbean at that time had opposite views on 
the issue. While, Trinidad and Tobago supported Britain’s entry into the EEC as Dr. Eric 
Williams felt that the initiative would benefit the region, however, Alexander Bustamante 
of Jamaica was not in favour as he felt that the Commonwealth would be hurt by the 
move51. 
The creation of Part IV has remained a source of problems for the EEC from its 
inception as its intent is indicative of French Colonial thinking and protectionist policy 
approach to external trade. Indeed, because the regime was crafted with French 
colonial interests predominantly, as the EEC expanded its development policy the 
purposes of the Part IV instrument seemed to have shifted but without coherence. 
Europe had become so accustomed to using the instrument of Part IV quite selectively 
and at will, to either include   or exclude whichever Sate or group of States it saw fit, for 
example, it excluded the Asian Commonwealth Countries on the occasion of Britain’s 
application to join the EEC. However, under the United Kingdom Treaty of Accession, 
Asian Commonwealth countries were not offered association in a declaration of intent of 
the EEC, they were given the assurance that the EEC would be ready to seek 
appropriate solution for their problems which may arise in the field of trade. This, it is 
argued was in keeping with the EEC’s attempt at initiating a common aid policy vis-à-vis 
the whole Third World52.  
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 This instrument was not designed for countries with competitive manufacturing base as 
the EEC and so would not be extending it to aid development through industrialization53. 
The British Model of Colonialism however, had some marked differences from that 
maintained by the French in that  the British saw their colonies as mere suppliers of raw 
material and consumers of British goods and services and were never made part of the 
metropolitan arrangements. In short, the relationship was one of convenience54, Britain 
and France had been great European rivals well over centuries, the major World Wars 
did not resolve the issues of their cultural and historical divergences in outlook. Those 
divergences have accounted for Britain’s original absence from the negotiations for the 
Treaty of Rome and were alive even at the eventual Accession and Membership of the 
EEC. France had vetoed Britain’s first two Applications to accede to the treaty in the 
early 1960s. It took Britain almost a decade to Join the EEC and only did so with the full 
support and collective activism of the other five signatory States, which had manifestly 
decided to end France’s manipulation on the occasion of the signing of Yaoundé II in 
1969 by implementing the terms of their 1963 Declaration of Intent. 
So, after the conclusion of Yaoundé II the other five European State made the 
acceptance of their intent and willingness to extend the agreement or other similar 
instrument to other developing countries with the similar economies a quid pro quo for 
their signature55. 
They had effectively encircled France which gave in to their demands, so even before 
Yaoundé II was ratified by them, the six Member State of the EC at their summit on 
December 2, 1969 in the Hague, unanimously agreed to resume negotiations for 
Britain’s accession. The Yaoundé II which was signed in 1969 had a life of five years 
and would expire in 1973, so was the Arusha Convention. By the time Britain’s 
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application was accepted, the European agenda which Britain had elected to follow 
meant some changes had to occur in respects of its trading arrangements with former 
colonies.  
The reverberation of the decision of the Hague summit was felt throughout the British 
Commonwealth of Nations and the urgency to act was self explanatory, particularly for 
countries of the Caribbean which were all too aware that the Europe’s real interests 
loomed largely in Africa’s minerals and energy sources, and with only rum and sugar in 
the offing, the interests of the Caribbean region could be threatened. The stage had 
therefore been set to create new relations, a challenge the Caribbean had to accept.56  
The Hague decision also exposed two intrinsic but diametrically opposed elements of 
Protocol 27 of the Treaty of Rome, namely its merits and weaknesses. Because, while 
the Yaoundé and Arusha Agreements were made at a time when Britain was not party 
to the Treaty, the power dynamics of the internal arrangements of the EEC had 
changed and new considerations had to be confronted.  
The problems were many and intricately bound with the historical relations lasting many 
centuries which could not be simply rearranged. For example; the size of British colonial 
expanse and its potential impact on EC’s internal market and budget ,so also the need 
to address concerns which surfaced throughout France’s earlier efforts in frustrating 
Britain’s attempt to join the EEC, there the newly independent Anglophone States 
particularly Nigeria never sought to  embrace Europe even after the 1963 Declaration of 
Intent57. 
The impact on preferential arrangement under Yaoundé was also a problem because 
even before the second Yaoundé Agreement was ratified by some African States, 
another milestone in the world trade regime was pressing upon Europe and in response 
Europe introduced the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in July 1971 on 
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certain manufactured goods. That development, coupled with the gradual duty reduction 
under GATT beginning with the Dillon and followed by the Kennedy Round of 1964 had 
begun to impact the privileges granted under the Yaoundé regime. These were issues 
which affected the stability of the political economy of Europe in the context of its 
internal arrangements and also its global responsibility for which it had contracted to 
cooperate and therefore obliged to respond. 
Britain’s policy had by then become focused in the industrialized world. This new focus 
meant that North-North relations had priority over North-South, as Britain had by then 
came to accept and believed that its future rested with Europe and not in their former 
colonial empire. However, there were residual issues which had to be addressed as part 
of the way forward on both sides of the economic and geo-political divide. 
The South came to realize that the “umbilical cord” that bound the relationship could not 
be severed neither contemporaneously nor permanently, but can only be adjusted over 
time for the relationship to begin to bear some semblances of fairness, mutual respect, 
solidarity and the preservation of the right of self-determination as expressed under the 
Charter of the United Nations while demanding equality in partnership for international 
cooperation.  
British policies towards the developing South became short-term and was crisis 
determined58, because with a declining empire and domestic problems of 
reconstruction, Britain had to rely on special but not sustainable arrangements with its 
former colonies for its market outlets. But as in the case of France it could not afford to 
relent on those markets built up over centuries, even upon entry into the ECC. The 
protection of British external markets and domestic economy was vital. So, both Britain 
and France wanted to protect their markets  through the egis of the economic and legal 
construct of the Treaty of Rome by holding onto aspects of their past, while 
contemporary Europe was looking to protect its markets against the wider transatlantic 
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threats. There were underlying differences and uncertainties within the ranks of the 
Membership of the EEC with respect to a forward strategy in light of the existing policy 
paradigms. The level of unity within the group was suspect and uncertainties prevailed.  
It appeared that neither Britain, France nor the EEC itself had any clear vision or firm 
strategies to harness and drive the shift in their policies towards the former colonies 
mainly in Africa in light of the African responses, political profiling and expressions of 
the political leadership of the 1960s, particularly among the newly independent 
Anglophone countries. So Europe also, as in the case of the African and the Caribbean 
was searching for a way forward.  
Therefore, while the problems of Europe in relation to Africa in the new dispensation of 
political independence was to recalibrate the old colonial template of trade relations and 
in the changing order to suit its agenda, the Africans were organizing, planning and 
searching to determine and define a way forward and a mechanisms to rebuild Africa for 
the benefit of Africans within the global economic super structure which they had come 
to realize was not designed to benefit their development. It is argued that with matters of 
trade reform being stymied in UNCTAD and the United States showing interest in Latin 
America, Africa and the Caribbean had to advance their cause through the only viable 
course opened to them to impact changes in the global trade architecture by looking to 
their former colonial masters. Indeed, the Lomé negotiations then were the only “show 
in town”59.  The Caribbean however was concerned that the region would be left behind 
if it failed to join with the African States. Therefore, their first objective was to unite the 
Caribbean and then work with the African States to unite them and then as a united 
body of African and Caribbean State they would be better able to confront Europe60. 
Both the ACP States and the EEC were now on a collision course in circumstances that 
could possibly bring an outcome which neither Europe, neither Africa nor the Caribbean 
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could safely predict. It was Europe, not Africa which had to find a way to stave that 
pending confrontation. It is within this contextual framework, that the Lomé regime 
provided a well needed and welcomed respite for Europe to stave such possible 
confrontation and saved its industries from collapse as they depended heavily on raw 
material, energy sources and mineral resources from Africa mainly and to a lesser 
extent the Caribbean and the Pacific States61. Indeed, during the negotiations for Lomé 
I, then British Minister in charge of trade approached the Caribbean delegation and the 
Chief negotiator for the sugar protocol, seeking re assurances that the ACP would 
protect supplies of sugar to the British factories at a time when world market prices were 
very favourable to exporters and there were major shortages of the product across 
Britain62.  
The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) oil price increases of 
1973-1974 and the subsequent recession which occurred at the time of the negotiation 
coupled with the threats of formation of Commodity Cartels merely exacerbated the 
anxieties of Europe which influenced the outcome of the negotiations. But those 
activities in and of themselves had not offended the fundamental thinking and 
injunctions which undergirded the creation of the Lomé regime. But, instead they 
seemed to have justified and defended the very core of the hypothesis which 
expression explains the characteristics that define the Lomé regime as a mere trade 
‘pause’ so astutely crafted to meet the urgency of a response at a most crucial juncture 
in European relation with its former “colonial servants”, which were demanding equality 
of partnership by sitting at the negotiating table, with a mission to obtain redress and 
balance in their relationship.  
The events which ensued was a coming together of a group which saw themselves as 
victims of a colonial structure perpetuated for many years, that gave them political 
independence without any concomitant economic power and had been left to so exist in 
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a global economic structure, already set, not to serve their interest, but that of the very 
architects who designed it. The pending meeting of Europe and its former colonies was 
destined to be one of unprecedented discourse. 
1.4 Africa preparing to negotiate with Europe  
The move to establish the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was designed to unify 
Africa, but the Organization was mired in difficulties due to political feud and narrowness 
in thinking of some leaders, the wide differences in cultural orientation coupled with 
tribal nepotism among the newly independent states63. Africa had never been united, 
and was kept that way ostensibly, because of the European Colonial rivalries which 
necessitated such exploits for its own gains64. 
By the mid 1960s most of the African Anglophone and Francophone countries were 
politically independent but were far from been a united group. There were divisions 
among them varying from ideological to socio-cultural orientations. Those divisions had 
undermined their efforts to organize Africa under a unitary structure. Part of their 
difficulties had their genesis in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome which conferred associate 
status for eighteen African States and Madagascar (AASM) comprising fifteen French, 
three Belgian, and one Italian65 former colonies. 
Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Ghana, an Anglophone African State 
had proclaimed independence about ten years after India and Pakistan got statehood. 
Pan-African political leaders were campaigning for a united Africa to develop its own 
resources and towards industrialization for economic independence of Africa. However 
African unity was elusive until 1963 when the Yaoundé Convention was signed with the 
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AASM after it was presented for signatures ‘to take’ or ‘leave it’66. The Francophone 
African States had become accustomed to negative diplomacy, a phenomenon which 
seemed to have persisted throughout the entire period of the ACP-EC relations.  
At the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in London in September, 
1962 the African delegations left convinced of the urgency to unite Africa. However, the 
model to be followed was contentious. The Brazzaville, Casablanca and the Monrovia 
groups had different ideas as to the way forward. However after the signing of the 
Yaoundé Convention in 1963, the African States became embroiled in a divisive political 
discourse which was resolved through the intervention of Nigeria which by then had 
been articulating African unity. It negotiate a comprise which laid the foundation for the 
eventual establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963.  
 African unity was forged through the expression of the Declaration of the Monrovia 
group which emphasized economic cooperation and non-interference in each other 
internal affairs.67 This newly found unity created the opening for the wider unity and 
solidarity which continued into the Lomé negotiations and the eventual formation of the 
ACP group of States. The role and involvement of the OAU was very instrumental in this 
regard. 
When Nigeria opened negotiation with the EEC in 1965 that move had caused 
uneasiness among some members of the union, but the resulting agreement was never 
ratified and the Arusha Accord signed in July 1968 was never implemented. So, also 
Ghana’s attempt to negotiate an agreement with Europe in 1966 was later abandoned.  
The fragile unity in Africa became threatened in 1969 after the 2nd Yaoundé Convention 
was signed. This threat was exposed because of the compensation package offered to 
the AASM arising from the imposition of the GSP which took effect in 1972 and the duty 
reduction under GATT. The acceptance of the package by the AASM created a problem 
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for many African States which fostered further divisions because the Francophone 
African States were in support of the Yaounde package. Again, this package was never 
negotiated as the negative diplomacy embraced by the Francophone African States 
which was encouraged by Europe had prevailed and the other African Member States 
of the union became uneasy.  
The newly independent African States were for the most part suspicious of the aid 
package of the conventions and were also very opposed to the principles of reciprocity. 
The AASM felt they had to accept it because they had no alternative. By then it  became 
clear to most African States that in this existing global political economy, the balance of 
power did not reside in Africa or indeed the South which made them even more 
sceptical of the Europeans. The United Kingdom was about to joint the EEC and the 
divisions in Africa was exposed to possible exploitation by the Europe in the pending 
negotiations, a position which Africa could ill afford. Again it was left to the diplomatic 
efforts of Nigeria to hold the unity which has been earlier forged68. 
In the new dispensation of the Britain’s Accession, African States began to re-visit the 
issue of their relationship with Europe, a discourse which opened up old wounds and a 
renewed resistance to European control of African resources.69 So, the Africa States 
searched for a common ground as the leaders of the newly independent states realized 
their dilemmas in the spheres of international trading regimes arising from the capitalist 
imperial systems for which they were not properly prepared to participate.  
Britain’s pending entry into the EEC was causing problem for some for African States as 
they became sceptical. So, while Britain was preparing for a future in an enlarged EC, 
some African States were forging a new unity to confront Europe in the pending 
negotiations. 
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Some African leaders believed fundamentally that the intention of the Europeans and 
also the British was design to pave the way to continue the exploitation of African 
economies for the benefit of European and Africa would become the dumping ground 
for European manufactured goods and thereby discourage African industrialization.70 
So, as the African States consolidated their unity, the EC on the eve of its first 
enlargement had to contemplate negotiations for a new trade arrangement with them. 
But, this was not to be, because as the Africans searched for new strategies to develop 
their relation with the EC, the Caribbean was also searching for a way forward in 
dealing with the effect of Britain’s entry into the EC on the economies of the region.  
1.5 West Indian Federation: The Caribbean’s first attempt at organising 
By the time Britain made it third application for Membership of the ECC, the Caribbean 
had already gone through two attempts to organize and was at its third. The first attempt 
was made during the World II as part of war time efforts by the United States of America 
and allied World War II colonial interest to organize the West Indian islands as a unitary 
system.71 The initiative was not sustained because it was not designed with the 
necessary political and social infrastructure for sustainability. It was merely a war time 
effort. 
After World War ll, the Caribbean took the opportunity to foster a Caribbean indigenous 
input in organizing the region through political action, organized labour and the creation 
of other regional institutions including the establishment of the first university located on 
West Indian soil.72 But, Britain wanted  direct involvement in the efforts to organize the 
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Caribbean and therefore had established a commission to investigate conditions in the 
West Indies. The report which followed formed the basis for attempting to federate the 
West Indian islands as a unitary state.73 The Caribbean’s next experience at trying to 
unite was through the democratic process. The West Indian Federation was established 
on the 3rd January, 1958 and the voters across the region had elected a Federal 
Government but within three years the government had collapsed and on the 31st of 
May, 1962 the Federal structure was officially dissolved. 
The negotiations for Federal status for the Caribbean was affected by Britain’s delay in 
making decisions on the establishment of the federation between 1947-1958, by which 
time circumstances both in the Caribbean and Europe had changed. Resistance to 
federation had been building up in Jamaica and it became an issue of the national 
political adventurism. The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) lead by Alexander Bustamante 
had opposed the federal institution while his cousin Norman W. Manley leader of the 
Peoples National Party (PNP) was in favour of the institution. At the Montego Bay 
Conference, in September 1947, Norman Manley argued in favour, while Alexander 
Bustamante opposed, maintaining that unless federation would lead to national political 
independence, the JLP and his government would not support it. The other islands were 
in favour. Bur, at the time of the conference, the J.L.P. had formed the government of 
Jamaica, however, by the time the Federation was established the P.N.P had has 
formed the Government and Mr. Norman Manley lead Jamaica into the West Indian 
Federation. There were deep opposition in Jamaican on the question of its role in the 
Federation and after a national referendum; Jamaica in 1961 left the federation which 
precipitated it’s collapsed74. 
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As it was in the case of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) in its formative years, the 
West Indian Federation was rife with political self interest among its leaders while 
national insularity was very pronounced. But, unlike the OAU, it was a political 
governance institution subject to the vicissitudes and idiosyncrasies of politics.  So deep 
was the insularity factor within the Federation that one of the proponent and political 
participant Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad &Tobago observed that the isolationist attitude 
among the islands was a product of the colonial plantation system which is linked to the 
mercantile metropolitan trade among rivals which is deeply divisive in practice75. 
1.6 The establishment of CARIFTA and CARICOM  
After the Collapse of the West Indian Federation, the Eastern Caribbean countries had 
approached Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad to reconsider his position and hold the 
federation together, but he decline opting to seek independence as Jamaica had done. 
But Trinidad & Tobago having had its independence, the Caribbean felt isolated and 
vulnerable. Dr. Eric Williams tried to get Trinidad & Tobago to play a lead role in the way 
forward for the region in its international relations after its fractured image. He 
approached the French to seek a relation with it through its overseas territories of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe76. When that attempt failed he approached Canada, but 
was quietly rejected on the question of an association between Canada with the region. 
But by April 1963 Dr. Eric Williams again began to look inwards and expressed his 
frustration at trying to organize the region77. 
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However while Williams searched for answers, on the 6th July 1965 Barbados and 
Guyana announced that they would establish a free trade area by January 1966 and 
that other territories of the region were welcomed to join. The announcement had a 
monumental impact in the region more so in the other Eastern Caribbean Countries 
because they were at an advanced stage of discussion with Barbados to enter a federal 
arrangement. Even Dr. Williams was indeed taken by surprise and the initiative was 
seen as an effort to snob the Trinidadian Prime Minister, but this was later denied and 
clarified by Forbes Burnham Premier of Guyana.78However, as the discussions to form 
the free trade association gathered momentum Trinidad & Tobago became concerned 
that they would be left out and eventually decided to come on board.79 Jamaica stayed 
out for reason which was not unconnected with the events leading up to the demise of 
the West Indian Federation. However, Barbados and Guyana firm in making sure that 
the political rivalry between Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica did not undermine the 
initiative to the establishment of the Free Trade Association within the time schedule. 
The anxiety of Caribbean leaders became heightened when Britain made another 
application to join the EEC as the future of preferential trade arrangement for sugar and 
banana was threatened. This event consolidated the region’s resolve to act to protect its 
vital interests and so the joint initiative of Barbados and Guyana to establish a free trade 
area took on added importance which bought both Jamaica and Trinidad fully on board 
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Gaulle. See also Dr. Eric Williams’ Speech at Woodford Square, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 22 April 1965, Nation, 
Vol. 7 No. 32 30th April 1965. 
 
78 Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould: Select Discourse by the Prime Minister of Guyana,  Africana Publishers, 
London,(1970) pp. 56‐7. 
 
79 The announcement to establish CARIFTA was seen at the time as a primary political move by many as being 
an anti‐Trinidad manoeuvre designed to snob Dr. Eric Williams. However, this was refuted by Forbes 
Burnham who argued that the Agreement to set up CARIFTA was not intended to be exclusive. F. Burnham 
“Report to the Nation” in Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould: Select Discourse by the Prime Minister of 
Guyana London, (1970) pp. 56‐7. 
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with the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CAFITA) in 1968. CARIFTA was 
established on the 1st of August 1968 and all the Associated States with the support of 
the United Kingdom signed the Treaty. However, the Bahamas and British Honduras 
(Belize) stayed out. Forbes Burnham, the Premier of Guyana who was one of the 
pioneers of the CARIFTA movement offered to host the headquarters for the 
Association was accepted and Georgetown, Guyana became the official headquarters. 
The regional unity was forged as a result of external threat, but the initiative to unite was 
propelled by the need for the region to craft its own destiny. The suspicion surrounding 
Britain’s motive for promoting the Federation of the West Indian islands had permeated 
the region which came to believe that the federal initiative was nothing more than an 
administrative convenience for Britain which was finding it burdensome to deal with so 
many small countries as Independence approached. Indeed, Britain had encouraged 
the establishment of the federation, but later failed to provide the financial and technical 
support for its success. It is commonly believed that Britain effectively undermined the 
federal experiment by suggesting to the Premier of Jamaica, Norman Manley, that 
Jamaica was qualified to gain its independence80 .Realizing Britain’s intention, the 
region had to find a way forward which could sustain after Britain joined the EC. A 
situation had developed in the Caribbean similar to the experience of the Africans and 
the Yaoundé Agreement. Because, Britain had granted Associated statehood to the non 
independent Members of CARIFTA, so that these countries were in a position to benefit 
from the EC trade and aid arrangement by virtue of Protocol 22 and this was acceptable 
by the EC because their impact on the EC internal agricultural arrangement would be 
negligible as the United Kingdom (UK) imported banana and limited supply of sugar, 
rum and tropical spices.So, Britain was assured of adequate supplies of sugar, rum and 
tropical fruits just as France and the Netherland had through their Caribbean holdings.  
                                                        
80 For a detailed discussion on the federation of the West Indies see Payne, Anthony. The Political History of 
Caricom Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, (2008).  pp3‐30. 
 
  
51 
 
 
These arrangements were of mutual strategic importance to those European former 
colonial and imperial rivals which reinforced equality and pride of place among 
themselves. For purposes of the negotiation, prima facie, the U.K had not accepted 
anything less than what its former rivals, now become partners had retained for 
themselves. This factor offers some support to the argument, that the arrangements 
under the Lomé regime was not intended to benefit the ACP States in the main, but 
instead was so crafted to suit the European interests and the question of fairness on the 
issues concerning the developing countries was not part of the primary construct of 
Europe. However the ACP States though not fully satisfied with the outcome had to be 
content with what they had negotiated give the circumstances of asymmetry between 
the parties. 
In July 1969, Caribbean trade ministers and a delegation went to London to present the 
region’s case to the British government concerning the trading arrangements. They 
returned with a new conviction that the way forward for the Caribbean in dealing with 
the issue of trade would have to be collective negotiation as one unit81. Their experience 
of Britain’s new focus and their own sense of purpose drove that conviction. 
But even though, they decided to negotiate as a single unit, the next three years were 
mired in debates as to the substance of the deal to be negotiated. The debates were 
highly divisive and intensely contested in the period leading up to negotiations with 
Europe. The problems were very complex. Firstly, for a region which had just forged a 
unity given its very recent experiences with the failed federation, secondly, it had no 
substantive or long history of collective bargaining of trade terms on this scale at the 
international level and thirdly, there were deep divisions among Member States on the 
type of relationship the region should have with the EC after Britain became a Member. 
                                                        
81 By September 1970 when the Conservative government in power in Britain Jamaica Trade Minister, Robert 
Lightbourne led another mission to London to put its case to the British government, the result of the visit 
was disappointing. Lightbourne was then a member of the JLP government which was politically allied to the 
conservative party in Britain. 
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Britain, in preparation for its final bid to join the EC, created the status of Associated 
Statehood for some of its Caribbean OCTs namely: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts & Nevis, all of which adopted the status in 
1967 while St. Vincent and the Grenadines did so in 1969. Bermuda, the British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands remained as 
British OCTs. A pattern of behaviour of post war European colonial powers that was 
exposed in the making of the Treaty of Rome by France and the Netherlands in respect 
to Guadeloupe and Martinique which are French OCTs, and the Netherland Antilles 
which are Dutch OCTs in the Caribbean was followed by Britain, all designed for long-
term strategic purposes. The way was now paved for Britain to renew its application to 
join the EC at the 1969 Hague Summit meeting of the EC where Britain’s application 
was unanimously accepted for it to become a full Member by January 22nd, 1972. So, 
while the dissentions and political divide were being exposed in Africa by opposition to 
the acceptance of the Yaoundé Convention by the AASM in Africa in 1969, a similar 
debate was bearing down heavily on the Caribbean region on the question of the type of 
deal that the region should seek when Britain joined the EEC.  
Trinidad &Tobago and Guyana were not in favour of the Yaoundé model of associations 
as they were of the view that it was inimical to the region’s sugar and banana export. 
Jamaica, under a conservative and the pro-western Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) 
administration had wanted the Yaoundé model because of the financial aid and 
technical assistance it offered. In its resistance to go with the others, Jamaica had 
broken ranks with its Caribbean partners and went to Brussels to get support for its 
case. Jamaica’s attitude further complicated matters as it created suspicion among the 
rest of the Caribbean and added pressure on the fragile infrastructure of the new 
CARIFTA movement because by then, the EC had agreed to commence negotiations in 
1973. Jamaica’s problem was its insularity and unilateral tendencies. It had to convince 
the other Member States to go with the Yaoundé Model, but Jamaica had a further 
credibility problem not unrelated to its role in the demise of the West Indian Federation, 
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a problem which was further compounded by suspicions surrounding its visits to 
European capitals to get support for the Yaoundé model.  
But, Jamaica’s problems in the region were further exposed when in February 1971, 
Geoffrey Rippon, the then British Minister responsible for negotiating with the EEC had 
visited the Caribbean with an agreement from the EEC to protect the economies of 
those countries which were solely dependent on export of sugar and primary products82.  
By June, 1971 Robert Lightbourne, Jamaica's Minister of Trade and Industry visited 
London and in a meeting at Lancaster House, he sought Britain’s commitment to 
support the Caribbean’s request to continue export of sugar on favourable terms vis-à-
vis all other developing countries and in doing so, was unequivocal about the region 
displeasure on the issue of the EEC’s assurances of protecting the economies of the 
region83. Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji was in attendance at the Lancaster 
House meeting in London. He observed that what Britain had intended was to ask the 
sugar producing Commonwealth States to do was to give up the security of the sugar 
agreement and made a strong case for the sugar suppliers to take Britain at its words 
that it would protect the sugar market. Fiji decided to “…put its trust in the UK’s 
assurances and go in”84.   
The region had taken note of the treatment they received regarding their requests at the 
meeting of the EEC Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the 7th of June 1971. There, the 
region’s declarations on the issues that affected their interest were only noted, but no 
reference or record was made of them in the deliberations of the meeting. In addition, 
the Caribbean had an even more fundamental problem caused by the Associated 
                                                        
82 Mr. Geoffrey Rippon  in  the House of Commons, 17 May 1971  (Hansard, Volumes 385‐6) cited  in Central 
Office  of  Information,  Britain  and  the  Developing  Countries:  The  Caribbean,  (London,  HMSO,  1973).  p.  21. 
 
83 By September 1970 when the new Conservative government came in office in Britain, Jamaica’s Trade 
Minister, Robert Lightbourne led another mission to London to put its case to the British government, the 
result of the trip was disappointing. Jamaica was therefore forced to look to the Caribbean for compromise. 
84 Mara, Kamisese:  “The Pacific Role in the ACP” The Courier No.93 (September to October 1985) p.80.See 
also Communiqué: The Lancaster House Statement Consultations with Developing Countries .2‐3 June1971.  
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Statehood granted to the majority of the Member States of CARIFTA. This problem was 
not only unique in law and practice, but was of historic magnitude as it threatened the 
very existence of the CARIFTA regional grouping. The Associated States found 
themselves in an invidious position due mainly to Britain’s incoherent policy towards the 
region based on its own self interest as it move forward to join Europe and refocused its 
policy towards the Industrial North. It intended to treat the Associated States in a similar 
manner as the French had treated its OCTs and ASSM under the Yaoundé regime and 
the Treaty of Rome. The Caribbean did not want that type of arrangement85 
These small states were indeed self- governing colonies but in their external relations 
they had no competence in law, as Britain had retained such authority. But their 
decision to join CARIFTA was supported by Britain. They, having become Associated 
States prior to Britain joining the EEC were expected to follow the path taken by the 
ASSM under the Yaoundé regime. A position with which most of them were quite 
comfortable86 but that in and of itself had exposed three major difficulties. Because, 
unlike the AASM under the Yaoundé Convention, these Caribbean Associated States 
were then  Members of a regional arrangement with other partners which carried legal 
obligations and required specific procedure to removed themselves from membership if 
they so desire. The unanimity rule of governance was applicable which meant that 
decisions had to be made in unison and Britain could not force them to leave, having 
given them consent to join in the first instance. So therefore, any decision to leave 
would have to be made by them with the active support of the other Member States, or 
in the alternative, they could renounce the arrangements, but such an option seemed 
remote as the political fall out in the region would be beyond what they would have 
wanted on in light of the history of the failed West Indian Federation of which most of 
them were members and the trauma of those events was still very fresh in their minds. 
So, in as much as the Associated States had majority in numbers, and would have 
                                                        
85 Interview‐ PJ Patterson, Kingston, Jamaica, March 3, 2009. 
86 Ibid 
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preferred to go along with Britain, Jamaica which was by then a newly independent 
Member failed to convince the other willing and larger Memberships to go with it and 
take the Yaoundé Model, though prima facie the Yaoundé offer had very appealing 
financial and technical features.  
Trinidad & Tobago however, had a credibility problem not unconnected to the failed 
West Indian Federation which was further compounded by the subsequent rivalry 
between itself and Jamaica which had overshadowed the establishment of CARIFTA. 
So, as in the case of Nigeria’s efforts in uniting Africa, it was therefore left to Guyana to 
hold the Caribbean group together and staved it from being undermined and the 
divisions being exploited by the EEC leading up to the negotiations. The task to get 
consensus on the issue was extremely challenging difficulty. So difficult and protracted 
were the debates at the regional trade ministerial meetings and at the Heads of 
Government level that one participant, P.J Patterson of Jamaica observed that, so 
heated were those discussions that to reach consensus was more difficult than to get all 
of Africa to negotiate with the Caribbean and Pacific as a single unit.87  
A significant turning point for the region came with the election of the Peoples National 
Party (PNP) lead by Michael Manley on the 29th February, 1972. Manley by then had 
proclaimed his commitment to the regional integration movement88. But even then, the 
task of convincing the Associated States of the region to walk away from the 
arrangements Britain had in place for them was much more difficult to deal with than 
that which was posed by Jamaica and Trinidad. Tackling of these issues hinged closer 
to being resolved at the 15th meeting of Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Free 
Trade Association held in Roseau, Dominica on the 10th - 12th July 1972. 
                                                        
87  Interview‐ PJ Patterson, Kingston, Jamaica, March 3, 2009. 
 
88 For an articulation of the Regional Integration Movement see Demas, William: From CARIFTA to Caribbean 
Community, (Georgetown, Guyana 1972). 
 
56 
 
 
The meeting89 resolved that it was essential for CARIFTA countries to seek a Group 
relationship with the enlarged EEC base on the need to obtain the best possible terms 
at minimum cost through joint bargaining and the collective power of the countries of the 
region. It reaffirmed its recommendation to governments made at the 6th meeting in 
November 1970 that all the CARIFTA governments should decide to seek as a group, a 
relationship with the enlarged EEC with special arrangements to safeguard vital exports 
commodities, without prejudice to the status of respective states consequent on the 
listing in the Treaty of Brussels of the Associated States. Belize and Montserrat were 
eligible for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. There was some need to 
determine the arrangements for the effective representation of the non-independent 
countries for satisfactory implementation of the decision, especially in a context where 
so many difficulties and such little success had attend the efforts to negotiate the text of 
appropriate Part IV arrangements. 
The meeting agreed an eight point Plan of action for recommendation to the up coming 
Heads of Government meeting as follows: that- 
1. The Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) countries should seek a “group’ 
relationship with the EEC. 
2. A sui generis relationship was required. 
3. The focus of attention should be the content of the relationship rather than the 
exercise of a particular option.  
4. The relationship should provide for aid at least to the LDCs. 
5. CARIFITA should seek to secure a continuing market on the basis of an agreed 
Commonwealth quota for the supply of sugar to the enlarged EEC on fair terms in 
respect of quantities of sugar covered by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.  
                                                        
89 Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the seventh Heads of Government Conference of Commonwealth 
Caribbean Countri, 14‐19 October, 1972, Chaguaramas, and Trinidad & Tobago. 
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6. Commonwealth Caribbean countries should engage in intense diplomatic activities 
in Europe in order to convey the special problems of CARIFITA countries. 
7. Invitations should be sent to representatives of the European Commission to visit 
CARIFITA countries in 1973.  
8. Closest cooperation should be developed with the African Associates under 
Yaoundé II and other Commonwealth Associable.  
9. The position of dependent territories should be clarified.  
This meeting made a major breakthrough in uniting the region and tempered the 
tensions and divisiveness that set the tone for the negotiation, but it left the question of 
the status of the Associated States to be dealt with by the Head of Government 
Conference. It was also from these deliberations that the decision to send a technical 
team of seven experts including Alister McIntyre to countries of East and West Africa in 
September 1972 to lay the foundation for building the technical expertise for the 
negotiations. This technical team worked closely with the OAU and visited as observer 
to its deliberations90 . 
The 7th Heads of Government Conference held in July 197291, was yet another major 
milestone in Caribbean diplomacy and integration. There, in the renewed and positive 
political atmosphere emerging in the region, Michael Manley who felt that his 
government had an historic mission to restore the image of the Caribbean in 
international affairs and build unity and cohesiveness, made a significant impact.92 That 
meeting took some very profound decisions as follows: (1) to move from a Free Trade 
                                                        
90 Interview‐ Sir Alister McIntyre, Kingston, Jamaica, November 14, 2008. 
 
91 Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the seventh Heads of Government Conference of Commonwealth 
Caribbean Country, 14‐19 October, 1972, Chaguaramas, Trinidad & Tobago.  
 
92Michael Manley had found comradeship with Forbes Burnham of Guyana, from his Alma Mater and long 
time colleague and fellow Federalist Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad And Tobago and Errol Barrow, Prime 
Minister of Barbados, whose Democratic Labour Party (DLP) was historically aligned to the Peoples National 
Party (PNP) lead by Norman W. Manley of Jamaica in the Federal Elections of 1958.  
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Association and established the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) effective May 1st, 1973 and for the community to cooperate in foreign policy 
and other areas of functional cooperation, (2) resolved the impasse with the Associated 
States by leaving the matter open but stressed coordinated action in the region at all 
times and (3) sending a high level technical team from the region to Africa to gather 
information and to examine how best to relate to the EEC. 
Coming up on the heels of those decisions, the mettle of Caribbean unity and foreign 
policy was severely tested for the very first time in the modern era as a group. The 
collective act of recognizing Cuba severely tested the strength of Caribbean unity and 
commitment in preserving it’s newly won Independence and to build support throughout 
the developing world and in the capital of both east and west. This gave some credibility 
to the region, because even though the United States had frowned upon the region’s 
decision to break Castro’s international isolation it accepted the Caribbean’s States’ 
sovereign right so to do. That decision had paved the way for Cuba to attend the Non-
Aligned Foreign Ministries meeting in Georgetown Guyana in August in 1972, its first 
appearance outside of the United Nation in any International forum within the 
Hemisphere.93  
The signal was sent that the region was ready to carry the issues of its concern to the 
international community and take its seat in the spheres of global initiatives. But even 
before the Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing CARICOM was signed, Britain was 
applying pressure to keep the Associated States from signing or make it as difficult as 
possible for them to sign.94 The real crux of the problem and confusion was fermented 
by Britain’s seemingly convoluted policy towards the region in general and particularly 
the Associated States because even though not politically independent Britain 
                                                        
93 Ramphal, Shirdath, Alister McIntyre and William G. Demas, Caribbean Regionalism: Challenges and Options: 
Institute of International Relation, (St. Augustine, U.W.I. Trinidad, 1987) p. 35. 
 
94 The Premier of St. Kitts, Robert Bradshaw had walked out of the signing ceremony of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas as a protest against British government advice not to sign the Treaty on behalf of Anguilla. The 
St. Kitts government eventually sign the Treaty on the 26th July 1974. 
59 
 
 
supported their entry into CARIFTA. They were in a hiatus and a legal conundrum as 
Britain was prepared to take them into the EC Arrangements under Protocol 22. 
However, they opted to stay within the agreement under the CARIFITA umbrella. Britain 
issued warning and threats to them. As a consequence they went along with the 
independent Caribbean Commonwealth states and rejected their inclusion as British 
Associated States under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. Eventually, they all signed the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community and Common market 
(CARICOM)95 as the Caribbean was determined to chart its own course.  
1.7 Caribbean  States engaging the African and Pacific States  
The Caribbean had assessed its position and came to the conclusion that to get the 
best outcome from the negotiation it was crucial to have the negotiations broad base 
and inclusive. So, it was very vital get the African States on board and simultaneously to 
invite the Pacific States to joint them. The Caribbean knew that Europe‘s interest rests 
in Africa and therefore without having the Africans on board the Caribbean would have 
an uphill task with the Europeans.96 
Arising from the decision of the 7th Heads of Government Conference of 197297 the 
region took certain concrete steps. Firstly, it made contact with those Commonwealth 
African States with which it had a relationship through Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conferences and secondly, it dispatched emissaries to the European Capitals98 to 
sensitize them as to the important issues of the Caribbean States and thirdly, made 
contact with other bodies such as the Group of 77 Developing Countries and the Non-
Aligned Movement in which it had good relations. 
                                                        
95 Demas, W. G. West Indian Nationhood and Caribbean Integration, (CCC. Publishing House, Bridgetown, 
Barbados, 1974) p. 33. 
 
96 Interview‐ P.J. Patterson, Kingston, Jamaica, March 3, 2009. 
 
97 Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the seventh Heads of Government Conference of Commonwealth 
Caribbean Countries, 14‐19 October, 1972, Chaguaramas, Trinidad & Tobago. 
98 Interview‐ PJ Patterson, Kingston, Jamaica, March 3, 2009.  
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Caribbean diplomacy in the Non-Aligned movement took a positive turn when the group 
agreed to hold its Foreign Ministers Ministerial in Georgetown, Guyana in August, 
1972.There in a room at the official Presidential Residence, Shirdath Ramphal, the 
Foreign Minister of Guyana, chaired an informal discussions with a select number of the 
African delegation from Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In attendance 
also were representatives of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Having already briefed 
his Caribbean colleagues before the meeting about his intentions and secured their 
commitment he engaged the African delegations to press the EEC to open the 
negotiations to accommodate their mutual interests beyond the limits of the Yaoundé 
Group. They agreed to the suggestions made by Ramphal who later observed and 
explained what he was seeking to achieve, that his real intention was to use the 
opportunity of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers meeting to explore and talk with his 
Commonwealth colleagues about the EEC to see how the Caribbean could be involved 
with the process.99 Ramphal’s initiative paid off immensely for the Caribbean. Indeed it 
has been the real bridge between the two groups since the value of which cannot be 
quantified. This represented the first major break-through that the Caribbean so badly 
needed, because without the African States on board there would not be much in it for 
the Caribbean region to gain from the negotiations. The way was now paved for the 
technical team from the region to visit Africa and commenced the technical preparatory 
work for effective negotiations with the EEC. The region knew that Europe’s real interest 
was in Africa, not the Caribbean and that was why it was so important for the Caribbean 
States to join with the African States100in the negotiations. 
Alister McIntyre who was selected to lead the Caribbean team of expert had contacted 
his cousin, Arnold Smith, a Canadian, who was the Commonwealth Secretary–General 
to seek assistance for the mission to Africa. That initial contact paved the way for the 
                                                        
99 Ramphal, Shirdath.  ‘The ACP – the early years’ The Courier no. 93 September – October 1985, p. 81. See 
also Shirdath, Ramphal, ‘The ACP‐EEC Negotiations: A lesson in Third World Unity’. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Georgetown, Guyana, (June 1975) p.5. 
 
100 Interview‐ P.J. Patterson, March 3,2009, Kingston, Sir Alister Mc Intyre  Nov.14,2008, Kingston & Sir 
Shirdath Ramphal Bridgetown, Barbados, June. 2009. 
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limited but valuable role the Commonwealth Secretariat played in the formative years of 
the ACP relations with Europe.101 The team visited states in East and West Africa in 
September, 1972 and had extensive consultations covering issues of common interests 
including but not limited to, commodity arrangements, reverse preferences, 
development aid, quantitative restrictions, and rules of origin, rights of establishment 
and generally how to approach the Europeans in the pending negotiations. 
By March 1973, the Commonwealth African States sent a delegation of experts to the 
Caribbean and the relationship grew stronger as the both sides continued to meet. The 
Caribbean through their observer Status which the OAU had granted attended all 
meeting of the OAU and continued to build the relations which laid the basis for the 
eight point negotiating position which was adopted by the OAU with respect to the EEC, 
the original draft of which was prepared by Alister McIntyre. The initiatives at the 
political level however had to continue in order to preserve the unity which was in place 
both in Africa and the Caribbean, But while the region had gotten the Anglophone 
African States on board, there still remained the task of convincing the Francophone 
African States and a way had to be found at the political level to achieve this objective. 
The way forward was through the Non-aligned Movement102, by then the Caribbean had 
built a very good network among the African States in the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and had used their influence to break the 
deadlock between Francophone and Anglophone Africa and got them to come on board 
in negotiating as one group for Lomé negotiations. 
The Caribbean through Forbes Burnham of Guyana and later through Michael Manley 
in the Non-Aligned Movement had established a very strong relationship with Algeria 
and the region had placed the burden on Algeria to  use its influence to help to carry the 
                                                        
101 Interview‐ Alister McIntire McIntyre, November 14 2008. See also Akosa, Mabel Op.Cit. pp. 35‐38. 
 
102 Interview – Sir Shirdath Ramphal, Bridgetown, Barbados, June 8, 2009. 
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issue to the Francophone African States, an effort which finally got them on board103. 
Algeria had wanted to host the next Non-Aligned meeting of Heads of State which was 
to be decided at that meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Guyana in August 1972,there 
Ramphal brokered a deal with the Algerian Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Bouteflika who 
were in competition with Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka another 
Member State of the Movement to host the next Heads of Government conference of 
the Movement by guaranteeing the Algerians whom had great influence with the 
Francophone African States, that they would be allowed to host the conference, if they 
under took to convince the Francophone African States to join with the Anglophone 
African States to negotiate with Europe as one unit. The Algerian Foreign Minister took 
the offer and effectively got the Francophone Africans on board through the offices of 
the OAU104.  
That initiative, more than any other intervention was the decision that the Caribbean had 
wanted because without the Francophone Africans the Caribbean could not achieve its 
objectives105. 
The African States issued their Declaration for the negotiations at the tenth ordinary 
session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa. The 
eight point Declaration was expressed in ideological terms and stated Africa’s position 
for the negotiations with the EEC in terms: (1) the principles of non-reciprocity in trade 
and tariff concessions given by the EEC; 
(2) The extension of a non-discriminatory basis towards third countries of provisions of 
rights of establishment; 
                                                        
103 Interview‐ Sir Alister McIntyre, November 14, 2008. For a full discussion and analysis of the Caribbean 
diplomacy in UNCTAD see also Williams, Marc Andrew: The Group of 77 in UNCTAD: Anatomy of a Third 
World Coalition. PhD thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London (1991), 
p. 19. 
 
104  Interview‐ Shirdath Ramphal, June 8, 2009, Barbados. 
105 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal, Bridgetown Barbados, June 8, 2009. 
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(3) The revisions of the rules of origin must be formulated so as to facilitate the 
industrial integration of African countries and in particular, they must grant the status of 
original products to all good which had been produced in one or several of the African 
States, or which have been processed in accordance with mutually accepted criteria 
irrespective of whether or not they enjoy preferential relations with the EEC; 
(4) A revision of the provision on the movement of payments and capital to take account 
of the objective of monetary independence in African countries, and the need for 
monetary cooperation among African countries;  
(5) The dissolution of EEC financial and technical aid from any particular form of 
relationship with the EEC; 
(6) Free and assured access to EEC markets for all African products including 
processed and semi-processed agricultural products, whether or not they are subject to 
the common agricultural policy of the EEC; 
(7) The guaranteeing to African countries of stable, equitable and remunerative prices in 
EEC markets for their main products, in order to allow them to increase their export 
earnings; and 
(8) Any form of agreement made with the EEC should not in any manner adversely 
affect intra-African cooperation.  
The initiatives at the political level however had to continue in order to preserve the 
unity which was in place both in Africa and the Caribbean. But, while the Caribbean had 
gotten the Anglophone African States on board, there still remained the task of 
convincing the Francophone Africans and a way had to be found at the political level. 
The Ramphal’s initiative later proved very vital in securing corporation and unity. But the 
group had to be kept together was in and of itself was a monumental task. The several 
meeting of the OAU trade ministers held in Dares-Salaam, Lagos served to achieve and 
consolidate the newly found unity in Africa on the one hand and among the entire ACP 
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State on the other hand. Indeed the Dares-Salaam meeting which was held in July 1973 
was addressed by President of Tanzania, Julius K. Nyerere who emphasised the need 
for unity, and a position which was underscored by Shirdath Ramphal of the Caribbean 
who also addressed that meeting. The Lagos meeting which followed proved very 
decisive for African unity and solidarity going into the negotiations which were 
scheduled to commence on the 25th of July. 
So, by the time the OAU issued its eight points Declaration at its tenth Summit, the way 
forward was clear as Africa and the Caribbean were singing from the same page. The   
task which firstly was never even conceived on the occasion of Europe’s Declaration of 
Intent in 1963, but which appeared almost insurmountable when conceived at the sixth 
meeting of the Heads of CARIFTA in 1970 had become realty. The African States were 
now on board with the Caribbean to negotiate a new trade and cooperation agreement 
with Europe. But, the consensus was still not as solidified as the region would have 
liked, more work needed to be done. At this stage, Pacific States had to come on board 
and the Caribbean had taken a decision to invite them to join106. The region made 
contact with the Leadership of Fiji and Mauritius, Prime Ministers Ratu Sir Kamises 
Mara of Fiji and Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolan of Mauritius accepted the Invitations 
respectively and agreed to attend a meeting of the Commonwealth Sugar exporters at 
Lancaster House in London to discuss the approach to be taken regarding sugar107.  
The French had no colonial holdings in the Pacific which were of economic strategic 
importance to France. In 1975 French holdings in the Pacific were cantered around a 
few islands. These islands did not play a significant role in terms of global trade but for 
the British the Pacific islands were suppliers of sugar. So, when Britain joined the EEC 
the Pacific Associable were only three independent states108 which were Members of 
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Statement consultations with Developing Members Countries of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 2‐3 
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the South Pacific community. But, while the community included Australia and New 
Zealand these two states were not qualified as Associable. The Associable had agreed 
to present a common front for the purposes of the negotiation and the Secretariat of the 
Southern Pacific Economic Commission (SPEC) assisted them in preparing for and co-
ordinating their activities for the negotiations.  
 On the occasion of the eighth Heads of Government meeting of CARICOM in Guyana 
in April 1973, three months before the 1st meeting in Brussels, the Heads reaffirmed 
their support for the new development in Africa which opened the possibility of 
negotiating a new agreement all together, not merely an enlarged Yaoundé II. The 
meeting appointed Shirdath Ramphal as Chief Spokesman for the region, because by 
then he had secured the African commitment at the Non-Align Foreign Ministers 
meeting  in Guyana.  
1.8 The final preparations for negotiating with the EEC 
The Caribbean was determined to make a lasting impact on the historical architecture of 
North–South relations during the course of this negotiation with the EEC 109quite aware 
of the monumental task and complexities of the issues coupled with the extent to which 
powerful countries of the North in their Global trade arrangements had sought to define 
and determine the degree of liberty and the quality of the options it give to small 
countries.110 
Having adopted a comprehensive negotiating position at its seventh Heads of 
Government Conference meeting, and having appointed its chief spokesperson to lead 
the negotiations, the Caribbean took some concrete steps in preparation for the opening 
of the negotiations.  
                                                        
109 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal Bridgetown, Barbados, June 8, 2009. 
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(1) They agreed upon a broad agenda for the three groups, and seven negotiating 
groups were established. 
(2) A high level technical team was sent to a meeting in Lagos Nigeria between 7- 9 
July to make final preparation before talks were opened on the 25 - 26 July,1973 
(3) A meeting of the Commonwealth Sugar Exporters was arranged at Lancaster House 
at which time the group concurred that Jamaica’s Minister of Trade and Industry, P. 
J. Patterson would lead the negotiation for sugar. 
The African and Caribbean groups continued to meet up until negotiations commenced. 
At the last meeting of the groups in Lagos Nigeria before negotiation started, P.J. 
Patterson, Jamaica’s Minister of Trade and Industry in response to the presentation by 
the President of Nigeria, General Gowan had establishes a very positive tone for the 
pending negotiations. His reference to his African ancestry became a rallying point for 
the other members of the Caribbean delegation. The opening of the negotiations with 
the EEC was their next encounter. The negotiations were scheduled to last eighteen 
months to coincide with the expiration of the Yaoundé and Arusha Agreements both of 
which were to expire on the 31st January, 1975. 
1.9      Negotiating the first Lomé Convention 
When the Caribbean States came to the negotiating table along with the African and 
Pacific State one the one side, they were united, not only were they well prepared, they 
had built up a pool of experience in international relations and had earned some degree 
of respectability as a unit and was supported by a very well qualified technical team. At 
the start of the negotiations there were six factors which the region was going to rely on 
for their strength, (1) Britain had made it conditional for entry to the EEC that the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which it had with the Commonwealth sugar 
producers be respected and  would have wanted for sugar to be treated separate; (2) 
Britain’s interests in sugar spanned the three regions and its investments in the sugar 
industry across these regions was vast, also all its refineries depended on the product 
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for survival and Britain was itself a major consumer of refined sugar; (3) Britain had 
investments mainly in energy resources in Nigeria while its  market for British exports 
was vital; (4) Britain was supporting  most of the positions taken by the region because 
of the multiplicity of its own self interest111; (5) Europe was vulnerable because they 
were divided and that division was because they were unsure. They were unsure 
because never in its history had Europe had to confront a group of such proportion, so 
united and purposeful and (6) Europe therefore was on the defensive. 
The EEC’s Memorandum published in April 1973,112 explained the need for 
“partnership” and shied away from the previous usage “association”. It also reflected a 
change from the earlier position of limiting the selection of options under the protocols of 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome as preconditions. It made a proposal for a stabilization 
scheme for the fluctuation of commodity prices and also addressed aid for 
developments projects even more so for the least developed countries, but pressed the 
question of reciprocity.  
The Caribbean’s short-term interest was to protect its exports, develop its industries and 
deepen its regional integration. However, its long-term objectives were to effect a lasting 
change in the construct of the global political economy in terms of the existing North-
South relations and so the negotiations with Europe were one aspect of those 
objectives113.  What was enshrined in the Lomé regime was therefore not an end in and 
of itself but a part of a wider initiative underpinned by the basic tenets of the call for a 
New International Order (NIEO). In the international outlook of the Caribbean, Lomé 
was just a step in a longer journey114. 
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For Africa, their short-term interest was to develop their industries and shape their own 
destiny without interference while the long-term objective was African Unity. However, 
for the Pacific, their short-term interest rested in stabilization of prices for their main 
export and building a lasting relationship with Africa and the Caribbean. 
When the Preliminary Round opened on July 25th 1973 at the Egmont Palace in 
Brussels in attendance were forty six ACP States to include; thirty four African 
countries, to included nineteen Associable, twelve Commonwealth Associable, in 
addition to Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sudan, all Members of the OAU. From the Caribbean, 
there was the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and the twin island state of 
Trinidad and Tobago and from the Pacific were Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa. In the 
capacity of observers were the North African States of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia. The deputy Secretary-General of the OAU represented that organization. 
The Caribbean Spokesman was confident of the technical and political support he had 
both in the region and the wider ACP, the OAU by then had elected Wenike Briggs, the 
Nigerian Commissioner for Trade to be lead Spokesperson for Africa, Nigeria, being 
one of the most populous and influential State in the Continent and had been a keen 
actor in leading and maintaining African unity. Europe also had a preoccupation with 
African mineral resources including energy, Nigeria was of particular interest to the 
British. The Caribbean team was lead by Shirdath Ramphal, Guyana’s Foreign Minister 
while the Pacific was lead by Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of Fiji. The nine 
Member States of the EEC namely; Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal 
Republic) Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom were 
present.  
Three opening statements were prepared for delivery by the ACP which had required 
considerable coordination and collaboration to ensure consistency. Firstly, within each 
region and secondly, among the three separate groups covering all participating 
Member State. To have completed those processes and to have gotten the groups to 
agree to the Caribbean’s proposal that only one presentation should come from each 
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region was extremely difficult, indeed “to achieve that consensus was a feat in itself”115. 
The policy positions of the ACP were enunciated in these three opening statements. 
The four opening statements were very important in different respects, all of which 
exposed the space needed and the intention of the parties which set the tone of the 
negotiations. The Ivar Norgaard, the Danish Minister of Economic Affairs and President 
of the EEC Council of Ministers spoke first. He emphasized the importance of the 
various choices that countries could take under Protocol 22. On the question of trade he 
specifically offered free entry into the EEC for most of the commodities requested. 
 Winike Briggs, the Nigerian Trade Commissioner who spoke for African went next116, 
and he stressed the importance of the event which allowed Africans for the first time to 
speak with Europe with a singular voice. He spoke about the need for an agreement to 
reflect conditions in the global economy with financial and technical support. On the 
question of trade, he spoke of the need to reach an agreement in the context of 
justification for preferential treatment for Africa in particular and developing countries in 
general.  
The next statement came from Shirdath Ramphal117, the Guyanese Foreign Minister 
who articulated the Caribbean’s position. He spoke to the historical importance of the 
linkages between the Caribbean and Europe which had shaped the destiny of its people 
but emphasized the regions commitment to the integration process and the need to 
negotiate as a group. He used the occasion to point out the differences in political status 
of the Associated State, and argued their freedom to choose to remain under Part IV of 
the Treaty of Rome. While expressing disappointment at the vagueness of the EEC’s 
position, he gave his own interpretation to the options that the EEC was not bound by 
past approaches and should be willing to formulate new models better suited for the 
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future and argued for trade and economic development that would be just. In doing so, 
he rejected reciprocity and pressed for sugar and bananas to be given special 
considerations as the main export earners for many countries in the Caribbean and that 
CAP should not be an instrument of impediment for Caribbean agricultural products. 
He argued that while aid was important it should not be used to establish relations 
which are neither just, enlightened nor effective or in furtherance of substitute for fair 
remuneration for commodity prices. Further, that the region wanted to be part of the 
decision making process for European Development Fund (EDF) spending and finally, 
he called upon Europe to make its 1972 summit Declaration a practical experience. 
Ramphal had used the occasion also to articulate the case of the Associated States in 
the regions and the dilemma facing the region because; at the beginning of negotiation 
the Commonwealth Caribbean as a group was beset by a political difficulty. The fact 
that some Sates were independent and therefore were competent to negotiate in their 
own right and others were merely Associated States and dependencies. In respect of 
the latter group both the Commission and Britain maintained that they could not be 
present during the negotiations and further pointed out that they had no real need to be. 
Indeed, the seating arrangement at the conference had excluded the Caribbean 
Associated States, but the region insisted that the arrangements be changed and 
Europe agreed 
The position was taken that since they were already guaranteed association under Part 
IV, the Associated states were far from happy but could not make any further headway 
on the matter. Moreover they operated under a thinly disguised British threat that if the 
associated states should decide to reject Part IV they should bear in mind that what was 
not negotiable was a different arrangement for them alone118. The Associated States of 
the Caribbean were obligated to rest upon the “goodwill” of the independent Members of 
the region and in the spirit of cooperation and the good offices of Guyana and the more 
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direct intervention of William Demas, the CARICOM Secretary-General the 
representative from the Eastern Caribbean Community sat with the official Caribbean 
delegation of the region throughout the negotiation to safeguard their interest. After 
Ramphal spoke, Britain did not pursue the matter of their status any further.  
The Caribbean had gone to the negotiations determined to underscore the point and 
signalled their intention to Britain on the question of their position of the Associated 
States in the region and how the United Kingdom was addressing the concerns of the 
region with respect to the dilemma and the invidious nature of the Associated States . 
The region had to express its recognition of the crucial difference between formal and 
effective sovereignty by arguing that the former is more symbolic than substantive, for 
its main focus centres on acquiring such ceremonial badges of independence as 
diplomatic recognition by other states, admission to the United Nation and other similar 
manifestation of acceptance into the international community.  
In contrast however, the latter refers to circumstances where a country and its people 
truly control their own destinies. They are in other words exercising their right of national 
self determination in the fullest sense of the term. Establishing and especially sustaining 
these conditions was not a simple matter. Therefore, constant vigilance must be 
maintained against any attempt by outside elements to usurp a nation’s power to make 
and implement its own decisions concerning its political, economic and social affairs119. 
The Associated States presence at the negotiating table through the representative of 
the CARICOM secretariat and Ramphal’s intervention seemed to have made the points 
because throughout the negotiations the matter of their presence and status was never 
revisited. Since then only the island of Montserrat has not gained independence from 
Britain and all the territories are now full Members of CARICOM. 
Ramphal’s presentation had clearly articulated to Africa, Europe and the Pacific what 
had become the hallmark of Caribbean international perspective. The region had built 
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up an international reputation as “bridge builders” between North and South and within 
the South between Africa, Asia, and Latin America120. The region believes that its 
international mission is to strive for consensus and so, even where wide disagreements 
exist, the parties must keep the lines of communication open as talking represents a 
continuous dialogue and engagement in order to resolve difficulties. 
Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was the last to speak. He too, spoke of 
the historical linkages between his regions made Europe and the need for Europe to 
begin to repair the damages of colonial spoilage and emphasized the importance of the 
unity and need for continued relations with African and the Caribbean. He premised his 
denunciation of reciprocity on the asymmetry between the two negotiating parties and 
also called for sugar to be treated especially as it was the main export earner for the 
Pacific States. He wanted all the products from the Pacific to be included in the 
stabilization scheme. In the area of aid and cooperation he argued for the inclusion of 
the other non independent Pacific countries. 
The positions of the Caribbean and Pacific States were very clearly articulated. 
However, there were problems within the African grouping particularly on the question 
of reciprocity, the Francophone Africans wanted it while the Anglophone rejected. Signs 
of dissention were emerging which had to be checked121. The ACP seemed to have 
read “through the line” of the EEC statement which confirmed their uncertainties, so 
much so that  at the close of the session, the EEC chief negotiator thought he had 
secured some agreement on the guiding principles going into the next rounds and 
requested that it be set out. Ramphal responded that only exploratory talks were 
completed and that there was no agreement122. 
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But, so it was also, that the obvious disquiet in the Africa group was identified by the 
European and the French were particularly pleased that the Francophone Africans were 
holding out on the vital question of reciprocity. The EEC strategy started to coalesce 
around this weakness in the coalition and therefore was further confounded, because in 
as much as the Europeans were well aware of  the importance of African unity or its 
disintegration in terms of the outcome, so too were the ACP States. If Africa 
disintegrated, the entire negotiation would have collapsed and this possibility would 
seem to operate in the interest of Europe. For the ACP States however, it would be a 
colossal disaster, the possibility of which they had to guard against. 
1.10 Formulating the institutional framework of the ACP States 
After the initial meeting in Brussels in July, 1973, the group came together at a Trade 
Ministerial meeting of the OAU in Dar-es-Salaam in October to which the Caribbean and 
Pacific countries were invited. However, while the Pacific delegation was unable to 
attend they gave a mandate to the Caribbean to represent them. But, although the 
Caribbean was present in the capacity of observers their input was most valuable in 
holding the group together. The meeting was addressed by President of Tanzania, 
Julius Nyerere who not only  emphasized the need for unity of the group but also the 
need to coordinate in light of the GATT negotiations scheduled for September in Tokyo 
and warned against the perils of internal divisions. Nyerere made an impassioned plea 
for Africa no longer to be mere suppliers of raw material and that the negotiations 
should free Africa from the strangle hold of Europe123. 
Shirdath Ramphal spoke on behalf of the Caribbean and the Pacific and in his call for 
unity, stressed the importance of the remarks of President Nyerere and the bonds 
between Africa and the Caribbean and the Asians who were transported to the 
Caribbean through the Colonial experience. 
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There, the dissenting voices on the issue of reciprocity were put to rest as the risk of 
political ostracism was too profound. The first sign of genuine pooling between the 
Francophone and Anglophone Africans had emerged.124 The Dar-es-salaam meeting 
consolidated the very essence of African unity and set it on a path strong enough to 
take their case to Europe in an unshakeable manner. In the eye of the African leaders, 
the issue had become international in character to include the Group of 77 developing 
countries within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Ramphal’s 
plea for unity has tied the African and Pacific States to the international solidarity 
needed to take the case to the Europeans and the message was well received. By the 
end of the meeting the message had gone out that Africa had united with the 
Caribbean, and an important signal was sent as Africa’s diplomacy was taking shape. 
1.11 Establishing the Institutional framework for the ACP States 
With this unity solidly concretised, the ACP group began to put the institutional 
framework in place to facilitate the negotiations. By then the AASM had already had 
their Ambassadors in Brussels and all the Ambassadors from the ACP had started to 
prepare for the negotiations and began speaking with the Commission in unison and 
were reporting to their respective Trade Ministers. While the African States were 
reporting to the OAU, a similar reporting was occurring in the Caribbean. The 
negotiations were been conducted by the Ambassadors who took instructions. A 
Council of Ministers was established to give political guidance and the chairmanship 
rotated quarterly; the membership was drawn from all regions in Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific. 
Within the Committee of Ambassadors a bureau was created with a chair and three vice 
chairs based on regions of the ACP. While the Committee of Ambassadors did the 
preparatory work for the Council of Ministers, the Bureau served as support body for 
experts involved in the negotiation and setting of schedules and meetings. 
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1.12 The commencement of negotiations 
Formal negotiations were opened in Brussels on the 17th of October, 1973. The 
President of the EEC Council of Ministers, Ivar Norgaard opened there he sought to 
bring the parties closer together in a conciliatory tone and pledged the EEC’s 
commitment to make a significant contribution to ACP relations. The issue of the model 
to be applied under Protocol 22 of Part IV was left wide open for negotiation. The 
question of reciprocity was still not settled. But Europe; made it clear that duty free 
access to agricultural products was agreed. Stabilizations mechanism for prices on 
agricultural produce was been considered but no clear and definitive position was 
arrived at. On the issue of financial support, Europe had agreed to greater participation 
by ACP States and proposal for a joint approach to projects and committed itself to 
promote regional integration in the ACP. 
When the ACP responded, the Minister of Trade of Zaire, Mr. Namwizi voiced his 
concern about the EEC continued vagueness on the question of reciprocity and 
stabilization proposals and called for the duty fee entry of agricultural products affected 
by CAP. It became clear that the EEC was trying to retract from its July 26th position 
which prompted a formal request for the statement to be treated together as one for the 
purposes of these negotiations. He called for a special regime for sugar and drew on 
the instructions of the Dar-es-salaam meeting for a response to the international crisis 
of the North and the South.  
Before the meeting started the Caribbean through Ramphal had initiated another 
masterful diplomatic “stroke” by offering to step aside so that only one person would 
speak for the entire group and that the chairman had that responsibility.  Indeed, the 
response of the chairman on that occasion had benefitted substantially from the 
authorship and input of the Caribbean125.His speech was already prepared by the 
Caribbean leadership for presentation, but on account of Ramphal’s diplomatic initiative, 
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it was offered to the group and was presented on behalf of the entire group with minor 
adjustments. That initiative represented an expression of the Caribbean’s determination 
to foster unity and build cohesion in the relations for the long-term relation. At the end  
of the presentations, Europe by then had come to realize that between Africa and the 
Caribbean the possibility of continuing with either of the existing models was non 
negotiable because (1) taking the Yaoundé  route to success could not be followed  as 
the Caribbean was firmly against it; (2)so too was the Arusha Model, it could not be 
resurrected as the Africans were resolute about reciprocity and the unity being so firmly 
displayed firstly among the African States has radically shifted and the Caribbean was 
fully locked in with them. A new Model had to emerge. 
At the end of the first round certain realities surfaced and the ACP had begun to feel 
confident. What had emerged bore the fundamental deficiencies in Europe’s policy 
positions in terms: (1) Europe has drifted into further disunity as the integrity of Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) was been exposed as the main source of the problem 
because France had opposed the principle of Non- reciprocity, Italy’s agriculture was 
about to face competition from African produce and Germany was vehemently against 
the stabilization scheme being proposed. Sugar posed a particular threat and the beet 
lobby was very formidable126.Europe was therefore not united, uncertain and vulnerable. 
Europe was not well prepared, but could not walk away from the ACP States so, it had 
to find answers. The ACP had sensed victory and was not prepared to relent, the stage 
was therefore set for a process so lengthy and possibly antagonistic, far beyond 
Europe’s own anticipation and yet the results they wanted could not be assured. It is 
further argued that, the European thinking and conduct may have informed their 
possible misreading that the ACP States had a wider and more profound agenda 
because in the minds of the ACP States, the real focus of the negotiation had changed 
since the preliminary opening in July.  Further, the political and cultural reliance of the 
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French on having their way with or through the Francophone African States had taken a 
departure which may not have been communicated clearly, if at all.   
By then, the negotiations were linked to the discussions in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and had become enjoined with the 
call of the G77 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).127 The new direction of 
the negotiation was designed to find a solution for the difficulties being played out in 
UNCTAD in light of the launch of the Tokyo Round of GATT as the ACP  recognized the 
need to move the process of negotiation along, vigorously, rigorously and speedily.  
Europe however, should have been aware of these intrinsic designs of the negotiations 
because from very early the Caribbean had taken steps to sensitize them on the issues 
when it had dispatched emissaries to the various European capitals. Europe seemed 
not to have afforded much regards for those initiatives and in hindsight it oversight or 
indifference came back to haunt Europe during the negotiations 
1.13 The negotiation processes 
The Negotiating Process had commenced in earnest in October 1973128 and the first 
round took place between November 1973 – February 1974 and the second round from 
May 1974 – January 1975. 
During phase one, there were difficulties at the technical and ambassadorial levels as 
the ACP negotiators became frustrated as the EEC negotiators had no answers to what 
were some of the ACP’s request. For example, on their question of reciprocity and 
export stabilization which was very vital to the ACP’s mandate.  
The EEC sought to get around the ACP by offering to approach the issue on a product 
by product basis in dealing with agricultural products coming into Europe from ACP. The 
ACP flatly rejected that offer. The ACP States were not prepared to take Europe 
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seriously because of past experiences. The financial package was another area of 
difficulty, but Europe was prepared to resolve that issue in their own way. For the 
Caribbean, aid was important but not the main determining factor as the region’s long-
term objective was to effect changes in the global economic and trade architecture.129  
The negotiations were being conducted at the technical level by the Committee of 
Ambassadors of the ACP States and the EC negotiators and at the Political level 
between the Community and the ACP Political directorate through their Ministerial. 
1.14 The British threat to renegotiate their Accession to the Treaty of Rome? 
Between November 1973 and February 1974, the negotiations made very slow 
progress because the negotiators were deadlock on the questions of aid and the 
stabilization proposal, but the deadlines for expiration Yaoundé and Arusha were 
approaching and the negotiations were running behind schedule. The ACP negotiators 
felt that Europe was stalling for time, hoping that expiration of time would force the 
hands of the negotiators. Europe was well aware of the importance of their financial aid 
to some countries in the African group and felt that if the existing agreements expired 
without replacement that could put pressure to force a decision favourable to the EEC. 
But, the ACP negotiators had decided to ignore the time constraint; and called for a 
ministerial to address those matters. However, the real problem for Europe was due to 
the fact that they were divided on the issue of the agricultural imports from ACP in light 
of its agricultural policies.  
Britain, by then had elected a new government led by Mr. James Callaghan of the 
British Labour Party who had threatened to pull out of the EEC if the accession 
arrangements were not renegotiated. Britain’s proposal for renewal rested heavily on 
the issue of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and aid for the developing countries 
to include Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and Sri Lanka. Britain’s 
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proposal forced a response which exposed the reasons why the EEC in the first place 
had excluded the Commonwealth Asian States, these reasons support the thesis that 
European was about protecting its interests. France opposed Asian inclusion arguing 
the size of the aid budget would be obliterated; The German’s were concerned about 
additional financial burden on their budget while Italy argued relative poverty in its own 
territory to the conditions in those Asian countries. Britain, after causing grave alarm in 
the EEC, eventually withdrew its conditions and proposals. But the initiative had not 
escaped the attention of the ACP States which they exploited because it opened up the 
depth of the divisions within the EEC. 
At the time of these negotiations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, Spain 
and Portugal were potentially suppliers of Mediterranean and semi tropical fruits 
including citrus but were not yet Members of the EC130. Europe by then had fairly cheap 
supplies of tropical products and there was no threat from the North American suppliers 
so, it was in Europe’s interest that the ACP-EC trade relations remain intact but must be 
monitored with safeguards. There were other concerns however which it was felt best 
left to be addressed over time as the relationship developed. For example, Europe 
wanted a longer-term Agreement to foster stability in supplies of raw material but the 
ACP opted for a five-year agreement, to which Europe conceded.131 
1.15 Building cohesion and support for Lomé through the Group of 77 
When Britain applied for accession to the EEC in 1969, discussion were already very 
advanced in UNCTAD on preferential trade arrangement as the African  and Caribbean 
countries had formulated their positions on preferential trade arrangements within their 
own group in UNCTAD.  
                                                        
130 Both Portugal and Spain  acceded to the Treaty on the 12th June 1985. 
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The Caribbean had also developed a strategy of negotiating with political leaders of the 
national level within the EEC while negotiating with the Commission not only did they 
penetrated the political elites but where necessary reached other Commissions within 
the EEC so as to impact the outcome of the various aspects of the Lomé 
negotiations.132   
The Africans States had been urging the acceptance by the developed countries of the 
principle that developing countries should be accorded preferential treatment 
particularly in the protection of infant industries based on the recognition that even with 
complete liberalization of trade the developing countries would not be in a position to 
compete on even terms with the industrialized countries. 
While the Lomé negotiations slowed because the EEC sought answers and responses, 
the ACP States were very active at another level in other arenas, organising themselves 
for the wider agenda to effect changes at the global level. The ACP convinced the 
Europeans to agree to a joint Ministerial in Kingston, Jamaica set for July 25th, 1974. 
The Caribbean had become a central point of focus as this was the very first time in 
over three hundred years that a meeting of Europe was been held outside of Europe 
and more so, upon Caribbean soil.  
The work of leading Caribbean Political figures namely; Forbes Burnham and Michael 
Manley in the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement had began to attract international 
attention, the Peoples National Party (PNP) of which Mr. Manley was the leader had 
gone to the center of left ideologically and had become a Member of Socialist 
International of which Mr. Manley himself was a vice President. He attracted the 
international spot light when he stood with Cuba in sending troops to Angola and 
Mozambique, and by taking stance against the racist regime in South Africa. He was 
view as a fierce critic of United States Foreign Policy in the Caribbean region and its 
Continuing treatment of economic embargo and isolation against Cuba. Mr. Manley had 
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publicly defended the region on its decision to recognize Cuba and opened diplomatic 
relations. He was indeed a vigorous proponent and campaigner of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). The Europeans were on “Caribbean soil”. Mr. Manley, himself, 
an economist and a successful trade unionist got an opportunity to break a deadlock in 
international negotiations and was determined to do so, on behalf of the ACP and the 
developing world.  
The Kingston meeting marked a crucial turning point in the negotiation. The negotiations 
had stalled because the EEC’s negotiators had no mandate and the ACP States came 
to realize that the real power in Europe rested not in the Commissions but in the EEC. 
Failure to make a break through at this meeting would be catastrophic and therefore the 
ACP was determined not to fail and this created the atmosphere for its success.  
Manley’s contribution was legendary. Referring to the prevailing world crisis and 
recession Prime Minister Manley argued; that “… it was only the final and conclusive 
evidence of the fact that the World’s economic system as it relates to the relationship 
between nations has been overtaken by events and is no longer capable of containing 
the political realities of our times and that it had outlived its usefulness”133.  
He further argued that “…the classical notions of free trade in which prices and the 
movement of resources respond to free market forces cannot inhabit the same world 
which subscribes to the political notion of equality and international justice”134.  
He continued to press the case and reiterated that “we will understand that the world 
cannot permanently contain the gross inequalities of wealth either as between classes 
or as between nations. We have been proclaiming these truths for a generation and 
have with each proclamation added to the climate of popular expectation now the 
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events of the last twelve months have brought us to that crisis where the entire world 
demands of its leaders and of its political systems that the will to action be found”.  
In addressing what he saw as the truth he said that  
“…the world is now familiar with the political rhetoric that summons us to action; it 
can equally be asserted that we know the problem. We all know that aid from the 
richer to the poorer countries is of assistance but cannot solve the problems. We 
also know that transfer of technology can also help. Any new arrangement of the 
world’s international economic relations which intends to seriously grapple with 
the problems of poverty and the growing gap between the rich and the poor 
nations must begin by providing a decisive answer to the problem of the terms of 
trade”.  
He emphatically called for new trade arrangements when he opined that:  
“…the principles of the stabilization of real export earnings must form a part of 
any new arrangements between the A.C.P countries and European community. 
There must be true commitment on all sides to an acceptance of the principles 
that the adverse movement of the terms of trade of trade against the countries of 
the Third World must be brought to a stop and that equitable terms of trade are 
the foundation of any world economic order that accepts the idea of international 
justice for all”135. 
At the end of Mr. Manley’s presentation, the President of the EC Council was obviously 
moved and responded positively by agreeing to the need for political negotiations on the 
principles and left the consequential details to be finalized at the technical level. Mr. 
Manley had made the case for the inclusion of stabilization scheme for fluctuation of 
prices for agricultural exports. The president of the ACP, the Minister from Senegal 
,Babacar Ba called for a solution to be found at the political level and that all efforts be 
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made to muster the will so to do must be expended. Francophone Africa had by then 
decided to permanently drop their insistence on reciprocity. 
But before the agreements were finalized, it seemed that some last ditched efforts were 
under the way to steer the unfolding events into another direction. There, upon 
resumption of one of the scheduled breaks, neither the chairman of the ACP, 
Senegalese Minister nor the chairman of the EEC could be found. Both were later 
discovered locked away in a Hotel room at the conference center conducting their own 
negotiations, the ACP’s response to this side meeting was swift and decisive.136 
An extensive and well needed break-through came in the Kingston meeting, there were 
agreements on non-reciprocity, rules of origin and that all ACP States were accepted as 
economic unit. The EEC also agreed to reduce non-tariff barriers under CAP, the 
principles of Stabilization but the size of fund was to be further discussed. 
There were still some outstanding matters to be settled for example; (1) ACP’s 
proposals for Industrialization on which some promises were made; (2) size of the 
financial aid package aid and sugar exports. But sugar was destined to be very difficult 
because of EEC’s continued incessant frictions between Britain on the one hand and 
the Belgians and French on the other over quotas and commitments under CAP and (3) 
arrangements for bananas, rum and beef. 
The ACP had made their position known and had used the opportunity to explain and 
further clarified some outstanding issues. Mr. Manley had widened the debate by pulling 
in the political actors at the center of the problems and forewarned that the 
consequences of failure would be placed squarely at their feet.  Mr. Manley’s approach 
put pressure on an already fragile uneasiness in the EEC Council to make a decision to 
avoid deepening the international economic crises with is precipitous and residual 
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political effects. The Kingston meeting forced the EEC to close ranks and collectively 
protect the interest of Europe against external threat by taking the necessary actions.  
1.16    The final stage of the negotiation 
After the Kingston ACP-EEC Ministerial, the negotiations moved into its final stage, but 
time was running out, as the EEC seemed to have been slowing the process tactically, 
to use the expiration of time to force   the hands of the ACP137. The ACP was resolute 
on the question of time; they were not prepared to let the EEC jeopardize their wider 
global agenda and therefore had declared their intention not to allow the possibility of 
not meeting the dead line for the expiration of the Yaoundé and Arusha Agreements to 
push them into signing an agreement. So, as Europe moved, the ACP countered, a 
classic negotiating game was been played out. The ACP had enjoined the EEC in using 
the time-tactics in negotiation. Neither party was willing to give in, but in the end. The 
Caribbean knew that a new model was their objective and therefore they were willing to 
play the “waiting” game138. 
The ASSM were fearful as to the consequence of no agreement when Yaoundé had 
expired, they were given them the assurances of protection as another Joint Ministerial 
was set for January13th, 1975 to try and move things along on the issues of sugar and 
the size of the EDF, after several arguments and counter positions, it became clear to 
both parties that one certainty loomed largely; no agreement would be reached to meet 
the expected deadline for completion.  
ACP’s resoluteness was unequivocally expressed by Ramphal when he observed that; 
ACP had the right to have the record of the meeting reflect the pressure brought to bear 
on the group by the Community intending to “stampede” the negotiations to close. His 
suspicion of European tactics came veritable when he further observed that the group 
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cannot agree to sign an agreement before it did what the Europeans regard “as 
necessary domestic examination”139 but the ACP will strive to reach an agreement. 
Ramphal exposition bore two important elements of ACP’s tactics. Firstly, they waited 
because Europe was under domestic pressure and its citizens wanted answers to the 
international crises and therefore time was turning against them, secondly, the ACP 
unity was holding. These were positive indicators for the ACP States. However, the draft 
agreement was ready and further delay would not have added any advantage to the 
ACP’s cause. But, they refused to sign the trade and aid package in order to secure the 
sugar agreement. Europe’s difficulties with sugar arose because the main beneficiary of 
ACP sugar was the United Kingdom which for its own self interests had joined issue 
with the ACP States and the French had given assurances to its Caribbean territories 
that it would protect them against ACP suppliers140. 
A further meeting was set for January 30th 1975.However,by then most of the political 
questions were settled. But the sugar regime was not agreed and remained very difficult 
and controversial. There, the issue of the size of the EDF was agreed, so too were the 
issues of banana, beef and rum. The EEC again pressed for Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) in the trade package, but, the ACP would not relent. 
Sugar was the very last item to decided and that session was very contentious, so 
fractious it was that voices were raised and tempers flared. The exchanges had gotten 
so heated between the ACP sugar negotiator and his Belgian EEC counterpart that only 
the timely intervention of the Head of the EEC delegation that averted a physical 
exchange.141 
The sugar agreement was reached at about 1 a.m on the 1st of February as Britain 
agreed for the Community to buy 1.4 million tons of sugar from ACP States, but the 
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parties could not sign until the French President has removed a veto, which he has 
earlier placed on Caribbean sugar to protect the sugar producers of Guadeloupe and 
Martinique from competition. The veto was finally removed at about 6 a.m. when the 
French team finally located the President142. The marathon meeting lasted almost 24 
hours, and in the end an agreement was reached and the heads of both delegations 
exchanged Letters of Assent. Armed with an agreement the ACP went into its 7th 
Ministerial in Accra, Ghana held on the11-12 February, 1975 and there the document 
was reviewed and by resolution the formal text of the agreement was adopted. 
Signing of the agreement which was originally scheduled to be held in Sudan was set 
for February 28th, 1975 in the Togo’s Capital, Lomé, from which it derived its name. 
This historic arrangement has never had any parallel in the annals of trade and 
cooperation agreements. At the signing, the President of the EEC Commission 
observed that; the Convention provided answers to some fundamental questions as to 
North-South relations. For the ACP States the agreement had opened up possibilities. 
Ramphal, in expressing hope and disappointments experienced during the negotiations 
observed the value of the potentials of the Agreement and accepted it as a stepping 
stone for a wider objective, but lamented some unfulfilled expectations143. 
1.17  An assessment of the agreement 
At the signing ceremony, Ramphal had expressed disappointment, but was hopeful, this 
meant that ACP did not achieved at the table all of what they had wanted. But in light of 
where they had started five years earlier, they had achieved something on which they 
hoped to build on.  
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For the EEC, the exercise was a learning experience in dealing with the developing 
countries. But they gave very little, for while Stabex was an innovation, its funding was 
still in the hands of the EEC and the payment of funds had to meet certain criteria and 
the quantities of ACP agricultural products including banana could not affect CAP, as 
banana is not produced in Europe and the supply of the fruit was covered. So, apart 
from internal commercial competition among EEC corporate interests the deal was 
favourable as the price of banana was not likely to fall due such as copper, nickel for 
example were excluded for reasons not unconnected to market prices and constant 
demand. Sugar which was the largest export commodity of the ACP States which was 
most important to CAP had guarantees in quantity. 
In terms of the rules of origin, the EEC gave up very little because to have lowered the 
value added to the levels where the ACP had wanted which was 25 percent would have 
given the ACP States a chance at competing in manufactured goods and possibly 
attract more FDI.So, the ACP did not gain in this area, so also in the area of industrial 
cooperation. EEC was not worst off, but succeeded in satisfying the Africans hope for 
industrialisation under the OAU’s Declaration at Abidjan May 12, 1973. 
Reciprocity was an item which the EEC had pressed throughout more than any other 
item. This in the end would have been their most valuable concession but, not just 
because it held out possibilities for markets share in Africa which was a large outlet for 
Europe’s manufactures goods, but more so, because the issue of justifying it under 
GATT Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and in particular to those other countries which 
were of similar economies and stage of development as the ACP States. 
The EEC seemed to have come out of the negotiations not with all of what it had 
wanted for example to get a reciprocal non preference agreement, but they secured 
three major objectives. Firstly, the integrity of Part IV as an instrument of aid and non 
industrialisation was achieved, secondly it secured for itself continued supplies of raw 
material for its industries and finally, staved threatening confrontation with the South 
and created a respite for Europe to plan for the return of reciprocity. 
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Before the Agreement was signed the ACP State assembled in Georgetown Guyana to 
formally sign the Accord which established the group as an entity in global trade 
relations. But, by 1977, the group met in Fiji and signed the Suva Accord which outlined 
the extent of the South –South cooperation for industrial development144. 
The implementation of the Convention was a clear and decisive exposition of the value 
and purposes of the Lomé Regime, its benefits, weaknesses and eventual demise are 
the issued now to be addressed. 
1.18 Lomé ll - Lomé IV 
The negotiations for the successive Lomé conventions had followed a similar pattern as 
the first agreement and their out comes seemed quite predictable. However since the 
first agreement, Europe embarked upon a process of reclamation145 and assertiveness 
and positioned itself to dictate terms.  
Since the 1975 Agreement, he ACP states have continuously complained about the 
responses of the EEC, and that the aid funding was inadequate while the process to 
access funds under the EDF remained very bureaucratic and cumbersome. The EEC 
started to pull back on some of the gains the ACP States had made for example, the 
mechanism for accessing the STABEX fund was very problematic in the implementation 
and the EEC tried to make change to it, there were problems with the SYSMIN regime. 
Lomé ll had not seen much changes except for the introduction of  SYSMIN to 
compensate for losses in the mining sector, but by then it was clear to the ACP that the 
trade arrangements were not making any difference for then in terms of earnings and 
contemplated further  measures to improve ACP trade performance. For example, 
Suriname made a request for liberalising access for 50 products but the EC declined the 
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request146. The EC had given it undertaking to the ACP States under Lomé ll, not to use 
safeguard measures or other means of protection to hamper ACP development, but, in 
1979 the EC threatened Mauritius to reduce exports of textile of face safeguard 
measures147. 
The shift in relative bargaining position started to show signs from the negotiation of 
Lomé II and continued throughout Lomé III and IV, for example, the relative ease with 
which the EC shifted grant resources from traditional projects to the financing of 
adjustment lending in Lomé IV. In circumstances where structural adjustment was a 
feature of ACP economies in the 1980’s and 1990’s and financial support was their 
priority areas for assistance. The EU opted to use those issues to obtain agreement to a 
highly conditional use of grant resources from those countries that just previously had 
successfully resisted the community policy dialogue.  
The introduction of political dialogue in ACP agreement was introduced by the ACP 
States in the joint declaration of Article 4 of Lomé III which addresses the issues of 
human rights. This was followed up in Lomé lV with further amendments arising from 
the mid-term review of Lomé .and so, the EU declaration in Article 4 of the Convention, 
annex III A, effectively incorporated Article 177 of the EU Treaty into the Convention 
and this was  linked to financial support under Article 5(3) of the Convention, a breach 
of which  would attract sanction under the terms of the Convention 
Lomé IV was signed on the 15th December 1989 for a period of ten years as opposed 
to five in previous agreements. This was termed a comprehensive cooperation 
agreement as it covered broad areas of human rights and industrial development to 
cultural cooperation. However it was  the EC which insisted on the ten years duration.  
                                                        
146  Address by Mr. Okelo‐Odongo, Secretary‐General of the ACP Group on “The Lomé Convention as seen 
from the ACP Perspective” April, 23, 1981. 
147 Ibid. 
90 
 
 
There is little doubt that after thirty five years of implementation that the Lomé system 
though not completely useless was a mere “ad hoc device” which served the European 
agenda at a time of real and perceived crisis for the global political economy which was 
in transition148. Indeed, it can be argued that the long term effect of the implementation 
of the Lomé Convention is to lure the ACP States into a unrealistic sense of 
achievement and comfort which served to undermined the debate for the New 
International Economic Order(NIEO) and put very little value to the UNCTAD regime of 
GSP in preparation for the launch of the Uruguay Round of GATT.  
By the time Lomé IV was signed, the EU again was about to expand under the 
Maastricht Treaty, a new Commission the college of Commissions programmes were 
under one Commission with responsibilities in DE VIII and DGI as were the newly 
created European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). DGI also dealt with trade 
and relations with developing countries which was overseen by two other Commissions. 
In the new Commission this is now divided between four Directorates General (DGs) 
and ECHO, each with a separate Commissioner149. This new Agreement has 
fragmented the development cooperation policy of the EU which made it extremely 
difficult to penetrate in any negotiation because of the various layers and tiers of 
authority and the extent of bureaucracy as DGI now has responsibilities for relations of 
the Community with the United State, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. Trade 
and commercial policies were placed within this directorate.  
DGI was put in charge of central and Eastern European countries and those of the 
former Soviet Union, Mongolia, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and other European countries 
outside of the EU.  DGI B had responsibilities for the Mediterranean region, the middle 
and far Eastern countries; Latin America and Asia while DGI was left to manage 
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149 Van Reisen, Mirjam.  EU ‘Global Player’: The North­South Policy of the European Union. International Books, 
London (1999), p. 53. 
91 
 
 
relations with ACP countries and the implementation of Lomé Convention and relations 
with South Africa.  
The insertion of Article 177-181 into the EC Treaty as a result of the 1991 Maastricht 
Intergovernmental Conference marked an important stage in the history of the EU’s 
development cooperation policy as it provides a road map to the future of the policy. 
The objectives set in Article 177 are a reflection of the past development policy. The 
measures taken by Council under Article 170 to further the objectives set in Article 177 
shall not accord with Article 179(3) which affects cooperation with the African Caribbean 
and Pacific countries in the framework of the ACP-EEC Convention. What the Cotonou 
Convention sought to do is to dilute the special provisions accorded to the ACP in the 
EU’s development cooperation policy now guaranteed by the Treaty but was developed 
“ad hoc” and piecemeal which led to some inconsistencies albeit maintained and 
streamlined. In an integrated policy approach, the EU has placed the Mediterranean, 
Asian and Latin American countries on a similar footing as the ACP States. 
A change in EC policy approach to ACP cooperation post Soviet demise had its 
foundation in the so called green paper which posited that a threshold of change for the 
twenty first Century ACP is seek a greater prospect for development, as their strength 
and structure of governance were under strain. There  in an effort to raise the quality of 
the partnership, the EEC has to address political issues in these countries.  
The Commission in this regard argued for a restructuring of the future of the EU 
Cooperation Policy with the ACP around the issue of politics, economics and a social 
agenda for sustained development and therefore the need for a fundamental shift in 
Lomé relations was envisaged150. The true character of the relationship was exposed 
when Member States of the EU sat in conclave and made their decision as to their 
course of action with respect to the ACP in order to achieve EU’s objectives and did so 
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ostensibly without consultation with their ACP partners. They came up with positions so 
cast, that no amount of debate or persuasion from the ACP States could cause a single 
iota or a mere scintilla of a shift to accommodate the views of the ACP states. Europe 
by then was in full charge of the direction it wanted to go in terms of trades and aid 
support. 
The outcome of these negotiations seemed to be already determined. This position 
raised questions as to the nature of this partnership and its new Euro-centric undertone. 
And so, as the negotiation opened, the ACP mandate of June 29th 1998 echoed article 
177 of the EC Treaty and agreed that the eradication of poverty and integration of ACP 
states into the global economy would be the focus of the new cooperation agreement.  
 
By 1998, the EU was very strong on the question of human rights in the ACP States and 
therefore political dialogue in ACP thought not new, was heightened based on the joint 
declaration of Article 4 of Lomé III addresses the issues of human rights. This was 
followed up in Lomé lV with further amendments arising from the mid-term review of 
Lomé lV, and so the EU declaration in Article 4 of the Convention, annex III A, 
effectively incorporated Article 177 of the EU Treaty into the Convention and this was 
now linked to financial support under Article 5 (3) of the Convention a breach of which 
will attract sanction under the terms of the Convention.  
Effectively, what was originally a trade and cooperation agreement had been 
transformed and broadens into a political instrument of EC internal policy position which 
the EU had long hoped to achieve.151  So by the time Cotonou was signed even the 
Lomé acquits was changed152 ostensibly, the ACP no longer stood at the apex of 
privilege and the ACP States. So, after thirty five years of cohesion and solidarity the 
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ACP have been split and indeed fragmented into six regions to negotiate further EPA 
with the EU without any opportunity of further waiver after December 2007.  
The dialogues surrounding the issue of aid and commodity price compensation under 
STABEX and SYSMIN as payments were very slow due to inadequacy of fund and the 
ACP’s call for reform of that system. In the final analysis, the EU demanded that transfer 
of funds under Lomé had to be conditional on economic reforms in the recipient states. 
This was structural reform type of conditionality along the lines of those impose by the 
IMF.  ACP states sought to protect their commercial interest in the Convention and as 
such expressed their concerns about the impact of the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO 
tariff cutting measures reached in December 1993. The EU Commission sought to 
tentatively defend ACP preferences in a document submitted to GATT/WTO in October 
1994, making the case that the Lomé system can be made compatible, through an 
exception accorded by the WTO or through the declaration of an eventual free trade 
area between the ACP and the EU153.  
It is without doubt however, that there was a need to better administer the aid aspect of 
the Lomé Agreement. Because, the conflicts of economic and moral interests which 
occupied the national interest of some European States seemed to have overflowed into 
their eagerness to enforce sanction against states of the ACP or regimes deemed guilty 
of human rights violation. These conditions, it is argued are more easily accommodated 
in multilateral or bilateral agreements and not suitable for trade agreements and so, the 
Lomé Convention became a convenient instrument of European political device to 
enforce adherence to human rights. It is therefore not surprising that the EU needed to 
take control of the implementation of its aid projects in ACP states contrary to the spirit 
and intent of the Lomé Conventions154.  
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The paradigm shift in EC policy and approach to ACP cooperation post Soviet demise 
was reinforced in the depth of the importance attached to human rights and governance 
issues which had been previously relaxed in the earlier years. The collapse of the 
Soviet system exposed the political undertone of the EC’s aid and development 
practices and policies towards developing countries more so, to those in Africa.  
The Commission in this regard, pushed for a restructuring of the future of the EU 
Cooperation Policy with the ACP around the issue of politics, economics and a social 
agenda for sustained development and therefore the need for a fundamental shift in 
Lomé relations was envisaged.155 
One of the issues which confronted the Member States of the EU was how to reconcile 
the failure of past Lomé Agreements to meet their objectives on the one hand and 
further, to justify its continuation in light of the need for development, and at the same 
time protect the persona of the EU itself. Further, if the ACP countries are to be 
integrated into the global economy, a framework had to be developed which was WTO 
consistent and to avoid at all cost any need for a GATT waiver.  
There was general consensus on the need to integrate. However, the reasons 
advanced by the EU Member States were diverse at the least, for example the UK took 
the view of the negative impact of GATT waiver on the predictability of trading 
arrangement, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands argued the need to avoid 
discrimination against other developing countries therefore this need for a global 
approach found favour with other Member States, while France argued against 
globalizing the Convention in preference of the need to keep focused on Africa, 
Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain argued for regional economic partnership 
agreements as a means of revitalizing the Lomé relationship.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Assistance,  ACP Secretariat, (1997). 
 
155 See. McMahon, Joseph A, in Olufemi Barbarinde and Gerrit Faber ed, Op.Cit.  p. 45. 
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It is very instructive that these Member States of the EU sat in conclave and made their 
decision as to their course of action with respect to the ACP in order to achieve their 
objectives and did so ostensibly without consultation with their ACP partners and came 
up with their positions so tightly cast, that no persuasion from the ACP States could 
amount to a single iota or a mere scintilla of factual presentation was sufficient to 
accommodate the views of the ACP states on the part of the EU. The outcome of these 
negotiations seemed to be already determined.156.  
And so as the negotiation opened, the ACP mandate of June 29th 1998 echoed article 
177 of the EC Treaty and agreed that the eradication of poverty and integration of ACP 
states into the global economy would be the focus of the new Cooperation Agreement.  
Effectively therefore what was originally  trade and cooperation agreement had been 
transformed and broaden into a political instrument of EC internal policy position which 
the EU had long hoped to achieve157 so, by the time Cotonou was signed, even the 
Lomé acquis was changed158. Europe’s external trade policy has been inextricably 
linked to its social policy and was transported into the ACP-EU cooperation as a part of 
a deliberate design and strategy to enforce its governance standards by tying aid 
support to trade and political questions. The ACP States could not resist the linkages 
applied by the EU, but succeeded in getting them to relent on their demand to apply 
sanctions to the entire group of ACP States, were a Member State to have been guilty 
of any violation of Human rights conditions159.The ACP States had previously 
introduced Human and political rights issues into the Lomé regime in the 1980s  as part 
of its offensive strategy in trying to get the EU to be more involved in the political 
questions impacting some African States. However, those early initiatives were never 
                                                        
156  Interview: K.D Knight, Kingston, Nov.14, 2008. 
157 ACP Council  of Ministers Meeting,  Lusaka 1997. The Courier No.  47  (January – February 1978),  p.  111. 
 
158 Interview‐ K. D. Knight.  November 12, 2008.  See Georgetown Agreement. 
159 Ibid. 
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intended as conditionality’s to be imposed, but instead to be used as mere offensive 
instruments of good governance in the apartheid era.  
Lomé IV the EC had grown in self confidence, stature and importance more so than at 
any time in its history buoyed by the prospect of completing the single integrated market 
in 1992 and the pending accession of an unprecedented list of new entries to the union 
coupled with the emergence of the new geo-political landscape in Europe. These 
developments added further pressure on the ACP States not only in the areas of aid 
support, but in trade... The EU was  constrained financially with internal demands so 
that its ability to concede to ACP demands in many respect was limited and 
circumscribed, for example, Greece and Portugal feared that the liberalization of trade 
in agricultural products would affect their economies, while Greece  opposed an 
extension of SYSMIN because it argued that it would adversely affect Greece’s bauxite 
production.  
The timing of the negotiation for Lomé IV is of significance because of the EU’s 
involvement with the Uruguay Round of GATT which was ongoing at the time of that 
Round. The EU wanted the support of the ACP state during those negotiations and 
secured that support through its relations with the ACP160 under the Lomé 
In the context of the Uruguay Round negotiation, the EU was cognizant of the 
repercussion on Lomé of reducing tariff further at the multilateral level and so before the 
negotiation for Lomé IV opened the EC announced its intention to cut tarrifs on certain 
tropical products, for example, coffee, oilseeds, jute and hard fibers, manioc tobacco 
and spices. This move compromised the integrity of Lomé which was already being 
affected by the expansion of the EU to take in the newly independent state of Eastern 
Europe. This also compounded the ACP‘s position as it compressed EU’s timing for the 
negotiations with the ACP.  
                                                        
160 Interview‐ Senator K. D Knight. Kingston, Jamaica, November 12th 2008. 
97 
 
 
The EU was therefore in no mood for a protracted negotiation of the Cotonou 
Agreement as delay could be inimical to its interest. They therefore pressed for an early 
conclusion of those negotiations. So, while the internal political wrangling continued in 
the EU on issues of aid for ACP and other trade issues had delayed their negotiating 
mandate and thus the start of its negotiation with the ACP. The ACP states craved 
some certainty regarding many areas of their  negotiation and what was the likely 
position of the EU. Because, it was only on the eve on the opening of those negotiations 
that the EU settled its mandate. This further compounded the time frame to negotiate an 
agreement and the EU was not prepared to alter its agenda in any material respect to  
benefit  its ACP Partners. The EU by then was well aware of the ACP States dilemma 
and internal weaknesses but was not willing to aid their case. From there onwards, ACP 
unity was fundamentally fractured and the cracks began to open.  
ACP States were very slow in accepting the fact that their interests were affected by the 
revolutionary changes taking place in Europe and the likely impact on their trade and 
financial relations and also on the nature of its political cooperation. The political 
dynamics of Europe had changed so also, its approach to external relations with ACP 
States161 and other developing countries.  
To this end, the Caribbean to the initiative to organise a conference in London on the 
theme “1992 and the Caribbean” to examine the implications of 1992 for the region but 
in as much as the EC Commission gave assurances that post 1992 European would not 
become a fortress. But will develop through partnership in which there will be benefits to 
EC and non EC countries alike because the completion of the single market would also 
give major boost to the EC and that would in turn have favourable repercussions for its 
internal relations. In this regard, the 1992 integration would not mean greater 
protectionism as the EC has a great stake in free and open international trade and that 
                                                        
161 Interview‐ K .D. Knight, November 12, 2008. 
 
98 
 
 
the EC’s external economic policy in transition post 1992 would take place in harmony 
with its existing international obligations both multilaterally and bilaterally.  
But soon after Lomé IV was signed the EC embarked upon a review of its relationship 
with the Third World and commissioned a green paper which was adopted by the 
European Commission on the 20th November 1996 which addressed all aspects of the 
ACP-EU relations since the 970s. This opened a debate on the future of the 
relationship. The goal of the EU to revitalise ACP-EU relations and opened up new 
horizons was still a key part of the Union’s identity162 following upon the midterm review 
of the relations which commenced paving the way for the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.  
The ACP States were so underprepared for that negotiation that apart from the issues 
of cultural cooperation and human rights163 the only changes which emerge in Lomé IV 
was mainly those which the EU wanted including the ten years duration for the 
Convention with the funding levels review after five years. It became clear from the 
tenor of the midterm review that it would not be business as usual between the parties. 
The midterm review was launched in May 1994 and should have been completed by 
March 1995 but continued to the end of June. The question of aid was a vexed one 
which the EC wanted not to address because the desire to reformulate the entire Lomé 
regime in the wake of the end of the Cold War was a crucial issued which was raised as 
Europe wanted to have more control over the Lomé Convention.  
At the very heart of the relationship between ACP and EU was the political and 
economic question which was best expressed post Cold War assessment. During the 
midterm assessment it was felt that the fundamental changes in the international 
political landscape following the demise of the Soviet system called for a morefar- 
reaching examination of the Convention than just valuing the aid package. The 
                                                        
162 Forward to the EC’s Green Paper on relations between the Europe Union and the ACP countries on the eve 
of the 21st century, Changes and Options for a New Partnership. European Commission Directorate‐General 
VIII, Brussels. (November 20, 1996). 
 
163 News Round Up,  the A.C.P‐EEC Negotiations for Lomé IV, The Courier 117, (September – October 1989), 
p.1. 
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Commission was in some haste to effect changes to modernise the convention. By 
1990, the Convention had no political competition from the Soviet system while large aid 
donors such as the World Bank, USAID and the EU had reached a consensus on the 
direction of the market economy which they wanted to pursue with developing countries. 
European Member States wanted to take control of Lomé and further shift the balance 
of power and consolidate the relationship more in favour of the EC partners. It was the 
ACP-EU Joint Assembly which had to remind the EU that the mid-term review was 
intended for a review of Lomé IV and not a renegotiation of a new Lomé. It became 
clear from the result of the midterm review as to the directions the EU wanted to go with 
respect to Lomé. They were impatient for change so by the time the review was 
completed the motion was set in place for the Commissioning of the green paper which 
provided the framework for Cotonou and the EPA. However, PJ Patterson of Jamaica 
warned of the dangers to ACP economies and the problems which would ensue if 
Europe continued to pursue the proposed changes to its internal arrangements without 
due regards to the ACP’s concerns. He made clear the position of the Caribbean states 
by drawing to the attention of the political leaders of the EU and Heads of State of ACP 
as to the CARICOM’s main concerns on the draft proposals emanating from the 
European Commission which were outlined as: The over-concentration on political 
issues which the EU proposed for address almost exclusively in the first phase of 
negotiations 1998-2000 deferring the trade and economic aspects of the new 
arrangements for the period 2000-2005. Mr. Patterson was concerns about; 
a) The EU’s unilateral approach in setting its own selective political criteria on which to 
judge ACP states in making its decisions on future ACP/EU trade and economic 
cooperation. There criteria crave focused on ACP countries treatment of issues 
relating to human rights democracy and the rule of law and good governance and  
b) The crucial importance of maintaining the ACP Groups solidarity which had played a 
key role in achieving the Lomé Agreements. He argued that the Caribbean region 
remained of the view that any new cooperation agreement should support existing 
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regional arrangements and not dismantle existing structures for cooperation 
between the ACP and the EU. While accepting the need for a new ACP-EU 
agreement to be compatible with WTO rules, he asserted the Caribbean‘s intension 
to secure no lower levels of market access from that which is presently provided to 
ACP countries under the Lomé Convention164.  
1.19    Cotonou and the dismantling of the Lomé regime 
The European Union had shown clear intentions from the mid-term review of Lomé lV 
that it was about to institute sweeping policy changes to it relations to developing 
countries and the ACP States were not being spared, the policy documents and official 
pronouncements were pointing in that direction165. So, by the time Contonou was 
negotiated the mood for change in Europe had taken effect and ACP diplomacy was by 
then on the defensive and non- responsive. The approach to negotiating the Cotonou 
Agreement was quite different on the part of the EU as compared to earlier experiences. 
The green paper set the tone and directions for the Cotonou arrangements. So, by the 
time Cotonou negotiations were opened, the fate of non-reciprocal preferences under 
Lomé were known in light of the influence of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
the rejection of UNCTAD’s development policies in terms of global trade directions.  
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO had ruled on the EU banana regime in 
the case brought by non-ACP Member States166. There, in dispute was the EU 
Regulation establishing a common organization of the market against which dollar-zone 
                                                        
164 Speech by Honourable P.J. Patterson, Q.C. M.P, Prime Minister of Jamaica to the 17th ACP/EEC Joint Council 
Meeting, Jamaica Conference Center, Kingston. Jamaica. May 21, 1992. 
 
165 The EC published several documents indicating of its new policy positions. The EC Green Paper on the 
relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century, Luxemburg: 
Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1996. EC Guidelines for the Negotiations of new Co‐operation 
Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific 9ACP) Countries. Luxemburg: 1997, The Lomé Trade Regime, 
Luxemberg, 1997, An Analysis of Trends in the Lomé lV Trade Regime and Consequences of Retaining it. 
Luxemburg 1999.  
166 For a full discussion of the WTO ruling on the Banana regime see Komuko, Novio. ‘The EC Banana regime 
and Judicial control’ Journal of World Trade Vol. 34 No. 5 October 2000 p. 1. 
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exporters had objected and challenged twice. On their second challenge the WTO 
decided in their favour. In the view of the Tribunal the Lomé waiver granted by GATT 
was limited to preferential treatment so required by the Convention and therefore could 
not be extended to all preferential treatment which the EU may want to extend to ACP.  
Both the ACP States and the EU went to the negotiating table fully aware that under the 
provisions of GATT/ WTO, preference erosion had affected the Multi-Fibre  Agreement 
(MFA) and therefore would affect textile and clothing which the ACP States exported to 
the EU for which they had exemptions since the 1970s. The challenges to the Lomé 
Agreement covered a wide range of exports of the ACP States more particularly: sugar, 
bananas, rum, beef and veal are under threat. Neither side took any positive step to 
address these problem at the multilateral level, to cushions it the impact on Lomé 
During those negotiations, the EU also had to contemplate the pending enlargement of 
its Membership by accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the 
impact of reform of its internal policies principal of which was the Common Agricultural 
Policy and issue of aid. So also it had in mind the development of relationship with 
countries in the Mediterranean. . 
The severity of the impact of the erosion of trade preferences had placed the Caribbean 
in a very difficult spot from the beginning. For example, the phasing out of rum,  
modernizing of banana regime and the replacement of the licensing regime for ACP 
bananas and the cut –backs  in  set in motion by the reform of the sugar regime decided 
by the EU in November 2005, had very serious  economic consequences for the region.  
The starting point of the EU mandate was compatibility with WTO rules as the Cotonou 
Agreement had committed the EU and ACP States in a defensive position within the 
WTO of their own arrangements in light of what had taken place in the 1990’s and the 
challenge mounted by the United States and others. The issue of compatibility they 
argued was not to be measured in terms of current but futuristic possibilities.  
102 
 
 
Article 37(7) of the Cotonou Agreement speak to conformity with the WTO rules then 
existed and therefore future agreements are not confined by the scope prescribed by 
the current WTO rules and therefore opens a flexibility of interpretation which allows 
negotiators to anticipate certain dynamism to allow them to conclude a convention then 
seek WTO approval. 
The Cotonou Agreement was intended to be a cornerstone arrangement for the return 
to reciprocity. It is argued that in the negotiations for the Cotonou agreement Europe 
used the “time honoured technique of the carrot and stick” to achieve its objectives. 
Cotonou was therefore cast in line with the WTO, and became the “bridge” to make the 
cross over to compatibility to remove the non- reciprocity type of trade regime167. 
The Economic Partnership Agreement between the ACP states and the EU should 
secure an opportunity to accelerate ACP’s regional and global trade integration and an 
important tool for development and the eradication poverty 168.The Cotonou Agreement 
established a comprehensive new framework for bilateral economic relations between 
the EU and ACP by promoting economic growth and development as well as a smooth 
and gradual integration of ACP states into the world economy. From the perspective of 
the EU, two main objectives stood out. First, the EU wanted to include a perspective 
that combined politics, trade and development. In fact, the EPA’s aimed not only to 
provide improved access for ACP’s goods and services to E.U markets to enhance 
trade in services but to increase cooperation and investment. So, the Cotonou 
arrangements went beyond the standard features of a free trade agreement by 
enhancing the political dimensions explicitly addressing corruption, promoting 
participatory approaches and focusing development policies on poverty reduction. The 
main argument for this objective is that the export performance of ACP States had been 
far from satisfactory despite the non-reciprocal trade preferences far products 
                                                        
167 Interview‐ Nornan Girvan, June 15, 2009. University of the West Indies (UWI) St. Agustine T&T. 
168 Bormann, Axel  and Matthias Busse, ‘Development Policy The Institutional Challenge of the ACP/EU 
Economic Partnership Agreements’, Development Policy Review Vol. 25 No. 4 (July 2007), p. 403. 
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originating in the ACP as part of the predecessors of the Cotonou Agreement the Lomé 
I to IV Conventions. The share of the EU market achieved by ACP States declined from 
6.7 percent in 1976 to three (3) percent in 2005.169 Moreover, about 68 percent of total 
ACP export to the EU consisted of agricultural goods and raw materials, and some 74 
percent is concentrated I only ten products. Additional preferences on market access 
alone were very unlikely to benefit ACP in the future. However, the EU failed to evaluate 
the root causes for ACP’s performance. For example, the impact of Lomé restrictive 
RoO, lack of FID and debts.  
Further, among the various reasons for the disappointing export performances and 
general development of ACP States, is the quality of their institutions. This has been a 
major impediment which needed EU’s long-term support to be reformed. However, the 
greatest single disappointment of Lomé era has been the failure of the ACP Group of 
Developing States to actualise the planned industrialisation of the South, through South 
South cooperation170.Secondly; the EU wanted an agreement which is WTO 
compatible. The non-reciprocal trade preferences established under Lomé Conventions 
required a WTO waiver as they are neither restricted to the least developed countries 
(LDC’s) nor were they granted to all developing countries. At the Doha conference 
(2001) the EU obtained the last waiver and it expired in 2007 and therefore the ACP 
States would have to substantially open up their market to EU products within twelve 
years, 2008 to 2020. In the end, the EC  achieved what it had always wanted  to have, a 
reciprocal trade171.So, by 2007, the EC had returned to is original position of the 1970s 
which was to negotiate separately with all three groups, but in parallel negotiations and 
pushed for reciprocity172 
                                                        
169 EU Commission, 2006. 
 
170  Interview‐ PJ Patterson, March 3, 2009. Kingston, Jamaica. 
 
171  Ibid. 
 
172   Interview‐ Sir Alister Mc Intyre Nov.12, 2008. Kingston Jamaica. 
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1.20 Conclusions 
Although Lomé offered generous terms of preference for developing countries in  trade 
and development Co-operation provisions with the objective of promoting trade between 
the ACP states and the Community, the obstacles in implementation played a significant 
role in preventing the success of the agreement in its delivery of ACP’s economic and 
social development. .  
The constant whittling away of the benefits offered to ACP States under Lomé coupled 
with the level of economic decline in almost all of the economies of the ACP countries 
points to the marginalization of the importance of ACP in the context of global political 
economy. The marginalized institutional framework and cooperation apparatus of the 
ACP-EC trade regime has been used by the EU to provide support for its global profile 
of its institutional importance in the global political economy. Therefore, except for their 
support at the multilateral level, ACP States had become less and less important to the 
EC. It was therefore without doubt that there was a great need to better administer the 
aid aspect of the Lomé Agreement. However, the conflicts of economic and moral 
interest which occupies the national interest of some European states seem to have 
overflowed into their eagerness to enforce sanction against states of the ACP or 
regimes deemed guilty of human rights violation are more easily accommodated in 
multilateral or bilateral agreements and so the Lomé became a convenient instrument of 
European political interest in human rights issue. It is therefore not surprising that the 
EU needed to take control of the implementation of its aid projects in ACP States 
contrary to the spirit and intent of the Lomé Conventions. The ACP States found 
themselves bound up in an economic system which predetermined their destinies, a 
situation which they themselves had not created and had not benefited and which was 
never created with their best interest in mind, but was so designed to meet the urgency 
of the then existing pre World War II colonial economic order which was fast failing and 
needed new directions. In circumstances where the need for a new direction found 
expression in the creation of the post World War II institutions which lay the foundation 
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for the political independence of European colonial holdings without making any real 
provision for their economic independence and their integration into the global 
economy. It was just for a matter of time that the carefully disguised EEC’s strategy 
under Lomé, and so craftily implemented that the ACP would err and the EEC got its 
way and achieved its goal. The negotiations of the Lomé Agreements since 1975 have 
highlighted the weaknesses and strengths in the trade and diplomatic strategies of both 
the ACP states and the EC and therefore the Lomé regime cannot be seen as a total 
failure, but the fault of each side to advance their interests by working together as true 
partners. The EU resisted involving the ACP State in many crucial areas of its policies. 
The EPA negotiations within the context of Cotonou, were launched on the 27th 
September 2002 to define a new set of arrangements and focus on WTO compatibility, 
the substratum of which was to achieve the removal of the barriers to trade and 
enhance cooperation in trade related areas in order to impact growth and deal with the 
new development objectives of Cotonou.  
It is therefore argued that the basis of Lomé was indeed a response to the frustration 
faced in UNCTAD by ACP states which seem to have had political “clout” but no real 
economic power. This factor coupled with the fear of Soviet influence penetrating these 
economies and the threat of Commodity cartels made it imperative for the North to seize 
the opportunity to open up a different type of relationships with their former colonial 
territories at a time when the North had had no real answer to the urgency of an 
evolving Third World political Militancy for economic reforms of the global trade 
arrangements and therefore found it convenient to negotiate than to confront.  
The Cariforum states entered the negotiation for a new EPA with the EU to replace the 
Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 and for the new arrangement which came into 
effect on the 1st January 2008, while the aid aspect of Cotonou will continue separately 
until 2020. The Agreement was signed on the 16th of October, 2008 in Bridgetown, on 
the Caribbean island of Barbados. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Negotiating the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement(EPA) 
2.1 Introduction 
The Lomé era came to an end; the regime had served its purpose and had become 
redundant in the context of the emerging trade post Uruguay. The phenomenon of 
Globalization has become the reality of the Global political Economy and the majority of 
European States, which had no colonial link or history to the ACP felt no duty to their 
part to provide one-way preferential trade and development aid, more so to countries 
which are defined as middle-income or developing countries, a group which include 
most of the CARIFORUM States. It was never the policy of Europe to give non-
reciprocity trade preferences, but the circumstances of the early to mid 1970’s forced 
the advent of the Lomé convention. The changes in the Global geopolitics and the result 
of the Uruguay Round presented the opportunity for other countries to persistently 
challenge the EU’s non-reciprocity arrangement with the ACP,  more so for commodities 
such as banana and sugar and to a lesser degree semi processed rum and also some 
the finished product. When compared to the other ACP configuration the CARIFORUM 
ranked 5th in trade volume to the EU, and when taken as a whole, EU’s trade with Africa 
far exceeds, that of the Caribbean.173The Caribbean was well aware that, its value to 
European market had diminished over the years.174 However, the CARIFORUM saw the 
EU as a major source of investment flows and trade particularly Tourism. The Region 
had small trade surplus with the EU in 2006175and it recognized that its growth area for 
trade did not lie in trade in goods, but in services.  
                                                        
173 Eurostat, European communities 2007. EU‐27 Trade with ACP Regions in 2006. 
 
174 Ibid. 
 
175 Ibid. 
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Table 1: Value of Domestic Exports to the EU by CARICOM Countries: 2004 - 2008 
 US$000 
CARICOM COUNTRIES 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CARICOM 987,065 893,925 2,267,464 2,500,599 3,496,781
      
MDCS 865,044 799,290 2,144,829 2,387,185 3,382,165
BARBADOS 36,275 40,549 39,622 37,375 42,120 
GUYANA 183,173 208,307 182,640 237,950 243,950 
JAMAICA 424,534 343,443 481,164 564,520 658,273 
SURINAME * * - - - 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 221,063 206,991 1,441,403 1,547,340 2,438,092
      
LDCs 122,021 94,636 122,635 113,414 114,616 
BELIZE 60,686 55,667 84,357 82,299 79,116 
      
OECS 61,335 38,968 38,278 31,116 35,500 
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA * 103 - 62 - 
DOMINICA 7,422 6,869 7,622 5,134 5,202 
GRENADA 10,127 5,378 1,878 2,438 2,667 
MONTSERRAT 0 0 - - 0 
ST. KITTS & NEVIS 9,673 60 122 141 84 
SAINT LUCIA  22,052 16,014 19,259 13,943 22,977 
ST. VINCENT & GRENADINES 12,060 10,544 9,397 9,398 4,571 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat (2008) 
www.caricomstats.org/Files/Database/Trade/eXCEL%20FILES/CC EU.htm Down loaded April 30, 2010.   
http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/trc/CommonDocs/CARIFORUM-EU_Economic_Partnership_Agreement.pdf 
Key:-means Nil; *means not available 
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Table 2: Value of Imports from the EU by CARICOM Countries: 2004-2006 
 US$000 
CARICOM COUNTRIES 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CARICOM 2,079,906 1,821,804 2,014,134 2,245,061 2,526,839
      
MDCS 1,859,210 1,542,321 1,721,576 1,935,034 2,294,716
BARBADOS 195,852 210,390 222,557 222,842 232,613 
GUYANA 54,359 66,752 89,087 115,296 109,031 
JAMAICA 314,078 340,529 477,398 453,005 505,228 
SURINAME 177,560 249,736 241,144 287,165 237,463 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 1,117,361 674,916 691,390 856,727 1,210,382
      
LDCs 220,696 279,482 292,558 310,027 232,123 
BELIZE 25,540 30,723 42,591 36,609 45,960 
      
OECS 195,156 248,760 249,968 270,417 186,163 
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA * 59,326 58,303 70,275 - 
DOMINICA 19,512 21,026 19,307 20,902 20,817 
GRENADA 30,706 46,422 37,726 39,759 39,231 
MONTSERRAT 4,678 3,183 2,385 2,678 2,620 
ST. KITTS & NEVIS 18,547 19,756 17,950 24,622 21,116 
SAINT LUCIA  85,572 63,251 77,553 65,582 54,428 
ST. VINCENT & GRENADINES 36,140 35,795 36,744 46,599 47,951 
Source: www.caricomstats.org/Files/Database/Trade/eXCEL%20FILES/CC_ EU.htm 
http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/trc/CommonDocs/CARIFORUM-EU_Economic_Partnership_Agreement.pdf 
Key:-means Nil; *means not available. CARICOM’s Major trading partners are: TheUSA, Canada 
&Europe.  
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The conclusion of the Contonou Agreement on the 23rd June, 2000 signalled the end of 
the non-reciprocal trade arrangements which started under the Lomé Convention of 
1975 between the European community and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
group of states. The Agreement led to some changes to the Georgetown Agreement 
which bound the ACP States as a collective group. Shortly after the signing of the 
Cotonou Agreement, the ACP’s Council of Ambassadors were mandated by the Council 
of Ministers to revise the Georgetown Accord and submit proposed changes to the 
Council for approval176. The Accord was amended to reflect the realities of the changed 
circumstances of the ACP States in the context of the Eu’s global trade agenda.  
The negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the 
CARIFORUM group of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States was based upon the 
Cotonou Agreement which outlined the nature of the regime with which it should be 
replaced by the 31st of December 2007.  
The EPA negotiations were conducted in two phases starting with the all ACP-EC 
phase which was launched on the 27th of September 2002 in Brussels and concluded 
on the 2nd of October 2003 when the ACP Council of Ministers and the EC 
Commissioners for Trade and for Development and Humanitarian Aid jointly declared 
the adoption of the Joint-Report on the result that phase. The report served as the guide 
for the negotiations at the regional level 177 which was the next phase.  
The CARIFORUM Group of ACP States and the EU launched negotiation for the EPA 
on April 16th 2004 and concluded in the “early hours” of the morning of October 16th 
2007 in Bridgetown Barbados when the Agreement was initialled by Ambassador 
Richard Bernal of the CARIFORUM group and Karl Falkenberg of the EC. 
                                                        
176 Decision no.3/ LXXIII/ 01/ of the 73rd session of the ACP Council of Ministers held May 9‐10 2001. 
Brussels. 
 
177 European Commission Director‐General for Trade, Brussels, (15 September 2004). Pacific ACP‐EC EPA 
Negotiations Joint Road Map. 
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The negotiations further exposed the nature of the relationship between the 
CARIFORUM States and the EC in its historical context, because the EC having 
decided its external trade policy sought to negotiate with the ACP regions to fit them 
within its wider trade agenda in the context of the Global political economy.178 
This chapter examines the approach of the CARIFORUM States in negotiating the 
Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Commission highlighting its 
preparedness, trade strategy and policies, the offensive and defensive tactical 
positioning of these States in their commercial diplomacy from the launch of the 
negotiation to the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European 
Union and its member states on the 15th of October 2008 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
2.2      Background  
The CARIFORUM States had participated in the all ACP phase of the negotiation for the 
EPA. Leading up to the launch of that phase, the ACP States had completed their 
preparatory work through the establishment of an advisory group of high-level trade 
experts to assist them. In addition, the ACP group got support from some its regional 
configuration which had competence and experience in the main areas for negotiations. 
Support was also sought from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). 
The 75th session of the ACP Council of Ministers held in Punta Cana, Dominican 
Republic on the 26th-27th of June 2002 approved the ACP negotiating guidelines179 
                                                        
178 Interview‐ Anthony Hylton, former Jamaican Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, February 20, 
2009. Kingston, Jamaica. 
 
179  The  guidelines  identified  the  following  issues  for  discussion  at  the  all  ACP  phase  of  the  negotiations: 
principles,  scope  and  content,  special  and  differential  treatment,  financing  the  cost  of  adjustment,  rules  of 
origin, standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, custom and administrative cooperation, framework 
agreement on trade in services sector, fisheries, treatment of trade related issues such as competition policy, 
investment  promotion  and  protection,  trade  and  environment,  institutional  matters  ,  modalities  for  the 
phasing  of  the  negotiations  and  the  resultant  implementation  issues  ,  dispute  settlement  mechanisms, 
safeguard  measures,  legal  status  of  the  agreement,  support  measures  to  overcome  supply  constraints, 
capacity  building,  treatment  of  commodity  protocols,  trade  facilitation,  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  CAP 
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which was prepared by the group of experts and instructed the Ministerial Trade 
Committee to prepare the procedural guidelines for the launch of phase one. 
It was therefore anticipated that at the all ACP phase there would be binding 
commitments made and only country or region specific issues would be addressed at 
the regional negotiation phase. This was one way of achieving uniformity in the 
negotiated out come at the wider ACP level, while the region specific issues were to be 
dealt with at the regional level180. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
reform,  on  agricultural  exports,  WTO–compatibility,  product  coverage  and  transitional  periods  and 
arrangements  with  respect  to  the  establishment  of  the  FTA,  investment  promotion  schemes,  including 
measures to promote the transfer of technology, know‐haw and skills. The regional phase of the negotiation 
would cover inter alia, tariff negotiations and any other specific sectorial commitments at national or regional 
level  as  the  case  may  be  and  issues  of  specific  interest  to  ACP  countries  or  regions.  
 
180    Interview‐  K.D.  Knight,  former  Jamaican Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Foreign  Trade,  November  12, 
2008. Kingston, Jamaica. 
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Table 3: All ACP schedule for EPA Negotiation 
Source: 
ACP/ 61/056/02  [Final] Brussels 5th of  July 2002. Guidelines  for  the negotiations of Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
Dates Negotiation Action Review 
June – Sept. 2002 • Establishing Negotiating Groups. 
• Appointment of Ministerial 
Spokespersons. 
 
Sept. 2002 • Formal launch of the negotiations. • Meeting of ACP MTC.  
• Meeting of Joint MTC. 
• Special Session 
Oct. 2002 – March 
2003 
• Development of negotiations 
documents and positions 
• ACP & Joint MTC to review 
progress 
March – June 2003 • Negotiations at technical level – 
Phase I issues 
 
June  – July 2003 • ACP – EU Ministerial round of 
negotiations – Phase I issues 
• ACP Council of Ministers to 
review progress. 
Sept – Dec. 2003 • Development of legal texts for the all 
ACP – EU Agreement 
• Technical level preparations for 
approach to subsequent negotiations. 
• Start of Phase II of EPA negotiations 
 
2004  • ACP – EU consultations on the 
situation of non-LDCs which are 
not in a position to enter into 
EPAs.  
2003 – 2007  • Phase II of EPA Negotiations  
2006  • Formal ACP – EU review  
2007 • Drafting of legal texts and conclusion 
of the agreements 
• ACP – EU Council to formally 
conclude negotiations.  
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The all ACP phase was not successful for the ACP States because the European 
Commission’s slowness in responding to the ACP’s demands and concerns. The EC 
maintained the view throughout the entire negotiations that the concerns raised by the 
ACP States were already addressed in the Contonou Agreement so that by October 
2003 very little progress was made. The year long stalemate between the two sides was 
broken when Pascal Lamy, the EU’s Commissioner for trade at the Joint Committee 
Meeting in Castries St.Lucia In March, 2003, offered to commence negotiations at the 
regional level with any region which was ready, even before the all ACP negotiations 
were closed. That offer was accepted by the Eastern and Southern African Group of 
ACP States. Therefore, by virtue of those actions Europe had, with the help of the 
COMESA configuration effectively ended the all ACP phase of the negotiations. The 
rest of the ACP grouping was left in an untenable position and quite vulnerable. The 
Council of Ministers on October 1, 2003 realising that the ACP States could not 
manoeuvre, decided to conclude that phase of the negotiations early in 2004.   
The EC  wanted to negotiate  the details of the EPA at the regional level because for 
them it would be too difficult to negotiate some areas for example, the so called 
“Singapore Issues” at the all-ACP level as they were well aware that the ACP States 
and other developing countries were collectively and resolutely opposed to these 
issues181. 
The EC preferred to negotiate those tough issues at the regional level where they 
believed that a greater possibility existed for them to achieve their global objectives than 
to face the entire ACP as a group. However, the ACP wanted to negotiate as a group to 
get an agreement on the broader framework within the ambits of the understanding of 
the developing countries’ trade objectives at the WTO to include the Doha Development 
Agenda. Both positions seemed diametrically opposed in terms of the way forward 
                                                        
181 At the WTO ministerial in Seattle and Cancun, the developing countries band together and opposed the 
negotiation of the “Singapore Issues”. These are areas which are very vital to Developed economies of Europe, 
the USA and Japan. 
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which resulted in a gridlock, but while some members of the ACP group were 
disappointed that Pascal Lamy made the offer to negotiate with any region that felt they 
were ready to commence negotiations even before the all ACP phase was closed, they 
were even more disappointed in its acceptance. The view is widely shared that 
whatever semblances of ACP solidarity which may have remained were for all intent 
and purposes effectively removed in Castries, St. Lucia where the offer was made by 
the EC and accepted by one among the ACP Group182. 
This development was particularly damaging to the ACP’s expressed  agenda, solidarity 
and cohesiveness, because in 2002 the ACP had established a frame work to guide the 
negotiating process which encompassed the need to remove barriers in trade in 
conformity with article 36 (1) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Their approach to 
the negotiation was to keep a steady focus on trade issues in the wider global trade 
arena and to see to what extent they could infuse some flexibility particularly at the 
WTO bearing in light of the requirement for noting the agreement at the WTO. 
It was therefore the intention of the ACP Group to enhance its network in all major 
forum of trade discussion and to maintain its long standing tradition of unity, solidarity 
and cohesion within the group. It therefore behoved them to agree on a common 
approach to the negotiations and the pushed for the following outcome. 
1) EPA’s which were capable of sustaining development. 
2) Enhance ACP unity and solidarity. 
3) Preserve and improve upon the Lomé′ acquis  
4) W.T.O compatibility regarding trade in Goods. 
5) Coherence and consistency. 
                                                        
182 One Cariforum interviewee took the view that the ACP solidarity had waned over the years since the first 
Lomé in 1975. Another  felt that the Francophone Africans were always the weak link in the ACP group and 
that they accepted Lamy’s offer because they believed that an additional financial package would be made 
available for the EPA and therefore to negotiate early would have benefitted them. 
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6) Flexibility 
7) Regional integration priorities 
8) Legitimacy and the provision of additional resources and support for the 
adjustments which would accompany the EPA implementation.  
The objective of the group was therefore to seek to: 
a) Create a special fund for EPA implementation separate from the European 
Development Fund. 
b) Address supply side constraint, diversification, improved productivity and 
competitiveness. 
c) Attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by garnering resources for investment 
promotion.183 
The EU however, paid little attention to the lofty goals of the ACP States during the 
negotiations and proceeded to hold out on its mandate. In the end, there was neither a 
legally binding framework nor any agreement on specific areas. Part of the problem 
faced in phase I was that both sides could not agree whether the result of the all ACP 
phase was to be legally binding or a mere declaration of understanding. There were 
fundamental differences on both sides as to the role of phase one as the EC did not 
want a legally binding framework and it argued that the Cotonou agreement already 
provided the framework. So, seven months before the scheduled completion of phase 
one, the 4th ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC) held in ST. Lucia on the 
1st of March 2003 proved to be a major turning point in the negotiations. 
This meeting was significant to the CARIFORUM States because it afforded the region 
to state its position to the ACP at two levels, firstly at the ACP-Joint Ministerial level and 
secondly, at the CARIFORUM regional level. At the ACP level, Prime Minister Kenny 
Anthony of St. Lucia in his address to the meeting of the all ACP-EU Joint Ministerial 
                                                        
183  ACP/ 61/056/02 [Final] Brussels 5th of July 2002. Guidelines for the negotiations of Economic Partnership 
Agreement.  
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Trade Committee (JMTC) emphasised that what the ACP was negotiating was not a 
traditional Free Trade agreement, but to craft an arrangement to bring the relationship 
with Europe in line with the present realities and to promote further cooperation. He 
stressed that the development aspects must go beyond issues of financial and technical 
assistance and embraced a regulatory framework. In the meanwhile, St. Lucia’s Minister 
of Trade, Dr. Keith Hunte urged the ACP States to devise proposals to put forward in 
the negotiations which will make significant differences to the economic future of their 
countries184 
These statements coming at a time when the all ACP-EU talks were already on the way 
seemingly suggested that the negotiations in phase one would be drawn out beyond the 
scheduled close in October, 2003. The negotiations were already moving at “snail’s” 
pace because of the fundamental disagreements between the parties on the question of 
the legal framework for phase two to be agreed in phase one was very daunting. This 
coupled with the EU’s lethargic response to ACP’s demands seemed to have created a 
level of frustration which led the EU Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy to shift 
position and indicated the EU’s willingness to commence negotiations at the regional 
level with any region if they were ready, even during the course of the phase one. The 
ACP States had exhibit some discomfort with the efficacies of the all-ACP phase,185 
because a great deal of time was spent talking with the EC, yet the EU had not issued 
their negotiating guidelines which was indeed very frustrating to the ACP States. 
At the close of the all joint ACP-EU meeting, the CAFIFORUM delegation met 
separately with Pascal Lamy on March 1st.  There, Dame Billie Miller senior Cabinet 
Minister of Barbados, representing the CARIFORUM States urged the EC to consider a 
framework agreement that would offer countries greater flexibility in assuming the 
obligations commensurate with their stage of development and trade interests. She also 
pressed the view that the region is very vulnerable due to its openness and physical 
                                                        
184 CRNM Update No.0303, March 18, 2003. 
 
185 Ibid. 
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size and urged that the EPA should reinforce support for the CARICOM Single Market 
and Economy (CSME)186.  At the end of these meetings it became clear to the region 
that Commissioner Lamy’s offer to the joint ministerial had not gone down well with the 
wider ACP group.  
2.3  The ACP’s Revised Mandate 
Coming out of phase one, the ACP States agreed certain principles to guide phase two, 
and reiterated that issues which were of common interest at the all- ACP level would be 
addressed according to the all- ACP negotiating structures during the regional 
negotiations. 
It seemed however, that in light of the fractious state of the outcome of the St. Lucia 
meeting, the ACP group intended to salvage the situation and try to maintain some 
levels of cohesion on issues of common interest as much as possible to ensure 
solidarity... The group agreed that even though each regional configuration was free to 
negotiate their own terms, any region which embarked on negotiation in areas of 
common interest before the specified completion deadline of phase one, must duly 
inform the ACP Group.187 
The underlying thinking at the all ACP level was to maintain cohesion and build 
solidarity while negotiating at the regional level. It was agreed that ACP States would 
co-ordinate their activities so that as the negotiation progressed the ACP States 
collectively would place itself in a position to say to the EC that nothing would be agreed 
until all is agreed across the regions.188This approach would have seemingly 
strengthened the hand of the ACP in the negotiations and produce a better outcome for 
them in terms of their demands. 
                                                        
186 Ibid. 
 
187 ACP/27/024/03 Brussels 3rd of October 2003. 
 
188 Interview‐ Keith D. Knight former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Jamaica. November 2008. 
Kingston Jamaica. 
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The ACP group of States however faced serious challenges in phase two which 
affected the outcome and quality of the regional negotiations, because of he EC’s 
insistence on relying on the framework arrangement of the Cotonou to guide its 
positions in the negotiations at the all ACP level was carried over into the phase two. 
In addition, both the ACP and the EC were constantly engaged in the difficult challenges 
posed to the EU’s banana, sugar and rice regimes arising from its Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and Single Market. These issues continued to affect the ACP’s ability to   
strengthen their position in the negotiations, especially among the CARIFORUM region 
to effectively negotiate as those commodities had different protocols which were not 
part of the overall EPA negotiations. The sugar issues were being treated, not as issues 
for negotiation but more in the light of responses of the EC to the WTO pressure as a 
consequence of Europe’s market reforms. 
The ACP Council of Ministers was strident in trying to apply pressure on the EC on the 
question of the approach being taken with respect to ACP’s banana, sugar and rice. At 
its 78th session in Brussels Nov.27th-28th, 2003, the ACP Council of Ministers resolved 
that the EC should take steps urgently to stop the deterioration of prices and to 
guarantee access of ACP’s banana into the European Market receive remunerative 
prices. Further, that the EC should consult with the ACP States on the question of the 
pending enlargement of the community and how that would impact the ACP. 
The ACP States called for the EC to adhere to the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement 
namely Article 36(3) under which the community was bound to guarantee that no ACP 
States shall be place in a less advantageous position in the EC market. They argued 
that it was fundamental to the spirit of the Cotonou agreement that the EC was 
obligated to ensure that the level of tariff to be imposed on ACP banana as of 2006 
would be such to maintain the viability of ACP banana Industry189. 
                                                        
189 ACP /25/013/03. Brussels 28 Nov. 2003. 
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They further argued that the EU must honour its legal obligations and political 
commitments under the Cotonou Agreement and that the “review” mentioned in Article 
36(4) of the Agreement did not give the EU the right to renegotiate the Sugar Protocol. 
The ACP also made the case that the EU should desist from passing on the burden of 
its market reform unto the weak and most vulnerable economies of the ACP sugar and 
banana producing states. The ACP group vowed to carry those demands into the 
regional negotiations an area in which the CARIFORM State were also very strident.  
The group continued to express its dissatisfaction with the EU’s approval of the rice 
regime which reduced the intervention price by 50% coupled with their increase in direct 
aid to European rice farmers to the detriment of the ACP rice exporting countries190. The 
ACP had intended to apply pressure to the EC to declare sugar as a sensitive product 
with the context of the Doha Development Round of WTO in order to strengthen the 
development goals of ACP sugar exporting states.191 
This was a very challenging period for the ACP group in general, but moves so for the 
CARIFORUM States, of which a significant number of its Member States depended on 
export of banana and sugar, while Guyana remained its leading exporter of rice192. 
2.4 Launch of negotiations for CARIFORUM- European( EPA) 
The negotiations for the EPA at the CARIFORUM Regional level promised from the very 
opening to be quite difficult but the region was resolved to complete it within the agreed 
deadline. The negotiation for the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement was 
launched in Kingston, Jamaica on April 16, 2004. Trade Ministers from the fifteen 
CARIFORUM States were in attendance along with representative from the European 
Commission. The new paradigm in CARIFORUM trade diplomacy had began to emerge 
as the launched was hailed as “a watershed” in the relationship between the two 
                                                        
190 Ibid. 
191 ACP/25/011/05.Brussels, 23 June, 2005. 
192  The CARIFORUM States were more threatened by the CAP reform than any other region in the ACP 
configuration. 
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regions which bear the longest standing integration movement, and this phase of the 
negotiation was indicative of the new approach to North-South co-operation.193 
The formal launch was address by the Most Hon. P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister of 
Jamaica who used the opportunity to set the tone by which the negotiation should be 
developed by elaborating the historical context of the relation. He stressed the region’s 
“long standing friendship, political cooperation, shared history and economic 
partnership” with Europe and further remarked that “this renewal is intended to 
consolidate on enduring economic relationship” with a new dimension and approach to 
“economic activities and trans-border transaction”. 
 
Mr. Patterson pressed the case for both sides to “mutually agreed goals and principles 
which will guide the design of this new phase” and that they must “recognize the 
fundamental differences in size, economic structure and levels of development”. He 
urged them to accept that these negotiations envisioned “an expanded trade regime 
that promotes sustainable economic development in the CARIFORUM Region”194. 
He also outlined the Caribbean’s trade strategy, policy and expectations within the 
context of the Doha Development Agenda and its connection with the EPA by pointing 
to need for the recognition of the “continuation of special and differential treatment, 
including preferential marketing arrangements”195. 
He made it very clear that “CARIFORUM Countries will continue to pursue positions 
which are consistent and coherent across negotiating arenas and emphasized that the 
                                                        
193 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) press release, Kingston Jamaica, April 17, 2004. 
 
194 Ibid. 
 
195 Ibid. 
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region “will not be pressured or induced into agreeing to position at the WTO or the 
FTAA which is not consistent with the European Union”196 
In closing Mr. Patterson made an excellent pitch for the acceptance of the region’s 
policy on cultural diversity and its importance to development. He urged that cultural 
interaction is of primary importance to the people of the Caribbean and that respective 
countries needed to develop closer bonds of friendship and understanding through that 
medium. This, he argued “must be emphasized in light of the addition to the European 
Community of new Member States with little, if no historical ties to the Caribbean region. 
He pleaded for a framework by which this dimension of people’s contact would become 
an integral part of the objectives of the ACP-EC partnership.197Prime Minister 
Patterson’s speech had resonance on both sides of the negotiating regions. 
Dame Billie Miller, who had political oversight of the CARIFORUM Negotiating team 
also addressed the meeting and in her presentation she echoed the sentiments 
expressed by P.M. Patterson but rested the strength of the regions concerns on the 
problems associated with the escalation of security threats arguing that “security has 
now become the newest non-tariff trade barrier” in the global system. She urged that the 
EPA needed to create an architecture which reduced vulnerabilities and also facilitated 
sustainable development.  
Mr. Paul Nielson, the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 
also addressed the opening session. He  stayed closely to the European mantra carried 
over from the all ACP phase that the EC was not prepared to establish new funding 
mechanism for the EPA implementation, but that funding will be in  keeping with the 
expressions of the Cotonou Agreement. However, he was silent regarding specific 
quantum of funding and urged that “Several Instruments were available to support the 
                                                        
196 Ibid. 
 
197 Address by the Most Hon. P.J.  Patterson, Prime Minister at the Launch of Negotiation for the Caribbean/EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement, Wednesday April 24, 2004. 
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preparation and implementation of the EPAs. In defending his position he pointed to the 
existence of the Regional Indicative Program (RIP), the National Indicative Program 
(NIP) and the investment facility provided for in the Cotonou Agreement198. 
The EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy also addressed the opening session. He 
seemingly warmed the hearts of his Caribbean hosts by alluding to the carnival 
festivities then in progress in true Caribbean spirit and expressed the view that were the 
parties to bring a similar spirit of enthusiasm and energy to bear upon the negotiations, 
then everyone would be in for an good time. 
The strength of the argument he put forward, seemed to have found favour with the 
CARIFORUM region as he placed the EPA in the context of a process which started 
under Cotonou which was being extended.  He argued that “…part of the Cotonou 
vision was also to enable ACP Countries to manage the challenges of its globalization 
and to adapt progressively to new conditions of intervention Trade199.  He enunciated 
the EU’s position and made it clear that the he had no mandate to negotiate 
development finance, but made much of the fact that funding was provided for under the 
Cotonou agreements which would continue until 2020.He further argued that it is 
because “..the question of market access, including elements of reciprocity, and the 
degree of asymmetry’ were of  immediate concern200, why the EU in keeping with its 
understanding, was already investing in these areas” 
In this regard however, the EU’s position was not new to the Caribbean because 
although there were expectations that development aid would become part of the EPA 
implementation processes, it being the largest donor, CARIFORUM States had arrived 
at a policy position not to wholly rely on any single donor for their financial aid package 
                                                        
198 Speech by Mr. Paul Nielson, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid at the 
Opening of the Negotiations for the E.P.A   between the CARIFORUM Sates and the EU on 16th of April 2004. 
Kingston Jamaica. 
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primarily as a source development, but saw trade as  being very crucial to development 
and therefore, the region had no delusion about EU funding for the EPA programs.201   
The EU Trade Commissioner however, seemingly hit the high point of EU’s trade 
strategy in the region by placing it in the context of four fundamental principles. He 
explained that firstly, for Europe the EPA negotiations were geared to take its special 
relationship with the region to another level in the context of the global economy. 
Secondly, that Europe is developing a new relationship in the Western Hemisphere as a 
whole and the Caribbean Sates must have a special place within that relationship. 
Thirdly, that the negotiation is important in sending a signal that the enlargement of the 
EU will not weaken the long standing support that is given to the Caribbean region as 
part of the ACP Group and, fourthly, what happened under Cotonou was not 
fundamentally different from what had been going on elsewhere including the EU’s 
relations with Central or Latin America. Europe was therefore developing a global 
approach to trade and development with all developing countries. He pointed to the fact 
that the EU is bilaterally supporting “regional integration and the building up of markets 
in order to harness the process of globalization”.202. The CAFICORUM States 
appreciated fully well that EPA negotiations were about free trade; quite different from 
the old Lomé type arrangements and the special relations with the EU was quite moot.  
After the Launch, the principal negotiator of the CARIFORUM remarked that 
negotiations represented a significant juncture in the continuing North-South relations 
and predicted that result would place the region directly in the globalization process203.A 
CARIFORUM Ministerial with Commissioner Pascal Lamy follow; also a special meeting 
of the CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) was held. 
                                                        
201 Interview‐ Sam Chandler permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Barbados, 
June 10, 2009. Bridgetown, Barbados. 
 
202 Speech by Pascal Lamy EU Trade Commissioner. Opening of the negotiations for the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) between the Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM) and the European Union on 16th 
of April 2004. (Kingston Jamaica). 
 
203 RNM update 0406. April 20 2004. 
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The CARIFORUM’s strength in the negotiations rested heavily on the level and quality 
of its preparedness for the negotiations. How the CARIFORUM States prepared 
themselves to meet the Europeans was therefore important to the outcome of the 
negotiation in terms of Caribbean successes in trade diplomacy. The parties agreed a 
structure and the schedule of the negotiations204.  
2.5  Competences, Legitimacy and Preparedness      
The CARIFORUM region had to overcome several hurdles in order to mount a 
successful preparation and actual negotiations for the EPA. Firstly, there was the 
regional configuration of countries which had to negotiate as one group but, indeed 
within the group there were different logistic, legal and economic issues in terms of its 
competences and actual coordination of the preparatory initiatives and the conduct of 
the negotiation. The internal political dynamics of the regional institutions came into 
sharp focus during the preparatory phase and throughout the entire negotiations. 
2.5.1       Competences         
There were three processes connected with the issues of competences within the 
CARIFORUM negotiations and its structures, which had to be carefully addressed at 
each negotiating step. 
There is the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) which were 
established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas; within CARICOM there is the Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) a sub-regional grouping of States created in 1981 
which included all the Member States of the Eastern Caribbean some of which are still 
                                                        
204 The negotiation proceeded in four phases. First phase April to September 2004 to establish the EPA 
negotiating priorities on both sides. Phase two September 2004 to September 2005 to identify the 
requirements for bolstering Cariforum regional integration. The third phase September 2005 to 
December 2006 for consolidating the various discussions and work towards a first draft of EPA 
document. The final phase from January 2007 to December 2007 contracted on finalizing areas of the 
negotiations.  
  
 
125 
 
 
protectorates of Britain205. There is also the Caribbean Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) of which all the CARICOM Member States except the Bahamas are 
signatories. Superimposed upon this configuration is the CARIFORUM Group of States 
which includes the Dominican Republic and Cuba, even though Cuba did not participate 
in the EPA negotiations the Dominican Republic was a key participant.  
The CARICOM Secretariat which is the administrative arm of CARICOM did not play 
any substantive role in the negotiation because it had no competence. However the 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) established in 1998 had the 
responsibility to coordinate the CARIFORUM EPA Negotiation206. 
To establish competency the region had to align the negotiating structures outside of 
the CARICOM’s formal institutions both in terms of developing the negotiating mandate 
the negotiating processes themselves. This involved two dimensions: Firstly, the 
CARIFORUM process and secondly, the actual negotiating process. Within the 
CARIFORUM there existed three levels of negotiation taking place simultaneously. 
There was the CARICOM process, the OECS process and finally, the CSME process. 
Furthermore, while the CARICOM Secretariat which is the principal administrative arm 
of the institution was not directly involved in the negotiation, the CRNM which was not a 
CARICOM institution under the Treaty of Chaguaramas had a coordinating role in the 
management of the negotiations for the EPA. The head of the CRNM was the principal 
negotiator and the organisation also provided resource persons to guide the process 
and conducted research to inform policy and negotiating positions. This created a 
                                                        
205 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Island, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis and St. Vincent. Politically Independent member as a group exhibits levels of integration include 
monetary Union, and a common Judiciary with a Secretariat to oversees its external Relations and Internal 
process.   
206 The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) was set up in 1998 by regional Heads principally 
to spearhead external trade negotiations particularly the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) which has 
been stalled since US President Bill Clinton demitted office, 2004. The CRNM was not then have any status as 
a regional institution under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, but it had its existence based on policy 
decisions. In 2009, the CRNM was transferred to the CARICOM Secretariat with a name change. It is now the 
Office of Trade Negotiations and it is located in Bridgetown Barbados. 
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problem which simmered during the negotiation of the EPA, but surfaced most 
unexpectedly after the agreement was initialled207. The competence to negotiate 
external agreements rested with no single body as obtained in the EU. The 
CARIFORUM processes therefore gave rise to a uniqueness which provided for 
flexibility in some respects, but forced a rigid compliance with the region’s mandate208. 
The process of developing the region’s negotiating mandate was elaborate and it 
informs the structure and positions taken within  the negotiations in a two way flow of  
exchanges from bottom up and then from top to bottom. The competence therefore 
resided in each Member State of the group which participated in the process and 
through the Conference of the Heads of Government of CARICOM of which the 
Dominican Republic was not a Member State and therefore could not participate in the 
decision making processes. But it was invited to meetings in an observer status. 
 
2.5.2.     Legitimacy 
The Negotiation process was influenced in a large part by the structures established 
under the Cotonou Agreement which envisaged the involvement of a wide cross- 
section of players in each region. This process was designed to give ownership of the 
EPA to each region and it should reflect the regional priorities. The legitimacy of the 
CARIFORUM EPA was therefore very crucial in establishing both the mandate and the 
actual outcome of the negotiations. The acceptance by the region of the negotiated 
outcome was therefore very important in the philosophical thinking underlying the 
establishment of the regime. The CARIFORUM States set about establishing legitimacy 
by having all sectors of the society participated in the development of the mandate and 
to a large extent some institutions were allowed into the various negotiating sessions209. 
                                                        
207 There we several calls for the revamping of the CRNM. Calls emanated from regional Academicians, labour, 
Media, NGO, and opposition politicians. 
 
208 Interview‐ Henry Gill CRNM, June 10,2009, Barbados. 
 
209 Ibid. 
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2.5.3    Pre-negotiation preparations   
The Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery (CRNM) had primary responsibilities to 
coordinate the negotiation and develop the CARIFORUM mandate. In executing its 
mandate, the CRNM held several meeting and consultations at various levels across 
the region and also embarked upon research and studies to guide and inform the 
process. Consultations were held in all the Member State of the CARIFORUM Group 
with various stake holders. These included technical working groups which were 
comprised of officials of regional governments, regional Institutions, academia, private 
sector organizations, NGOs and labour. The process was also supported by specialized 
international Institutions such as Commonwealth Secretariat, WTO, Inter American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank.210  
The process at the local level was quite elaborate as the ministry in charge of trade in 
each Member State spearheaded the process of consultation by establishing Technical 
Coordinating Committees (TCCs). The positions developed through the consultative 
processes were carried forward for further development and analysis by specialists on 
agriculture, market access, services, investment, trade related services, trade 
facilitation, legal and institutional issues. The technical working groups (TWG) prepared 
proposals under various subject areas and made recommendations which were then 
forwarded to the Council of Trade and Economic Development (COTED).Their 
decisions were forwarded to the Heads of CARICOM for final approval and instructions.  
The Caribbean ministers with portfolio for trade met in Barbados on the 3rd of May 2003 
and considered proposals and recommendations to define the regional negotiating 
positions. The draft negotiating guidelines prepared by the CRNM was approved by 
COTED which took the following decision that:  
                                                        
210 Bernal, Richard L.  “Globalization: Everything But Arms; The EPA and Economic Development” Grace 
Kennedy Foundation lecture 2008. Grace Kennedy Foundation, 73 Harbour Street, Kingston, Jamaica W.I. 
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1) the EPA must promote sustainable development in keeping with the development 
strategy of each Member State and, 
2)  the EPA was between two highly unequal regions and must therefore be 
accomplished through special accommodation for the least developed countries 
in the region.  
The Director- General of the CRNM argued for the acceleration of the region’s 
preparedness for the negotiations and emphasized the need for the region’s skilled and 
unskilled persons to be able to enter the EU as suppliers of service under the EPA.211 At 
the special meeting of the CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development 
(COTED) on external negotiations held on the 16th of April, which was preceded by a 
meeting of the CARIFORUM Countries at the senior official level which fine tuned the 
regions negotiating position, COTED endorsed the proposal for the negotiations to be 
conducted in three levels and also the structure of the Negotiations.212   
The CARIFORUM Ambassadors in Brussels were very integral to the process and the 
regional team is Brussels was headed by Ambassador Errol Humphrey of Barbados 
who was the Vice Dean of the CARIFORUM’s College of Negotiators. The college of 
lead and alternate Negotiators was in charge of executing the negotiations in specific 
areas. The college was comprised of experts in the various negotiating subject areas 
and it took instructions from the mandates approved by the CARIFORUM Heads of 
Government.. The CRNM attended a meeting of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) between the 22 -29 May, 2003 in Nairobi, Kenya and also 
gave advice and consultation to the African various other African configurations of 
States. The CARIFORUM States benefited from these as the meetings also served as 
                                                        
211 CRNM update 0307, May 5, 2003. 
 
212 The negotiation was conducted in four phases. The initial phase lasted from April 2004‐ September 2004 
and covered the priorities of the EPA Negotiations, the main concerns and interest. The second phase ran 
from September 2004‐September 2005 dealt with the strategic approach to CARIFORUM Regional 
Integration. The third phase September 2005 –December 2006 dealt with the structuring and consolidation 
Negotiations to arrive at a draft Agreement and the final phase ran from January 2007‐December 2007 and 
dealt with the finalization and consolidation of the Agreement.    
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preparatory initiatives for its own regional negotiation. So that by the time CARIFORUM 
EPA negotiations had commenced, the region was ready. The CRNM in its coordinating 
role had to interact with the stakeholders of all levels. But more so, it dealt primarily with 
ministers of trade, within the COTED framework and also various ministers in the region 
and at the official’s level. The configuration of the meeting at the ministerial level posed 
a specific challenge because the Dominican Republic had not been part of the COTED, 
but the Dominican Republic was regularly invited to the COTED meeting specifically to 
address matters affecting their interests. A special COTED was established to include 
the Dominican Republic.  
The structure of the negotiation included civil society, business interests and officials up 
to the Heads of Government which provided overall directions and signed off on all 
decisions213   
                                                        
213 The Heads of Government was of the Apex. Lead ministerial spokes person, former minister of Barbados, 
Dome Antoinette (Billie) Miller was appointed to take charge of the process at the ministerial level. CARICOM 
Council of Trade and Economic Development (COTED) was in charge of making recommendation, approved 
strategies  and  take  positions  and  provided  overall  guidance  to  process  and  approach  to  the  negotiations. 
Principal  negotiator  and  dean  of  the  college  of  negotiations  was  the  Director‐  General  of  the  Caribbean 
Regional  Negotiating Machinery  (CRNM),  Ambassador  Richard  Bernal  of  Jamaica  was  ask    to meet  at  the 
principal negotiators  level  to dial with  issues which  could not be  agreed at  the  technical negotiating  level. 
There was the college of negotiators who negotiated the text of the Agreement, Four Technical Group dealing 
with market access, services and Investment, Trade related issues (TRI), Legal and Institutional issues which 
involved both sides negotiating texts for the various chapters of the Agreement, and the Technical Working 
Group which dealt with  development  of  Regional  position  through  consultations  at  the  local  and Regional 
levels.  There  was  also  Caribbean  Non‐  State  Actors  (NSA)  which  existed  to  strengthen  dialogue  and 
participation with Regional civil society stakeholders.    
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Table 4: Structure of CARIFORUM-EPA Negotiations 
Political Heads
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
COTED
Lead Political Negotiator
College of negotiators 
Subject Specific technical level  
Market access service and investment 
Trade related issues 
Institutional market access service and investment trade related issues 
Legal and institutional issues 
Principal negotiator 
Dean of College 
Vice Dean 
Special advisor on CSME 
Source: Researcher’s analysis of Data from www.crnm.org. Joint statement of the 17th meeting of CARIFORUM-EU Principal 
Negotiators March 28, 2006 
Note: (1) the technical negotiating Groups (TWGs) consisted of representatives from Gov. NGO & Businesses on 4 subjects: market 
access including Agriculture Service and Investment Trade Related Issues and (4) legal and Institutional Issues. 
(2) The RPTF served as strategic links between EPA negotiations and Development Corporation, translating needs for support 
identified during negotiation to operational ideas for trade-related and other development assistance. 
Regional Preparatory Task Force 
(RPTF) 
Interest Groups 
Civil Society 
CRNM 
Technical Working Group 
(TWG) 
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The structure of the EC Negotiating mechanism and procedures were determined by 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. The European Commission 
negotiated on behalf of the EC which was represented by the Commissioner for Trade 
at the Ministerial level along with Officials of DG Trade at the Principal Negotiators level. 
Negotiations at the technical level were coordinated by DG Trade along with other DGs 
as appropriate. 
Table 5: Structure of EC-EPA Negotiations 
European Community 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
EC Commissioner for 
trade/ministerial level 
Principal lead negotiator  
DG Trade 
Subject Specific technical level negotiation  
DG Trade and other DGs as appropriate  
Source: European Commission Director- General for Trade Brussels, 22 April 2004. 
Note: (1) Regional Proprietary Task Force (RPTF) is not a formal part of the negotiation.  
(2) The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) was not a formal entity in the negotiation, was 
mandated under Articles, 1, 18, 20 and 35 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Regional 
Preparatory Task 
Force (RPTF) 
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2.6  The CARIFORUM’s Negotiating Mandate 
The development of the CARIFORUM Negotiating mandate having gone through the 
various tiers of the consultative processes was presented in draft form to the 
CARIFORUM meeting of Trade Ministers with recommendations. The mandate was 
followed closely to the all ACP mandate but with its own regional specificity was 
approved by the Heads of CARICOM. The task of coordinating the regional negotiation 
agenda posed specific. Firstly, there had to be agreement at the local level among 
stakeholders and subsequently at the regional level as each state had its own agenda 
and concerns which had to be translated into the regional agenda for negotiation at the 
international level. This process proved to be the most difficult challenge for the CRNM 
and it took considerate investment in time at all levels.214    
Shortly after the launch in April 2004, the Caribbean Negotiating Machinery with support 
from the Commonwealth Secretariat convened a meeting of trade experts on the 7-11 of 
June 2004 in St. Kitts The purpose of the meeting was to review the negotiating 
mandate and to develop a revised text. It considered the scope of the negotiations and 
the regions offensive and defensive strategies in the areas of agriculture, market 
access, investment, services and trade related issues. The meeting also examined 
measures to strengthen the integration process and to align national and regional 
development policies. The recommendations of the expert group went to the meeting of 
the Technical Working Group held later in June in Trinidad and Tobago for refinement. 
These were then approved by the Special CARICOM Council of Trade and Economic 
Development (COTED) on the 2nd of July in Grenada.      
The recommendations of COTED was approved at the twenty-fifth meeting of the 
CARCOM Heads of Government in July4-7, 2004. The Heads welcomed the launch of 
the EPA and gave its instructions and commitment to coordination with the wider ACP 
Group while continuing to press its cause at the WTO and build consensus amongst the 
                                                        
214 Interview‐ Henry Gill, CRNM, Barbados. June 10, 2009.  
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G 90215.This broad based approach adopted by the CARIFORUM States was designed 
to place the region at the center of the global thrust to impact the process at the 
multilateral level while negotiating its free trade agreement with Europe. 
The mandate to negotiate the EPA was now in place and the regional negotiators had 
begun to focus their energy on obtaining a favourable deal for the CARIFORUM States 
in the EPA negotiations. The approach and strategy of the CARIFORUM States was 
multi-pronged and three-tiered. Because, while negotiating at the regional level, 
consultations were taking place at the national level, also in Brussels and Geneva. The 
regional negotiators had a carte Blanche mandate, which facilitated the late inclusion of 
cultural services came at the insistence of Prime Minister Owen Arthur of Barbados. His 
demand was strenuously opposed by Germany and the Netherlands. However, the 
Barbadian Prime Minister made the demand a quid pro quo for there to be an 
agreement and argued that the demand was very vital to the entertainment industry in 
the region216.Therefore, even though the EU’s mandate did not expressly included it, the 
subject was left open for decision217 and the EC conceded to that demand. 
2.6.1      Divergences on issues for negotiations 
In June 2002, the General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU gave the 
commission a mandate to negotiate an EPA. That mandate guided the Commission 
throughout all the phase of the negotiations without variation, but it allowed discretion. 
The Commission held the view that even though the EPA’s was being negotiated on a 
region to region basis, it was important to maintain the objective of the ACP-EU 
Cooperation and the Aquis of the ACP218. It emphasised that EPAs should be as similar 
as possible depending on the specific needs of each region. The EU made it quite clear 
                                                        
215 Press release 115/2004. July 8, 2004. Communiqué issued the conclusion of the Twenty‐ Fifth meeting of 
the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 4‐7 July, St. Georges, Grenada.  
216 Interview‐ Henry Gill, June 10, Barbados & Sam chandler June 10, Barbados. 
217 Council of the European Union X44X/02 DGEII, Brussels, 30th of April 2002. 
218 ACP‐EC/WG/LI/MN/21. Joint Report on the 1st meeting on the specialised group on legal issues. Brussels, 
6May2003. 
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that the negotiations must achieve WTO compatibility under Article XXIV of GATT, but 
stressed a case by case analysis of a region’s specificity and noted the speed at which 
adjustments should take place must depend on the intensity of the integration in that 
particular configuration of ACP States, and also the degree of cohesion within the 
group.219 So, by the time the CARIFORUM States started their negotiations they were 
aware of what the EU wanted to achieve. There was, however a clear divide between 
the ACP States and EU on the question of: 
1) The Interpretation of WTO Compatibility. 
2) The EU’s interests in including the so called “Singapore Issues” a part of the new 
trade arrangements and 
3) The degree of reciprocity and special and differential treatment under the 
provision of Article XXIV of GATT.  
From the CARIFORUM’s perspective, the basic thrust of the negotiations was how to 
fashion the EPA to achieve development objective and still satisfy the requirements for 
W.T.O compatibility. So, from the very onset, the EU wanted to have trade liberalized as 
high as 90% of “all trade” to include trade in services. However, notwithstanding that the 
ACP States along with other developing countries had rejected the inclusion of the 
“Singapore Issues”, in the WTO rule based system, both in Seattle and Cancun, the EU, 
Japan and the USA continued pressing for their inclusion. The EU seized the 
opportunity to advance its global trade agenda through these negotiations as the EPAs 
seemed to have offered them the best platform to push its agenda. The multilateral talks 
were stalled for a protracted period. The EU wanted to negotiate region to region as it 
would be too difficult to negotiate with the all ACP as one unit, even more so, because 
the group had already resisted the inclusion of the Singapore Issues at the WTO and in 
the EPA at the all ACP negotiation.220.The CARIFORUM Group of ACP States wanted 
                                                        
219 Commission of the European communities SEC (2002) 351 Final. Brussels April 9, 2002. 
 
220 ACP/61/056/02.  ACP secretariat Brussels (2002). See also ACP. EU Negotiations for Economic 
Partnership Agreements. Areas of Convergence and Divergence ACP/61/113/03 Rev.1, ACP secretariat, 
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however, to include services in their EPA.221 Because for them, services represented 
the only area in which they had some trade advantages. Therefore, their strategy was 
designed to achieve two primary trade objectives. Firstly, in light of the decline in its 
export of manufactured goods and agricultural products to the EU and the uncertainties 
regarding the future of banana and sugar, coupled with the importance of tourism and 
other services industries emerging in the region, including entertainment in addition to 
the need to attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), it was in the region’s best 
interest to negotiate the services sector with the EU. Secondly, the region knew that the 
EU wanted to open up the service sector to competition more so, to tap into the very 
lucrative area of public procurement and therefore the region felt that in agreeing to 
negotiate those issues it could leverage and secure more concession from Europe. 
Indeed, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA was the only one from the six configurations which 
was prepared to negotiate the ‘Singapore Issues” and that made them the central focus 
of the EU’s strategy in the EPA negotiations, which the CARIFORUM States later used 
offensively to leverage concessions. 
The continuing problems of banana and sugar were always of grave concern to the 
CARIFORUM States. The EU was undergoing it market reforms and the adjustments to 
the Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) and so, the region received its first major setback 
in their negotiations , within months of its launch, when it information surfaced that the 
EC was about to review the mechanism for implementing the ACP Sugar Protocol in the 
European Union (EU) sugar regime. Realising the potential impact on Caribbean 
economies, the fourth summit of the Heads of State of ACP countries meeting on the 
23rd-24th of June, 2004 in Maputo, Mozambique called upon the EU to respect the legal 
and political undertakings enshrined in the ACP Sugar Protocol and argued that by 
virtue of Article 36(4) of the Cotonou Agreement the EU was bound to ensure that under 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Brussels (2003). 
 
221 Interview ‐Sam Chandler, Barbados June 16, 2009. Interview Henry Gill CRNM, Barbados June 10, 2009. 
See also DR. Richard Bernal, Grace Kennedy Foundation lecture 2008. Kingston Jamaica. 
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European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),the future EC sugar 
regime the ACP sugar supplying states were guaranteed the same level of export 
earnings as provided to the EU sugar producers. But, this was not to be as the EU 
ignored those calls and proceeded to cut the ACP sugar prices without any reference, 
consultation or hearing from the ACP State.  The EU’s decision set in motion a period of 
continuous strain on the relationship of the CARIFORUM States as the negotiations 
continued. Indeed, sugar and banana were not being negotiated as part of the EPA 
because they were governed by different commodity protocols222. The ACP States 
called for dialogue and consultation on the issue of sugar, but the EU made no 
response directly, but by the 9th of July 2004, the EC announced its new General 
System of Preference (GSP) and the companion principles to guide the regime through 
to the year of 2015, commencing on the first of January 2006.The EU’s proposals to re-
organize its sugar regime which was tabled on the 24th of July 2004 was severely 
criticised by the Twenty-Fifth meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of 
CARICOM held in Grenada. The Heads characterized the EU’s proposal as a “betrayal 
of the commitments and guarantees given by the EC at the time of negotiating the 
Sugar protocol” in 1975. The Heads contended that the projected losses to the region 
due to the EU’s action would outstrip the proposed compensation package by well over 
150% and it called upon the EU and European Commission to withdraw the proposal 
and to consider the interest of the ACP sugar exporting countries in the region regime. 
The Caribbean States expressed condemnation of the EU’s conduct and stressed the 
ungratefulness of the EU, arguing that in 1975 when Europe was desperate for the 
supplies of sugar for their factories and industries to be guaranteed they turned to the 
Caribbean and Pacific States, particularly for such guarantees and the former colonies 
obliged and now the EU has turned its back against these States223.So, potentially 
devastating was the EU’s proposal on the export earnings of the CARIFORUM States 
that St. Kitts which had been producing sugar for European markets for well over three 
                                                        
222  ACP/28/010/04 Final Maputo Declaration. 
 
223 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 9, 2009. Bridgetown, Barbados.  ??? 
137 
 
 
centuries announced the closure of it sugar industry and the quota allotted to it under 
the protocol was re-allocated and distributed among the other CARIFORUM sugar 
exporting States.  
2.6.2      The first meeting of Principal Negotiators 
Negotiations for the CARIFORUM-EC EPA were launched in Jamaica on the 16th 
September, 2004 and it was scheduled to close in December 2007.The process was to 
be conducted in four phases224. 
Table 6: Schedule for CARIFORUM- EPA Negotiations 
Dates Negotiation Review 
Phase I 
April 2004-Sept. 2004 
Establishing the Priorities of EPA Meeting of Principal negotiators 
Phase II 
Sept. 2004-Sept. 2005 
Convergence on strategic 
approach to CARIFORUM 
Regional Integration 
Meeting of principal negotiators 
Phase III 
Sept.2005-Dec. 2006 
Structuring and consolidating of 
EPA Negotiations 
Meeting of principal negotiators 
Final Phase 
Jan. 2007-Dec.2007 
Finalization Meeting of principal negotiators. 
December16, 2007. Agreement 
to be initialled. 
Source: Researcher’s analysis of Data from CRNM. www.crnm.org   
                                                        
224 The negotiation proceeded in  four phases. First phase April  to September 2004 to establish the EPA 
negotiating  priorities  on  both  sides.  Phase  two  September  2004  to  September  2005  to  identify  the 
requirements  for  bolstering  Cariforum  regional  integration.  The  third  phase  September  2005  to 
December  2006  for  consolidating  the  various  discussions  and  work  towards  a  first  draft  of  EPA 
document. The final phase from January 2007 to December 2007 concentrated on finalizing   all areas of 
the  negotiations. Note:  The  initialling  of  the  agreement  signalled  the  end of  the negotiations,  not  that  the 
agreement was ready for signing by the various parties because changes could be made before its signing. 
  
138 
 
 
The CARIFORUM’s principal negotiator had his first official meeting with his EU 
counterpart in 2004, shortly after the announcement of the new proposals for the sugar 
regime. They discussed the scope and priorities of the negotiations and exchanged 
views on the wider vision of the EPA and agreed on the objectives to strengthen 
CARIFORUM regional integration and that the main purpose of the integration initiatives 
was not to promote liberalization of trade and the opening up of the region’s market to 
Europe. They also had convergence in principle on the question of Special and 
Differential Treatment (SDT) for small Caribbean economies, but the EC was non 
committal on the question of the CARIFORUM States’ requests for SDT commitments 
to go beyond what was agreed at WTO. 
The EU’s proposals for changes to the sugar regime was of concern to the Caribbean 
negotiator who pressed the Europeans to get an agreement to use the EPA as an 
instrument to address the negative effect of the EU’s policy changes under the Common 
Agricultural Policy  (CAP) on the Caribbean export of banana, sugar and rice. 
The CARIFORUM States were very firm in holding to the view that development 
assistance is a vital link between trade liberalization and development strategies.  Both 
sides agreed that the establishment of the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) 
comprising of development expert from either side would better address those issues. 
They also agreed the modalities to guide the operations of the RPTF. 
The EC seemed well aware of the position taken by CARICOM Heads at their Twenty-
Fifth conference held earlier in July, 2002 which mandated a meeting of CARICOM 
Stakeholders to review the EU’s proposals for changes in its sugar regime and to agree 
a collective response. The CARIFORUM negotiators had to bear in mind that the 
outcome of those deliberations at the stakeholders’ level would have some impact on 
the directions of the negotiations on the question of market access and agriculture. 
Therefore, from the very early stages of its preparatory work, the CRNM had to be 
proactive in coordinating the various aspects of the negotiating processes. 
The CARIFORUM stakeholders meetings were scheduled for September 28-29th. So, 
the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) promoted a national 
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consultation on EPA in St. Vincent and the Grenadines for the 15th of September which 
would precede the meeting of its Technical Working Group scheduled for October 11-
12th in the Dominican Republic. The stakeholders meeting rejected the EU’s proposal. 
The region acknowledged that the issues of agriculture and commodity protocols were 
very integral to CARIFORUM’s sustainable development and therefore, were 
inextricably linked to Caribbean Integration and sustainability. Of necessity, both issues 
had to be tackled as companion matters. 
A meeting of CARIFORUM’s Technical Working Group (TWG) was held in the 
Dominican Republic to define the scope and priorities of the regional integration process 
prior to the convening of the fifth meeting of the Joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade 
Committee (MTC) in Brussels on the 26th of October 2004.The issues raised by the 
CARIFORUM Technical Working Group were also raised at that level and the ACP 
argued for infrastructural support for the development of the regional integration process 
across the entire ACP regions. So, the ACP made their position clear that regional 
integration must go beyond the mere creation of regional markets ostensibly for EU’s 
penetration through trade liberalization. This therefore represented a dual push by the 
ACP States as part of their overall strategy at both the all ACP and regional levels. 
The ACP as a group and the CARIFORUM States in particular knew from their own 
experience that the EU’s strategy and broad objective in trade negotiations were to 
create market access by opening up market of its trading partners and therefore, 
notwithstanding the EU’s earlier concessions under the Lomé΄ and Cotonou 
Agreements on the question of non-reciprocity in favour of the ACP States, it had 
always exhibited a preference for reciprocity in market access225. The Caribbean 
conceded on the need for reciprocity, but pressed for sustainable adjustments and time.  
 CARIFORUM’s offensive strategy in negotiating the scope and defining their regional 
Integration process was to link trade policy to development policy and stress that trade 
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is a very pivotal issue for development and not aid support.226 It argued that regional 
integration is about development of which trade is a very important component and 
pointed to the achievements of the EU as the most enduring and successful Integration 
movement, and further made the case that the Caribbean had embarked on its own 
integration movement since the 1960’s following the EU’s model as it envisioned 
economic development for itself. The Caribbean was of the view that its integration 
process must benefit from the EPA processes and was determined to hold the EU to its 
commitment to regional integration stated in mandate and the Cotonou Agreement.  
The region therefore resisted the EU’s demand for it to become a custom union under 
the EPA and argued that under the Cotonou Agreement and by virtue of the EU’s own 
mandate, each region must be allowed to negotiate an EPA, consistent with its level of 
integration and its own development needs. This line of argument proved 
insurmountable as the Caribbean impressed the EU to make concessions on their 
demands for CARICOM to become a custom union. The EU had hoped that with the 
introduction of a custom union, it would have achieved a major breakthrough in opening  
up the market of the region to meet the WTO’s  objective of liberalizing substantially “all 
trade” to the accepted level of 90% or above and to include trade in service as an 
integral part of that regime. But, the CARIFORUM States were resolute that the custom 
union approach to trade was not in their best interests and successfully argued that it 
would undermine the basic tenets of the Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the 
Caribbean Community. 
The Caribbean has to vigorously defend the peculiar characteristics of its own 
integration process, by making much of the fact that in as much as Dominican Republic 
was negotiation as part of the CARICOM Institutions, it was not part of CARICOM and 
further, that CARICOM was in the process of developing its Single Market Institution 
with the vision of creating a single economic space in the future. 
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In this regard there existed other variables, for example, the OECS which under the 
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas are designated as Least Developed Countries (LDCs),  
CARICOM-Dominican Republic free Trade Agreement signed in 1998 which was  not 
yet implemented and that the Bahamas was not a Member State of the CSME although 
being a Member State of CARICOM. These issues created a “variable geometry” quite 
unique to this region and a factor which was employed defensively and offensively by 
the CARIFORUM States during the negotiating processes to achieve its principal 
objectives in light of the asymmetries between the negotiating parties227. 
The Caribbean kept themselves constantly informed as to what was happening in the 
EU which caused them to be better prepared. For example, the region recognised why 
Europe wanted to advance a Custom Union approach to the EPA. But Europe had 
disguised their real motive, arguing instead, the success of EU itself as a measure to 
advance its position. However, the Caribbean felt that the EU wanted the Custom Union 
approach to integration because it favoured them, because the Custom Union would 
remove the internal trade arrangements which the region had developed since 1968 
and would allow the EU to have access to all the markets of each country as the 
economic arrangements would be seamless. The CARIFORUM States rejected that 
demand.
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Table 7: The Variable Geometry of CARIFORUM States 
 
OECS‐ Monetary Union 
Anguilla & All OECS Member States 
          
      CSME 
    Cuba & 
Associate Members         CARICOM                                               Dominican Republic                  
                               MDCs                 CARICOM‐ DR       
  Bahamas     CARICOM‐ LDCs  FTA                      
  Haiti                        Members of OECS &Belize 
                                                                          Haiti (UN‐ LDC)               
             CCJ                                                                           
                                                                                Original Jurisdiction ‐ 
                                                                                Interpretation of Revised  
                                                                           Treaty of Chaguaramas 
         Full Members 
         Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) Appellate Jurisdiction  
        Barbados 
       Belize 
         Guyana 
 
                                                        Configuration of CARIFORUM’s (Variable Geometry configuration)  
Source: Researchers analysis of Data:  www.crnm.Org/ http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/trc/Articles/CARICOM_Report_2.pdf downloaded, 
February12, 2009. Key: CARICOM: MDCs Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago. CARICOM 
LDCs: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, (Haiti –UN), St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
(British Virgin Islands are not Members of the OECS Monetary Union) 
Note 1: Bahamas &Haiti are a Member States of CARICOM/CARIFORUM, but not Members of the CSME. Only Barbados, Belize 
and Guyana are Full Members of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). 
Note 2: The Dominican Republic (DR) is a Member of CARIFORUM, but not CARICOM. It has a FTA with CARICOM & is a 
signatory State to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) which does not include CARICOM Member States.  
Note 3: Haiti is the only UN LDC in the region and all the OECS & Belize are Regional LDCs. Cuba, however was not part of EPA 
Anguilla, 
Bermuda, 
British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Turks 
and Caicos 
Islands 
(Not member of 
CARICOM) 
DR (Member of 
CAFTA) 
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2.6.3      The November, 2004 meeting of the negotiators in Barbados  
By the time the senior negotiators on both sides met in Barbados on the 12th of 
November 2004, the Caribbean position on the question on regional integration was 
well established. That meeting made significant and early progress in the areas of 
regional Integration and the schedule of the EPA negotiations. Good progress was also 
made on the modalities and work of the joint Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF). 
Recognising the value of the integration processes in the region regarding the future of 
the EPA, both sides agreed a framework to deal with CARIFORUM regional integration 
and cooperation with special emphasis on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) and the deeper involvement of Haiti along with the CARICOM- Dominican 
Republic Free trade agreement. The question of the institutional framework and 
capacities to effectively deal with consequential   adjustments were also agreed.  
The significance of this meeting is that it served to clarify some fundamental 
misunderstanding and perceptions on the part of the EU as pointed out by Karl 
Falkenberg the lead negotiator for the EC team who in expressing his appreciation of 
having a better understanding of the CARIFORUM integration and suggested that this 
was a ‘good starting point for the negotiation of the EPA to support integration and 
development in the region”228. The EC therefore had to confront and come to terms with 
CARIFORUM’s desire not to pursue a course of integration via custom union. The EC 
wanted a custom union arrangement because it would remove the internal trade 
arrangements which the CARICOM States had developed for themselves since 1968 
and therefore allowed the EU access to all the markets of the region because the 
internal market would be seamless. 
The meeting agreed on a framework to address CARIFORUM regional integration and 
co-operation with emphasis on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), the 
further integration of Haiti into CARICOM, the CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free 
                                                        
228  CRNM Update 0418, November 16, 2004. 
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Trade Agreement and also on institutional framework and capacities to address the 
adjustment issues of the region. The region held to their defensive strategy on the 
question of the regional integration processes and the impact of the EPA upon those. 
Ambassador Bernal, the principal negotiator for CARIFORUM highlighted the two main 
challenges for regional integration: Firstly, the need to conclude and implement the 
decision of the tenth meeting of the Heads of CARICOM made on November 8th, 2004 
to have the Single Market and Economy fully operational by 2005, and secondly, to 
implement the CARICOM-Dominican Republic (DR) Free Trade Agreement229. The EC 
recognised these as failures of CARICOM and used it to put the CARIFORUM on the 
defensive when it sought to press the EU for a new funding institution for the EPA 
processes. These were criticisms which the region could not successfully counter230.   
At the first meeting of the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) which preceded the 
meeting of the principal negotiations, the Caribbean raised the question of the EU’s 
policy on commodities and its impact on Caribbean bananas and sugar exports. This 
was an issue which the region was resolved to raise whenever the opportunity arose 
because of its vital importance to the region’s security. 
Within the context of the EPA negotiating sessions, the CARIFORUM participated in the 
launch of a regional Non-State Actors (NSA) network on the 13th of November 2004 in 
Barbados. The Cotonou Agreement had mandated the involvement of civil society in the 
development of the EPA in order for the regions to show ownership of the EPA. The 
purpose therefore of the NSA was to encourage dialogue among NGO’s in the region to 
impact the out come of the negotiations. The principal negotiators addressed the group. 
The occasion was used by both sides to highlight the importance of the EPA to the 
development of the region and the vital role of the private sector to the success of the 
EPA negotiation and implementation. Mr. Falkenberg was impressed that the Caribbean 
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had made considerable strides in the adjustment process and will deal with the realities 
of preference erosion. However, Ambassador Bernal was unequivocal in making the 
point to his EU counterpart that the level of adjustment envisaged by the EU in the 
banana tariff arrangement was unsustainable and cause problems in the Caribbean231. 
2.6.4      Negotiating Market Access 
Next on the agenda was the issue of market access. The preparations for negotiating 
market access was enhanced by the third meeting of the CARIFORUM Technical 
Working Group (TWG) held in Dominican Republic on the 8-9th of December 2004.It 
prepared for the first CARIFORUM-EC Technical Negotiating session on market access 
scheduled for Jamaica on the 17th and 18th of December 2004.There the issues of 
market access were extensively analysed covered all areas of trade which touched 
upon the commodity protocols. The EU however had by then excluded these areas from 
the specificity of the EPA negotiations. 
Akin to the question of market access was CARIFORUMS’S drive to gain acceptance at 
the international level of the concept of Small Island Developing State (SIDS) as a 
special group in the global trading arena. The negotiations for the EPA presented an 
opportunity for the regions to make a breakthrough on this issue. The region placed so 
much importance on the issue of the SIDS to its sustainable development in terms of 
maintaining preference in the global trading arrangements and linkages with the EPA, 
that the CARIFORUM took its case early in 2005 to the international meeting convened 
to review the implementation of the program of action for the sustainable development 
of Small Island Developing States held in Port Louis, Mauritius, January 10-14th 2005.  
There, the regions pressed for the implementation of the Barbados Plan of Action and 
the meeting adapted the Mauritius strategy along with a political declaration which 
highlighted twenty broad headings including issues of globalization and trade 
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liberalization. One feature of the declaration was that the SIDS should maintain 
preferential access and to allow all preferences to be phased out over a long period to 
avoid shocks and dislocation in those economies232. 
Prior to the Mauritius conference on sustainable development, the new EU 
Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson,233 had his first meeting with CARICOM 
Trade Ministers on the 6th of January, 2005 in Georgetown Guyana. Having recently 
succeeded Mr. Pascal Lamy, Mr. Mandelson confidently spoke of the upcoming 
conference on sustainable development scheduled for Mauritius and addressed 
CARIFORUM’s concerns about the issues of development. He urged the region to 
participate in the Doha round and committed the EC to build coalition with the ACP 
Group on the development component of Doha. He also stressed that both the ACP and 
the EU “… must craft in the DDA .. a global strategy for the smaller and more vulnerable 
WTO Member States” but noted that the region’s  interests “ …will be better served by 
embracing the round rather than seeking to slow it down and remaining over dependent 
on preference”234. Mr. Mendelson was not oblivious of his predecessors position on 
these issues, so on the question of the EPA negotiations he committed to put the EPA 
process under continuing review so as to make sure that the process would really put 
development first. He explained his decision to “establish a mechanism to monitor the 
roll out of development and trade related assistance, to check continuously whether or 
                                                        
232 A/CONF.207/CRP.7. 13th of January 2005. Port Louis, Mauritius. The purpose of UN conference was to 
review the Barbados Plan of Action (BPOA) for the sustainable Development of SIDS. The BPOA was adapted 
in 1994 at the United Nations sponsored Global conference on the sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States. Held on the 25th of April to the 6th of May 1994. The concept of special category for Small 
Island Developing States had its origin in the Caribbean as a response to the issue of Globalization and its 
impact on small Island landlocked State and Small Island State in the Global political Economy, Also 
development in terms of the environment, climate change and Biological Diversity. 
 
233 Peter Mandelson of the UK was confirmed as the new EU trade commission on the 12th of August 2004, 
replacing Mr. Pascal Lamy who become the new Head of the W.T.O. in 2004.  
 
234 SPO5‐202 EU. European commission commissioner Mandelson’s speech to the CARICOM Trade Ministers 
in Georgetown on the 6th of January 2005. 
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not it is delivering the right result to build up local economic capacity and that the 
process really does constitute the true economic partnership”235.  
On the question of the EU’s sugar regime which was of vital importance to the 
CARICOM group of States the Commissioner pledged support to produce an action 
plan to assist ACP sugar producers affected by the new sugar regime. He argued that 
development assistance would be advanced to assist the ACP to diversify and cushion 
the impact of the new sugar regime being instituted in the EU. He advocated urgent 
dialogue to define the measures and pushed for a formula to be agreed well in advance 
of the Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005. On the question of banana, he treated 
it as an “unavoidable” result of the EU’s reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and internal market reforms236. The Caribbean trade ministers took warmly to the 
position advocated by the EU Trade Commissioner as his speech was seemingly 
crafted for the special circumstances of the CARIFORUM States. Mr. Mandelson later 
tried to retreat, but the CARIFORUM States held him to those undertakings as the 
negotiation progressed and the Commissioner tried to shift positions237.The 
CARIFORUM Trade Ministers would not relented on the problems the EU’s internal 
market reforms caused and argued the devastation which those reforms would have on 
the region, even while accepting that non-reciprocal preferences would eventually go. 
So, a compromise had to be found as the EU was not prepared to make any change. 
2.6.5  Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the EPA negotiations 
The concept of SIDS is the “brainchild” of the Caribbean238 and it had received 
recognition in some trade arenas and was a vital component of the region’s trade policy 
and strategies. The region’s objective was to use the EPA negotiations to further 
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237 Dame Billie Miller, Speech to the Joint ACP‐EU Parliamentary Assembly Meeting In Vienna, Austria June, 
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highlight the need for more concerted and urgent global action on this issue so that the 
EPA would become a vehicle for the promotion and implementation of the SIDS.  
 The potency of the CARIFORUM case was carefully crafted and presented to the EU, 
which could not deny the logical and factual expressions of the region’s case. The 
region argued that it wanted diversity in imports as net food importers, as it could not 
afford to be left exposed, as food security was vital to the region’s sustainability. 
Therefore, even though the region does not export any of those products which it 
sought to protect, it had to protect them because the farmers of the region must be 
encouraged to remain on the land. This line of argument was not new as the region had 
made that position known to Europe from as far back as 2003 in Cancun239.  
The region’s approach was to avoid the economic issue of protection of its domestic 
agriculture and pressed their case by making reference to the practice of developed 
countries including EU Member States that support inefficient industries because of 
political reasons. The EU conceded and the CARIFORUM States got what they wanted. 
The EU however while making concessions to CARIFORUM’s demands did not apply 
any political pressure to achieve any of its concessions240, indeed the EU made 
concessions in order to strengthen its global agenda through these negotiations. 
 
2.6.6      Negotiating Trade Related issues 
In phase II of the Regional negotiation, the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) 
agreed to examine eleven trade areas identified by the CARIFORUM States as areas 
which will bolster the regions trade capacity to include the areas of Investment, 
Competition policy, Government procurement and Intellectual Property. 
The Europeans were very strong on two aspects of the “Singapore” issues; competition 
policy and Government procurement even though these were not put to the region at 
the launched in 2004, but were an integral part of the all ACP level phase I, where they 
                                                        
239 Interview‐ Sam Chandler, Barbados, June16, 2009. 
 
240 Ibid. 
 
149 
 
 
were identified by the EU as issues for negotiation241. The CARIFORUM States did not 
resist their inclusion because they wanted to negotiate services as a matter of regional 
priority. However the CARIFORUM States were careful not to concede on any issue 
which would undermine their position in the Doha Development Round of the WTO. 
They wanted to ensure that the negotiations kept in tandem with the Doha Agenda. So 
for example on the question of Trade Facilitation and transparency which were very  
crucial  to the ACP states the region resisted the EU’s demands and pressed the 
argument that they were being asked by the EU to make commitments which involved 
expenses on their part and the EC was not committing to assist the region in the 
transition. In this regard the CARIFORUM States at the all ACP level had taken the view 
that they would cooperate with the developed countries, only if they were prepared to 
commit technical and financial support to make the changes being requested by the 
developed countries. 
So, by that same token the CARIFORUM States held out and argued that if Europe 
wanted commitment in those areas, then because of their size, the regional economies 
would need financial support to shoulder the burden which the CARIFORUM States 
were bound to face. Consequently, while the region was willing to make some 
commitments they needed the assurance of financial commitment from Europe. The 
CARIFORUM States were very cognizant of Europe’s slowness in disbursing funds, and 
this was also of grave concern to them. So, the real challenge for the CARIFORUM 
policy makers was firstly, whether the EU would make the commitment and secondly if 
they did, then the type of framework to facilitate disbursement would be very critical242. 
 
The CARIFORUM States needed to be satisfied on both fronts before it would agree to 
the EPA. 
However, the EU continued to press its case on the issues of trade liberalization and the 
MFN treatment, but was reluctant to make the concomitant commitments. So, as the 
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Europeans pressed for market access in Government procurement, the CARIFORUM 
States made it clear that they had no mandate to negotiate market access in that area. 
But the CARIFORUM policy makers knew quite well that the Europeans were gravely in 
need of some concessions in this area as it was very important to their overall external 
trade policy and strategies, “Global Europe” particularly in the context of the Doha 
Round which was stalled and the EU wanted to get the round re-started.  
The CARIFORUM States also knew very well that the EU was not likely to get 
concession on these issues in the other EPAs, at least not in the near future because 
most of the member State of the other configuration were LCD’s, which had no real 
interest in negotiating services or trade-related issues as they were benefiting under the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) regime. The region also knew that except for South Africa, 
most of the other ACP African States did not want to negotiate these issues. Therefore; 
for the EU’s global agenda to gain momentum they needed to have some concessions 
in Government procurement, but the Caribbean itself had serious constraints243 . 
 
The EU demanded CAFTA parity on the issue of public procurement; however the 
Dominican Republic decided to offer a compromise and gave the EU an undertaking to 
deal with the question with regard to future agreements. The Dominican Republic could 
not afford to open up to the EU to get CAFTA parity because of its Free Trade 
Agreement with CARICOM under which it gave CAFTA parity to the region. 
The region realising the EU’s desire to get some concessions on the question of 
Government procurement made a compromise offer to deal with the full issue in the 
future, but would only make commitments in the area of transparency in public 
procurement. This compromise was offered in the context where not even under the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) was there any regional coherence on 
the issue nor were there any regional policy positions in this area. But the region was 
well aware that they had to make some concessions in this area to ensure the success 
of the negotiations. 
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This compromise offer was accepted by the EU and it gave them “a foot in the door”, 
even though the region had not yet reached that point in their market access policy and 
was therefore not willing to concede on government procurement beyond the area of 
transparency. 
However, this compromise would not have been forthcoming were the European not 
prepared to make concession on the question of funding for the EPA, the region’s 
success in this regards hinged heavily on its offensive and defensive tactical 
manoeuvres244, which was crafted particularly to deal with and counter what the region 
saw as Europe’s strategy in the negotiating process regarding the question of funding 
for the EPA. The CARIFORUM States had by this compromise gone beyond what most 
developing countries had agreed at the multilateral level. This was the break-through 
which Europe needed, so having had this, they could not afford for the negotiations to 
fail and were therefore prepared to make further concessions particularly in the area of 
Cultural services. 
The region also recognized that while the EU was proclaiming its intention to fund 
development as it viewed the EPAs as instruments of development, it was very reluctant 
to commit the funds to assist the process. However, even though the CARIFORUM 
States were aware that it has always been the EU’s strategy to keep the financial 
package towards the end of its negotiations with the ACP States since their first 
encounter between 1973-1975, they were not prepared to wait because  by then the 
trade commitments  would have been agreed and it would have had serious financial 
implications far beyond any negotiations previously undertaken by the region and 
therefore it needed the assurances of funding support very early in the process. 
 
The Commissioner for trade adapted a stance that only Commissioner or the Director-
General for Development could address the question of development assistance and 
the trade commission deals with the questions of trade. This approach seemed to have 
given the impression to the ACP regions that the Commissioner was engaged in 
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“double talk” and was not been sincere. This approach was being pursued by the 
Commissioner for trade, while the Commissioner for development was being kept away 
from the negotiations, seemingly as a deliberate strategy to separate the two areas. 
 
The CARIFORUM States decided to raise the issue at the joint ACP-EU Parliamentary 
Assembly because the matter had become very “thorny” and was threatening to derail 
the negotiating process. The Caribbean lead political negotiator, Dame Billie Miller, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Barbados was elected to the chair of 
the ACP Ministerial Trade committee (MTC). By then the issue of funding for the EPA 
had become an all ACP concern and a way had to be found to get clarification so that 
the process could move ahead. The Caribbean took the initiative to find that way and to 
get the issue onto the agenda of the upcoming meeting of the Joint ACP-EU 
Parliamentary Assembly schedule for Vienna, Austria, June 20, 2006. 
Senior Barbadian Ambassador and Vice Dean of the CARIFORUM’s College of 
Negotiators in Brussels His Excellency Errol Humphrey was requested to make 
arrangements for the matter of the EC’s approach to the negotiations be on the agenda 
of the meeting and for Dame Billie Miller to address that forum. The arrangements were 
successfully completed and the region’s brief was prepared by His Excellency245. 
 
How to get the CARIFORUM lead political spokesperson to address the assembly 
undoubtedly posed some challenges. It was recognised that because Commissioner 
Mandelson was not scheduled to address that body of EU and ACP politicians, 
therefore to have the CARIFORUM’s political negotiator confirmed to address the 
gathering, it was agreed the Commission Mendelson would also address the Assembly. 
Neither of these officials were members of the Parliamentary Assembly. 
But the region had lobbied Mrs. Glen Kinnock, Co- President of the ACP-EU 
Parliamentary Assembly who was sympathetic to the ACP cause to agree to the 
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address by Dame Billie Miller. The Co-President was known to be a friend of the 
Caribbean246.The decision to have Dame Billie Miller addressed the Assembly had 
taken Mr. Mandelson by surprise as he had not anticipated such initiative from his 
CARIFORUM counterpart, indeed he was deeply provoked247.   
This was the CARIFORUM’s direct opportunity to effect changes to the direction of the 
EPA negotiations. When the time came for their respective presentation, Dame Billie 
Miller spoke first. She was well aware of the gravamen of the issue and was prepared to 
impress the EC Parliamentarians as to the need for changes to be made.  
Her presentation to this August body  half-way in the agreed time line for completion of 
the EPA made a significant impact on the EU parliamentarian and in the presence of the 
EU’s Trade commissioner she eloquently and with precision delivered a wide ranging 
speech so carefully crafted and presented was bound to resonate among the European 
Parliamentarians. 
The ground work was laid for this presentation because, prior to this meeting the 
Caribbean had embarked upon several consultations and lobbying in European capitals 
for example in Berlin, just before Germany took over the presidency, in London during 
the presidency of the UK and  also prior to the Finish presidency in 2006248. 
The senior Barbados Minister was well prepared and strategically placed as the chair of 
the ACP Ministerial Trade Committee (MTC). She opened her presentation by noting 
that this was her first appearance at the Joint Parliamentary Assembly and underscored 
the importance of her presence. She took the opportunity to invite the Assembly to 
Barbados in November that year and stress the importance with which the ACP valued 
the input of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) to the EPA negotiations. She spoke 
to four main issues which she believed went “..to the very heart of the EPA process” 
She addressed the core principles and also explained from the ACP’s perspective that 
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there existed a fear that the EPA was in danger of being compromised and remain  an 
unfulfilled promise. She cited the four main areas of differences between the ACP 
negotiators and the European commission. These were  
1) the pace and timing of the integration process 
2) Giving tangible expression to the concept of development  
3) Approach to tariff liberalization  
4) Market access and the creation of effective funding mechanism for supporting 
EPA implementation. 
She pointed to seven areas of convergence249 and remarked that notwithstanding 
marked progress in some areas, the disagreement is a serious reflection of the failure of 
the European Commissioner to offer meaningful expression on the question of 
development. 
She drew reference to the EC’s approach in applying pressure to the various ACP 
configurations to create custom unions are some other arrangements to facilitate them 
making common commitments in all disciplines. She noted that the approach being 
pursued by the EU’s Commissioner for trade was conflicting to previous positions 
expressed by him in different arenas on the question of regional integration that these 
should not be directed from Brussels.  She reiterated and emphasized that the 
approach been pursued by the Commissioner was neither acceptable nor practical and 
lamented that the  EU’s insistence on determining what is best for the regions and how 
they ought to arrange their economic space and also the pace at which they should 
move  seemed  more than a little disingenuous.  
 
She argued that it was difficult to picture how the Commission in negotiating in the 
manner in which it has been proceeding in light of its previous pronunciation on the 
EPA. She also addressed the critical question of development and argued that the EC 
                                                        
249 1) EPA should be tools for development 2) it should support regional integration processes 3) A decisive 
for long transition periods 4) granting improved market access for non LDCS 5) Asymmetry in trade 
liberalization and special and deferential treatment to ACP countries 6) Introduction simplified rules of 
origin.   
155 
 
 
seemed to have been downplaying the importance of the development dimension of the 
EPA talks. She drew reference to the early positions taken by Commissioners 
Mendelson and Michel, which follow up on similar positions advocated by their 
predecessors Commissioners Lamy and Neilson. She also bemoaned that these 
positions were replete with comments that the EPA are the instruments of development 
and were not designed to pry opened ACP markets. But, the Commissioner for trade 
was holding fast to the position that his mandate was to negotiate trade and not 
development, even in light of those statements he made to the EU’s General Affair and 
External Relation Counsel as recently as the 11 of April 2006. So also, these were at 
variance with the very resolutions adopted by this Parliamentary Assembly.  
In questioning the position taken by DG trade in the contexts of the Cotonou 
Agreement, she flatly suggested that were DG trade lacking competence on the 
developmental aspect of the EPA, it would be good were DG development be given a 
more lead role in the negotiations. She further pointed to the narrow interpretation being 
given to development issue by the Commission and explains their inherent 
contradictions in light of the Commission’s very narrow focus on trade liberalization.  
Minister Billie Miller made the case that the Commissioner’s conduct had created a 
problem for the ACP in the context of ACP’s approach to a Development –oriented 
EPA, which implied a need for special and differential treatment commensurate with 
level of economic develop, and the inextricable necessity to address supply side 
constrains a position which has been embraced by Commissioner Mendelson himself in 
principle in his various public utterances. But, while she endorsed the Commissioner’s 
positions and statement, she lamented the problem of lack of action on his part or 
willingness to give real effect to those utterances. She rejected the EU’s attempt at 
trying to create a singular ACP market regime where they do not exist and in 
circumstances where regions are not ready to make such moves. 
On the question of the monitoring mechanism for EPA which was promised by 
Commissioner Mendelson to ensure that development assistance would be effectively 
rolled out, she commented that the ACP had “seen precious little evidence of this 
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monitoring mechanism and the proposed EU assistance to build economic capacity in 
ACP countries has not yet materialized”250, further ,on the issue of the Regional 
Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) which was established to link the EPA negotiations with 
development cooperation, she accused the Trade Commissioner of trying to frustrate 
the work of the task force and effectively preventing them from making timely delivery of 
the promised EPA related support. 
The Barbadian Foreign Minister argued that this lack of support undoubtedly impacted 
the ability of the region to respond to EC’s demands in the area of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary requirements and Competition policies, Industrial and Service standards 
and Trade Facilitation. She pressed the case for an alternate funding mechanism for 
EPA issues, separate from the burdensome and cumbersome EDF regime and its 
inability to respond with any sense of urgency.  
She also address the question of the EPA review which was mandated by Article 37(4) 
of the Cotonou Agreement and emphasized that the review would be critical to the EPA 
negotiating process and implementation and called for the exercise to commence 
before the negotiations were completed.  
Her closing comments seemed to have touched the “right cords” among the European 
Parliamentarians and also to the satisfaction of ACP Members represented as she 
remarked that during the eighteen months of negotiations, both Commissioners 
Mandelson and Michel had time and time again spoke about the development 
dimensions of the EPA, but have failed to live up to their promises. She called for those 
promises to be converted in concrete action and she reminded the EU ‘..that neither 
liberalized trade nor preference access to EU markets, separately or jointly, will promote 
developments by themselves” arguing that “.. because countries suffering from capacity 
constraints and institutional inadequacies will not be able to make the best use of 
market access, even under preferential terms”251.  
                                                        
250 Dame Billie Miller’s Speech to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Vienna, Austria, June 20, 2006. 
251 Ibid. 
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The Senior Minister concluded by illuminating the point that  the“EPA’s should not 
merely involve enhanced market access for traditional exports from ACP countries, they 
should help ACP countries to implement policies aimed at transforming their economies, 
diversifying production and benefiting multiplier effect associated with new value-added 
activity”.252 She posited the view that this was what the ACP States had in mind when 
they spoke about the development dimensions. She described it as “..the road towards 
economic growth and sustainable developments which we would like to walk with our 
EU partners”.253   
The Minister’s delivery lead to a significant break-through for the CARIFORUM States 
and the wider ACP configuration as it clarified the diverging positions. The diplomatic 
initiative seemingly took Commissioner Mandelson by surprise both in form and 
substance. It was suggested that it was from there onwards that Commissioner 
Mandelson began to take the region quite seriously254.  
So, by the time the Joint Parliamentary group met in Barbados, November 2006 the 
region had made significant progress in all areas of the EPA negotiations as there was 
indeed a very marked contrast regarding the new approach towards the EPA 
negotiations by the EU Commissioner for trade. Minister Billie Miller had earlier 
announced255 that the EC had recognized the operation of the principle of “Variably 
Geometry” in the context of the region’s CSME and the CARICOM-Dominican Republic 
FTA and had therefore dropped its original demand upon the region to establish a 
Custom Union on the basis for EPA commitments.  
Minister Billie Miller announced that the CARIFORUM and EC had agreed at the last 
session of negotiations on the importance of linking EPA and development cooperation. 
                                                        
252 Ibid. 
 
253 EPAS in danger of becoming unfaithful promises and expectation: Speeches to the 11th session of the ACP‐
EU joint parliamentary Assembly on the negotiation of economic partnership agreements by the Honourable 
Dame Billie Miller. Vienna June 20 2006. 
 
254 Interview ‐ Ambassador Errol Humphrey, June 2008 Bridgetown, Barbados. 
 
255  In a speech to the south centre conference on EU‐ACP trade relations at the international trade union 
house Brussels, October 12, 2006. 
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Each side had agreed a two-tiered approach to the EPA cooperation that is horizontal 
provisions and an outline of potential areas for cooperation specific to each discipline 
with the expectation that periodic review of each area will be undertaken during the 
implementation stages of the EPA.  
 
On the question of supply sides constrained viewed in the context of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial and Aid-for-Trade support to which the EU Member States had endorsed, the 
Senior Minister expressed the view that “CARIFORUM negotiators would wish to see 
the EC counterparts give priority to addressing the region’s supply side constrains with 
sufficiently urgency to bring about a significant increase in the competitiveness of its 
economic operations before the reciprocal opening of the region markets”256.  
Highlighting the issue of funding for EPA adjustment facilities and the slowness of the 
EDF regime to respond to financing of ACP projects, the Barbadian Minister stressed 
the current thinking of CARIFORUM States that the EPA adjustment mechanisms could 
be operated on a time-sensitive basis to support priority ACP trade capacity needs with 
the understanding that the management would be a joint exercise between the ACP and 
EU, through regional development banks in order to reduce time in the implementation 
of projects and for the beneficiary to show a sense of ownership. 
In addressing the issue of review of the EPA negotiation mandated under the Cotonou 
Agreement article 37(4)257.  She explained the region’s understanding of the meaning 
and intent of the provision and announced that the CARIFORUM States were working 
on a first draft which would be ready by November in which the key elements had been 
identified in consultations with the EU.258 
                                                        
256 Ibid. 
 
257 This state that “the parties will regularly review the progress of the preparations and negotiations and, 
will in 2006 carry out a formal and comprehensive review of the arrangements planned for all countries to 
ensure that no further time is needed for preparation or  negotiations. 
 
258 These include 1) regional integration 2) major issue in negotiations 3) Development cooperation and 
support 4) Measured to support the timely completions of the negotiations 5) Schedule for further meetings 
6) Ongoing support to negotiation, identification of CARIFORUM negotiating capacity needs 7) 
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2.6.7      The progress made in phase lII  
 
The Caribbean negotiators had made significant progress in phase III of the 
negotiations. However, at the end of this phase there were still diverging issues which 
need to be resolved; these therefore had to be carried over into phase IV. The 6th round 
of EC-CARIFORUM EPA negotiations ended with the EU-CARIFORUM Ministerial in 
Brussels November 29-30, 2006. 
Prior to the conclusion, Ambassador Richard Bernal, gave an update on the state of 
progress of the negotiations to the Committee on Economic Development, Finance and 
Trade of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Barbados on the 18th November, 
2006. He pointed out that while there were convergence and agreement on many 
issues, there remained significant divergence on both sides. He expressed the hope 
that these issues could resolve at the Ministerial scheduled for Brussels, November 29-
30. But warned of the dangers of not reaching a resolution of these issues within the 
time line agreed by both sides. He declared that “CARIFORUM is committed to and will 
endeavour to forge on EPA within the schedule”259.However, while the region would 
vigorously pursue the commitments it made, he cautioned that such pursuit will not be 
at any cost. He was emphatic that in order to complete the negotiations, the 
CARIFORUM states must be satisfied that that the EPA will have development support 
to adequately meet its objectives given their circumstances. He identified the main 
unresolved issue under the broad headings of: 
a) Regional integration, 
b) Development, 
c) Adjustment cost, and  
d) Development cooperation  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Implementation measures and funding 8) Monitoring mechanisms.  
 
259 CRNM Update, Nov.2006. 
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The Director-General of the CRNM expressed confidence that the region would secure 
an agreement, but argued that the discussions were at a very critical juncture.260  
These unresolved issues were later addressed at the Joint Ministerial held in Brussels, 
November 29-30, 2006. Trade Ministers from the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago attended.  Dame Billie Miller of Barbados, who was 
the spokes person for the CARIFORUM and EU’s Commissioner Mandelson, co-
chaired the meeting and the Ministers agreed the following: 
1) That the EPA should promote and support regional integration and provide for 
flexibility in terms of its recognition of the political and economic realities of the 
region. 
2) That the issue of development cooperation must be linked to implementation of 
the agreement. 
The Ministers were however, quite conscious of the challenges ahead The Ministers 
were however, quite conscious of the challenges ahead and they used the opportunity 
to raise the issue of banana and sugar with the EU Commissioner and emphasized the 
link between the EPA processes and CARIFORUM development.261   
At the end of phase III in 2006, the extent of the progress that emerged caused both 
sides to prepare texts covering the areas of Invitation, Competition policy, Personal data 
protection, Current payment and the Movement of Capital.  In the areas of services and 
investment both sides had tabled their text which outlined the respective approaches to 
Investment and Service Liberalization, however the exchanges of offers were delayed. 
But the CARIFORUM States were ready to make their offer, the EU sought the delay 
because they were not ready to make their substantial offer in services. Each side 
agreed to make their substantive offer early in 2007.  
 
 
                                                        
260 Status and development of the EPA EC‐CARIFORUM EPA negotiations; addresses by Dr. Richard Bernal to 
the ACP‐EU joint parliamentary assembly’s committee on the economic development finance and trade. 
Barbados November 18, 2006.  
261 RNM update 0617. December 20, 2006. 
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2.7 Consolidating the negotiations  
 
Incorporating development enhancing measures as well as a taking a different 
approach to “tariffication” and the status and treatment of banana and sugar on the part 
of the EU were critical to the conclusion of the agreement within the schedule timeline. 
What had emerged was that even in light of Europe’s diminishing budget, European 
official had began to given consideration to leveraging the EPA through enhanced 
financial offers of support. They also realized that  political dialogue at the highest levels 
of the CARIFORUM States had become necessary.262However, Jamaica’s newly 
appointed Foreign Trade Minister, Anthony Hylton expressed concerns about finding an 
appropriate balance to capture the regions desire to develop local industries. Europe 
was however not prepared to give open-ended commitments while the CARIFORUM 
States wanted to decide its configuration of how to maximise EPA funding because the 
issue of EPA funding was most critical at the opening of the final phase of the 
negotiation which impacted the existing uncertainties as to whether the timeline would 
be achieved. This concern had gripped both sides as each wanted to finish the 
agreement within schedule but for different reasons. However, the CARIFORUM States 
were resolved to conclude the agreement was highlighted in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines at the 18th intersession conferences of the Heads of CARICOM on the 12th 
February, where except for Bahamas and Belize,263 all the Heads were in attendance.. 
                                                        
262Jessop, David. The view from Europe. The Caribbean Council, July 14, 2006. 
 
263 In attendance were; PM of Antigua and Barbuda, Hon. Baldwin Spencer, PM of Barbados RT. Hon. Owen 
Arthur, PM of Dominica HON. Roosevelt Skerrit, PM of Grenadier Carrriacou and Petit Martinique, Dr. the Hon. 
Keith Mitchell, President of Guyana, H.E. Bharret  Jagdeo, PM. of Haiti. Hon. Jacques Edouard Alexis, PM. of 
.Jamaica. Most Hon. Portia Simpson Miller, Chief minister of Montserrat, the Hon. Dr. Lowell Lewis, PM. of St. 
Kitts and Nevis Hon. Dr. Denzil Douglas, PM. of St. Lucia, RT. Hon. Sir John Compton, President of the Republic 
of Suriname, H.E. Dr. Ronald R. Venetioau and PM. of Trinidad and Tobago Hon. Patrick Manning. The 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas was represented by H.E. A. Leonard Archer, Ambassador to the Caribbean 
community, and Belize by Hon. Eamon Courteney, Min. of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. The associate 
members, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands were represented by PM, Hon. Ewart Brown and Director of 
International Affairs Ms. Lorna Smith respectively. The host PM. Dr. The. Hon. Ralph Gonzales.        
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 Dr. Ralph Gonzales , Prime Minister of the host country, in his opening address raised 
the question of the Region’s relations with Europe and emphasized that  for there to be 
a genuine partnership the region should demand that “ dignity to be restored” and that 
“there needs to be a cleansing of the spirit and the  historical decks”.264   The Heads 
agreed that all efforts be made to complete the agreement within the scheduled but; 
hinted that the region’s interest must be fully addressed. On the question of tariff 
liberation, they further agreed that the revenue implications must be carefully 
considered and addressed and also the critical issue of the inclusion of appropriate 
development components as a quid pro quo for a successful conclusion of those 
negotiations.265 It was quite apparent that the Heads wanted a conclusion on time, 
primarily to retain credibility. This expectation had implications for the regions, but the 
final signing-off on the agreement rested entirely with the Heads, singularly and 
collectively. There were concerns raised by the Bahamas, Haiti and the OECS 
regarding the resolution and the effect of the “variable Geometry” factor within the 
integration process and how the final settlement would impact on them as the EU 
wanted to treat the commodity protocols separate, but as regional exports to be dealt 
with in the context of the WTO liberalization requirement.  However, for the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the incorporating banana and sugar into the talks 
as part of the region’s effort to extract concessions in leveraging service liberalization 
was very critical.266  
At a special COTED meeting held on February 5, 2007, which reviewed the negotiation 
and gave further directions, Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller of Jamaica in her 
address to the group, urged the Ministers of trade for the region to decide among other 
                                                        
264 Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Eighteenth Inter‐sessional meeting of the conference of the 
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 12.14 Feb. 2007. Kingstown St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines. Released 48/2007. Feb 14, 2007. 
 
265 Ibid. 
 
266Jessop, David.  July deadline for Carib/Europe Economic negotiations, (Sunday Gleaner Feb.18, 2007, 
Kingston, Jamaica).  
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things, a strategic focus to point the way forward for the negotiations and define the 
nature of CARICOM’s external relationship in the wider Caribbean basin 267 as this was 
vital for the  integrity of the regional integration processes as envisioned by the region. 
In as much as the approach adopted by the EC in the negotiations had changed since 
the Vienna Joint Parliamentary Assembly meeting in 2006, the EU negotiators were still 
not committing additional funds to implement the EPA and this had created the kind of 
uncertainties which potentially threatened to stall the negotiations in the final stages, in 
circumstances where the parties had already lost so much valuable time.  
In this regard, the region decided to take its case to Germany at a meeting of EU’s 
Development Ministers in Petersburg on the 12th - 13th of March 2007. There, Dame 
Billie Miller at the informal dialogue session explained the challenges faced by the ACP 
States and pressed their case for a specific chapter on development be included in the 
EPA arguing that it was necessary to overcome supply side of constraints. She 
announced that the region had convinced the EU Commissioner on that issue. The 
undertone of her argument before the Development Ministers seemingly was to urge 
political support for the Commission and getting the Development Minister to support 
the Caribbean’s call for more resources. She justified the region’s case for support by 
articulating CARIFORUM’s undertaking to be engaged in objective assessment studies 
designed to prioritise its needs. The Senior CARIFORUM Minister had used the 
occasion to set a general political atmosphere among the European Policy makers on 
development issues deliberately intending to influence the outcome of the final phase of 
the negotiation so that both sides could conclude an agreement within time. Her 
intervention came at a critical juncture because the Development Ministers made a 
commitment to provide additional resources for development  by Europe early in 2007, 
in good faith as a step to facilitate conclusion of the only comprehensive EPA within the 
ACP configuration of regional groupings as the others were limited in coverage to trade 
                                                        
267 Address to Prime Ministerial Sub‐ committee on external trade negotiations and the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy: by P.M. Portia Simpson Miller, 5th of Feb. 2007, Montego Bay Jamaica.  
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in goods. This paved the way for what was to follow because on the 4th of April the ACP 
States received the EU’s proposal on Market access covering full duty free Quota free 
access for all goods except rice and sugar. The region viewed this as an opening to 
formulate a response and shape CARIFORUM’s position on the treatment of banana in 
the EPA. They accepted the offer, but were very concerned about the status and future 
of those commodities. The Heads gave a clear signal to the negotiators when they 
expressed the need for them to move assiduously to conclude the negotiations within 
time268 and on the question of the treatment of sugar under the EPA, they took the 
decision to seek a transfer of the benefits under the ACP Sugar protocol to the Sugar 
regime in the EPA. However European’s resisted and the region had to craft another 
approaching. The Conference rejected the EU’s demand to include provisions on good 
governance regarding tax issues in the EPA. 
In the CARIFORUM’s offer on services, the region stressed the importance of Modes 1 
and 4 to involve the areas of tourism, professional services, culture and entertainment 
when the crucial last stage of the negotiation opened in May 2007 with only five month 
to conclude the agreement. So, by the time the 28th meeting of the conference of Heads 
of Government of CARICOM was convened in Barbados on July 1, 2007, agreement 
had been reached on many issues to include Innovation which was a Caribbean 
infusion into the agreement. The Heads endorsed those areas of the negotiation which 
had been resolved to include five main out comes namely; (1) The insertion of a specific 
chapter in development (2) An unprecedented maximum phasing period of 25 years for 
tariff liberalization for sensitive products (3) Reduced burden of tariff liberalization 
commitments by reducing the application of the principles of non-discrimination in tariff 
liberalization (4) To treat cultural services and the inclusion of movement of natural 
persons not linked to establishing commercial presence in the services negotiation and 
                                                        
268 Ibid, see also CARICOM Secretariat Press Release 167/2007, 5 July, 2007. Communiqué issued at the 
conclusion of the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), 1‐4 July, 2007. Barbados.  
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(5) The development of an exclusion list269. The final list of goods to be excluded was 
most difficult for the region to calibrate in light of the multiplicity of individual territorial 
tariff levels within the region due to commitments made under varying regimes in the 
context of conditionalties under existing borrowing arrangements for example, IMF 
programs and also the extremely important issues of revenue considerations, food 
security and protecting the agricultural base of the regional economies270. 
Table 8: CARIFORUM: Liberalized and Excluded Goods 
 
 Goods to be Fully Liberalized  Excluded Goods 
Live animals for breeding Eggs, Chicken  
Human Hair  Peas, Beans, Potatoes 
Fertilizers Rice, Sugar 
Medicines Cooking and edible Oils 
Mushrooms Pasta 
Cars Chocolate 
various Capital goods  Milk and Milk products 
Essential Oils and Perfumery Frozen Meats and Fish 
Salt  Some textiles (DR, Haiti) 
Chemicals Some Iron and Steel products 
Source: Liberalized and Exclusions List (www.crnm.org) downloaded January 9, 2009. 
 
2.7.1 The closing stages of the negotiations 
The Caribbean had intended to initial an agreement in October 2007, in order to have a 
WTO compatibility agreement by December 31st 2007. Their options however had been 
reduced to either having an agreement in place or face the consequences of the EU 
imposing the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) if no agreement was reached as 
the option to seek a waiver was no longer possible. The EU had expressly stated as a 
matter of policy that it had no intention of seeking a waiver. Indeed, the EU had 
commenced preparation internally to impose the GSP on the CARIFORUM States by 1st 
                                                        
269 RNM update 0710, July 12, 2007. 
270  Interview‐ Sam Chandler, Barbados, June 10, 2009. 
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of January 2008, if there was no agreement271. The possibility of settling for a goods 
only agreement was aired and been urged by some NGOs, however the political 
directorate within the region remained quiet on the issue, while preferring to conclude a 
comprehensive agreement as there would be no real gain, indeed the region would be 
at a disadvantage because of the GSP and the EBA regimes already in place.      
The Caribbean negotiators had came to recognize that the EU was also very anxious to 
have an agreement and it was prepared to conclude only to the extent that any 
concession made beyond those already agreed would not impact negatively on the 
EU’s overall external trade position in the global context. Both parties wanted a positive 
outcome, but for different reasons272. So, by September,2007,when the parties 
convened, the text of the agreement was essentially agreed, however, there were 
outstanding issues of grave importance that only the Heads at the political level could 
initiate any resolution. The Government of Jamaica was very vocal against the 
proposed MFN clause, arguing that it was restrictive on the part of CARIFOURUM’s 
trade policy space in the context of South -South cooperation273.The General Elections 
of September 3rd in Jamaica is  important as it highlighted two significant developments 
in CARIFORUM political economy as it impacted the negotiations for the EPA. Firstly, 
because the newly Prime Minister became Chairman of the CARICOM Prime Ministerial 
Sub-Committee on External Negotiations and secondly, while the former Government 
was vehemently opposed to the EU’s MFN proposal, the new Government took a 
different approach because having being in opposition for over eighteen years, it 
needed to stamp its authority  and impacted regional leadership roles. 
In the context of these negotiations, each side recognized the political realities of the 
deadline, the depth of the asymmetries and complexity of the variable geometry factors 
which exist among the CARIFORUM States. These negotiations for either side, was 
                                                        
271 Interview‐ Henry Gill, Director‐General CRNM. June 10, 2009. Barbados* 
272 RNM update 0712 Sept. 14, 2007. 
273 Interview‐ Henry Gill, Barbados, June 10, 2009. 
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precariously positioned as neither could afford to stall. There was little to gain if the 
parties or either of the two were to hold back274. In fact, the process was by then, being 
driven by the deadline and the commitment not to fail. This had opened -up the realities 
for further and deeper compromises in order to close the negotiations in time. The 
political directorate on both sides had to meet to decide the way forward. Therefore, 
shortly offer being sworn into office, arrangements were finalised for a Summit in 
Montego Bay, Jamaica on the 4th of October 2007. A special meeting of CARICOM 
Heads of Government and EC Commissioners for trade and development was 
convened in Montego Bay to coincide with the Summit. However, before the Heads sat 
the EC Commissioners, they caucused to consider the CARIFORUM’s final position. 
Time was a pivotal factor for these discussions if the negotiations were to close on time 
to meet the deadline set by the WTO. There, in his opening address to the Heads, 
Prime Minister of Jamaica, Honourable Bruce Golding observed the context of 
globalization in which the region’s farmers and manufacturers will have to compete with 
imports from Europe where agricultural output is subsidized. He also spoke about  the 
extent to which Caribbean bananas and sugar were under pressure because of the 
EU’s internal market regime changes and called for an assurance that under the EPA 
the region would not be worse off than they were under Lomé and Cotonou. Further, he 
urged the region to move ahead and conclude an EPA of which it can be proud to 
present to its constituents. The Jamaican Prime Minister indicated the region’s intention 
regarding the type of EPA it wanted and that the region was committed to complete the 
deal within time. This assurance was important to the Europeans as it sought to open-
up their negotiators to the thinking of the new Chairman.In their deliberations prior to the 
meeting with the EC commissioner, the CARIFORUM Heads had to take some tough 
decisions. They made a positive and calculated decision that the European’s wanted an 
agreement, but was not prepared to pin itself to guarantee for funding outside of the 
established EDF; but would consider alternative sources of funding.  The fact is that no 
                                                        
274 RNM update 0712. Sept. 14, 2007. 
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previous Trade Agreement had gone that far in providing financial guarantees, and to 
do so would have arguably left Europe very vulnerable in future negotiations especially 
with Latin America.275So, also, Europe understood and was indeed very cognisant of 
the region’s position in standing its ground in the areas where it would not concede. 
Europe therefore did not apply pressure through a rely on its superior economic 
strength and sheer size of its market  to force the CARIFORUM to open up their 
markets276 because they knew the region’s limitation, concerns and vulnerabilities for 
failing to meet the deadline277. In short, none of the parties could afford a failure, but for 
different strategic reasons and so, the CARIFORUM Heads decided to accept the 
liberalization arrangements and the MFN clause after the EU’s Commission for 
Development made the proposals to give effect to the need assistance for trade related 
adjustment and implementation support for the EPA. But needed firm commitments 
regarding the source of funding and the ease of disbursement. Therefore, the 
CARIFORUM Heads were quite calculated in their actions and indeed were very calm 
and cordial to both EC Commissioners.278 There were continuous discussions of varying 
levels during those sessions, with many side meetings and a flurry of activities on both 
sides, political and technical. So, by the time the parties actually convened for formal 
talks, several issued had already matured279. During those negotiations, Prime Minister 
Owen Arthur of Barbados made it a quid pro quo for the region to agree to EPA, that 
Europe must agree to the inclusion of Cultural services. The European objected, on the 
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grounds that they had no such mandate, however in the end they conceded, although 
the Netherlands had opposed it vigorously.280 
The Heads agreed a five (5) point formula for a way forward to completion within time 
as follows: (1) That priority be given to development and also specific provision for 
technical assistance, capacity and Institutional building, regulatory reforms; the design 
and   implementation of the EPA (2) Emphasized the significance of the increased 
European Development Fund(EDF) allocations, and additional resources from the EU’s 
Aid-for-trade strategy contained in the Memorandum on Development Cooperation by 
the European Commission. (3) The provision of further guidance to CARIFORUM 
negotiators along with their European counterpart to finalize other outstanding issues 
including market access for goods, services and investment. (4) The tabling of 
CARICOM proposals aimed at securing the viability of the regions sugar industry, and 
(5) to continue to press for specific development assistance for the regions vulnerable 
banana industry.281The region insisted that it was prepared to walk away from the 
negotiations if Europe was not prepared to make further concessions. At this juncture, 
the region’s defensive and offensive strategies in the negotiations processes had 
emerged and it brought into very sharp focus their understanding of the European’s 
need and the extent of Europe’s limitations in terms of their global trade agenda and 
general responsibilities to their own constituents. This recognition seemingly lessened 
the pressure on both sides to make concessions beyond the extent of their mandate. 
The negotiators’ next meeting was set for October 29th-November 6th to finalize the 
outstanding issues based on the new guidelines issued by the Political Heads of the 
Region. But, the EU had by then indicated that they were willing to stay their position 
regarding the imposition of the GSP regime until mid- November 2007, after which there 
would be no guarantee for “late comers”. They indicated that if any ACP country which 
was not included in the transitional arrangements, then the GSP would be imposed. The 
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CARIFORUM States was quite cognizant that the EU’s position was directed at the 
region to stave any possibility of stalling the negotiation tactically in order to gain further 
concessions. They therefore took the position that the threat was not a veil attempt to 
pressure the region to conclude the negotiations on time. The Director-General of the 
CRNM, Richard Bernal stated that the November meeting would be the last opportunity 
to close the deal if they are to meet the deadline, and emphasized that “… under no 
circumstances would CARIFORUM sacrifice the quality of the agreement to meet any 
given schedule.” 282as this was recognized as a possibility by both side in 2004. The 
CARIFORUM Heads again convened in Guyana on the 7th of December 2007 this was 
intended to be  their last meeting before the expiration of the non- reciprocity trade 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, they having previously convened in the Bahamas 
in November. The MFN clause and exclusions list was still a major obstacle in the 
negotiations. At that meeting, the Guyanese President Bharrat Jagdeo proposed that 
the region accepts the EU’s proposals and the political economy had therefore prevailed 
as the Heads accepted the position advanced by President Jagdeo who had 
commended the region’s negotiators.. Even then, the more difficult issue of the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) remained unresolved, it being an area in which the 
CARIFORUM States had very little flexibility and no real fall back position and a 
compromise had to be reached to move beyond this difficulty.283 . 
The December meeting gave the final instructions and guidance to the negotiators; so 
that by the 10th of December, the Prime Minister of Jamaica in his capacity as chairman 
of the Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee on External Negotiations dispatched a letter to 
His Excellency Jose’ Manuel Barrosso, President of the European Commission 
indicating the regions willingness to conclude the negotiations and that it will present the 
final text by December 14. The Jamaican Prime Minister however, impressed upon the 
EU President the need for the EU to respond positively on the question of market 
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access in the very fundamental areas of entertainment and recreation, the region’s 
proposals on Mode 4.regarding contractual service suppliers and independent 
professionals in the areas of entertainment and recreation284. He emphasised the 
immediate impact and importance to the region’s economic viability and urged further 
concessions in order to conclude on time.  
So, with less than two weeks before the scheduled close of the negotiations, the 
CARIFORUM States made one last offer and further requests which would determine 
the failure or success of the negotiations within the time limitations. This notwithstanding 
that it would be far too late to consider any other practical and feasible options in light of 
the EU’s continuous opposition to the idea of seeking a waiver and the threat of the 
imposition of the GSP regime. However, the CARIFORUM’s master diplomatic move at 
this late stage was coined in Prime Minister Golding’s letter, because it left open the 
possibilities of placing the blame at the feet of the powerful European Union in case the 
negotiations were to have failed to meet the stated deadline for completion. At this 
stage however, the negotiations were indeed very delicately poised and neither party 
anticipated nor wanted a failure. But, the CARIFORUM negotiators at this stage had two 
distinct advantages in the process; one strategic and the other political and tactical. 
While Europe had only one advantageous position, being its economic power and ability 
to unilaterally impose the GSP on the CARIFORUM States. The region’s, strategic 
offensive position rested within its knowledge as to what the EU wanted which was, to 
get an agreement which could give a fillip to its global trade agenda more so, in the 
areas of the so called “Singapore issues”. Politically, the region knew that the EU’s 
negotiators could not go back to their principals for further guidance for the negotiations, 
while the CARIFORUM negotiators had access to their political Heads at all material 
times. Further, the EU could not afford a failure as its international reputation would be 
hurt as blame for the failure would have been placed upon them. Further, the 
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CARIFORUM States would gain international sympathy as Small Island Developing 
State (SIDS) being bullied by their former colonial masters. Therefore, when the two 
sides convened for the last time in Barbados at the principal negotiators’ level between 
December 14 and16, 2007 to conclude the agreement, the atmosphere seemed ripe for 
last minute concessions to be forth coming. So, as the pressure mounted, the EU made 
further concessions on mode 4, cultural services and alternate mode and sources of 
financial support for implementing the EPA.The CRNM was in charge of monitoring the 
negotiations and had relied upon the use of telephone conferencing with the Heads of 
Government in the region throughout the meeting and more particularly on the night of 
the 15th December, constantly updating them of the progress being made and getting 
their consent for CARIFORUM’s positions as the negotiations hastened towards the 
end. The deal was finalised at 1 am on the morning of the 16th the Heads of States of 
CARIFORUM were agreed on the terms of the final text.285. So, after three years and 
ten months of negotiations, the principal negotiators initialled the agreement which 
signalled the end of the negotiations286, but not before CARIFORUM Heads were all 
consulted via telephone in the early hours of the morning of the 16th of December.2007 
to sing off on the final text. 
2.7.2     From initialling to signing of the EPA 
The initialling of the agreement signalled that the negotiations from the principal 
negotiators stand point was over and the residual matters were now in the charge of the 
political and diplomatic machinery to see them through to the signing. The Director-
General of the CRNM and principal negotiator for the CARIFORUM States, 
Ambassador Richard Bernal speaking at the initialling commended the technical staff 
and the political directorate of the region for their efforts in carrying through the 
negotiations to completion. He described the agreement as a “momentous and proud 
achievement for the region. In emphasizing the region’s achievements and experiences 
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during the process of these negotiations he described the efforts as “unprecedented in 
the region”287. The Director-General expressed the view that the region had always 
wanted an agreement which “Met core standards to make it a good deal”. He argued 
that the strength of the agreement in terms of the key areas necessary for regional 
development and expressed appreciation to the Europeans for their contribution to the 
process and made the point that the CARIFORUM States had triumphed in securing 
concessions from Europe. He further expressed the view that “..the EC should find 
satisfaction in the triumph, as Europe, despite its own domestic reservations and 
sensitivities  was able to give meaningful concessions” which are very vital in terms of 
CARIFORUM development. Because, despite Europe’s own domestic reservations and 
sensitivities it was able to give meaningful concessions, vital to our region’s 
developments”.288 Mr. Karl Falkenberg, the EC’s Director-General for trade spoke on 
behalf of the EC and made it clear that although the agreement had its strengths, 
notwithstanding, it must be used appropriately as a tool for development. He stated 
commended the stake- holders for their hard work in completing this agreement and 
argued that the task which now faced the region has just began. He stressed the point 
that the task has shifted to the implementation of the agreements289 as both sides 
seemed quite satisfied with the outcome and were eager to move to the next level. 
The passage between initialling and signing the agreement was very tumultuous and 
had threatened to undermine CARICOM’s unity and solidarity as politicians, retired 
diplomats ,regional  academics, labour unions, the media and civil society began to 
oppose some areas of the agreement arguing that the region gave up far much and 
received too little. The opposition voices were quite pronounced in Barbados, Guyana,, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Publicly, the agreement was embroiled in 
controversy. Most regional Heads, with the exception of the President of Guyana who 
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led the political wing of the opposition to the agreement, failed to come out and publicly 
embraced and defended the agreement which they had authorised. The problem with 
Guyana is that it not to play a major role in the negotiations and the political economy of 
the decision making at Montego Bay meeting290 but was caught up in the whirlwind of 
the decision making process to meet the deadline for completion and wanted to find a 
way to redress those short comings to satisfy its domestic constituents.  
At the 19th intercessional Meeting of the Heads of CARICOM held in Bahamas March 7-
8, 2008, the issue of the CARIFORUM EPA was high on the agenda for discussion due 
to the level of public criticisms which was taking place across the regions and the 
internal divide within the ranks of the CARICOM Heads. In his address to the meeting, 
Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding gave his full support for the agreement and 
explained the procedure the region followed in arriving at the deal. He stressed the 
need to move on to the implementation of the agreement as time was of essence291.The 
Jamaican Prime Minister got support from of the Barbadian Prime Minister, the 
Honourable David Thompson who argued that the global order was changing and the 
region cannot be left behind and further that the agreement was only possible because 
the region has come to recognise this phenomenon. Guyana had differed signing the 
agreement and argued for a goods only agreement, but the EU threatened that it would 
not accept a goods only agreement. The Guyanese Government called a national 
consultation with stake- holders before it took any final decision. Guyana continued to 
oppose the signing of the agreement and it needed a way forward to redress its earlier 
failures in following the consensus path of the region. The agreement was slated for 
signing on September 2, 2008, but it had to be rescheduled for various reasons 
occasioned by both sides. Firstly, the Agreement had to be translated into the 
languages of the EU. This also contributed to the delay; however, there were some 
lingering doubts in the European Capitals about the efficacy of signing the agreement 
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as some European Parliamentarians felt that the European Parliament should await the 
approval of CARIFORUM Governments before it approved the agreement.292 
At the fourteenth special meeting of the conference of Heads of Government of the 
Caribbean Community in Barbados on the 10th of September 2008, the Prime Minister 
of Barbados, David Thompson again urged his colleagues to sign the agreement and 
sought consensus  within the Community among Member States as the issue of signing 
of the agreement had threatened to damage the sense of unity, cohesion and solidarity 
which has been the hallmark of Caribbean diplomacy since the signing of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. However, Guyana had by then completed its national consultations on 
the 8th of September, which was arguably  as a political rallying a point of departure 
where all the dissenting voices were heard. The consultations rejected the agreement 
and called for the re-negotiation of certain terms. This meeting followed closely after the 
twenty-ninth meeting of the conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) 1st-4th of July 2008 in Antigua and Barbuda, where the Heads 
of Government expressed a willingness to sign the agreement. However, the Bahamas, 
Haiti and Guyana had various concerns and were not comfortable about the directions 
of the regional positions and the potential impact on their economies. But, time was 
running and even though the EU had stayed the imposition of the GSP regime the 
CARIFORUM States were well aware that the EU could still impose the regime if the 
agreement was not signed. Therefore, ten months after the initialling and following upon 
various levels of intra- regional negotiation, public discourse across the CARIFORUM 
region, a decision was taken at the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in 
July to sign the agreement. However, by convention, CARICOM Member States strive 
for consensus in regional decision making. But, as they sought consensus, Guyana 
insisted that as a condition for its signature, a five year review clause must be 
incorporated to allow for the agreement as a whole to be review. With regard to 
Guyana’s position, the CARICOM Heads at their July Summit noted that national 
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consultations were on going in Guyana and decided await before a decision is taken to 
fix a date for signing the agreement. However, Barbados was confirmed as the venue 
for signing of the agreement. The Heads had suggested possibly date of July 30 or 
August 30th for signing, but had to change to facilitate the development in Guyana, so 
by the September Summit they agreed on the 15th of October 2008 for signing, 
Guyana’s protests by then, were less confrontational as the EU has agreed to the 
inclusion of the five year review clause demanded by Guyana as a quid pro quo for its 
signature. 
The signing ceremony took place on the 15th December in the Barbadian Capital, 
Bridgetown. Honourable Christopher Sinkler, Barbadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade and the EU, Vice President Siim Kallas was among other speakers. The 
Barbadian Minister, outlined the process which took the region to the signing of the 
EPA, the steps to be taken to implement the agreement and the region’s expectation of 
Europe in support to implement the agreement. In his response, Vice President Kallas 
of the EU gave the assurance that the EU was committed to the success of the 
agreement, and expressed the view that what the parties were involved with was more 
than just the completion of an agreement to change trading relationships, but instead to 
place the CARIFORUM region on the map as an exporting market where traders and 
investors can find Innovation and opportunities for growth and security of their 
investment. The agreement was signed by representative of all the CARICOM Member 
States except Guyana and Haiti293 and the twenty-seven Member States of the 
European Union. So, after a prolonged period of negotiation the CARIFORUM-EU EPA 
had become an official trade agreement which is now noted at the WTO and is 
deposited in the Depository of the EU. 
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2.8 Conclusions 
Europe had made a decision in the context of the dynamism of negotiation at the WTO 
that the non-reciprocal trade arrangement had to be discontinued.  CARIFORUM State 
accepted the realities. So, in negotiating the EPA the question had to be answered as to 
how the region would negotiate a deal with Europe for itself in the context of the new 
and emerging trends of world trading arrangements. The issues to be negotiated were 
formidable, and in some areas were never negotiated in a free trade agreement before. 
The Region realized however, that to maximize their position of weakness as an 
offensive and defensive approach to those negotiations were appropriate strategies.  
The region did its research and drew upon its knowledge of the EU occasioned by their 
longstanding relationship and was therefore well prepared to negotiate The EPA was 
never requested by the ACP States. Indeed, they resisted it but Europe and the WTO 
wanted reciprocity and the ACP had to give- in. Europe has changed since 1975, so 
also has been the relationship between the two sides. Many of the more recent Member 
States of the EU have had no real understanding nor sympathies for the ACP States. 
But the Caribbean knew the issues at hand and the monumental task of negotiating with 
Europe and was equal to the task of negotiating a free trade agreement within the 
realities of international bargaining with a Two-Sided Constrain. The Caribbean knew 
that their strength States and also that some of the EU’s Membership had no affiliation 
with r the region and therefore expected no colonial empathies ,but accepted the 
importance of the value of being small Island State and by effectively appealing to the 
emotions and conscience they gained  some advantages in leveraging the negotiations. 
Going into the negotiation, the Caribbean knew that Europe, although economically and 
politically was stronger partner, the region was not prepared to be dictated to by Europe 
and so when Europe tried to push its brand of development and the type of regional 
economic arrangement that should be put in place under the EPA, the CARIFORUM 
States successfully resisted by soundly arguing their case and displayed positive 
diplomacy. So, the region had its own policies clearly defined and a philosophy for its 
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own development and was not prepared for it to be replaced by European 
understanding of development. While the CARICOM States had to draw on the lessons 
of the Uruguay Round and the experiences of negotiating the FTAA to inform its 
approach to negotiating the EPA, the Dominican Republic was well endowed in this 
area through the CAFTA experiences which was bought to the fore by both regional 
groupings, a factor not shared by the other ACP configurations. This combination of 
experiences and knowledge seemingly underscored the new paradigm in Caribbean 
Commercial Diplomacy. Therefore, at the all ACP level ,the EU’s stance seemed to 
have frustrated the ACP’s strategy for the regional negotiation phase. The EU’s strategy 
succeeded because the ACP States had become fragmented and their unity had waned 
over the years. The EU’s strategy of “divide and rule” had succeeded at the all ACP 
level, but the Caribbean was determined not to allow it to succeed in the regional 
negotiation for the EPA. The region spoke with one voice through the Regional 
Negotiating Machinery(CRNM) with the authority and support of the political directorate  
both at the Ministerial and the Heads of Government levels.  
From as early as 2003, EU Commissioner, Pascal Lamy made an offer that Europe was 
willing to commence negotiation with any region that was ready to negotiation even 
before the All ACP phase was concluded, suggested that the Europeans had no interest 
in a successful conclusion of all ACP talks from the ACP’s perspective. CARIFORUM 
States  recognized that when the Central and Southern African configuration accepted 
Commissioner Lamy’s offer, the fracture in the ACP’s cohesion and solidarity was 
exposed in a very fundamental  way and therefore the region had no choice but to go it 
alone. The Caribbean knew that they were more prepared than any other configuration 
but did not take up the EU’s offer, but and therefore waited to see the response of the 
others. At that time, the region was cognizant that with the stalled Doha Round and the 
problems at the multilateral level, the EU wanted some success especially on the so 
called “Singapore issue”, more so in light of the Seattle and Cancun experience. Europe 
wanted to get those issues restarted and to extent that the Caribbean would be 
prepared to negotiate those meant that “Global Europe” would get some momentum. 
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The Caribbean also appreciated the importance of those issues to the European’s 
global trade strategy and sought to capitalize on that. The Caribbean knowing also that 
the EU’s mandate issued in 2002, placed some emphasis on trade in service and the 
trade related issues and that once given it is very inflexible and indeed very difficult to 
change; or renegotiate and the region was prepared to use that inflexibility to its 
advantage instead of trying to get it to be more flexible. .And so, when the European’s 
responded to issues raised by the CARIFORUM States and argued that they had no 
mandate to negotiate, CARIFORUM appealed to the emotional sensitivities of Europe 
by going to the political directorate to get answers. 
The region was also very cognizant of the historical tradition of Europe democracy and 
used the network of NGOs and the media housed to its advantage,. Both the print and 
electron media were used a medium of expressions to reach and influence the 
European public on the issues of the conduct of the negotiations in order to get its way 
in the various European Capitals. 
The Caribbean also used the influence of the European Parliament to get concession by 
appealing to them through the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. The region’s 
decision to take that initiative created the opportunity for its chief spokesperson Dame 
Billie Miller to address the meeting of the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly in 
Vienna in June 2006. The event remains as one of the most masterful piece of 
diplomatic feat carried out by the ACP States and  more particularly the CARIFORUM 
region in the entire EPA negation processes. That was the opportunity which created 
the break- through which ended Mr.Peter Mandelson’s “divide and rule “double taking 
approach to the negotiation. That change in attitude towards the negotiation augured 
well for the ACP as a whole, up to the end of the negotiation as Mr. Mandelson was 
kept in check by the European Parliamentarians and the European press to a large 
extent. Because while the mandate to negotiate the EPA was specific, it did not speak 
to the manner of how the negotiations should be conducted in terms of tactic, strategies 
nor personalities, nor the issues for calibration in the negotiations nor the other DGs to 
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be involved. So, therefore when Mr. Mandelson took over as Commissioner for trade 
and sought to find his “footing” among the regions and in doing so, had made several 
speeches outlining his intentions, the CARIFORUM States used his utterances of 
policies and directions to extract concessions and also forced an end to his public and 
private posturing regarding the EPA. In the end however, there were no specific area in 
which the EU did not compromise, their main concern was to get a degree of 
liberalization of 90% or above but, settled for 85%. When the EU tried to get parity 
under the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) from the Dominican 
Republic (DR) they refused and the EC settled for an undertaking for future 
arrangement. When they sought to get the Caribbean States to give 90% liberalization, 
the regions offered the defence of “Variable Geometry” and the existence of its own 
internal market arrangement. The liberalization formula was only achieved through 
regional solidarity and unity, because it was the offer made by the Dominican Republic 
to the CARICOM States which brought the region’s combined offer to meet WTO 
compatibility requirement.. The fact is no other country in the region could have done 
what the DR did without suffering severe economic injury and loss of revenue. 
What was made clear to the Europeans by the CARIFORUM States was that as a 
region they were not prepared to go to Europe with “Cap in hand “as the basis of their 
negotiating strategy. The region knew the age-old strategy of the Europeans to hold the 
question of funding as a matter for discussion towards the end of these negotiations, 
where it can be used more effectively to extract concessions. But the CARIFORUM 
States was well aware that this negotiation was not in the same realities as the old 
Lomé type agreements it therefore demanded that the necessary financial support be 
addressed very early, because only those assurances of adequate funding would 
secure a deal. The EPA is a free trade agreement which was demanded by Europe and 
had to be negotiated in a very serious way and therefore the CARIFORUM States 
wanted guarantees of development assistance, not in the form of hand -out Aid 
packages, but as an integral part of process to move the region to grow itself out of 
poverty and take its pride of place in the global trading arena. So, when the EU pressed 
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on the issues of intellectual property, the Caribbean put the issue of Innovation on the 
table. This was a Caribbean concept, so innovative and carefully presented and 
analyzed; that in as much as the European negotiators said they had no mandate to 
negotiate it, but the region left the European’s with no room to reject it. Because the 
CARIFORUM States came under pressure due to the applications of the European 
Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the reform of their internal market, its  
banana, sugar and rum industries were being affected by the EU’s approach to the 
reforms. Europe however, refused to engage the region in any meaningful discussion of 
those internal reforms but the region would not give-in easily, and used every 
opportunity during the negotiations to convey a sense of European “betrayal” of their 
historical and legal commitments to the ACP partners. The EU’s unilateral denunciation 
of the Sugar Protocol which had been in place since 1975, had left a bitter taste in the 
CARIFORUM region and that decision was understood by the region as a signal of the 
changing Europe on which they could not rely as much as they did in the past.  
While the CARIFORUM States fully understood, that Europe had to be cognizant of  
competition from Brazil, China, India, and NAFTA and also the need for it to shape a 
relationship with the developing countries of Asia and North Africa which are not 
Member States of the ACP, it expected the EU to do what it saw as being in its best 
interests a position for which  they could not be faulted .The Caribbean accepted that 
services and trade in services  remained an emerging trend in the region’s trade pattern 
as its agricultural base was being diminished, and so that it was in the region’s best 
interests to negotiate a comprehensive EPA and not just  an EPA to for trade in 
goods.Therefore,Inward flows of investment are very crucial to the Regions 
development and so it was important to negotiate the so call” Singapore issues”. 
However, both parties wanted this agreement, but for different reasons and so in the 
end this was a pivotal factor which drove the negotiation as each side knew the 
consequences of not having an agreement in place by December 31, 2007. 
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How the CARIFORUM States had prepared  themselves for the negotiations of the EPA  
exposed a model of inclusiveness, coordination, vision and a sense of the maturity of its 
diplomacy within the region and externally. The level of preparation and the breath of 
activities which informed the preparation underlie both the legitimacy and competences 
of the process. It was a model of success in terms of structures, processes and the 
outcome. In a very frank presentation to the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly in 
Vienna in June, 2006, Senior Barbadian Minister and political spokesperson for the 
CARIFORUM EPA, Dame Billie Miller let the European Union knew how the 
CARIFORUM and the ACP state felt about their positioning and the reality of their 
conduct and questioned their political will to give meaning to their verbal expressions on 
the question of development. He approach to these issues was very effective.   
The region’s approach to the negotiations was very focused and being driven by their 
desire to stand on their own and develop its resources and resist being dictated to. In 
the end both sides made compromises and the negotiations processes has further 
bonded the region as group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) for a better 
understanding of their own aspirations. The CARIFORUM region got a deal which is not 
perfect, but one they are prepared to work with. The critics however, are of a different  
persuasion.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 A critical analysis of the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) 
3.1. Introduction  
The CARIFORUM –EU Economic Partnership Agreement is a Free Trade Agreement 
with development dimensions .It replaces the Cotonou Trade Agreement between the 
EU and its former Colonies in Africa, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) which was the 
successor to the Lomé Conventions 1975-2000.The EPA was negotiated across six 
regions in the ACP Configuration of States between 2004 and 2007 to coincide with the 
expiration of the waiver granted by the WTO for the Cotonou Agreement in 2001.The 
CARIFORUM States were the only configuration which had signed a comprehensive 
EPA with the EU at the end of 2007 to be implemented over a twenty-five years period. 
The purposes of which are to eradicate poverty, build regional integration and gradually 
integrate the ACP States into the global economy. The CARIFORUM EPA is the first 
Free Trade Agreement negotiated by the Caribbean the terms of which have gone 
beyond the WTO provisions. The agreement is very far reaching in terms of its 
commitments and scope covering the so called Singapore Issues. Never before were 
these issues negotiated to the extent that they have been in this Free Trade Agreement.   
This chapter examines some aspects of the provisions of the CARIFORUM-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), highlighting the major areas in terms of the 
CARIFORUM negotiating mandate and analyse why these are relevant to 
CARIFORUM’s Economic and Social development and Policy cohesion. 
3.2 Structure and Provisions of the CARIFORUM- European Union EPA. 
The main agreement has four parts, Seven Annexes, three Protocols, final Act and joint 
declarations, covered in two hundred and fifty Articles.  
Part I outlines the objectives, guiding principles and the general terms of the agreement. 
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Part II, contains four titles and twenty chapters covering the areas of: Trade in Goods, 
Investment, Services and E-commerce, Current payment and Capital movement, Trade 
related issues if to include competition, innovation and intellectual property, Public 
procurement, Environment, Social aspects and Personal Data Protection and Part Ill 
addresses the issues of Dispute Avoidance and Settlement covered in two chapters, 
while Part IV covers General Provisions. 
3.2.1     Part I: Objectives 
Article I sets out six main objectives of the agreement to include  (a) Contributing to the 
reduction and eventual eradication of poverty through the establishment of a trade 
partnership consistent with the objective of sustainable development, the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Cotonou Agreement;(b) promise regional integration, 
economic corporation and good Governance; (c) Promoting the gradual integration of 
CARIFORUM States into the world economy; (d) improving the CARIFORUM States’ 
capacity in Trade policy and Trade related issues, (e) supporting increasing investment, 
enhancing supply capacity, competitiveness and economic growth; (f) Strengthening  
the existing relations between the parties on the basis of solidarity and mutual Interest. 
It recognized the asymmetrical nature of the relationship in the liberalization of Trade 
due to the level of development consistent with the Cotonou Agreement and the WTO 
requirements of reciprocity and trade liberalization. These represent the broad context 
of the negotiation in keeping with the desire of the parties. The issue of development is 
integrally linked to CARIFORUM Trade policy and is very important to its development 
strategies. Conceptually, the CARIFORUM viewed trade as developmental because it 
guides and drives of development. The CARIFORUM States got the Europeans to 
agree and accept its conceptualization as being crucial in order to get an agreement294 
and  therefore, development issues are addressed in almost all areas of the Agreement 
and are also contained in a dedicated chapter. The CARIFORUM States by getting the 
                                                        
294 Interview‐ Henry Gill, Barbados, June 10, 2009. Sam Chandler, Barbados date June16, 2009. 
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Europeans to accept their conceptualization of development has highlighted the 
regional‘s political economy and the question of development which has always been at 
variance with those of Industrialized states. The persistent neo-colonial and Washington 
consensus driven conceptualization and thinking which are often imposed on 
developing countries therefore came into very sharp focus in the context of the EPA. 
This, it is argues is part of the new paradigm in Caribbean trade diplomacy which has 
emerged. 
3.2.2     Development Cooperation?   
The principles of development cooperation are reflected in Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Agreement. Article 7 recognizes development cooperation as a critical element of the 
partnership and identifies the form of cooperation anticipated by the parties as being ; 
financial and non financial. It outlines the rules, procedure and the sources of funding 
along with the purposes for which the funding should be applied. The European 
Development Fund (EDF) is the main source of funding. However Member States of the 
EU are identified as addition sources of funding through their National Budgets and aid 
for trade initiatives and each Member States will also facilitate additional funding 
through other donors295. Funding for the EPA had been a critical area of the 
negotiations on which the CARIFORUM held out and the EU made concession without 
which no agreement would have been reached. While, Article 8 identifies the priority for 
cooperation to include technical assistance to build human, legal and Institutional 
capacity. Fiscal reform, support for private sector and enterprise development, 
enhancing interactional competiveness to CARIFORUM firms and diversification of 
CARIFORUM economies are priority  areas for assistance.296These are the overarching 
priorities of the agreement., while it anticipates the establishment of a Caribbean 
Development Fund through which funding for implementing the EPA can be channelled 
independent of support from the EDF.  
                                                        
295 Article 7(3) (5) and (6) CARIFORUM‐EU.EPA. 
 
296 Article 8 (1) of the CARIFORUM‐EU EPA. 
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The sum of Euro 165 million financing for the Caribbean Regional Indicative Program, 
(CRIP) under the 10th EDF and the revised Cotonou Agreement have been made 
available to complement aid for trade contributions by Member States of the European 
Union (EU).297This is very important to the CARIFORUM States, for which they pressed 
the Europeans and were willing to walk away from the deal if additional sources of 
support were not offered by the EU. The burden of adjustment under the EPA would be 
too much for them to bear. It was this offer to assist the region which found favour at the 
Montego Bay meeting which helped to pave the way for the conclusion of the 
Agreement; because following up on the commitment given by Commissioners for 
Trade and for Development, the EU published its aid for trade support for the EPA; 
which identified how the EU would assist the ACP regions under Development 
Cooperation. So, in addition to an increase in the EDF allocation in the 10th EDF, the 
Commission under took “ to work assiduously with the Member States to ensure that a 
range of 5% of the increase in EU trade related assistance will be allocated to ACP 
countries when the target of £2 billion per annum is realized by 2010.298 However, the 
allocation under the CRIP will be based on the strategies and priorities set at the 
regional level to effect implementation of the agreement. This procedure will have to be 
replicated at the national level in order for the allocation to be made to a particular 
county in the region. The allocation therefore will depend on the country’s strategies for 
implementing the agreement. This approach provided substance to the issues of taking 
ownership of the EPA to foster sustainable development as particularized in Article 3 (b) 
of the agreement, which states that “..decision-taking methods shall embrace the 
fundamental principles of ownership, participation and dialogue.”   
 
                                  
                                                        
297 Part IV, Joint Declaration on Development Cooperation. Annex 4 sets out procedure for programming 
resources under the Agreement. 
 
298 The communication from the commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 23rd of 
October 2007.  Com (2007) 635 Final. 
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3.3 Part II:Trade and Trade Related Matters    
The Broad Structures, processes and mechanism through which CARIFORUM States 
and the EC will corporate to eliminate barriers to Trade are addressed in this section of 
the agreement commencing with trade in Goods under Title I which covers seven 
chapters; followed by Title II, which deals with Investment, Services and Commerce 
covered in a further seven chapters, Title III which deals with current payments, Capital  
movements and Title IV dealing with Trade-Related Issues  are covered in six chapters. 
3.3.1     Rules of Origin (RoO) 
Part two of the agreement addresses the broad framework of trade in goods under title I 
which sets up the preferential trade arrangement between both parties. The content of 
Rules of Origin (RoO) is very important to industrial manufacturing base of the region. It 
is the first fundamental issue outlined. The agreement provides preferences for goods 
originating in the CARIFORUM States. Article 10 defines the purposes of the Rules of 
Origin and their broad principles of application based on the “development needs” of the 
CARIFORUM States. The rules are more precisely defined in Protocol One and 
incorporate the elements of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT).“..Originating 
Products” are defined as “products wholly obtained in the EC party within the meaning 
of Article 6 of the Protocol”, or incorporating materials which have not been wholly 
obtained there, providing that such have undergone significant working or processing in 
the EC party within the meaning of Article 7, this is also applicable to the CARIFORUM 
Party.299 While the majority of the CARIFORUM Economies do not boast industrial 
manufacturing base, States such as Trinidad &Tobago, the Dominican Republic and to 
a lesser extent Jamaica enjoy some degree of manufacturing for domestic consumption 
and export and therefore stand to benefit from these Rules .   
  
                                                        
299 Article 2 (1) (a) (b). Article 2 (2) (a) (b) and 3. 
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The degree of processing which will render the material to have undergone substantial 
work or processing however is very  important to the region’s Industrialization, because 
for the purpose of Protocol One; regional market is treated as a single market, even 
where the processing is done in an individual territory, or partly in one and partly in 
another.300 While Article 8 disqualifies certain operations as not meeting the status of 
originating products notwithstanding the provisions of Article 7. It sets out six (6) 
conditions for disqualification which includes “husking, partial or total bleaching, 
polishing, and glazing of cereals and rice”. This provision seems to be a direct response 
to perceived loophole in the Lomé and Cotonou Rice Protocols with respect to the Rules 
of Origin, which has given rise to the rice dispute cases in the EU between 1992 
and1995301 involving production of processed rice in the Netherland Antilles..But more 
importantly, Article 4 which deals with the question of Cumulation is the deal the 
Caribbean was seeking to secure from the very early stages of the negotiation. It was 
always the view of the region and the wider ACP States that the restrictive Rules of 
Origin which existed under the Lomé and Cotonou never favoured industrialization of 
the South; and is part of the reason for the failure of the ACP States to build an effective 
and competitive export manufacturing base and give effect to the purposes of the Suva 
Declaration of 1977. 
Article 4 established the mechanism for cumulation which allows the region to cumulate 
or negate input coming from other countries and treat them as if they were from that 
specified country. The essence of the Article 4 is that cumulation can take place within 
each CARIFORUM States and also across the region. Another essential feature of the 
Rules of Origin and the cumulation factor is found in Article 2 paragraph (3) of the 
                                                        
300 Ibid. 
 
301 Antillean Rice mills NV, Trading and Shipping Company. TER Beek BV, European Rice Brokers AVV, Alesie 
Curacao NV and Guyana Investments AVU vs. Commission of the European communities. Joint cases T‐
480/93 and T.483/93. European Court Reports 1995 II.02305. There the court had to examine the issues of 
Safeguard measures, Application for Annulment and Admissibility arising from the importation of Rice from 
Guyana and Surinam by Corporation in the Netherland Antilles in the Caribbean and semi*‐ processed the 
price before selling it in the European market. The French complained; that such import was affecting the 
market and sought to impose safeguard measures. 
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protocol which makes input coming from other trading partners in the EU, or its 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) or any other ACP country be eligible for 
cumulating, and even more importantly, Article 5 allows for input from certain Latin 
American countries302 by request may be eligible for cumulating. These improvements 
have opened-up possibility for deeper economic intergration in the region and also to 
widen the process to include Latin America. 
Up to 70% input can be eligible for cumulation, but while the EC partners can have 
cumulating from its OCTs, EC and ACP States; it cannot have accumulation from Latin 
America. The arrangement with the Caribbean seems to be a special form of special 
and differential treatment between the CARIFORUM and the ACP States. This is very 
important to the development of South-South trade, which was stifled under the 
previous Rules of Origin arrangements. The CARIFORUM States had placed great 
emphasis on the Rules of Origin beginning with the all ACP phase and this issue was 
among the first that was placed on the negotiating table by the CARIFORUM States. 
The region needed to craft the Rules of Origin early with the intention of influencing the 
discussion, because it did not want the EC to push them on those issues. In this area 
the CARIFORUM provided leadership of the all ACP level and carried it over to the 
regional negotiations303.However, so important was the issue that the region was eager 
to settle the Rule of Origin question even before it embarked on market access.304 
The conventional view among CARIFORUM policy makers and trade strategists is that 
the Rules of Origin under Lomé and Cotonou agreements was a fundamental 
contributor to the lack of performance by the ACP countries in improving their export of 
                                                        
302 See Annex VIII of Protocol I countries include: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela.   
 
303 Interview ‐ Neville Totaram, Georgetown Guyana June, 2009. 
 
304 Ibid. 
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processed food, and manufacturing in general for export to the EU305,because those 
Rule of Origin (RoO) under the previous conventions were quota  and cumulation 
restrictive. The strategy of the CARIFORUM States in the EPA negotiation was to 
achieve a degree of cumulation under the Rules of Origin which would enhance the 
region’s chances of diversifying its economies in food processing and light 
manufacturing for export for which it could develop competitive capacities in light of the 
DFQF commitments of the EU. This is an area in which the EU would have preferred 
that the CARIFORUM States sought full asymmetry, but the Region did not, because to 
do so would have given the EU greater access to the CARIFORUM markets and the 
mechanism to administer those rules would be too complex. So, the region pressed for 
cumulation 306 and the EC conceded but maintained limited application of cumulation in 
the case of rice and products with sugar content.307 This limitation did not sit well with 
Trinidad and Tobago which is a competitive exporter of confectionary; and further give 
credence to the argument that the EU wanted the region to continue as a supplier of 
primary products308.However, Guyana which is the regions only rice producer for the EU 
is significantly affected by the limitation on cumulation for rice based products. 
Under the Rules of Origin, the CARIFORUM benefits in the area of clothing 
manufacturing, because the region secured concessions for the EU to adapt similar 
rules to those found in the United States- African Growth and Opportunity Act which 
address the issue of derogation for lesser developed countries which allows for knitted 
and woven clothing to be produced from material which have not being wholly 
originating in the producing country, but still retain the wholly originating status. The. 
                                                        
305 Interview Ambassador Frederico Cuello New York May 15, 2009. See also Stevens, Christopher, Kennan, 
Jane and Meya, Mareika: “Analysis of contents of the CARIFORUM and Pacific ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreement and challenges ahead Final report”. Commonwealth Secretariat. London. December, 2008 p. 40. 
Http/www. CFTC‐EAD‐BCWG‐208 Final Report. pdf. (December 1, 2009). 
 
306 Economic commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (ECLAC) LC/CAR/L.181. 26 Nov. 2008. p. 8. 
 
307 Annex X to Protocol I of the EPA. 
 
308 ECLAC. LC/CAR/L.181. Nov. 26, 2008. p.8. 
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These provisions are far more enhanced than what the Dominican Republic received 
under CAFTA.309 However, the derogation is not automatic, it must be applied for and 
the value added must not exceed 60%. For example, take the case of tobacco, up to 
4% of its manufacturing content can be imported into the region and the finished 
product is qualified under Rules of Origin. However the sugar content restrictions will be 
reviewed within 3 years, while the overall  regime will be reviewed in five years. 
3.3.2 Customs Duty 
The EU had offered Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) access to its market beginning 
January 2008, for the region’s export except for sugar and rice.310In the case of sugar, 
there is duty free quota free access commencing in October 2009. What had obtained 
up until then, were the provisions of the Sugar Protocol under Contonou Agreement 
which gave guaranteed price and quotas for the various ACP suppliers .However under 
the Joint Declaration of the Final Act of the Agreement, if during the operation of the 
Sugar Protocol, there is any short fall from any of the individual CARIFORUM States on 
their quota, that short fall will be allocated to the other CARIFORUM States. But even 
though the region is now free to negotiate directly with the EU’s sugar processors of raw 
sugar which was not the situation prior 311 The St Kitts, a Member of the CARIFORUM 
Group was severely impacted by the new arrangements as it was forced to cease 
production of sugar for export after over three hundred years of production and its quote 
has been re-allocated to the CARIFORUM States. While rice has been granted Duty 
Free Quota Free access to the EU market as of January 1, 2010. These were the 
essential features of the commitment under the Tariff liberalization for imports from 
CARIFORUM countries. The approach to liberalization sought to maintain the principle 
of special and differential treatment for CARIFORUM States. So, while States must 
reduce tariffs, the period for reduction is staggered and has different variations in the 
                                                        
309 Interview‐ Ambassador Frederico Cuello, New York, May 15, 2009. 
310 Article 15, CARIFORUM‐EU‐EPA. 
311 Interview‐ Ambassador Derrick Heaven, Chairman of the Sugar Industry Authority, Jamaica May.  2009, 
Kingston Jamaica.   
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degree of liberalization. The Member States of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) and Haiti for example have different levels of commitment from the rest 
of CARIFORUM312.This approach gives comfort to the Variable Geometry within the 
region which provides for Special and Differential treatment of the region’s designated 
LDCs. There is also a three-year moratorium while the phased reduction on tariffs is 
applicable to products with high revenue sensitivity or falls in the category which 
requires protection from competition posed by liberalization of imports. The 
CARIFORUM States were prepared to accept no less because of their vulnerabilities 
and   potential revenue loss. 
There was also the exclusions list of sensitive goods on which duties will still be 
imposed. So approximately 13.1% of food items imported from the EU will continue to 
attract import duties. The extreme sensitivity implication for the region’s budget support 
was being exposed, So, in developing its exclusion list and also to apply rates base on 
revenue considerations, the region had listed all 5,224 sub-heads in the EU Harmonized 
System (HS) 2002 nomenclature and further indicated how these items would be dealt  
over 25 years. For example, in 2009, a 52.8% tariff reduction. In 2013, tariff were to be 
reduced by 56%, by 2018 the percentage will be 62.1%, by the year 2013 it will be 
increased to 82.7% and by 2028 and 2033 from 84.6% to 86.9% respectfully. The 
advantage for CARIFORUM States is that this reduction would not be front loaded in 
order to reduce the impact on revenue loss in the short-term. The first reduction of 
52.8% is with respect to goods already zero rated, so he impact will be negligible313. 
See Table 8 for CARIFORUM’s liberalized and excluded goods and table 9 for its 
liberalization commitments by country. 
                                                        
312 Article 17 provide that “in light of the special developmental needs of Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, the 
commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, the Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, St. Christopher and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the parties may decide …to modify the level of custom 
duties stipulated in Annex III, which may be applied to the products from the EC party upon its importation 
into the CARIFORUM States”. 
 
313 Interview‐ Henry Gill, CRNM, Bridgetown, Barbados, June 10, 2009. 
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Table 9: CARIFORUM Tariff Liberalization Commitments by Country 
Country 0 yr 5 yr 10 yr 15 yr 20 yr 25 yr Excl 
Antigua and Barbuda 7% 7% 25% 35% 2% 2% 22% 
Bahamas 32% 2% 13% 34% 3% 2% 13% 
Barbados 48% 0% 2% 24% 1% 1% 23% 
Belize 13% 6% 10% 27% 1% 3% 39% 
Dominica 17% 3% 18% 27% 2% 1% 27% 
Dominican Republic 53% 8% 5% 21% 3% 5% 5% 
Grenada 9% 14% 20% 25% 2% 3% 28% 
Guyana 53% 1% 7% 18% 2% 1% 18% 
Haiti 60% 0% 1% 7% 2% 4% 27% 
Jamaica 56% 0% 1% 26% 2% 1% 13% 
St. Kitts and Nevis 18% 16% 16% 17% 2% 2% 29% 
St. Lucia 38% 0% 4% 22% 5% 2% 29% 
St. Vincent and 
Grenadines 
8% 7% 14% 30% 2% 2% 37% 
Suriname 9% 9% 20% 27% 2% 3% 28% 
Trinidad and Tobago 73% 0% 1% 18% 0% 1% 6% 
CAR 53% 3% 5% 22% 2% 2% 13% 
Source: CRNM www.crnm.org downloaded Dec. 12, 2008 
Note (1) at entry into force of the agreement, CARIFORUM commits to liberalize 52.8% comprising the following 
elements: 
42% of CARIFORUM imports currently duty-free; 
9% to be liberalized by the Dominican Republic (CARTA-party); and  
1.8% to be liberalized on tariff lines that are currently low (nuisance tariffs). 
Note (2) the average share of CARICOM MDCs and LDCs imports excluded from tariff liberalization are 15 and 30%, 
respectively. 
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This is an area which had caused the region grave difficulties in achieving because of 
the “Variable Geometry” in the region, and the very extensive exclusion list prepared by 
each territory within the Region. These liberalization schedules are intricately linked to 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause of the Agreement which seems to provide 
some flexibility under the review process because,  it is stipulated in Title I, Article 16.6 
of the Agreement that during the implementation of the agreement if  serious difficulties  
arise  due to  imports of a given product, then it is permissible to review the schedule of 
custom duty reduction by the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee to 
change the schedule or eliminated it. However, “If the CARIFORUM-EC trade 
development committee has not taken a decision within thirty days of an application to 
review the time table, the CARIFORUM States may suspend the time table provisionally 
for a period that may not exceed one year”.314This provision seems to give further 
cohesiveness and some flexibility within the schedules as this type of safeguard 
measure is essential for Small and Vulnerable Island economies so highly susceptible 
to external shocks. Other duties and charges and export duties are prohibited.315 
 The general MFN clause is prohibitive as neither Europe nor the CARIFORUM States 
can unilaterally give to another group of States or individual country any term more 
favourable than those terms given to either party under this Agreement316. This self 
restraining clause is mutual in scope and application. What this means is that while 
Europe continues to negotiate with third countries, whatever it gives to those countries 
or state which is more favourable than what it gave to the CARIFORUM States it is 
obliged to give to the CARIFORUM States. The converse holds true for the 
CARIFORUM States. Therefore, while there is no General MFN clause in the 
Agreement, the EC party is obliged to give to the CARIFORUM States the same 
treatment, if it were to conclude an FTA after the coming into force of the EPA and gives 
                                                        
314 Article 16.6. Article 17. 
 
315 Article 14. 
 
316 Article 19 (5). 
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more favourable treatment to that third country than it gives to the CARIFORUM States. 
However, the arrangements seem not to operate automatically as they relate to the 
CARIFORUM States vis-à-vis the EC, but the granting state would be required to seek 
consultation with the EC party to give more favourable terms to a third party, but in the 
case where Europe is granting such more favourable terms to a third country, then the 
benefits automatically passes to the CARIFORUM States. The treatment however, only 
applies to matter covered under the chapter on custom duty317.The CARIFORUM States 
are obliged to give to the EC party the same treatment it give to a major trading 
economy or Group of country in and FTA concluded after the EPA in which the 
treatment given under that FTA is better than that the CARIFORUM States give to the 
EC under the EPA.318So, while the restriction applies to treatment given to any third 
party by the EC party in a future EPA, the CARIFORUM States’ obligation is limited to 
Group of States or an individual State with a share of 1% or more of world trade. Article 
4 stipulates that for the purposes of this provision that group of States or an Individual 
States is defined as “major trading economy”319.Because is not difficult to determine 
which country or group of countries that this is aimed at, what seems clear is that no 
Caribbean basin country is qualified. It is therefore contended that the real aim of the 
EU’s insistence on this provision is to focus on the potential threats of emerging markets 
of Brazil, China and India and the its main trading partners; the United States. However, 
the real challenge for the CARIFORUM States rests in the definition of “major trading 
economy” and whether this applies to South Africa which is an ACP Member State and 
the impact this may have on its ability to give special treatment to South Africa in the 
future without offering same to the EU. It is therefore important to observe that from the 
                                                        
317 Article 19 (1). 
318 Article 19 (2). 
 
319 A “major trading economy” means any developed country, or any country of territory accounting for a 
share of world merchandise exports drove*one (1) percent in the year before the entry into force of the free 
trade agreement referred to in paragraph 2 or any group of countries acting individually, collectively or 
through an free trade agreement accounting collectively for a share of world merchandise exports above one 
and a half (1.5) percent in the year before the entry into force of the free trade agreement referred to in 
paragraph 2.” Article 19 (4). 
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CARIFORUM’s prospective the EC cannot give any more favourable treatment to a third 
country than the Duty free Quota Free access which it gives to the CARIFORUM 
exports to the EC under this chapter. The only products from the region which do not 
have this type of access are sugar and rice at the time of the coming into force of the 
CARIFORU-EU Agreement. However, it seems possible for CARIFORUM to conclude a 
Free Trade Agreement in which it could offer better treatment to a third country or group 
of countries that qualifies under Article 19 (4). But the region’s major trading partners 
are the EU, Canada and the United State of America and it seems very unlikely that 
they would be giving any better treatment of goods imported from Canada and the USA 
than those of the EC party.320The MFN clause was one of the most controversial and 
difficult to agree because it was felt by some that the region was giving up too much and 
that it is restricting itself from further South- South development321. However, the 
counter argument is that it is very unlikely that any other major trading partner will be 
giving to the CARIFORUM State. Duty Free Quota Free entry of its exports into their 
country to prompt the CARIFORUM States to offer more favourable terms to them than 
what the region has given the EC322. 
                                                        
320 The Caribbean trade with the Canada CARIBCAN and with the US, under the CARIBBEAN Basic Initiative 
(CBI) both of which give preferential treatment to Goods imported from the Caribbean. These are not Free 
Trade Agreements. The Dominican Republic Trades with the US under CAFTA, which is a Free Trade 
Agreement. 
 
321 Main Caribbean critics of this clause are: Sir Shirdath Ramphal, Interview Barbados June 2009, and 
Anthony Hylton M.P. EPA: The opposition’s view point. Sunday Gleaner, March 30, 2008 and EPA: Why the 
opposition walked out. Sunday Gleaner September 7, 2008. Sir Ronald Saunders: Europe’s ploy to secure EPA 
signing coming to light. The Jamaica Observer, Sunday Oct. 5, 2008. Thomas Clive. CARICOM perspective on 
the CARIFORUM‐EC, Economic Partnership Agreement.http/www.normongiven.into/up‐
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3.3.3     Protocol III 
Protocol lll deals with cultural cooperation and makes special provisions for Audio-
Visual cooperation which are relevant to market access. Article 1 of Protocol III provides 
that “…the parties shall cooperate for facilitating exchanges of cultural activities, goods 
and services, including inter alia in the audiovisual sector”. Provisions are also made for 
technical assistance to the CARIFORUM States to develop their capacity and 
implement their cultural policies and for the parties to cooperate and endeavour to 
facilitate the “…entry into and temporary stay in their territories of artists and other 
cultural professionals and practitioners from the party”.323This Protocol is read in 
conjunction with Article 139 of the agreement which creates an obligation on the parties 
to effectively implement treaties that protect Intellectual Property Rights and also Trade- 
related aspects of Intellectual Property. The agreement reinforces the parties’324 
obligation to honour other international obligation in the area of Intellectual Property 
rights; but recognized the need for special and differential treatment in the 
implementation of the provisions. The time line for implementation is set for January 1, 
2014, but for the more developed economies the period is 2010. However, they may 
apply to the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and development committee for any relief. These 
provisions are vital to Europe’s interests because of the difficulties of monitoring and 
policing infringement of Intellectual Property Rights at the global level. 
.Article 142 addresses the very important question of transfer of technology which is 
inextricably linked to innovation and intellectual property rights. The parties agree “to 
exchange views and information on their practices and policies affecting transfer of 
technology, both within their respective regions and with third countries…” The activities 
of each party will “...include measures to facilitate information flows, business 
partnerships licensing and subcontracting”. The parties have undertaken to pay 
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particular attention “to the conditions necessary to create an adequate enabling 
environment for technology transfer in the host countries including issues such as 
development of human capital and legal framework”325. This is very crucial for 
CARIFORUM States in the context of their trade and development policies, because of 
the incentive to be given to institutions to transfer technology to enterprises in the 
region. However, the parties cannot derogate from, but most comply first with their 
international obligation with respect to intellectual property rights and trade- related 
intellectual property rights. It is therefore important to develop monitoring mechanisms 
to ensure that the technology being transferred is not only appropriate, but should not 
be obsolete. 
Very importantly, the agreement offers protection for Geographical Indications 
permissibility to register Geographical Indications alongside relevant trade mark and 
places an obligation on CARIFORUM States to commence negotiation to protect 
geographical indications in their respective territories, no later than 1st of January 2014. 
This is particular important to countries such as Jamaica that has develop the world 
famous Jamaican Blue Mountain Coffee brand. However, Europe faces a formidable 
challenge in this area in terms of its wines  and other beverages. 
Articles 151-163 set out the mechanism for enforcing Intellectual Property Rights 
wherein the parties undertakings to provide measures, procedures and remedies to 
ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights and to ensure also that such 
“measures and remedies be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied 
in such manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against their abuse. The important elements of these arrangements in the 
context of CARIFORUM’s  preparedness for global competitiveness is that the EC party 
has undertaken to provide financial and technical assistance in developing and 
supporting the establishment and implementation of these measures and procedures, 
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the standards of which are in keeping with the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property rights (TRIPS) Agreement under the WTO because of the lessening of the 
financial burden of implementing TRIPS on the part of CARIFORUM States is very vital 
to their fiscal budgets.  
3.4     Trade Defence Instruments 
Trade defence measures are outlined in Chapter two, Articles 23-25 covering Anti-
dumping and countervailing measures, multilateral safeguards and a general safeguard 
clause. The Articles set out the circumstances under which CARIFORUM States or 
Europe may impose temporary barriers to trade to include tariff measures. For example,  
were imports from a trading partner has  increased to a level where it causes serious 
harm to certain industries or to the economy, it is permissible for that party to use 
safeguard, which are barriers to trade to prevent injury  to domestic industries and the 
economy  caused by such increased in imports. Either party is therefore permitted to 
adapt whether singularly or collectively “anti-dumping or countervailing measures in 
accordance with the relevant WTO agreement”, however, “…before imposing anti-
dumping or countervailing duties in respect of products imported from CARIFORUM 
States, the EC party shall consider the possibility of constructive remedies as provided 
for in the relevant WTO agreements.”326  But, while the EC party is obliged to take such 
steps before imposing such measures, the CARIFORUM States are not so obliged. 
Further, the parties are permitted to take steps in accordance with Article XIX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, with respect to Safeguards, and also in 
respect to Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture under the WTO .The imposition of 
any such measure shall be temporary and can only go up to a period of five years from 
entry into force of this Agreement.327 Subsection 2 of Article 24 provides for exceptions 
to give effect to the objectives of the agreement in the context of the small size of the 
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economies of the CARIFORUM States. The EC party shall exclude imports from any 
CARIFORUM States from any measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT 
1994, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and Article 5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The injured party may examine other solutions, and having done so may 
apply safeguard measures of limited duration which derogate from the provisions of 
Article 15 or 16 as the case may be328. The safeguard measures however, are not 
subject to WTO dispute provision and countervailing measures such as duties can be 
employed to prevent unfair competition between subsidized imports and unsubsidized 
domestic products. This provision is of critical importance for Caribbean food security 
based on the threat posed to domestic agriculture from subsidized  agricultural imports 
3.5  Non-tariff Measures  
 Articles 26-28 cover non-tariff measures including prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions, National Treatment of internal taxation and regulation and agricultural 
export subsidies. These provisions seek to reduce barriers to trade other than tariffs to 
include quotas, license to import or export products. They also address unfair 
competition between imports and similar domestic products within the domestic 
market.329 
Discrimination against import is prohibited as the parties are obliged to apply National 
Treatment (NT) to all products and therefore no charges and internal taxes may be 
levied to imports where they are not similarly applied to similar products in the domestic 
market. 330  Therefore, like treatment must be accorded to both imports and locally 
produced goods in any regulation or law affecting internal sale, offers for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of product. However, the NT provisions do 
not prevent either party from offering domestic support to national products. In this 
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instance, the provision of the EPA slightly differs from the provisions of established 
International Trade Rule which accord National Treatment status for imported goods 
and services provided. Under these provisions, Europe shall eliminate export subsidies 
on all products which the CARIFORUM States have liberalized. However, the 
CARIFORUM States are allowed to maintain such subsidies on their products during 
the transition period afforded to developing countries under the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures 
(SCM).331 The Caribbean States need these safeguards to protect its domestic 
agriculture in light of the dismantling of the commodity protocols by Europe. 
3.6 Government Procurement 
The provisions dealing with public procurement are very detailed332. This area was very 
important to EU’s trade policy and they needed to have the area addressed in the EPA. 
The EC pressed very hard for market access in government procurement, but the 
region did not have a mandate to negotiate in this area. So, while they pressed, the 
region knew that Europe wanted something and so decided on a compromise.333 The 
regions expression of recognition of the need for transparency in Government 
Procurement procedure was as far as it was prepared to concede on the issues, 
specifically referring to the tender processes only. Article 165 states that the general 
objectives of the parties was to recognize the importance of transparency in competitive 
tendering for economic development with due regards being given to the special 
situation of the economies of the CARIFORUM States. The region’s undertaking is 
limited to future development in the area. This approach had to be adopted because the 
CARIFORUM States had not reached the levels of development in this area to meet the 
demands of the EU neither at the regional, national nor multilateral levels. However, in 
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the spirit of compromise they allowed the EU a “foot in the door” by making the 
concession to undertake transparency in government procurement market access334. 
So, Article 167 for example addresses the scope of procurement and the need to 
support the creation of regional procurement markets335. The procurement is restricted 
to those entities included in the schedule in Annex VI and not to all government entities, 
and also to the value of the contract with respect to the thresholds. The parties are 
required to treat eligible suppliers equally in accordance with the principles of open and 
effective competition.  While Article 168 sets out the qualification of eligible suppliers 
and places the obligation on the CARIFORUM States to determine the qualification of 
eligibility for participation in the process. The position does not seem to deal with the 
question of market access in government procurement, but instead it addressed the 
question of transparency of the process. Therefore, decisions must be taken in a 
transparent manner. So, government procurement was deliberately left out of the 
chapter dealing with market access at the insistence of CARIFORUM to make it clear 
that they were not making any concession to Government Procurement in the context of 
market access, but instead to address one aspect of government procurement limited to 
transparency in the process.  Article 182 sets out the priorities for cooperation in this 
area while Article 181 provides for a three year’s review by the CARIFORUM-EC Trade 
and Development Committee. The EU seemed quite content with the opening created. 
3.7 The Environment 
The Agreement also addresses the issue of the Environment in Chapter 4, Articles 183-
190. It recognizes the importance of the treatment of the environment in terms of 
sustainable development. The objectives for this are set out in Article 183 (1) which 
states inter alia that “the parties reaffirm that principle of sustainable management of 
natural resources and the environment are to be applied and integrated at every level of 
their partnership” in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Cotonou Agreement dealing 
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with their commitment to sustainable development. Also, for the purposes of promoting 
international trade and ensure sustainable development the “ …parties agree that in the 
absence of relevant environmental standards in national or regional legislation they 
shall seek to adapt and implement the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, where practical and appropriate”336. Article 190 sets out the 
importance of cooperating on environmental issues to meet the objectives while Article 
88 prohibits the lowering of Environmental Standards as a means of gaining advantage. 
Article 89 sets up the process of consultation and monitoring through the CARIFORUM-
EC Consultative Committee on Environmental issues at which the parties can make 
submissions written or oral with recommendations for disseminating and sharing best 
practices relating to environmental issues. This provision though potentially 
advantageous to both sides, the CARIFORUM States will only benefit, if the EU 
provides the necessary support for achieving  and maintaining such standards. Where 
therefore, the region has achieved such standards, they should not be discriminated 
against by the EU in its dealing with third countries which have not adhered to those 
standards.  
3.8 Social Aspects 
 The social aspects of the partnership are covered under chapter 5, Articles 191-196. 
The objectives of which are set out in Article 191 on international labour standards. It 
states inter alia that “the parties affirm their commitment to the Internationally 
recognized core labour standards as defined”337 under the International Labour 
Organization(ILO) Convention to include freedom of Association and the right to 
collective bargaining, abolition of force labour, the elimination of the worst form of child 
labour and non discrimination in respect of employment”338 These are very important 
Core Standards which are traditionally up held in the region because of the long 
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established labour movements. So, while the Article is not geared to influence and force 
regional governments to open new areas of regulation, it seeks to maintain International 
Standards to avoid unfair advantage in competitive trade. It therefore prohibits 
competitive advantage through lowering of core standards to encourage trade or direct 
foreign investment339. The CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee has responsibility 
for consultation and monitoring of the processes under this chapter340. Where there is 
an issue under consultation, the process shall not exceed three months and the parties 
may “seek advice from the ILO, and if this is done the process may be extended for a 
further three months. A dissatisfied party may request the committee of experts to 
examine the matter and at the end of which that committee shall submit a report to the 
CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee for final action. 341 Again 
cooperation is needed to give effect to the objectives of the chapter. The level of 
cooperation required is set out in Article 196 which outlines an elaborate process and 
machinery to give effect to the cooperation undertaking, to include formulation of 
national legislation, education and awareness measures and enforcement mechanism 
at the national level342These provisions are important to CARIFORUM States which 
face competition in the agricultural sector namely in the production of banana in Central 
America “dollar banana” producing States. The EC must raise these issues with the 
Latin’s in their negotiations for Free Trade Agreement as the CARIFORUM banana 
Interest has complained about the low labour standards which obtain in Latin America.   
3.9 Protection of Personal Data 
The protection of personal data is covered in chapter 6, Articles 197-200 of the 
Agreement.  Article 197 sets out the objective of the provision on personal data 
protection which places obligations on the parties to recognise their “common interest in 
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protecting fundamental rights and freedom of natural persons and in particular their 
rights to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data,” The maintenance of 
“effective data protection regime is a means of protecting the interest of consumers, 
stimulating investor confidence and facilitating broader flows of personal data”343 is very 
important. The data should be collected and processed in a “transparent fair manner 
with due respect to the data subject”. The parties have agreed to establish appropriate 
legal and institutional framework for implementation of the data protection mechanism 
no later than seven years after the entry into force of this agreement344 
The regime establishes priorities for cooperation which oblige the parties to 
acknowledge the importance of cooperation to facilitate the establishment of the 
regimes to give effect to the objectives of personal data protection; to include 
appropriate legislation, Judicial and institutional framework345. These cooperation 
activities are complementary to the general principles of cooperation outlined in Article 8 
of the Agreement. 
3.10 Part III:Dispute Avoidance and Settlement  Mechanisms. 
The dispute avoidance and settlement principles and procedures are outlined in three 
chapters covered in part III of the Agreement. The process of Dispute resolution is 
established and facilitated under a three- tier procedure outlined in chapter one, the 
objectives and scope of which are set out in Articles 202 and 203 of the agreement.   
The objective is to avoid disputes and to settle them  where they exist   between the 
parties by arriving at mutually agreed solution, and for the parties to seek interpretation 
and application of the Agreement346. However dispute concerning development finance 
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cooperation under Cotonou Agreement shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
procedure set out in Article 98 of the Cotonou Agreements. Therefore only disputes 
arising from Aid for trade finance and financial support from other donors outside the 
EDF can be accommodated under these procedures347. This provision seems to 
presuppose that the Cotonou Agreement will be in force in perpetuity  or at least to 2033 
when the implementation processes will be completed. Because by dividing the funding 
arrangements into two areas to be treated separately, suggests in some measure that 
the problem of funding under the EDF can only be addressed under Cotonou, yet the 
EDF is the key funding support for the EPA. The two systems must be reconciled for 
effective management of the funding arrangements for the EPA.   
The provision envisages a three- prong approach to dispute avoidance and settlement 
namely; arbitration which includes Consultation under Article 204, Mediation under 
Article 205 and Arbitration under Article 206. The application of which is determined by 
the nature of the dispute. Where for example, there are issues of interpretation and 
application of the Agreement, the parties must first use best endeavours to resolve them 
by consultation in good faith.  
In this regard, the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee is therefore not 
the first line of invocation but, must be notified by means of written request copied to it.  
The request must be made to the other party and consultation must commence within 
forty (40) days of submission and are deemed to be concluded after sixty (60) days, 
except where the parties agree to continue. If however, there is no resolution the parties 
can move to mediation and where mediation fails, the parties have recourse to 
arbitration under Article 206.348  
However, any dispute arising under chapter 4 and 5 of title IV must be addressed under 
the procedures outlined in Article 189 (3), (4) and (5) and also Article 195 (3), (4) and 5 
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respectively, but where such disputes fail to be resolved within 9 months they will be 
accommodated under their general provision.349 At all times these proceedings shall 
remain confidential.350 These provisions are designed to discourage matters of dispute 
from going to the WTO for resolution, though this path is not prohibited. However 
neither party to a dispute can resort to the WTO regime while its matter is before the 
EPA Dispute Settlement body.. 
3.10.1     Arbitration Procedure 
The procedures for Arbitration are covered in chapter 2, which is divided into three 
sections. Section 1, Articles 206-209 deal with the procedures while section 2, Articles 
210-214, deal with compliance with rulings of the Arbitration and section 3 deals with 
common provisions covered in Articles 215-223 of the Agreement. 
Where the parties fail to resolve the issues through consultation and mediation, a 
request must be made in writing to the party against whom the complaint is made and 
also the CARIFORUM-EC Trade Development Committee identifying the specific issues 
and explains the breach.351 A  request must be made within ten (10) days after, for a 
panel to be established and the parties must consult on the composition of the panel 
which shall consist of three members.352 Where no agreement is reach on the 
composition, by request of the parties, the chairman of the Joint CARIFORUM-EC 
Trade and Development Committee however, shall select the three member panel from 
a list established under Article 222. Where the parties agree on one or more of the 
members to the panel, then “any remaining members shall be selected by the 
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procedure” as set out in Article 207353. But where however, the dispute arises under 
chapter 4 or 5 of title IV the panel must consist of at least two (2) expertise in the matter 
covered under those chapters taken from a list of fifteen (15) persons from a list 
prepared by Joint CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committees pursuant to 
Article 221; The effective date for establishment of the panel is the date when the three 
members are selected.354For the purposes of a resolution, the panel shall issue an 
interim report and notify the parties within 120 days of its establishment. Therefore any 
party and any party may submit comments on any aspect of the report within 15 days of 
notification.355 Thereafter, the panel shall notify the parties within 150 days from its 
establishment. However, where the subject of the dispute are perishables, the ruling 
shall be made in 75 days from its establishment or provide a preliminary ruling within 10 
days were the case  so deems. The Panel may provide recommendation for 
compliance.356 
3.10.2    Compliance Measures 
The compliance provisions make it mandatory for each party to comply with the ruling of 
the panel, within the agreed time. However, such period must be reasonable but shall 
not exceed 30 days after the ruling. The party against whom the complaint was lodged 
shall notify the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee of the time for 
compliance committee. However, where the parties have failed to agree on the time, the 
aggrieved party shall within 20 days of the notification, write to the panel to determine 
the time. The notice shall be served on the Joint Trade and Development Committee 
and the complaining party simultaneously and the Committee must respond within 30 
days of the submission of the request. In arriving at its decision the panel can consider 
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capacity constraints.357 However, where the panel is unable to reconvene, the 
procedure set out  in Article 207 shall apply and the period for notification in those 
circumstances shall be 45 days from date of the submission of the request under and 
the time, however, can be extended by consent358.  
3.10.3  Review Processes 
Article 212 provides for review of measures taken to comply with the ruling and the 
party against whom the complaint is made, shall notify the Trade and Development 
Committee of steps or measures taken before the expiration of the reasonable time to 
comply with the ruling. Where however, there is disagreement on the measures taken 
by that party as to compatibility of the measures notified, the complaining party may 
request in writing that the panel makes a ruling on the matter and thereafter, the panel 
must notify its ruling within 90 days of the request. Where the matter is one of 
emergency, the period shall be 45 days and where the panel  is unable to re convene, 
the procedure under article 207 shall apply.359 
 Provisions are made for temporary remedies in case of non-compliance. So, were non-
compliance becomes an issue, the party against whom the complaint is made may offer 
financial compensation, but the complaining party is not obliged to accept.360 
Consequentially, if no agreement on compensation is reached within 30 days of the 
expiration of the reasonable time period on the basis that the measure is not 
compatible, and the complaining party may, by notice to the other party entitled to adapt 
appropriate measures. 361  However, where the dispute involves matters under chapter 
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4 and 5, of title IV, suspension of trade concession shall not be an appropriate measure 
and the complaining party may adopt other measures within ten (10) days after 
notification362.  Therefore, the obligations which are placed upon the EC party in terms 
of taking punitive steps for failure to comply with a ruling show differences as compared 
to the CARIFORUM’s rights. For example, the EC party is obliged to exercise restraint 
in seeking compensation or adapting appropriate measure. Further, an appropriate 
measure shall be temporarily applied until there is conformity, or until the parties have 
resolved the issues363.One peculiarity of the compliance provisions is that where the 
CARIFORUM States is found to be in breach of the Agreement, the EC party is not 
allow to take appropriate action against CARIFORUM collectively to enforce 
compliance. This is a form of special and differential treatment which is very important 
to CARIFORUM States and therefore, appropriate measure must be aimed at the 
particular offending CARIFORUM State364. 
3.10.4 Common Provisions 
By mutual agreement the parties can terminate their dispute at any time and notify the 
CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee which will accept the agreed 
solution and terminate the proceedings. The rules of procedure for dispute shall be 
governed by the rules of procedure adopted by the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council 
within 3 months of the provisional application of this Agreement365.Article 217 deals with 
the flow of information and technical advice available to the panel. The panel is not 
restricted in getting information from whatever available source it deems appropriate to 
address the matters before it, including the opinions of expertise as deemed appropriate 
and it shall interpret the rules in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
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public international law366. The panel shall endeavour to take decision by consensus, 
but if not by majority. However, the minority opinion shall not be published. 367 The 
ruling of the panel shall be made public through the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and 
Development Committee, but, by its own decision may decide not to do so368. 
3.10.5 Approved list of Arbitrators and their functions 
The CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee shall within three months of 
the provisional application of this agreement, establish a list of fifteen (15) Arbitrators 
who are willing to and available to serve as arbitrators369.  Once established, the list 
shall be maintained at that level and these arbitrators are required to be of specialised 
knowledge or experience in Law and International Trade370 .The procedure for selecting 
the Arbitrators is not defined nor the source from which they will be drawn. Article 222 
prohibits any arbitrator from adjudicating disputes concerning a signatory States  right 
and obligation under the Agreement setting up of WTO. However, recourse to the 
dispute settlement provisions of this Agreement shall not be prejudicial to any action 
taken under the WTO including dispute settlement. However, proceeding cannot run 
concurrent both of the WTO and under this Agreement. A proceeding must be 
completed in one forum before it can be instituted in another, and the decision of either 
body is mutually exclusive.371 Time for the purposes of these proceedings is calculated 
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in calendar days from the day following the act or fact to which it refers however, the 
parties may mutually agree to an extension of time. 372 
3.11   Part IV:General Exceptions  
Part IV of the Agreement deals with the General exceptions under Articles 224-226 
which outlines the conditions and circumstances where a contracting party namely the 
CARIFORUM or EU can derogate from terms of the Partnership Agreement. Any such 
derogation however, must not be arbitrary or unjustifiable discriminatory against the 
other party, but “nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by the EC party, the CARIFORUM States or a signatory CARIFORUM 
state of measures which are geared to protect the public security and morals or 
maintain public order”373.The exception also applies to action taken in protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health. In addition to six other conditions outlined in this 
paragraph and for reasons of security as outlined in Article 226, if there is any 
inconsistency between this agreement and any convention dealing with these issues  of 
general protection, the to the extent of the inconsistency, the convention shall prevail. 
3.12      Part V : Institutional Provisions    
The Agreement established four main Institutions to facilitate the objectives of the EPA  
which follows a similar structure established under the Cotonou Agreement namely: (1) 
The joint CARIFORUM-EC Council which is the premier Institution, (2) The CARICOM-
EC Trade and Development Committee which is the second highest Institution, (3) The 
CARIFORUM-EC Parliamentary Committee and (4) The CARICOM-EC Consultative 
Committee. Their primary responsibilities are delegated by the CARIFORUM States and 
the EC to implement the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 
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3.12.1  The Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council  
Article 227 establishes the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council with responsibility to oversee 
the implementation of the Agreement. It will meet at the Ministerial level periodically, but 
not to exceed two (2) years and in extraordinary session when required and so agreed 
by the parties. The Joint Council shall function without prejudice to the Council of 
Ministers at the ACP level under the Cotonou Agreement. It may address trade issues 
of mutual interests whether of a bilateral, multilateral or international nature374. The 
council shall establish its own rules of procedure and shall comprise of Members of the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission and representatives of 
the CARIFORUM States375. The chair shall sit alternately and issue periodic reports on 
the operations of the Agreement to the Council of Ministers at the ACP level under 
Article (15) of the Cotonou Agreement.376 The decision of the Joint CARIFORUM-EU 
Council is binding and it is also empowered to makes recommendations. The parties 
may agree to act collectively and in such circumstances the Joint Council may take 
decisions by mutual agreement377.The Joint Council is a very important Institution in the 
context of the overall relationship because, while it sits at the apex of the institutional 
framework of the EPA it  interfaces at the regional level with COTED, at the ACP level 
through the Council of Ministers and at the multilateral level with the Group of 77 at the 
WTO.  
So, while the EU had rejected the ACP’s demand  at the all ACP phase for there to be 
established a joint monitoring committee to coordinate activities at the multilateral level, 
the EU, has through the authority of the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council established the 
linkages necessary to coordinate activities for cooperation at the multilateral level. 
                                                        
374 Sect. 227 (1), (2). 
 
375 Articles 228 (1), (2) and (3). 
 
376 Article 227 (4). 
 
377 Articles 229 (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
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Prima facie, this mechanism seems to create an advantage in favour of Europe, 
because although it is a joint body, the more powerful partner will be exposed to almost 
all of the inner workings of the regional configuration, but the opposite may not be 
equally so, because the ACP States will not as a matter of course or right be able to 
impact EU’s decision making processes in the wider context of the global political 
economy and Europe’s agenda. 
 
3.12.2  The CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee  
Article 230, establishes the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee with 
responsibility to assist the Joint-CARIFORUM-EC Council in the execution of its duties. 
The body is comprised of representatives from both Parties at the senior official’s level.  
Unlike the Joint Council, its rules of procedure are not determined by the committee 
itself, but instead such rules of procedure are established by the Joint CARIFORUM-EC 
Council. However it’s chaired will sit alternately for a period up to one year and the 
committee shall report to the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council.  
The committee is the main administrative body within the architecture of the 
CARIFORUM-EC Institutional framework. It has regulatory and decision making powers 
in trade dispute, responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement and 
also the day to day operations of the entire regime to ensure that the objectives of the 
EPA are met.378 Further, it as the power to appoint sub- committees to assist its 
function. In addition to its regulatory functions, the committee also has powers of 
enforcement of its regulations and decisions. 
 
 
                                                        
378 Article 230 (1), (2) and (3). 
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3.12.3 CARIFORUM-EC Parliamentary Committee 
The CARIFORUM-EC Parliamentary Committee is comprised of European and 
CARIFORUM Parliamentarians who will meet and exchange views and facilitate 
cooperate with the Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the ACP and EU established under 
Article 17 of the Cotonou Agreement. The committee shall be chaired alternately and 
unlike the Trade and Development Committee, this body of politicians is empowered to 
set their own rules of procedure and also has the authority to request and receive 
information from the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council and it shall be informed of the 
council’s decisions and recommendations. It can also make recommendations to the 
Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council and the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development 
Committee379. 
3.12.4 Special Committee on Custom Facilitation 
The Agreement provides for the establishment of a Special Committee on Custom 
Facilitation to deal with Custom procedure and commitments and monitor the provisions 
of the Rules of Origin of Origin (RoO). 
3.12.5 CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee 
The CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee is established under Article 232 of the 
Agreement to assist the CARIFORUM-EC Council in promoting dialogue between 
representatives of evil society organizations with regards to the relationship between the 
CARIFORUM and EC parties. It may make recommendation to both the Joint Council 
and the Committee for Trade and Development.380The rational for its establishment is to 
have an input from all stake holder at all levels in the implementation of the Agreement.   
See Table 10 for an explanation of the flow of information and the linkages within the 
CARIFORUM-EC Institutional framework.                                                          
                                                        
379 Article 231 (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) and (7). 
 
380 Article 232 (1) and (5). 
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Table 10: Organizational Structure of CARIFORUM EC Institution 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
JOINT CARIFORUM‐EC COUNCIL 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEE (Art.4) 
IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS CO‐
OPERATION AND TRADE FACILITATION 
CARIFORUM‐EC CONSULTATIVE 
COMMITTEE 
CARIFORUM‐EC PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMITTEE 
  Source: Researcher’s configuration using information from the text of the EPA 
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I3.13 Part Vl: General and Final Provisions 
The General and Final Provision of the Agreement are futuristic in the nature of 
facilitation of arrangement under the Agreement. These provisions are captured in 
Articles 233-250 in which the parties to the agreement are defined. The EC party is the 
European Community and its member States and the Fifteen CARIFORUM states 
singularly, though acting collectively by agreement381. 
Article 234 deals with the coordination and exchange of information to ensure the 
effective implementation of the Agreement while Article 235 addresses  the question of 
transparency and places obligation or each party who shall ensure prompt publication 
and notification of any Law, regulation, procedure and administrative ruling made 
regarding any matter covered under this agreement382. Article 238 deals with the 
obligations to foster dialogue on issues of finance and tax policy and administration. The 
parties agree to collaborate in the fight against illegal financial activities to include 
corruption, money laundering and terrorist financial and among other things organized 
transnational crime383. 
Article 238 which deals with regional preferences has been the most difficult and 
controversial area to have been resolved in the negotiations. It acknowledges the 
“variable geometry” of the Regional integration movement and the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy (CSME). It states inter alia that “nothing in this agreement shall 
obliged a party to extend to the other party any more  favourable treatment which is 
applied within each of parties as part of its regional integration process”384. 
CARIFORUM States are obliged to extent to each other whatever advantage it grant to 
                                                        
381 Article 233 (1) and (2). 
 
382 Article 234 (1). 
 
383 Article (237). 
 
384 Article 238 (1). 
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Europe on all duties with a zero rate with immediate effect and between CARICOM 
States and the Dominican Republic, and within one year between the larger territories 
MDC’s of CARICOM and the Dominican Republic with respect to all other goods, and 
within two years between the smaller States LCDs of CARICOM and the Dominican 
Republic on all other goods. Haiti has up to five (5) years to make the adjustments385. 
Article 239 deals with the outermost regions of the European Community and its trade 
relations with the CARIFORUM States and leave open the possibility of including them 
in the EPA 386in the future, while Article 240 deals with balance of payments difficulties 
and State practices and non-discriminatory trade practices. Article 241 addresses the 
relations between the Cotonou Agreement and the EPA with respect to travel-related 
measures, and Article 242 focuses on the relations with the WTO.The parties are 
obliged to act in a manner consistent with the WTO arrangements. 
Articles 243-250 deal with the issues of entry into force, duration, territorial application, 
and accession of new EU member State, accession of other Caribbean States, 
Authentic text and the Annexes respectively. The Agreement is of indefinite duration, 
but can be denounced in writing six months after notification387and shall be applicable to 
only the territories in which the treaty establishing the European Community is 
applicable and in the signatory CARIFORUM States388.The agreement establishes a 
long-term relationship between both sides as compared to the five years duration of the 
Lomé Convention. Europe had pushed to make Lomé an agreement of a much longer 
duration. However it was the ACP States which never wanted a longer-term 
arrangement and opted for an agreement for a period of five years. 
                                                        
385 Article 238 (3) (I) (II) (III). 
 
386 The Outermost Regions of the European Community includes the Overseas countries and territories 
(OCTs) of European States within the Caribbean namely: Anguilla, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, The 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caucus (UK); French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and 
Saint Martin, (FRENCH) Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, Saint Eustatious (Dutch).     
 
387 Article 244 (1), (2) and (3). 
 
388 Article 245. 
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3.14  CARIFORUM Liberalization 
There is an exclusions list with an extended phasing-out period up to twenty five (25) 
years for some sensitive products imported by CARIFORUM States389.However, the 
Dominican Republic (DR) has granted to the EU better conditions of liberalization than 
the other CARIFORUM States because of its free Trade-agreement with the United 
States. Its commitment of liberalization offer was therefore more generous when 
compared to the CARIFORUM States. The CARIFORUM States have benefited from 
the liberalization commitment made by the Dominican Republic as it is through that 
commitment that the group was able to satisfy the WTO compatibility requirement for  
substantially all Trade390. This level of exclusion bears benefit for the CARCOM States 
in two materials regards. Firstly, to meet their policy on food security and protect the 
vulnerable small farmers in the various CARIFORUM farming communities and 
secondly, to create the opportunity for Agro- Industries to develop and also for small 
manufacturing to build capacity and efficiencies to complete in the global market place.   
The extent of CARIFORUM’s reliance on collection of revenue from other duties and 
charges to include discriminatory levies and surcharges over and above the regular 
custom duties have been address in a manner to lessen the burden of adjustment 
through a standstill provision (moratorium) followed by the phasing out of such charges 
over a period of seven (7) years after signing of the Agreement and for final elimination 
within 10 years. However, where export duties exist, those are eliminated immediately 
except for Guyana and Suriname which have a limited period to eliminate those 
practices.  
The EU’s liberalization commitment is for Duty Free Quota Free access (DFQF) for all 
products except Rice and sugar. The rice regime imposed a two year transition up to 
                                                        
389 This is a non‐exhaustive list of some sensitive products to include Agricultural products, fishery products, 
food preparations, beverages, ethanol, rum, vegetable oil, chemicals, furniture and apparel.   
390 Interview – Henry Gill, CRNM, Barbados, June 10, 2009. 
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the 31st of December 2009 with a DFQF access of 250,000 tonnes which is an increase 
of 100% over the previous allocation with the removal of the quota regime. However, 
unlike rice which was not subject to the various challenges at the WTO sugar though 
benefiting from (DFQF) in October 200. It also has a transitional automatic safeguard 
mechanism which will last up until the 30th of September 2015.Under the Protocol, 
CARIFORUM States have received an additional 60,000 tonnes of sugar at zero duty 
from October 1, 2008 to September 30, 2009 of which 30,000 tonnes go specifically to 
the Dominican Republic (DR) which had no preferential treatment under the Sugar 
Protocol and any shortfall under the Sugar protocol will be reallocated for redistribution 
within the CARIFORUM region. The arrangement for sugar also addressed the price 
mechanism which guarantees that the price paid for CARIFORUM sugar would not be 
less than 90% of the EU reference price for a period of three years commencing 
October 1, 2009. 
Infused into the Agreement of a surveillance mechanism for sugar to deal with, attempts 
at trade circumvention of the allocation during the period; January 1, 2008 to 30th of 
September 2015. Therefore, where for example product with sugar content has shown 
import increases of 20% or more in any twelve month’s period consecutively, the 
Commission is empowered to analyze the pattern and where necessary may suspend 
the preferential arrangement for the affected products. The DFQF benefit Caribbean 
sugar exports by allowing them the freedom to negotiate prices directly with the 
commodity house in the UK as with operators of refineries391.  The restriction on value 
added export of product with sugar content will affect Investments in the Agro- 
Industries in the region in terms of potential export of processed foods to the EU market 
in two material aspects more so for Guyana. Firstly, the CARIFORUM States are net 
exporters of raw sugar as there are no sugar refining facility in any of the CARICOM 
State and because the EU sugar regime makes no real distinction between raw sugar 
and refined sugar export, then it seems that any sugar exported from the region into the 
                                                        
391 Interview‐ Ambassador Derrick Heaven, Kingston, Jamaica. May22, 2009. 
221 
 
 
EU will be covered in the quota allocation. Therefore, even if the Caribbean were to 
increase its yield and productivity, there would be no real incentives to invest in value 
added in terms of refined sugar and or processed food. For example, Guyana is the 
largest producer of sugar in the region, while Trinidad and Tobago has the cheapest 
energy source. Therefore, were a sugar refinery be established in Trinidad and Tobago 
to refine raw sugar from Guyana to export to the EU that may not be economically 
feasible because of the restrictions. So also would be the situation for investments in 
agro-processing of product with sugar content. Therefore, although the Rule of Origin 
allows greater flexibility for the manufacturing sector, it will bear no real benefit with 
respect to products with a sugar content coming from the CARIFORUM State.  
Of course, this does not assist the expansion of trade and investment for the region; for 
if the Caribbean States are to diversifying exports their Agro- processing must be part of 
that measure for potential export diversification. This is a disincentive to industrialization 
in the region and  inhibits the deepening of economic integration in the region.  
So, while there is some degree of asymmetry in the liberalization process under the 
Agreement,the pattern of the trade between the EU and CARIFORUM indicates that the 
CARIFORUM import of goods from the EU exceeds to a great extent what it exports to 
the EU. The figures available for 2008 show that CARICOM’s  export to the EU was 
US$ 1.38 billion and import stood at US$2.45 billion392, a trade deficit on the 
CARICOM’s side as between the two partners exist in all areas except tourism and 
tourism -related travel. In term of the basic structure of the trade relations, the 
CARICOM States are exporters of unfinished or raw material to the EU market, while 
the region is a net importer of finished products which the price differential between the 
export of raw material and the import of finished products almost on all count remains 
                                                        
392 The CARIFORUM‐EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): An assessment of the issues relating to 
Market Access, Safeguards and implications for Regional Integration, Economic commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Port of Spain, T&T.  C/CAR/L.181. (26 Nov. 2008). 
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higher. The Caribbean continues to be in a deficit with the EU. However, one of the 
objectives of the EPA is to adjust this imbalance over time.  
The Caribbean’s exclusion list and its liberalization approach have highlighted the 
concerns of the CARIFORUM States in the context of their objective in meeting the 
liberalization targets for WTO compatibility with the least possible negative impact. For 
example, the products which CARIFORUM States have liberalized in the main are those 
for which they have no competitive advantage nor any immediate capacity or likely 
future capacity to be competitive. Therefore, where there is competiveness or the real 
likelihood of building competitive capacity exist, the region succeeded in getting those 
products onto the exclusions list. 393 But even within that list of products to be fully 
liberalized, there exist a great degree of asymmetry geared towards protecting 
CARIFORUM revenue base for as long as possible by staggering of the schedules of 
liberalization. For example import of motor cars which is a big revenue item in 
CARIFORUM States will be liberalized in ten (10) years even though motor cars are not 
produced in the region.  
The efforts to calibrate the exclusions list had expose the depth of CARIFORUM’s 
internal negotiating strengths and capabilities, because even though there is overall 
asymmetry between the region and the EU, there had to be some degree of asymmetry 
within the region itself to protect the interest of each Member States without damaging 
the overall interest of the region. Take for example, the case of the Bahamas, which is a 
net importer of goods, with minimal agricultural and manufacturing bases, their tariff rate 
is very high and they are allowed to liberalize over eight (8) years after the Agreement 
comes into force. While Jamaica phases out its high tariff rate on imported Portland 
cement over 10 years, ostensibly to protect job in the building and construction sectors 
of the Economy and keep a significant revenue earner both in terms of General 
Consumption Tax (GCT) and import duties.  
                                                        
393 The list includes mainly Capital and Intermediate Goods and some “superfluous*” products for example 
human hair and mushrooms. 
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Trinidad and Tobago on the other hand which arguably has the strongest manufacturing 
base in the region with increased exports of over 500% between 2004-2006 to the EU 
was not under any compulsion to immediately liberalize all product not on the 
exclusions list but did so, to assist the regions target of “substantially all trade” 
Therefore, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica were the leading campaigners urging the 
conclusion and signing of the agreement394. In essence, Europe’s commitment for 
liberalizing is seen as quite liberal and its acceptance of an exclusion list of more than 
10% of its trading partner CARIFORUM States is not within the normal course of Trade 
Agreement.395 
The CARIFORUM States had effectively advanced their positions in the area of 
sensitive and special products in order to achieve their strategic trade objective and 
shielded their agricultural products. This they did by relying heavily on the openings 
provided under the WTO regime which allow developing countries to treat certain 
agricultural products as special products which can be “… treated with a greater degree 
of “flexibility” either by attracting lesser liberalization or exempt status, where selection 
is based on the question of “food security”396. Most of the products which the 
CARIFORUM succeed in adding to the exclusions list are those which are heavily 
subsidized in develop countries to protect their domestic farm industries397. Indeed 
during the CANCUN Ministerial, the Caribbean had to remind the French of this fact and 
practice in which the French themselves398 have been deeply indulged. 
                                                        
394 Ibid p.6. 
 
395 Ibid. 
 
396 Interview‐ Chandler. Barbados. 16.6.09. 
 
397 These include; Chicken, Milk and dairy products, Rice, Sugar, pork and brine* meats, corn, potatoes, sheep 
and goat meat, wheat, vegetable oils, tomatoes, onions and garlic, beans and peas. All of which are in the 
CARIFORUM exclusion list in a broad sense.  
 
398 Interview‐ Sam Chandler, June 16, 2009. 
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 CARIFORUM’s strategy was very pointed in terms of their liberalization commitments. 
For example, finished products are liberalized at a lesser rate and over a longer period 
than goods which although finished, are imported in furtherance of local production 
capabilities as in the case of fertilizers for agriculture production and also for medicinal 
supplies. What the region succeeded in doing, was to have placed those products which 
it produced at a sufficient level in terms of quantities on its exclusions list, while giving 
its producers up to10 years in some instance to be competitive. The strategy is to 
liberalize faster in areas such as fertilizers and some chemicals to make that import less 
costly to farmers and manufacturers so that they may become more competitive in 
agricultural production and agro-processing. This initiative is then linked to the zero-for 
zero provision of the Agreement where EU has undertaken to remove all subsidies on 
products which CARIFORUM has liberalize. This aspect of the Agreement is non-
reciprocal but seems consistent within the rules of the WTO. Further, the CARIFORUM 
States will now enjoy the benefits of exemption of the Multilateral Safeguards Generally 
applicable under the WTO regime.399  
There were enlightened arguments that the food security provision of the CARIFORUM-
EU EPA is restrictive in scope and therefore does not include all agricultural products. 
Further, that it limits products to those which are “essential to ensure food 
security”400and serves as a complement to the general safeguard clause by virtue of 
Article 25 of chapter 2 which deals with trade defensive mechanism. But it seems 
important to CARIFORUM not just for food security  reasons, but also as a menu of 
trade objectives in the region’s overall trade strategies in that the products on which it 
sought to have based its food security policies are also those which are placed on the 
exclusions list. This was a major aspect of the regions negotiating strategies.  
Therefore, even where the region does not produce such products which are covered in 
                                                        
399 LC/CARL.181. 26. Nov.2008, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Port of 
Spain, Trinidad & Tobago. 
 
400 Pitschas, Christian: ‘Special Safeguard Mechanisms in Agriculture Drawing Inspiration from the TDCA and 
the CARIFORUM EPA?” A study commissioned by GTZ on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany. Http. Downloaded March 13, 2010.   
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adequate quantities, they are place on the exclusions list for purposes of “food security”. 
For the region, food security is also linked to the issue of food prices. So, for example, 
even though most peas and beans which form part of CARIFORUM Staple have been 
liberalized401 the broad heading of peas and beans are in the exclusions list for the 
region. This is therefore a major part of the regions defensive and offensive approach to 
food security on the one hand and also to maintain its policy of developing 
competitiveness in these areas on the other hand402. 
3.15 Liberalization of Services:  
It was very important for the region to negotiate  a trade in services agreement, because 
over 60% of its GDP comes from the service sector, with Tourism accounting for 18%. 
Because of the importance of employment which is now linked to Tourism its  value to 
the economies of the region cannot be overstated403.The service sector mix of tourism, 
investment and entertainment is vital to the regions export sector and source of 
employment. These are areas within which the CARIFORUM States are distinguishable 
from the other ACP regions which arguably justifies the need to negotiate separate 
trade agreements for each configuration. The extent of the asymmetry in the 
CARIFORUM States is reflected in large measures in the services agreement. Indeed, 
this is an area of the Agreement where there have been several agreements at the 
country level404; as between the EU 27 and the CARIFORUM 13.For example the 
Bahamas which is not a member of the WTO and Haiti which is a LDC had not 
                                                        
401 ECLAC.LC/CAR These include Chicken, Milk and dairy products, Rice, Sugar, pork and brine* meats, corn, 
potatoes, sheep and goat meat, wheat, vegetable oils, tomatoes, onions and garlic, beans and peas. All of which 
are in the CARIFORUM exclusion list in a broad sense. 
 
402 Interview‐ Sam Chandler, Barbados, June 16, 2009, Henry Gill CRNM, Barbados, June 10, 2009. 
403 Payne, Anthony and Sutton, Paul: “Repositioning the Caribbean within Globalization”. Caribbean Paper 
No.1.p.16.TheCenter for International Governance Innovation, (June 2007. p. 9) 
http/www.sta.uwi.edu/iir/news/docs/Caribbean.cpapers.pdf.downloaded (March 14, 2010). 
 
404 Stevens, Christopher, Kennan, Jane and Meya, Mareika:  Analysis of contents of the CARIFORUM and Pacific 
ACP Economic Partnership Agreement and challenges ahead Final report. Commonwealth Secretariat. 
London. Dec. 2008 p. 40. Http/www. CFTC‐EAD‐BCWG‐208 Final Report. Pif. (December 1, 2009). 
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submitted any offer on services, compatible with the General Agreement in Services 
(GATS).These two countries are excluded under Article 63 of the EPA from 
commitments in the services sector 405 at the time of signing. However, the Bahamas 
had subsequently presented its offer. While there is no compulsion on Haiti to make any 
offer as it benefits from the EBA. The EU has commitments under the EPA to open up 
its market to CARIFORUM service providers and investors in a range of service to 
include commercial presence and temporary presence of natural persons for business 
(made 4) for business visitors, and other types of short term entry. Individual 
professionals are also included as contract services suppliers. This seemingly brought 
the EU on par with similar service contractor allowed into the U.S.A and Canada under 
various assistance arrangements for temporary works. 406 However there are 
restrictions based on the receiving States immigration Laws and procedure. These 
restrictions can hamper the benefits under the EPA. In addition, CARIFORUM States 
are allowed to have management trainees sent to affiliated companies in the EC for 
training  for up to one year, and also to send other categories of workers for up to six 
months in 29 areas in which CARIFORUM States service providers have contract to 
provide services. So also, in the 11 areas in which self-employed persons  provide 
service.407 
The CARIFORUM States have committed to open up their services sector with a 
specific focus on export and infrastructural development. The strategy is to encourage 
investments in these areas to gain efficiencies though transfer of technology. It focuses 
on tourism, manufacturing, telecommunication, transport and services in the 
                                                        
405 Article 63 states that “with a view to incorporating in Annex IV the commitments of the Commonwealth of 
the Bahamas and the Republic of Haiti, which shall be compatible with the relevant requirements under the 
General Agreement on Trade in services (hereinafter the GATs), the parties and the signatory CARIFORUM 
States shall make changes to this Annex by decision of the CARIFORUM‐EC Trade and Development 
committee no later than six months after the signatory of this agreement. Pending the adoption of such 
decision, the preferential treatment granted by the EC party under this Title shall not be applicable to the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the Republic of Haiti”.   
 
406 These include Tourism workers, entertainers, Artists, chef de cuisine and fashion models. 
 
407 Legal advisory services, computer related services, and management consulting.  
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Environmental sector. In these areas the Dominican Republic has offered the EU the 
same terms as it offered to the US under CAFTA, while the CARIFORUM States had 
pressed the EC for concession on cultural cooperation through which it’s Artists and 
Musician can enter the EU as services providers in a special category from those 
covered under mode 4. This was a priority, and a quid pro quo for the Region in the 
dying moments of the last stages of the negotiations. The asymmetrical nature of the 
EPA is also evidenced in the services sector commitments. Overall the CARICOM 
States have opened their markets in the service sector between 55-75% and with 
respect to the Dominican Republic they have opened up 90% and the EC has opened 
94%.408The CARIFORUM’s trade strategy is reflected in the asymmetrical approach in 
opening up its services market as it is the only ACP configuration which is a Net 
exporter of services mainly in the area of tourism. The region opened up those areas 
while restricting others for which it is net importer. These States had to be consistent 
when negotiating future agreement with the U.S.A-Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and 
Canada (CARIBCAN) both of which Countries along with the EU are the region’s main 
sources of tourism409.Off-Shore financial services in the OECS and Belize is also a vital 
area of the region’s services sector. There existed a desire in the region to diversify its 
services by promoting investment in telemarketing, informatics, information technology, 
and data processing, banking, insurance and international maritime transport services. 
These are important areas the region’s as a net importer of capital and  this coupled 
with their eagerness to reduce unemployment  is of very serious concern as these 
factors weigh heavily on the region’s development policies and strategies.  
On the question of National Treatment (NT) and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) in 
Trade in services, the CARIFORUM’s negotiating strategy has fully emerged through its 
                                                        
408 Stevens, Christopher, Kennan, Jane and Meya, Mareika:  Analysis of contents of the CARIFORUM and Pacific 
ACP Economic Partnership Agreement and challenges ahead Final report. Commonwealth Secretariat. 
London. Dec. 2008 p. 40. http/www. CFTC‐EAD‐BCWG‐208 Final Report. pif. (December 1, 2009). 
 
409 The EU‐CARIFORUM EPA on services Investments and E‐Commerce Implications for other ACP countries. 
South Centre Analytical note SC/AN/TDP/EPA/17, April 2008, Geneva p.3. http/www.southcentre.org/index 
2.php? option=com_documenttask=doc_view&gid=754&itemid=69. (March 14, 2010). 
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commitments in those areas. The region had downplayed the risk of exposure of limiting 
itself in terms of its options in promoting and encouraging domestic service suppliers in 
the sectors where it made commitments, 410 vis-à-vis third countries, because, for it to 
give better commitments in those areas to third countries, for example, Brazil, China or 
India, would necessitate the concurrence of the EU though the Joint CARIFORUM-EC 
Council. The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) argued that there is 
no country in the developing world with which it trade that it is likely to give any better 
treatment, and the same is true with respect to countries in the Global 
North411.Therefore, the region liberalized 29 sectors which have potential for inward 
investment flow to build competitive capacity in developing the service sector. The 
MDC’s of the region will open up 76%, and the LDC 65% over a 25 year period. 
In the area of competition policy, the region has only opened to the extent that it had to 
protect the region from unfair practices of large EU Corporations in bidding for 
Government contracts in the region. The CARIFORUM States had agreed that the 
process must be transparent. In the area of cross border supply of service, modes 1 
and 2, there are three (3) services which are excluded namely: audio-visual services, 
National Maritime and international air transport services and government services. The 
EU has completely excluded all Telecommunication services, and the satellite 
broadcast transmission services are subject to Safeguards. Their exclusion will have 
negative impact on CARIFORUM service providers. So also are the limitations placed in 
the areas of health and social services impacting on mode 1 service suppliers.
                                                        
410 Ibid p. 10. 
411 Interview‐ Henry Gill, Barbados. June 10, 2009. 
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                                      Table 11: Liberalized service sector in the CARIFORUM-EU Agreement 
 CARIFORUM States commitment on service Entertainment services Liberalized by the EU:
• Accounting, auditing and bookkeeping Services 
• Architecture 
• Computer and related Services 
• Convention services 
• Courier services 
• Engineering 
• Entertainment services 
• Environnemental services 
• Hospital services 
• Maritime transport 
• Management consulting 
• Related scientific and technical consultant services 
• Research and Development  
• Services Incidental to manufacturing 
• Telecommunications 
• Tourism and travel-related services 
 Theatrical producer, singer group, band and orchestra 
entertainment services 
 
 Services provided by authors, composers, sculptors, entertainers 
&individual artists 
 
 
 Ancillary theatrical services  
 
 Circus, amusement park and similar attraction services 
 
 Ballroom, discotheque and dance instructor services 
 
 Other entertainment services  
 
I. “ Contractor service Providers 
1- Legal advisory services in respect of international public law and foreign law (i.e. non-EU law). 2- Accounting and 
bookkeeping services. 3- Taxation advisory. 4- Architectural services. 5- Urban planning and landscape architecture services. 
6- Engineering services. 7- Integrated Engineering services. 8- Medical and dental services. 9- Veterinary services. 10- 
Midwives services. 11- Services provided by nurses, physiotherapists and paramedical personnel. 12- Computer and related 
services. 13- Research and development services. 14- Advertising services. 15- Market Research and opinion polling. 16- 
Management consulting services. 17- Services related to management consulting. 18- Technical and analysis services. 19- 
Related scientific and technical consulting services. 20- Maintenance and repair of equipment, including transportation 
equipment, notably in the context of an after-sales or after-lease services contract. 21- Chef de cuisine services. 22- Flashions 
model services. 23- Translation and interprétation   services. 24- Site investigation work. 25- Higher education services (only 
privately-funded services). 26- Environmental services. 27- Travel agencies and tour operator’s services. 28- Tourist guides 
services. 29- Entertainment services other than audiovisual services. 
II.  Independent Professionals  service providers 
1- Legal advisory services in respect of international public law and foreign law (i.e. non-EU law). 2- Architectural services. 3- 
Urban planning and landscape architecture services. 4- Engineering services. 5- Integrated Engineering services. 6- Computer 
and related services. 7- Research and development services. 8- Market Research and opinion polling. 9- Management 
consulting services. 10- Services related to management consulting. 11- Translation and interpretation services.” See Sources. 
Sources:  CARIFORUM-EC EPA,   www.crnm.org  See also Sauvé, Pierre and Ward, Natasha; 
     http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/the-ec-cariform-economic-partnership-agreement-assessing-the-
outcome-on-services-and-investment/PDF Downloaded May, 12, 2009. 
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3.16 Regional Integration: 
By virtue of Article 238 (2), any treatment  given to the EU by any Member State of 
CARIFORUM shall be extended to the other Members of CARIFORUM. This 
notwithstanding that the Dominican Republic is not part of CARICOM, but has a Free 
Trade Agreement with the region, which is not fully implemented. Further, that the 
Dominican Republic has a liberalization schedule commitment under which it will 
liberalize at a faster rate with the EU than the rest of the Region. What this therefore 
means is that whatever the Dominican Republic offers to the EU which is better than 
what it offers CARICOM States under the Free Trade Agreement it is obliged to offer to 
the CARICOM States. But, the converse is also true that within a year of the agreement 
whatever more favourable advantage CARICOM gives to the EU, some will have to be 
offered to the Dominican Republic, but for the LDC’s of CARICOM the period is two 
years and five years in the case of Haiti412. 
The asymmetrical commitments which are the hallmark of the agreement following 
closely to the Cotonou trade regime as the policies and strategies of the EC in its 
relation to the CARIFORUM States is to build a reciprocal trading arrangements and 
regime. This, the EC insisted was at the centre of their objective in opening up regional 
markets more so in the area of services. It argued that the “services and investment 
provisions include reciprocal but asymmetrical commitments, with gradual and effective 
Market opening consistent with WTO rules, taking into account the level of development 
of the CARIFORUM countries”413. 
For example; on the question of Special and Differential Treatment in the area of trade 
in services, the EPA commitments made by the CARIFORUM and the EU parties 
exceeded the basic requirement of the GATS. Indeed it is GATS plus in favour of the 
CARIFORUM States particularly in the area s of investment, trade in services and e-
                                                        
412 Article 238 (3) (11) and (13) 
 
413 European Commission, “CARIFORUM‐EU Economic Partnership Agreement: an overview,” Information 
Paper by DG Trade, (April 2008), p. 21. 
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commerce. Therefore, except for these areas under mode 1, 2, 3 and 4 which the EC 
has excluded414, liberalization is asymmetrical. The pattern of scheduling  is unique with  
some flexibility as the Dominican Republic and the EC have committed to liberalize a 
larger number of sectors, than the entire CARICOM. While, the CARICOM MDC’s have 
undertaken to liberalize more than its LDC’s with a built in stagger of these schedules. 
CARICOM’s policy to address its employment and investment deficits was a carefully 
crafted response to the EC’s offer on mode 4, to which the EC made adjustments and 
committed to open up its market to certain contract service providers and suppliers and 
independent professionals, buttressed by a phase- in period by the region’s LDC’s of 
between 5-13 years. The degree of flexibility allowed is even more pronounced where 
CARIFORUM States reserve the right to present its list of non-conforming measures, 
which have not been scheduled but had existed at the time of signing.415 
The greatest singular difficulty posed in the CARIFORUM region was the exercise to 
calibrate and agree the exclusions list for trade in goods and to meet the WTO 
requirement of “substantially all trade”. The matter was resolved through the internal 
negotiating processes and the parties used the GATs as their guide, so that each state 
within the region was never hard pressed to make offers in keeping with the national 
priorities and therefore there created greater flexibility in determining the regional 
offer416. 
 
                                                        
414 The EU‐CARIFORUM EPA on services Investments and E‐Commerce Implications for other ACP countries. 
South Centre Analytical note SC/AN/TDP/EPA/17, April 2008, Geneva p.3. 
http/www.southcentre.org/index2.php?option=com_documenttask=doc_view&gid=754&itemid=69. (March 
14, 2010). 
 
415 Pierre Sauve and Natasha Ward: “The EC‐CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement: Assessing the 
outcome on services and Investment”. European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) 2009 p. 9 
available online http.www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe‐working‐papers/the‐ec‐cariforum‐economic‐
partnership‐agreement‐assessing‐the‐outcome‐on‐services‐and‐investment/pdf 
 
416 Ibid. 
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3.17 Innovation and Intellectual Property (IP) 
Part of CARIFORUM’s trade strategy was to link competitiveness, innovation and 
creativity. It was significant that the region pressed for a separate chapter on Innovation, 
but excluded provision on patent especially in the areas of pharmaceuticals and agro-
chemicals. These are areas in which the region believed they are able to enhance 
competitive capacities for exports, while satisfying domestic markets over time. The 
extent to which the CARIFORUM States have liberalized under the goods regime is tied 
into the strategy of liberalizing the IP and Innovation sectors. For example, the region 
liberalizes products such as medicine and fertilizers at such levels so as to benefit 
production and build competitive capacities. This is linked to the approach to Innovative 
sector where patent in the areas of pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals are excluded.  
3.17.1 Innovation 
Innovation is dealt with under Title IV chapter 2, Article 131-138. The parties recognized 
the importance of protection of intellectual property “in restoring creativity, innovation 
and competitiveness” and were “determined to ensure increasing levels of protection to 
their levels of development”.417 Article 133 sets out the regional undertaking to establish 
measures and regulatory framework for enterprises to become “competitive through 
innovation and creativity”. Article135 sets out the need for cooperation in the area of 
competitiveness and innovation while Article 36 outlines the areas for cooperation to 
include joint research network in areas of common interest”.418 Article 137 deals with 
cooperation on information society and information and communication technologies 
while Article 138 addresses cooperation in the areas of eco-innovation and renewable 
energy.  
                                                        
417 Article 131 (2). 
 
418 Article 136 (1) (b). 
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This chapter is unprecedented in the annals of IP chapters as it is the first to include a 
dedicated section on innovation419. This aspect was first put on the table by the 
CARIFORUM State, which insisted that there should be a dedicated section on the 
subject420.The potential for CARIFORUM to increase competitiveness and attract 
investment will depend to a large extent of the cooperation they receive in terms of 
financial and technical support to build the institutional mechanisms and framework 
necessary for a first class innovation regime to foster research and development (R&D), 
particular in areas such as health and sports421. This could give a boost in development 
along the lines of the draft World Health Organisation strategy and Plan of Action on 
Health (R&D)422. 
Intellectual Property is covered under section 2 of chapter 2, Article 139-164. This 
section address a variety of issues and categories of IP to include but not limited to 
patents, copyright and related rights, utility models and most importantly the various 
cooperation measures to be employed to give effect to the objective of the overall 
agreement. The broad areas covered are namely: The nature and scope of the 
obligations (Article 139), Treatment of least developed countries (LDCs) expressed in 
Article 140, technology transfer (Article 142), copyright and related rights (Art. 
143),Trademarks (Article 144), Geographic Indicators (Article 145), Industrial designs 
(Article 146),Patents (147) Utility models (Article 148),Plant varieties protection (Article 
                                                        
419 Interview‐ Ambassador Henry Gill, June 10, 2009, Barbados. 
420 Interview‐ Henry Gill, CRNM. Barbados June 10, 2009. 
 
421 Bernal, Richard: Everything But Alms. Op. cit. 
422 In May 2006, the world Health Assembly at its Fifty‐Ninth meeting established and mandated and 
Intergovernmental working group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual property (IGWG) with a 
mandate to develop a strategy and Plan of Action to address “conditions disproportionately affecting 
developing countries” in the area of public health, innovation and intellectual property: Between Dec.2006 
and May 2008,the group met and at its 60th Assembly in May 2008, the WHO adopted Resolution WHO 61.21 
Global Strategy and Plan of action(GSPOA)on Public Health, innovation and intellectual property, which 
highlights eight main area, designed to foster innovation, build capacity, improve access and mobilize 
resources. 
All the CARIFORUM States are members of the WHO, so also are the EC Member States. Document is accessed 
on line at www.who.int/phi/implementation/phi_globstat_action/en/print.html. (March 15, 2010). 
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149), Generic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore (Article 150) and General 
obligation to include enforcement (Article 151-164). The commitments are therefore 
very exacting and detailed, which will require tremendous efforts, resources and 
technical support to implement on the CARIFORUM’s part. 
The degree of flexibility allowed to the LDC’s in the EPA is of significance to their 
development and policy space. The transition period is up to January 1, 2014 but may 
be accelerated, so also the LDC’s can extend the period through the Trade and 
Development Committee (TDC) based on development priorities. The approach to the 
Intellectual Property regime in terms of its flexibility on implementation reflects 
CARICOM policy of Special and Differential Treatment in the general context of the 
reciprocity and degree of asymmetry envisaged through the negotiations.  
However, it is in the area of Transfer of Technology that the CARIFORUM States 
seemed to have gained some of its better successes in the EPA negotiations. The 
region suffers from a technology deficit and is a net importer of technology. Here, the 
EC has undertaken to exchange information with the CARIFORUM on practices and 
policies regarding technology transfer. This is an area where the region had difficulty 
achieving any success at the multilateral level, so because of the issue of information 
asymmetries between the two sides, the undertaking to provide incentives for the 
transfer of technology is welcomed423.   
Another very important area of break-through for the CARIFORUM States is the 
inclusion of Geographical Indicators. This is an area which is vital to the EC, however, 
they were always better placed to address the issues globally because of their well 
developed system,424but this is also an area were the Caribbean producers and 
exporters suffer severe losses in international markets, in particular where they have a 
                                                        
423 Sisule F. Musungu. ‘Innovation and Intellectual Property in the EC‐CARIFORUM EPA: Lessons for other ACP 
Regions” A study commissioned by GTZ on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ), Germany.p20 www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en/‐epa‐cariforum‐and‐beyond‐
innovation‐and‐intellectual‐property‐2008.pdf (Dec.12, 2008). 
 
424 Ibid. 
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‘foot hold” in niche markets in Europe. The Caribbean Diaspora in Europe is a very 
important market source for the regions exporters of agricultural and finished products. 
Furthermore, the region has always lacked the capacity to address that problem 
especial in the European market, so the detailed protection offered in the agreement is 
welcome by the region. This is an area however, which would require significant 
resource, human, technical and financial to implement and CARIFORUM would need to 
garner such resources to effectively establish this regime and its monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms  
3.17.2     Genetic Resources and traditional knowledge          
The CARIFORUM States are no doubt aware of the ongoing discussion, in various 
International arenas  on the protection of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge,425  and would have its own policy positions. However, the region seems not 
to have pressed the EC in making specific commitments for the protection of genetic 
resources and the relevant traditional knowledge involved in those inventions. The 
region had an offensive strategy in the area of Innovation and intellectual property, but it 
also had a defensive strategy in trying to get an advantage to move the region into the 
direction of achieving technological advance. Its strategy in the negotiation was to 
identify areas where its interest were greatest and seek concessions as a trade-off for 
those which the EC had strategic interest.  But, while it gained concessions from the EC 
in Innovations, the region’s commitment to the EC are scheduled to take effect over a 
much longer period. For example, the LDCs in the region are obliged to implement their 
commitments in some areas as outlined in section 2 of chapter 2 until  2021426. 
                                                        
425 For example, at the W.T.O’ International committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) at W.I.P.O. and in the convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
 
426 See Suisule F. Musunga op.cit. p 35. 
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The establishment and enforcement of geographical indications have been of great 
significance to the EC.427 The rule base provisions in the EPA, reflect the EU’s 
enforcement regime which they have pushed at the multilateral level. The CARIFORUM 
States in agreeing to these have placed a severe burden on their own capabilities and 
Institutional latitude, beyond that which they have agreed at the multilateral level. They 
however, will rely on the EU for cooperation in establishing an effective regime to 
address issues of enforcement in both markets. The CARIFORUM’s strategy was to get 
commitment to assist the region in implementing the regime that the EC pressed for and 
the region made concessions. These specific commitments are costly to implement. 
The EC will assist the region in Implementing EPA that the region will be able to 
establish Innovation and IP regime anticipated under its multilateral commitment. This 
was another clear example of the outcome of the regions offensive and defensive 
strategies in meeting its development objective through asymmetrical commitments. 
Also,, the strategy has  strengthened the CARIFORUM’s gains in that the Innovation 
and IP commitments  which are linked to other areas  which have implications to impact 
positively for the region for example in the areas of Investment, regulatory aspects of E-
commerce, competition policy, dispute settlement and the  general exception clause. 
Furthermore, the issue of cultural cooperation is tangentially linked as part of the 
regions offensive strategy. Because, the inclusion of the Protocol on Cultural 
Cooperation is critical as a positive response with respect to Trade policy setting to 
accommodate and give effect and meaning to Article 16 of the United Nations 
Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Convention on the 
protection and promotion of the cultural diversity and application of the principle of 
preferential treatment. In this regard the inclusion of this protocol in a free trade 
agreement is unprecedented428. Some European States resisted the inclusion of this 
                                                        
427 European Commission Directorate General for Trade: Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Third countries. 
 
428 Pierre Sauve and Denis Audet: The Service Trade Component of an Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA): Implication for the Eastern African Community. International Trade Centre (ITC) Commonwealth 
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provision in the agreement, but finally conceded to the Caribbean’s demand for its 
inclusion. The region has a well developed cultural awareness which is highly 
recognised in its music dance form and culinary, fashion and other forms of cultural 
identities peculiar to the regions which it has to showcase as parts of the services it will 
provide in the future. The CARIFORUM States could not therefore allow the opportunity 
to pass without insisting that it be treated as a special protocol in this agreement. But, 
while the region is happy with this provision, its application and implementation will be 
problematic because each Member State of the EU has its own visa regime and 
immigration policies which no doubt will be used as a non-tariff barrier to prevent 
Caribbean Nationals from entering their territory to trade in cultural services. For 
example, Jamaican musicians are routinely denied visa to perform in many European 
States and this is a reflection of reverse discrimination, because the region depends 
heavily on Tourism services, it had no visa restriction on Europeans and North 
Americans visiting their shores, however the reverse does not hold true.  
It is argued that the very competitive tourism market in the region is use as the basis for 
restricting the Member States of CARICOM from instituting a visa regime for Europeans 
and North Americans out of fear that with the increase cost the tourism product could be 
harmed. But it is also equally argued that the region has its own uniqueness and a 
properly planned  and implemented regional immigration and visa policies could provide 
revenue to further enhance the tourism product of the regions. 
It will be extremely difficult for the region to remove the possibility of the visa regimes in 
Europe being used as a non-tariff barrier against Caribbean nationals, because it seems 
that this is not a matter which falls under the purview of the Joint CARIFORUM-EC 
COUNCIL nor the Trade and Development Committee. This provision if not properly 
monitored could prove to be a gain without any benefit, something against which the 
region has to be very vigilant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Secretariat London.p.4.online at www.intracen.org/btp/wtn/expert.meeting/vwanda/sauve.pdf (November 
22, 2008). 
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3.18 Competition Policy  
Competition policy is covered in chapter 1 of Title IV dealing with both goods and 
services. Article 125-130 provide for the definition of competition (Article 125), outline 
the principles governing competition (Article 126) the implementation (Article 127) 
enforcement and exchange of information (Article 128) Public enterprise and 
enterprises entrusted with special or exclusive rights (Article 129) and cooperation 
(Article 130). 
The CARICOM States have come to recognize the impact of competition on 
development. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, 1973 which establish the 
Caribbean Community makes provisions for competition, but implementation has been 
very slow. The inclusion of competitive rules in the EPA was welcomed by the region. 
The Caribbean however, is aware that the structure of their economies in many 
instance,  where some service such as utilities are provided by the state and it therefore 
pressed for exemption of those services from the rules and argued that those should be 
regulated through a special Regime. 
The competition regime under the EPA also recognizes the principles of special and 
differential treatment as it makes for flexibility for CARIFORUM State to continue to 
invest in utilities companies. The provisions of the EPA expressly states that “nothing in 
the services chapter should be construed to require privatization of public utilities”429, 
this provision seems to buttress the effect of Article 129 in terms of the region’s social 
policy space to maintain public or private monopolies. Flexibility is also provided by the 
commitment of the region to establish their own regulatory framework and enforcement 
mechanisms, nationally and regionally; with a period of five years so to do. The EU has 
undertaken to assist the CARIFORUM in developing the legal and Institutional 
framework for establishing and maintaining anti competitive practices. 
                                                        
429 Article 60.2. 
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3.19 Conclusion 
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership is a comprehensive free trade agreement, 
the terms of which have far-reaching effect on future regional or bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement between the global North and developing South, or indeed between 
developing countries themselves. Critics of the agreement argued that it has gone too 
far in terms of commitments made, which have not yet been agreed at the multilateral 
level and it has therefore left other  developing countries little policy space or indeed 
negotiating space at the multilateral level more so in the areas of the so called 
“Singapore issues” of competition investment, government procurement and trade 
facilitation. But, the terms of the agreement cannot be seen in a single dimensional 
confine, as it is designed to take the region into the emerging global political economy of 
trade and to fit into the trade architecture and regime which non define how  global trade 
structure is managed.  
The real measure of the success of the CARIFORUM States in achieving their objective 
in negotiating a comprehensive agreement is the extent of the application of its 
offensive and defensive approach to craft the best deal which they could have achieved 
given the circumstances of the conditions which they faced during the negotiation 
process. There have been gains and concession on both sides with each side believing 
that the terms of the agreement represent the furthest each was prepared to make 
concessions.  
The agreement on the face of it provides great hope for the future of trade in goods 
between CARIFORUM States and Member State of the European Union. On the issue 
of border restrictions, the EU has provided Duty-Free, Quota Free (DFQF) access to 
CARIFORUM  goods entering European markets as at the 1st of January 2008, subject 
to conditions on importation of rice and sugar which are dealt with under different 
protocols and the region is allowed up to twenty-five years to liberalize. However, the 
exclusion list of goods was problematic because of the commitment to eliminate all non 
tariffs barriers on the entry into force of the agreement and such non tariff barriers 
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commitment apply also to the products in the exclusion list. This would have an 
immediate negative impact on the revenue on CARIFORUM States. However, it does 
not seem from the tenor of the agreement that if such difficulty were to arise from fall out 
in revenues, whether these can be addressed by the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and 
Development Committee, as that committee will only in this regard deals with fall-out 
having to do with tariff reductions430. Therefore, the power of the Trade and 
Development Committee could prove disadvantageous to the CARIFORUM States in 
the immediate short term. 
On the question of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, the agreement is 
restrictive on CARIFORUM’s policy space in terms of its ability in future trade 
arrangements especially with developing countries. Because, by committing themselves 
to give to the EC the right to demand similar treatment of in any future Free Trade 
Agreement it negotiates, were it to give better treatment to a third country’s exports is to 
give the EU some degree of command over the region’s  trade policies.  This provision 
is unique and it has caused concerns to some developing countries such as Brazil and 
India. The region is of the view however, that the concerns are only in “theory” as in a 
practical sense, it is not foreseeable that the region will enter into any free trade 
agreement with a developing country in which its trading relationship would be of such 
great magnitude that it will be forced to give any better treatment to it than what the 
regions has committed to the EC in the EPA431. 
The Rules of Origin (RoO) is also another area which has potential for development of 
the regions Industrial base, because it offer better terms than what previously existed 
under the Lomé and Cotonou regimes. However, it restrict the input of sugar in 
processed foods to be exported to the EU, in terms of the sugar regime which will be in 
place to monitor the importation of sugar into the EU. 
                                                        
430 Title 1, Article 16.6. 
431 Interview‐Henry Gill, Director‐General CRNM, June 10, 2009, Barbardos.  
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The treatment of sugar is of particular importance to CARIFORUM States as this is an 
area where the region has lost significantly following upon the denunciation of the long 
standing Sugar Protocol of 1975. The reform of the EU internal market and its impact on 
the sugar regime establish with the ACP since 1975 came under severe challenge from 
other sugar producers namely; Brazil and Thailand. Since then there has been a 36% 
reduction in price for ACP sugar. Therefore, sugar revenue for the region was severely 
affected.  
The only area in which the Caribbean seemed to have gained any benefit under the 
sugar regime is that it is re-allocated any short fall under the quota given to a Member 
State. However since 2009, the quota system is abolished, but the price is subject to the 
EU price mechanism which bears not guarantee to maintain higher prices. 
Further, CARIFORUM sugar will be competing with sugar produced in the French 
overseas Territories in the Caribbean, whose producers are being paid €2 billion 
between 2007 and 2013 for an output of 280,000 tonnes of sugar which will put them in 
a more advantageous position in the European market when compared to the 
CARIFORUM States. The region’s problem is further exaggerated by the fact that, it will 
have to compete with sugar producers under the EBA regime whose product will enter 
the EU DFQF automatically and independently of any EPA arrangement across the 
entire ACP configuration.  
In the area of trade in services, the region made significant gains. However, its 
willingness to negotiate a service agreement which surpasses that which has been 
agreed at the multilateral level is of great concern to other ACP States. However, the 
region felt it very important to negotiate a service agreement which best suits its own 
trade policy. The services agreement negotiated was mutually desirable but for different 
reason. The Europeans wanted to use the services agreement to further its global trade 
policy by “kick starting” the stalled Doha Development Round. The fact the 
CARIFORUM  States were eager to negotiate services had to do more in light of the 
emerging trends in the regions trade direction, and the trade  diversification policies. To 
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have negotiated an agreement which include the controversial Singapore issue was a 
bold but necessary move by the CARIFORUM States, one in which they knew they 
would suffer losses in order to make gains, so they prioritize. For example, the region 
knew that getting an agreement on Government Procurement was vital to the interest of 
the Europeans and they had to concede something to the Europeans in order to 
achieve their priorities in the areas of Innovation and cultural diversity which some 
European state had vigorously opposed.  
So, while the commitments in the services  sector are vital to both sides, they leave very 
little room for flexibility, although being asymmetrical. The rules are of binding nature 
and are subject to the dispute settlement and avoidance procedures of the Agreement. 
This EU’s objectives having been met equally in these areas of the agreement further 
under-scored by the EU’s willingness to fund the Implementation of the arrangements. 
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership is one of the most innovative and far-
reaching free trade agreement ever entered into with the North-South Relation indeed, 
so unique and innovative that it now set the precedent for future free trade agreement, 
not just between Europe and the rest of the developing world but among developing 
countries themselves, United States and other developing countries, Europe and Asia 
and also have implication for the Multilateral level Doha Round of negotiation and within 
the United Nations System of Trade Arrangement spearheaded by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
The CARIFORUM States are net importers of capital investments and therefore 
depends heavily on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to move their economies along a 
part of development. However the portions of  Foreign Direct  Investment has been 
constantly declining since the 1960’s  and only in the areas of tourism there has been 
some appreciable investment ,but such investment are from North American sources. If 
the region is therefore to benefit from the new investment regime under the EPA, it must 
develop a comprehensive investment promotion plan and strategy to drive the 
productive and service sectors to take advantage of innovations and traditional 
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knowledge. The use of indigenous materials and knowledge for diversification of the 
economic and trade base of the Caribbean economies is very important to the future 
viability of the region in light of the pressures they now face due to the demise of the 
banana industry and the heavy indebtedness of the sugar industries within the region 
coupled with the falling export revenue from rum because of competition from cheaper 
sources from Brazil. Therefore for the region to be competitive in sugar exports  the 
region would require large sums of FDI in the short and medium term, but it seems 
unlikely that those sources  of FDI will emanate from Europe, and local resources to 
invest in these areas are non existent in an atmosphere where governments cannot 
subsidise the sugar industry because of scarcity of revenue and tight  fiscal conditions. 
So also, the bankable guarantee which the industry had long enjoyed under the old 
Lomé regime no longer appertains432. 
The Agreement embraced innovative arrangement both in terms of giving meaning to 
special and differential treatment, Innovation in service and trade-related Issues, 
particularly in the areas of services and the so-called “Singapore Issue” because it 
exceeds what have been agreed at the Multilateral level without infringing the main 
objectives and thrust of Caribbean regional trade and development policies. It reflects 
pragmatism and boldness on the part of CARIFORUM States to conform the realities of 
the global political economic system and carve for itself both offensive and defensive 
shields, However, while the CARIFORUM States have made positive achievements and 
gained, there are also serious challenges and in the short, medium and long term when 
the provisions of the EPA are viewed in their entirety. 
                                                        
432  Interview‐ Ambassador Derrick Heaven, Chairman of the Sugar Industry Authority, Kingston, Jamaica, 
May22, 2009. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The problems of implementing the CARIFORUM-EC Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
4.1 Introduction 
The Economic Partnership Agreement EPA signed between CARIFORUM countries 
and the European Union is a free trade Agreement with development components. It is 
the only comprehensive EPA negotiated within the ACP regional configuration of states 
which was negotiated within the stated period up to the 31st of December. 
The implementation processes will involve a plethora of reforms in the legal, procedure 
and administrative mechanisms of the CARIFORUM States, which of course will incur 
tremendous costs in terms of human resources, Infrastructural changes and revenue 
loss. However steps have been taken across the region and in individual states of 
CARIFORUM to commence the implementation process. Regional institutions will be 
established to function alongside those which are mandated by the EPAs, but, some 
existing Institutional framework will have to be modified. Further, while some deadlines 
have been missed by CARIFORUM State they have taken steps to meet the deadline 
set for reduction of tariff for 2011. However, the CARICOM secretariat faced challenges 
in completing the road map for EPA implementation. The implementation of the EPA is 
remains a work in progress which will run until 2033.. 
This chapter analyses the areas of implementation of the EPA both at the regional and 
the national levels, and identify the sources of funding in the context of the development 
dimensions of the EPA. While, the approach will not be country specific, references will 
be made to the steps taken in some territories and at the regional levels to implement 
the agreement and make some recommendations for the implementation process.  
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4.2  Legislative Requirements  
The early stages of the parliamentary process have taken place in all the territories of 
the CARIFORUM region. Ratification in the Dominican Republic was done with only two 
members not voting for the ratification of the Agreement433.  
The legislative processes of approval was required in each signatory state before those 
States could sign the agreement. The last CARIFORUM State which signed the 
agreement is Haiti, while the European Union and its Member States have all signed the 
agreement434 and have taken steps to implement   their obligations.  
So there was the pre-signing debate in all the national parliaments of the CARIFORUM 
States which provided the governments with the legal authority to sign the agreement. 
The signing having taken place on the October 15 2008, the region has embarked upon 
the post ratification phase of the legislative process. In Jamaica for example, the 
relevant laws are being reviewed to make the necessary changes to give effect to the 
implementation, indeed,  the cabinet has issued its drafting instruction435. 
There are three fundamental approaches to the implementation of the EPA, firstly the 
regional government are expected to embark upon the legal reforms and to enact laws 
and put in place the required procedures and mechanism to implement the Agreement. 
Secondly, the regional commitments are undertakings by the CARICOM secretariat as 
the implementing arm of the CARICOM States and thirdly, there are also the 
CARIFORUM requirements which are to be executed under the CARIFORUM 
Coordinator, because the Dominican Republic is not a Member State of CARICOM.  
 
                                                        
433 Interview‐ Fredrico Cuello, May, 15, 2009. 
 
434  Officials Journal of the European Union L289/1/3. (October 30, 2008). 
 
435 Interview‐ David Prendergast, April, 15, 2010. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade, EPA 
Implementation Unit, Kingston Jamaica. 
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4.2.1 Notification process at the WTO and provisional application to the EPA   
After the agreement was signed it had to be noted at the WTO in accordance with the 
December 14th 2006, decisions of the General Council of the WTO regarding the 
transparency mechanism for Regional Trade Agreement (RTAs). The CARIFORUM-EC 
EPA was jointly notified to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreement (CRTA) on 
16th of October 2008 and  has been modified twice to accommodate the late signatories 
of Guyana and Haiti. This procedure had to be set in motion from the time the 
agreement was signed to avoid challenges and to commence the immediate provisional 
application of the agreement before the 31st of October 2008. It was a condition 
precedent that the agreement had to be notified to the WTO before its provisional 
application436. Both sides had to notified the WTO because all the Signatory States on 
either side except the Commonwealth of the Bahamas are also Members of the WTO. 
However, in the case of the Bahamas, no adjustment had to be done because although 
it is a signatory States to the agreement,, it is not a member of WTO.437 However 
notwithstanding the processes at the WTO, the Secretariat-General of the Council of 
European Union is the depository of the agreement. 
4.2.2 The role of the CARICOM Secretariat 
The Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) had directed that 
an Implementation unit of the EPA be established in the Secretariat. The unit was 
established and commenced its work on the 16th February 2009. The secretariat is 
responsible for developing the EPA road map for the region to include capacity building, 
economic integration particularly in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) and to give support to the Caribbean Export Development Agency. The Unit is 
being financed through United Kingdom Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional 
                                                        
436 The Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements. Decision of the General Council of the WTO, 
(December 6, 2006). 
 
437 CARIFORUM Update on the EPA presented to the 88th Session of the ACP Council of Ministers Brussels, 15‐
18 December2008. http://www.acpsec.org/en/council08/CARIFORUMl.doc  (December 12, 2009). 
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Integration Trust Fund (CART Fund), with a grant of €5 million which is been 
administered by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) for EPA related projects438. 
However, while the CARIFORUM State have not yet appointed a Coordinator for 
CARIFORUM to oversee the implementation of the EPA, the secretariat is now 
coordinating the regional program to implement the agreement. It has developed draft 
model legislations for consideration by regional governments to facilitate the way 
forward in the implementation process. However, none of the CARICOM State has yet 
passed any of the necessary legislation to implement the Agreement439. Indeed, the 
schedule of work and work programs for the OECS are still being developed and the 
role of the OECS Secretariat in this process is not yet defined. This is so, because its 
work is dependent on the directions of the Implementation Unit of CARICOM and 
Member States440.There seems to be some degree of obscurity with respect to the 
relationship between the CARIFORUM Secretariat and the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and 
Development committee. Because, the CARIFORUM coordinator when appointed will 
have responsibility to the EPA institutions and such appointed is crucial to the 
implementation. However, there is no guiding authority to ensure that the appointed of 
the coordinator is effected and this has created a lingering political issue which must be 
settled in order to facilitate the implementation of the agreement as the Dominican 
Republic is not satisfied with the implementation arm of the agreement being placed in 
the CARICOM Secretariat.  
4.2.3 Financial cooperation   
The Europeans were careful not to make any binding commitment to provide additional 
fund for the implementation of the EPA, neither did they identify any specific amount for 
the region from their pledge of Aid for Trade under the 10th European Development 
                                                        
438 Interview ‐ Branford Isaacs, Friday April 16, 2010.  
 
439  Ibid. 
 
440 Request and Response from Ms Virginia, Paul of the OECS Secretariat. (April 11 2010). Ms. Paul is 
responsible for EPA implementation at the Secretariat. 
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Fund (EDF). However, a sum of €165 million is allocated for the CARIFORUM Regional 
Indicative Program (RIP) up to 2013 to be distributed in what is termed Focal and non-
Focal areas. The EU’s Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) specifically indentified the 
objective of the funding being provided, but the CARIFORUM State had to decide how 
the allocation would be made in the Focal areas. The non-Focal Area received €22 
million for the purposes of attending to the issues of vulnerabilities and social problems 
of dislocation, while €143 million would go towards increasing regional competitiveness 
in trade and the production of goods and services to achieve a deepening and widening 
of the regional Integration process441. Of the total sum allocated €72.6 million or 44% 
will be employed into development of EPA projects and implementation. Under the 10th 
EDF there is also an allocation of €480 million for the National Indicative Programs 
(NIPS) while the United Kingdom and Germany have provided and additional sum of 
€26.8 million from their Aid for Trade (AFT) support program.. Other European Member 
States such as France and Spain have made pledges under their aid for trade strategy 
for the 2007 package. But so far only the sum of €580 million had been clearly identified 
for funding for EPA implementation under the aid for trade initiative... 
The region and its donors developed an integrated approach to the allocation of the 
regional funding under the EDF. The funding  arrangement was not only designed for 
CARIFORUM states but also to include the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)  
of the European States and to promote the relations of the EU in the wider Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) context. The financial protocol has identified six (6) 
main areas for the distribution and spending of the allocated sum of €165 Million. (1) 
Deepening of the economic integration within the OECS (2).,CARICOM Trade and 
support for the establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) (3). 
                                                        
441 European Community‐ Caribbean Region. Regional Strategy paper and Indicative Program 2008‐2013 
http/llec.europa.eu/development/center/repository/scanned_rgCARAI_rsp_2007‐20013_en.Pdf. (May 20, 
2009). 
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Intra-CARIFORUM economic and social cooperation (4), a program for cooperation 
among CARIFOUM states, within the wider context of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
(5) EPA implementation and accompanying measures and (6) Investing in human 
capital442.  
There was no further guaranteed of funding from the EU for EPA and EPA related 
implementation activities after 2013. So the regional leadership must therefore take 
steps to ensure that there are funds available for implementation, because while the 
definition of Aid for trade is still not clearly defined, there exist the risk that potential 
donors within the EU may in the face of global recession, retrench there budgetary 
commitment for aid for trade443. However, the Caribbean Development Bank, (CDB) has 
undertaken a project to finance capacity building in human resources for EPA 
implementation under the Caribbean aid for trade and Regional Integration Trust 
(CART) Fund. The development chapter of the agreement focuses heavily on the 
financial and technical support for implementing the EPA, and has identified the priority 
areas for developing export 444. Funding for the projects will be facilitated under the 10th 
EDF and the promised Aid for Trade initiatives of EU Member States. 
Each State will receive funding as specified in their National Indicative Program (NIP) as 
set out in the various strategy documents covering the period 2008-2013; for the 10th 
EDF. However, while each State in the region has commenced their implementation 
processes, the funding mechanism is very slow in responding to the request for support. 
                                                        
442 European parliament: the CARIFORUM EU Economy Partnership Agreement (EPA): the development 
component. Director‐General for external policies of the union. Expo/B/DEVE/2008/60.PE406.994. March 
2009 www.odi.org.uk/resources/downloaded/3222.pdf. (April 19, 2010). 
 
443 Ibid. 
 
444 The area identified for priority treatment are: technical assistance to build human, legal and Institutional 
capacities to comply with the EPA, support for fiscal adjustment and reform, promote private sector and 
enterprise development (to include diversification by new investment and development of new sectors, 
enhancing technical and research capabilities and support trade infrastructure.) Implementation of the EPA 
to include (legislative, institutional, administrative and technical support) upgrading productive capacities, 
Implementation of trade‐related rules, business support and diversification, Research development and 
innovation transfer, business climate/competitive enhancement, investment support, promotion of regional 
integration, and creation of regional development financing mechanism within 2 years. 
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The region proposed  the creation of a “special window” within the establishment of the 
CARIBBEAN Development Fund (CDF) through which the EPA funding could be 
channelled so as to speed-up the request and disbursement procedures. This proposal 
is still being considered.However,France and Spain have not yet declared their 
contribution for Aid for Trade package for the CARIFORUM State and the  Road map 
for EPA is still been debated within the European Union445. 
4.2.4. The role of the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF)  
The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) was established under the Cotonou 
agreement for the purposes of facilitating the development of the design for the EPA 
and defined the development finance cooperation between the CARIFORUM States 
and the European Union. The RPTF assumed a facilitating role during the course of the 
negotiation for the EPA. It had a mandate to identify and translates the need for support 
into practical mechanisms to assist trade related and development446. Since the signing 
of the agreement on October 15 2008 the CARIFORUM-EC Joint Regional Preparatory 
Task Force has undertaken twenty (20) studies covering all 14 signatory CARIFORUM 
signatory states, the purpose of which is to determine the extent of the needs of national 
government and regional institutions to implement the EPA, and to address the effects. 
The implementation of the EPA therefore is to a large extent dependent upon the work 
and recommendations of the RPTF as the purpose of these studies is to provide donors 
with a better understanding of the regions needs447. After these are completed the 
report would be discuss at the regional level and the COTED would decide and adopt 
those recommendation to be acted upon. 
 
                                                        
445 Ibid. 
 
446 Edwin Carrington speech to the 5th Regional Preparatory Task Force meeting, 28 September 2006. 
Georgetown Guyana. 
 
447CARIFORUM Update on Economic Partnership Agreement presented to the 88th session of the ACP council 
of ministers Brussels, (15‐18 December 2008).  
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4.2.5. The Adjustment processes and schedules 
The adjustment process for the implementation of the EPA across the CARIFORUM 
States will affect three main areas of their economies namely: export potential, social 
cohesion and potential impact on revenue. 
The adjustment period extents up until 2033, and therefore the processes will have 
short-term, medium and long-term challenges which the region must face. In as much 
as there are clearly defined direction in which the implementation is focussed, the actual 
measurement of the reforms remains in the realm of possibilities because of the 
unpredictable nature of the medium and long-term variables. 
Take for example the liberalization schedule which will take several years to be 
completed and will affect the functioning of the yet to be implemented CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy(CSME). The negotiation of the EPA had taken account of the fact 
that the EPA though intended to facilitate regional integration could not be allowed to 
undermine the CARICOM Institutional arrangements one of such being the Single 
Market and Economy (CSME). One of the difficulties faced by the implementation 
process is that under the Treaty of Chaguaramas provisions are made for differential 
treatment between the LDCs and the MCDs of the region and such obligations cannot 
be usurped by the EPA. However, these problems  are compounded by the fact that, in 
as much as the CARIFORUM-EU EPA is a region to region arrangement, the 
CARIFORUM internal arrangements bear no Supranational Institutions which can bind 
the region as a whole, as in the case of the European Union. Therefore, each Member 
State of CARIFORUM is responsible to take steps to implement the agreement in its 
own territory. Further, each States has obligation under the Treaty of Chaguaramas with 
respect to the Common External Tariff (CET) and the preferential treatment afforded to 
the regions LDCs.  
The preferential treatment intra-regional is specific to the LDCs and is based on their 
level of development by CARICOM standards. While the EPA being a Free Trade 
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Agreement, which recognized the degree of asymmetry between the two region and not 
country to country provide special arrangement for the adjustment of tariffs in the 
context of liberalization of ”substantially all trade” to satisfy the requirement of WTO 
region. It seems therefore that the provision of the Treaty of Chaguaramas which allows 
for the special and differential treatment of the LDCs  will be subsumed  in practice by 
the EPA  as each member State of CARICOM  will have to liberalized tariffs to meet the 
obligation of the EPA, and to the degree that it liberalize to Europe, it must provide a 
similar liberalized regime to the Member State of CARICOM, and also to Dominican 
Republic which is not a member of CARICOM, but is a part of the CARIFORUM States 
for the purposes of the EPA. In this regard one of the foreseeable challenges in 
implementing the EPA is the preferential treatment accorded to the LDCs of the region 
under the Treaty of Chaguaramas. There seems to be no clearly defined approach to 
deal with these inconsistencies. However, it seems difficulty to accept that the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas should be breached in favour of upholding the terms of the EPA, 
because one of the basic tenets of the EPA is to promote regional integration and for 
the region to determine its own model of integration and their pace of integration. 
Therefore, to amend the Treaty to facilitate the EPA would seem unacceptable.  
However, it  seems that the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council can find solutions to these 
problems by applying the principles of Special and Differential Treatment recognised in 
global trade rules to address these potential problems. 
4.2.6 The Political Challenge  
The implementation process requires that CARIFORUM political leadership must take 
some tough decisions if the process is to proceed at a pace to produce the intended 
benefits. Their first major hurdle is how to calibrate the fusion of the CARIFORUM 
commitments and the CARICOM Institutional arrangements. Take for example, the 
Dominican Republic has a Free Trade Agreement with CARICOM which has not been 
fully implemented, since it was signed in 1998, provisions of which have been used to 
assisted the CARIFORUM States is satisfying the WTO compatibility and the principles 
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of liberalization of “substantially all Trade” requirement of the EPA. The Dominican 
Republic, being a contracting party under the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) with the USA had made a huge sacrifice and offer to the CARICOM States to 
ease the difficulties faced by some Member States of CARICOM in meeting those 
requirements448.  In light of these, the Dominican Republic felt that it has a legitimate 
expectation to be treated equally as any Member State of CARICOM even though it is 
not a formal Member of the Group. This therefore has shifted the focus from the 
economic question to a political dimension, because the demands of the Dominican 
Republic(DR) is tantamount to seeking Membership in CARICOM, an issue which the 
Community does not seem ready to address449.  
The political economy of CARICOM in the context of its relation with the Dominican 
Republic must be tackled at the regional level as it appears that it was never the 
intention of CARICOM to extend the offer of Membership to the Dominican Republic, 
hence their free trade agreement to develop trade relations for the deepening and 
widening of CARICOM450. But in light of the Cotonou Agreement and the CARIFORUM-
EU EPA, the political dynamics have changed and the Dominican Republic has 
expressed an interest in joining the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mainly for 
economic and politically strategic alliances451. However, CARICOM, though conscious 
of the contribution of the DR in the negotiation of the EPA, seems very slow to agree 
membership for the DR. So, while the CARICOM States have established an 
implementation unit to coordinate the EPA at the CARICOM regional level, there is no 
finality on the question of the CARIFORUM coordinator under the EPA. But, a 
CARIFORUM deputy Secretary-General is appointed to the Secretariat in Guyana.  
                                                        
448 Interview‐ Ambassador Fredric Cuello, May 15, 2009. New York. 
 
449 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 9, 2009. Barbados.  
450 Ibid. 
 
451 Interview‐ Ambassador Fredrico Cuello, May 15, 2009. New York. 
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The problems of the region in implementing the EPA, is also connected to the 
Dominican Republic’s desire to obtain  similar treatment as that which is granted by the 
CARICOM States to each Member  and also to the EU. This, notwithstanding the 
CARICOM-Dominican Free Trade Agreement which has not been implemented since 
signing. the DR is demanding equal treatment in the spirit of the EPA and Further, it has 
objected to the CARICOM Secretary-General being in charge of the regional 
implementation processes and questioned the efficacy of the CARIFORUM Secretary- 
General being vested is the same official who is also the Secretary-General of 
CARICOM452. These political question must be address by regional governments, 
because as the Caribbean and the EU sought to redefine their external relation, the 
issue of the Caribbean Commonwealth States are made to be connected in the wider 
Latin American context453.This development is intricately linked to the EPA and its 
implication for the Caribbean States in the global political economy. But, these linkages 
area part of the EU’s strategy and so is the establishment of the institutional framework 
to guide the implementation of the economic and political aspects of the relationship. 
The roadmap for implementing the EPA was held at the EU awaiting approval before it 
can be implemented; yet the region is pressed to implement the EPA.  
The joint CARIFORUM-EU Council of ministers has not met and it is this body which 
must provide institutional directions for the implementation of the EPA. However, this 
seemed to be part of the difficulties being experienced in the fundamental differences 
which exist between the CARICOM States on the one hand and the Dominican 
Republic454 on the other. 
 
 
                                                        
452 European Parliament: Director General for external policies. Expo/B/DEVE/2008/60 March 2009. p. 40. 
 
453David Jessop “what happen to the EPA?” Trade negotiations insights Issue 3. Vol. 9. April 2010. 
www.Ictsd.net/news/tni (April 10, 2010). 
 
454 Ibid. 
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4.2.7 The role of the regional governments in implementing the EPA 
The Governments of the CARIFORUM States are expected with the support of the EU 
to create the legal framework and policy space to facilitate the private sector in taking 
advantage of the opportunities of the EPA. 
In the case of Barbados, Dominican Republic (DR), Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
the governments have established committees to pilot the implementation process by 
interacting with the Private Sector Groups and Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO’s) in each State. In Jamaica for example, the cabinet has mandated the 
establishment of a Technical Working Group (TWG) with membership drawn from line 
Ministries which have a role to play in the implementation of the EPA .These include 
Ministries of Agriculture, Culture, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, 
Investment and Commerce and Tourism are charged with the responsibility to develop a 
national implementation matrix which sets out the legal obligation required to implement 
the EPA by each relevant Ministry or Government Agency within  a timeframe. The work 
of the TWG is ongoing and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade has 
established a unit to focus on the implementation of the EPA and all other Trade 
Agreements to include the CSME.  
There is therefore a collaborative approach in Jamaica to the development of the matrix 
for implementation of the EPA to include the office of the Prime Minister, (OPM) the 
planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) with responsibilities for developing the program for 
capacity- building to deal with the supply side constraints of the Agreement. Jamaica 
Trade and Invest (JTI) has responsibility for market intelligence and exploiting market 
opportunities under the EPA. While the TWG, in the case of Jamaica has submitted 
proposal to the cabinet’s Internal Relations and Trade Committee (IRTC) on the matrix 
of implementation for final approval with a rescheduling of time lines. In addition, the 
government has appointed a national coordinator and has so notified the European 
Commission. 
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The work of the TWG has continued to focused on the immediate actions which need to 
be taken mainly in the areas of sanitary and pystosanitary measure (SPS), Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and mutual assistance in customs issues and Services related 
matters455. 
The removal of other duties and charges (ODCs) is another area in which the TWG has 
focused its attention; however, there are several outstanding areas of legislative reforms 
which are to be addressed to include the customs Act to reflect the new tariff 
arrangement which are critical to the next phase of liberalization to take effect 2011.  
In the areas of mutual recognition in service it is the policy of the Governments of the 
region that the professional grouping so affected should take charge and ‘drive’ the 
process to implement the mutual recognition in service agreement. In this regard, the 
professional groups were invited to establish their standards in collaboration with their 
counterparts in the EU. These areas have been identified as priorities for 
implementation within three years of the Agreement. However, Jamaica’s private sector 
activities are driven by the national export strategy456 and for the private sector to 
respond effectively there has to be a concerted effort on the part of the regional 
Governments to speed up the implementation of the CSME. The private sector within 
the region seemed sceptical about the pace of the implementation process of the 
CSME457 because progress in implementation of the national level is very slow and 
indeed, inactive in some territories. However, most Member States in the region have 
established some mechanism to commence implementation of the Agreement.  
 
                                                        
455 Presentation by Ambassador Wayne McCook to the CARIFORUM Implementation seminar, Kingston May 
20, 2009. 
 
456 Interview ‐ David Prendergast. 15.4.2010 Kingston. 
 
457 CARICOM Press release 286/2009. July 15, 2009. CARICOM Secretariat .Statement by Mr. Lawrence Plcide, 
President of the Trinidad and Tobago coalition of services industries, at the opening ceremony of the Regional 
services symposium, 16‐17 July, St. Johns, Antigua and Barbuda.  
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4.2.8     The role of the Private Sector Stakeholders 
It is generally accepted across the region that the role of the private sector is very 
crucial to the effective implementation of the agreement, but even more so the 
importance of the business community in discussing the opportunities under the EPA so 
that each State within the regional configuration can  benefit from the arrangement. 
In the case of Barbados, for example, while the Government through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade along with other key Ministries has spearheaded the 
implementation process, the private sector has made a tremendous impact458.  
The Barbados private sector has secured funding for its projects to foster the 
implementation of the EPA, but argue that the process to obtain funding is very time-
consuming. They however have underscored the need for assistance to improve the 
competitiveness of businesses in Barbados to take advantage of the EPA. So the core 
areas which they have identified for action include the following; removing the 
constraints to trade in order to capitalize on the opportunities offered under the EPA, 
build institutional capacities to establish standards, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, develop the export services industries for example in the areas of music, film 
and fashion, training of staff within the key export sectors and to acquire technical 
expertise. In addition to coordinating with the Government of Barbados through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the private sector group also coordinate 
externally with the OECS Businesses Council and the Caribbean Association of Industry 
and Commerce.  
The approach to implementation taken in the Dominican Republic is similar to the other 
leading States in the CARIFORUM Group of States. There the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Foreign Affairs and Trade are playing a lead role in the implementation of the EPA, so 
                                                        
458 The Barbados chamber of Commerce, the Coalition of Service Industries, the manufacturers Association, 
the agricultural Society, The Private Sector Trade team (PSTT), Small Business Association, Barbados are all 
Development cooperation,  and Invest Barbados are all functioning as part of the Barbados sector bodies 
involved in the implementation of the EPA. 
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also is the Custom Department. The role of the private sector is well defined and is led 
by the National Council of Private Enterprises (NCPE) and the Chambers of 
commerce459.   
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, Private sector interest and Government sectors 
have worked in collaboration to implement the EPA. The Trinidadian model mirrors that 
of Jamaica in many respects, with the establishment of an implementation unit in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The functions and objectives of the unit are well 
defined; and all embracing and include; ensuring that the country’s obligations are met 
in a timely manner, coordinate activities of Government department and agencies, take 
and receive submission on all EPA related issues and relate to the CARIFORUM EPA 
Secretariat; to coordinate with the Ministry of Trade and Industry in all EPA related 
public education initiative and serve as the main point of contact for EPA related 
activities. The Trinidad and Tobago manufacturers association (TTMA) has the 
responsibilities to ensure that the interests of the manufactures are protected in both the 
negotiation and implementation phase of the EPA460. 
In the case of Guyana, the government has established an Implementation unit within 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade with the primary responsibilities of coordinating private 
sector and government initiative to give effect to the provisions of the EPA. The main 
stakeholder being the Guyana revenue Authority, the Guyana customs and the 
ministries of Trade Industry and Commerce, Finance, legal affairs, Foreign affairs. Also 
the Guyana Bureau of Standards, the private sector commission, trade unions and 
CARICOM Secretariat. In all the territories of the region to include Suriname, there are 
private sector led initiatives to implement the EPA. However, while their efforts are very 
important to the implementation process the cost of implementing the EPA is not fully 
assessed and therefore all the agencies, government departments and private sector 
                                                        
459 Presentation by Ambassador Fredrico Cuello to the CARIFORUM Implementation seminar, Kingston May 
20, 2009. 
 
460 Interview with Greg Lockey. President of the T&T. manufacturers association June 16, 2009 Port Of Spain. 
Trinidad & Tobago. 
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entities are in need of funding and technical assistance to give effective guide to the 
implementation of the Agreement. The region’s reliance on the EU and its Member 
States for financial and technical support for the implementation of the EPA is quite 
substantial, but the full extent of each countries need is not yet quantified. The Eastern 
Caribbean States have been quite slow in developing their implementation process, 
because of funding and lack of technical assistance and human resource capacity. St. 
Lucia has confirmed its financial need through their implementation matrix; but its 
activities are being coordinated through the OECS Secretary which has linked its 
implementation Initiative with the program established under the CARICOM Secretariat.  
In the main, private sector initiatives and activities across the region seem sporadic, 
tentative and lukewarm, with the exception of some States, namely Barbados and the 
Dominican Republic there is a sense that the private sector is looking to government for 
leadership or simply just “waiting for something to happen”461.   
4.3 The Institutional Framework: The Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council  
There seems not to be any clearly identifiable source of funding for the establishment 
and functioning of CARIFORUM-EPA Institution. The Agreement provide for the 
establishment of several bodies with defined functions and categories of membership; 
namely., the Joint-CARIFORUM-EU Council, the Trade and Development Committee, 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee and the CARIFORUM-EC consultative Committee. 
At the Ministerial level, the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council which will be responsible for 
policy decisions and shall provide overall oversight of the operations of the agreement. 
The Joint Council is the overarching body for the implementation process and in effect 
is the highest decision making authority within the context of the agreement. It will be 
comprised of ministers of all fifteen CARIFORUM States and the European Union 
Member States, along with European Commission; and it shall meet at least once per 
month. The rules of procedure are still being developed and therefore after twenty 
                                                        
461 Jessop, David, “Whatever happens to the EPA?” Trade Negotiations Insights Vol.9. (April 2010). 
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months since the agreement was signed, the body has not yet met. The agreement 
established Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council to deal with major issues, conflict or any 
other bilateral, multilateral or international development that might affect the 
implementation and functional operation of the EPA. However, there is no clear 
guideline as to how these rules are being developed. But what is clear is that the 
European Union is playing a major role in the development of the rules and will no doubt 
have the majority of members. It would therefore be very interesting to examine the 
proposed voting rights or principles of the decision making within the body. All the 
Member States of both sides will be represented, CARIFORUM fifteen and the EU 
twenty seven. The interesting development is that while the Commonwealth of the  
Bahamas will sit on this body, it is neither a Member of the WTO nor the CSME, while 
the Dominican Republic though a Member State of the WTO and CAFTA and is also a 
contracting party to the Free Trade Agreement with CARICOM, but it is not a Member 
State of the CSME.The function of the ACP-EU, Council of Ministers is preserved 
because the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council will report to the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers. However, the authority of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in some respect is 
undermined, because the decision of the CARIFORUM-EC Council is binding on the 
parties in the context of the global trade arrangements for RTAs 
4.3.1 The Joint CARIFORUM-ECTrade and Development Committee 
The Joint CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development committee is established to 
monitor the implementation of the EPA and to be the administrative arm of the 
Institutional mechanism. It reports to the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council .The 
development of its rules of procedure are well advanced however, this body cannot be 
inaugurated prior to the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council to which it shall report. The 
committee is comprised of senior officials from both sides and is the executing arm of 
the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council.  
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4.3.2 The Joint CARIFORUM -EC Parliamentary Committee  
The Joint CARIFORUM-EC Parliamentary Committee is compromised of European and 
CARIFORUM Parliamentarians who will meet and exchange views. This institution 
seems to mirror the Joint Parliamentary Assembly which exists currently in the context 
of the Contonou Agreement. Like the other Institutional bodies, this body has not yet 
convened, however the rules of procedure are being developed. Because of its function, 
it cannot proceed unless the other bodies have convened. The Parliamentary 
Committee will be able to request information regarding implementation of the EPA from 
the Joint Council, and be kept informed of their decisions; it can also make 
recommendations to the Joint Council and the Trade and Development committee. 
Therefore the functions of the parliamentary committee cannot be carried out unless the 
Joint Council and the Trade and Development Committee are in place. It is therefore left 
to the CARIFORUM State to decide on the persons who would represent each Member 
State on this body. 
 4.3.3 CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee 
The CARIFORUM-EC Consultative Committee is to function as a consultative body to 
the main Institutional bodies under the EPA. However, it is not yet constituted nor 
convened. Its membership will comprise organizations from civil society to include 
academics and other social and economic partners and it shall promote dialogue and 
cooperation and may make recommendations to the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council 
and the Trade and Development Committee. There is no clear expression of the cost of 
implementing the Institutional framework of the Agreement. 
The extent to which the Consultative Committee will influence decision making at the 
level of the Joint Council, though not clearly define in scope and operation, it seems to 
form the basis for deep involvement. It would be interesting to know the depth of 
transparency which will be involved in certain areas  of decision making such as for 
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example, the persons to make up the panel of arbitrators to be appointed to address 
disputes arising under the EPA. What role if any, will the Consultative Committee play? 
4.3.4 The Special Committee on Custom Cooperation and Facilitation 
Special committee on Customs cooperation and Trade Facilitation is established to 
implement the custom and Trade Facilitation chapter of the Agreement. Article 36 (1) 
establish a special committee on custom cooperation and trade facilitation “and it shall 
be comprised of representatives of the Parties. It reports  to the Joint CARIFORUM-EC 
Trade and Development committee and has five specific function among which it will 
“monitor” the Implementation and administration” of custom and Trade facilitation. So 
while it is empowered to meet and decide its own Agenda in advance of the parties 
meeting to establish the other Institutional arrangement of the EPA.. 
4.4 Implementing the financial package 
The full extent of the financial package required to implement the EPA is yet not 
determined neither is the cost in lost revenues to State Governments because of the 
liberalization of Trade in Goods and Services. The immediate, medium term and long 
term financial cost of implementing the EPA across the region must await the 
completion of twenty studies undertaken by the Regional Preparatory Task Force 
(RPTF)462.  So, while the European has identified two clear source of funding and the 
possibilities of a third source being other international donor agencies; there are no 
guarantees beyond the 10th EDF and Aid for Trade support from EU member States. 
                                                        
462 The studies cover the following area of the EPA. Competitiveness and innovation, Customs and Trade 
facilitation competition policy, public procurement, technical barriers to trade sanitary and phytosanitory 
measures for fisheries access to the EU markets, Agriculture, fisheries, investment and business facilitation, 
trade in services, regional investment promotion, information society, cultural Industries, innovation and 
renewable energy intellectual property, environment, social aspects protection of personal data, science and 
technology and good governance. These studies have already been completed. 
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 Further, there seems to be no real connection between the work of the RPTF and the 
funding being made available under the current EDF program; because it is by virtue of 
the studies undertaken by the RPTF that the region will inform itself, Europe and other 
donors of the detail need of Implementing the EPA. But, what seem clear is that the 
funding made available under the 10th EDF will be quite inadequate to implement the 
immediate and medium term costs and there is no other EDF funding until after 2013 
and even then, there is no commitment to make funds available under the EDF post 
2013. 
The completion of the  RPTF studies will also inform the EPA Implementation road map 
on the question of cost to implement the agreement, but CARIFORUM State must first 
agree on the road map before the process can commence in earnest but the road map 
is still being held up. Take for example the case of St. Lucia which is one of the smaller 
States within the OECS sub grouping of the CARICOM member States, although their 
national implementation unit was established in February 2009 and they have identified 
the immediate task of implementing the EPA and budgetary requirement by developing 
a matrix for the process of implementation, funding remains very challenging.  From that 
matrix, the cost of improving Agriculture and fisheries competitiveness along with the 
cost of enhancing the quality of traditional agricultural products is estimated at €6 
million. This is but a small component of the matrix is among the smallest  Member 
State of the CARIFORUM  group. 
The CARICOM Secretariat has estimated that the cost to implement capacity building in 
fiscal infrastructure, establish a private sector development fund and promote regional 
integration is approximately €401.4 million and for the implementation of those studies 
already completed, the RPTF has estimate that the cost is between €121-125 million463. 
The real challenge in implementing the EPA is two fold.  Firstly, among the identified EU 
sources, of funding namely; the EDF, and Aid for Trade, the EDF has a very poor record 
                                                        
463 Ibid. 
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of bureaucratic inefficiencies and slow response to request and so also, with regards to 
the Aid for trade its definition and scope are still in dispute.  So therefore, the availability 
of these promised sources remains uncertain. 
Funding is also expected from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), World Bank, IMF, UN, France, Germany and 
Norway, Spain, and also Aid for support from china and India under their Aid for Trade 
programmes, but there seems to be no clearly defined time schedule. However, the 
implementation processes cannot be delayed indefinitely. 
Secondly, the Caribbean States had pinned their hopes on the expected Aid support 
when they agreed to signing the EPA quite cognizant of the fact that they could not 
finance the obligation which they had under taken within the ambits of their own Tax 
revenue bases. Concerns had being raised with respect to the conduct of some EU 
Member States and their commitment to aid for trade, because, of all  those States 
which made lofty promises of bilateral and discretionary support for EPA, only two 
European Union Member States  had honoured their pledge of support namely; Britain 
and Germany. 
Further, there seems to be no clear way forward as to how the EU will provide the much 
vaunted €1 billion for their Aid for Trade promise of support. The region is concerned 
that after four months within the calendar year 2010, when this sum is to be provided 
outside of the funds provided in the 10th EDF, there was no allocation for the 
CARIFORUM State from the EC. However, CARIFORUM States were still concerned 
that the greater portion of the EC funds will go to Africa in light of the Euro- Africa 
political priorities. 
There is also the lingering fear that as the global recession settles, Some Member 
States of the European Union and other donors may re-package their Aid for Trade 
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support and subsumed those commitments into the general aid funding464. Against this 
background however, China has decided to step up its campaign to keep the Aid for 
Trade momentum going in light of the international economic crisis. China argued that 
the economic crisis will hurt the poor countries who will suffer most and it’s therefore 
incumbent that the WTO should intensify the momentum on aid for trade465. 
Europe has responded to some of the challenges being faced by the ACP States, in this 
regard and move particular to the CARIFORUM States as their commitment in the EPA 
is far more extensive that most of the other ACP configuration of States. The EU had 
indentified two approaches to address the slow and bureaucratic mechanism of 
delivering external assistance.  The first approach is to direct its funding to ACP States 
through budgetary support directly to government and secondly through a regional 
development fund. These are separate initiatives from the support provided through the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) which has committed €2 billion for Investment purpose 
in the ACP States. But Europe seems well aware that with the exception of the 
Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and a lesser degree, Barbados, the prospect 
for the new investment generally on a wide scale is not quite encouraging for the 
CARIFORUM region. 
Allocations have been made for budgetary support in most States of the region by the 
European Union. However, with respect to the proposal to open a special window within 
the Caribbean Development Fund (CDF)466 to channel aid for trade support from the 
European Union, there has not been any decisive position as a matter of policy or 
directions emanating from the European Union. However, as previously noted, the 
United Kingdom has made the sum of £5 million available through the establishment of 
                                                        
464 David Jessop. “Whatever happens to the EPA?” Op. Cit. 
465 China’s ambassador to the WTO Sunzhenyu’s addressed to the WTO meeting on Aid for Trade on February 
27, 2009. Reported in the China Daily Feb.28, 2009. www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009‐
02/28/content_7522726.htn. (April 22, 2010). 
 
466 The Caribbean Development Fund was established in July, 2008. The purpose of the fund is to provide 
financial and technical assistance to countries, regions and sectors which are disadvantaged as a result of the 
deepening of the integration. 
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a Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional integration Trust fund. (CART Fund) already 
established, from which the CARICOM Secretariat and other CARICOM States have 
accessed some funding for EPA implementation projects. 
But, while the UK has created a special window; the European Union has still not 
decided how it will proceed. What is clear however, is that the European Union will not 
create a new mechanism or Institution for funding the EPAs. This has been a long 
standing EU policy for which all suggestions for changes had been strongly resisted. 
It is argued that the CDF may not be the appropriate mechanism to channel the new 
source of funding, because, in its current form, it was designed to benefit the LDCs of 
the region, but it seems that the structure can be reformed so as to facilitate a speedy 
disbursement of EPA funding allocations from all sources. As of now, the bulk of the EU 
funding for the implementation processes is being channelled through the National 
Indicative Program (NIP) of each CARIFORUM State and the regional Indicative 
Program (RIP) through the CARICOM Secretariat.  
The sum of €580 million has been clearly earmarked for CARIFORUM EPA 
Implementation up to 2013. However, while the Contonou Financial protocol will 
continue to 2020, it is still doubtful whether the sum allocated will be made available to 
the CARIFORUM States on time to be effective; and further to what extent the EU’s 
pledge of € 1 billion to Aid for trade in 2010 will materialize along with the amount of €2 
billion pledged Globally for Aid for trade to developing countries within the WTO. It is not 
clear what amount will be allocated to the CARIFORUM States.  
The diversity of Aid donors to the region necessitated a coordinated approach to stream 
line the Aid fund for more effective application, accounting and coherence in keeping 
with the Paris declaration467. The region has benefited from Aid from the multiplicity of 
donors but seems not able to measure its effectiveness and application, or even to 
                                                        
467 The Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness February 2005. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf 
(April 20, 2010). 
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better inform donors when requests are being made. This incoherence will impact 
implementation of the EPA as the region sought to extend the sources of finance 
beyond the EU and its member States. The extent to which Europe delays making vital 
decision on the future of the CARIFORUM EPA Implementation support, the 
CARIFORUM States face the risk of been out paced by the more aggressive and free 
trading business of Latin America468. Further, there is more multinationals operating in 
Latin American than those operating in the CARICOM States469, these companies are 
better able to compete in European Markets due to economies of scales and Labour 
cost inputs in many areas of production compared to what exist in the CARICOM 
States. The Caribbean is therefore at risk by the delays in implementing the EPA. 
4.5 Implementing the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME)  
There is an implementation deficit with respect to the CSME which was launched in 
2006 and should have been fully implemented by 2008. This has not happened in time, 
in order for the region to concentrate on implementing the EPA, and so completing the 
EPA has seemingly placed the CSME and the EPA on a collision course, in 
circumstances where the lack of funding and political commitment to the CSME have 
created an atmosphere in which the EPA institutional arrangement are likely to overhaul 
some aspects of the CSME and indeed the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. The 
political dilemma for CARICOM is how to implement the EPA and at the same time 
avoid undermining the CSME and the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. The region must 
therefore muster the political will to complete the CSME process without further delay 
and establish a body with supranational status to have full responsibilities for the proper 
function of the internal market of the CARICOM States. This, however would 
necessitate some adjustment to the Treaty of Chaguaramas or indeed a new Treaty 
arrangements specifically to addresses the question of intra-regional  trade and market 
and market reforms.  
                                                        
468 David Jessop. “Whatever happens to the EPA?” Op. Cit. 
 
469 Ibid. 
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The initiative would have to be undertaken before the region completed its negotiation 
with Canada for a new  trade arrangement, as this could create the opportunity  to re-
order the Caribbean Development Fund(CDF) to receive funds for Regional Trade and 
Trade related facilitation to include EPA and CARIBCAN implementation. At the launch 
of the CSME on Jan. 20, 2006, Prime Minister of Jamaica Hon. P.J. Patterson had 
remarked that “..the implementation of the single market will result in unprecedented 
market access for our goods and services and a marked expansion in our business 
large and small, traditional and non traditional”. It was the hope of the region that full 
implementation of the CSME would have taken place before the EPA negotiations were 
complete. In light of the failure so to do, the region has faced a serious challenge to 
implement the CSME while addressing the needs of the EPA obligation. The pressure 
that is brought to bear on the CARIFORUM States to implement the EPA will no doubt 
affect the implementation of the CSME. 
4.6 Regional foreign policy and development 
Under the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas the Member States have agreed to 
coordinate their foreign policy to present a united front, in their response to the 
International Community. The extent to which the lack of foreign policy coordination 
exist in the region to drive its desire for economic gains in trade and development is a 
factor which has affected the implementation of the EPA. The weak foreign policy 
positions across the region had affected the negotiations for the EPA and it is a material 
fact that the implementation of the EPA has suffered from a funding deficit and so, it 
seems very vital that the region’s foreign policy initiatives should be geared towards 
enhancing the development fund from bilateral and multilateral sources. It must 
therefore continue to push for the implementation of the Doha Development Agenda, 
and also to focus on increasing its South-South involvement. It must seek to deepen its 
relation with countries in the wider Caribbean and South American region in order to 
support the cooperation needed to foster regional Integration and trade opportunities.  
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4.7 Public education  
The Caribbean has enjoyed an extended period of protection and preferential non 
reciprocal trade arrangement, about which the public and businesses were aware and 
took advantage of these export opportunities offered under Lomé and Contonou 
Agreement, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and CARIBCAN.It is generally agreed 
that the information dissemination and public involvement in trade negotiation and 
implementation is usually indispensible. However, this aspect of the negotiation of the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA was below expectation, and the regional governments should 
have done more to inform and involve the wider population of the region, more so, the 
business and commercial community470. The region must at this stage of the 
implementation processes be engaged in a public education campaign, except for the 
Dominican Republic which had a very high level of public discourse during the regional 
negotiations, the rest of the CARIFORUM States did not involve the public during the 
negotiations and therefore had to face very seriously challenges in convincing the public 
to accept the agreement after it was initialled. The region should implement a campaign 
to educate the public as it sought to implement the agreement in order for the public to 
be aware of what to expect arising from the implementation of the Agreement. It is 
important that regional governments must press the EC to assist in this regard, not only 
to encourage public awareness, but also to commence the process of democratizing the 
selection processes of persons to serve on the Joint Consultative Committee and to fill 
positions for arbitrators which are required under the Agreement. 
There are certain existing non-tariff barriers on the European side which must be 
highlighted, mostly in the areas of processed foods and agricultural products which 
must be addressed in the familiarization campaign. This will help to reduce the level of 
frustration the Caribbean entities are likely to face when they attempt to access the 
European market, both in the areas of trade in goods and services. The public 
                                                        
470 Interview with All Caribbean Interviewees: All have agreed that the region could and should have done 
more to get the public more fully on board and to inform them as to the developments in the negotiations. 
This is not to say however that nothing was done; but there were serious budgetary constraints.   
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Education campaign must also highlight the need for the development of the rule of 
procedure of the Institutional body’s to become part of the public discourse so that the 
principle of transparency in governance which is so cherished by the Europeans be 
invoked for the better understanding of the various processes on the part of the citizens 
of the CARIFORUM States. The Dominican Republic has had a very successful   public 
education campaign in this regard.  
There is no doubt that the freedom of movement mode 4 is very important for cultural, 
educational and trade development of the region, and so the governments in their 
campaign must explain the regime which exists in some States of the European Union 
which use visa restrictions to undermine the EPA provisions. Indeed Britain which had 
one of the more liberal visa regime in Europe with regard to its former colonies and 
Member States of the Commonwealth of Nations has recently commenced  a revision of 
its visa policies with respect to several CARICOM States whose citizens previously did 
not require visas to visit the United Kingdom. These are very important public issues, 
which should not escape public awareness during the implementation state. Therefore, 
the various implementation units within national governments across the region should 
be provided with the necessary resources, human, technical and financial to mount an 
awareness campaign as part of its EPA implementation responsibilities; or in the 
alternative, a special body designed to promote and offer advice on the EPA across the 
region should be appointed. 
4.8 The CARIFORUM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement  
The CARICOM-DR Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1998, but has not been fully 
implemented. The failure of both sides to implement this agreement has led to serious 
problem in the implementation of the EPA471.The failure of the Joint CARIFORUM-EC 
Council to be convened since the signing of the EPA is partly due to the problems that 
remain unresolved between the CARICOM States and the Dominican Republic (DR). 
                                                        
471 Press release 328/2008 Nov. 4, 2008 “CARICOM” CARICOM and DR to forge stronger ties”. 
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Under the Contonou Agreement, the DR became part of the CARIFORUM Group of 
States for the purposes of facilitating the trade and development co-operation with the 
EC. However, the CARICOM- DR Agreement is a Free Trade agreement between the 
region and the DR and what has been demanded by the DR is that it ought to be given 
the same treatment under the EPA  as is the case for the formal Member States of the 
Community and be made no worst off on the question of tariffs than that which is 
extended to the EU. The Dominican Republic was holding out for a decision on these 
critical issues before agreeing to the inauguration of the Institutional bodies to oversee 
and manage the implementation processes; and further, Spain which had more than a 
passing interest in the Dominican Republic’s accession to the ACP Group472 and that 
interest seemingly has extended to the Dominican Republic becoming a Member of the 
CARIFOUM Group of Anglophone and Francophone States in the Region. However, 
Spain had not made its contribution to the region Aid for Trade support program since 
the EPA was signed. The problems for the region is that the DR is making demands 
which Spain may be able to assist in resolving, because Spain has an interest in the 
Dominican Republic becoming a full member of CARICOM. 
4.9 Competition Commission 
The CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC) was inaugurated on the 18th January. 
2008, in Paramaribo, Suriname with the swearing-in of the six Commissioners and a 
chairman473. The CARICOM Competition Commission was established by virtue of 
chapter VIII of the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which requires that each Member 
State of CARICOM should establish and maintain a National Competition Authority to 
facilitate the implementation of the rules of competition. 
                                                        
472 Interview‐ Ambassodor Fredrico Cuello, May 15, 2009. New York. 
 
473 Dr. Kusho Horahsing, Chairman and six commissions Patterson K. H. Cheltenham, Dr. Trevor M. Farrell, Mr. 
Hans Rudolf Lim Apo, Dr. Maureen Pasil, Dr. Barton UA Scotland and Ambassador A.B. Stewart Stephenson. 
Appointed for 5 years with a possibility of re‐appointment for a further 5 years. 
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Article 171 of the Treaty establishes the CARICOM Competition Commission “..for the 
purposes of implementing the Community Competition policy”. As the Treaty anticipates 
an interdependent network of Competition Authorities at the national and regional level 
with the objective of driving the industrial development of the region to achieve 
economic and social development of its people. Article 171 (1) sets out the power of the 
Commission which is to: monitor, investigate, detect and to  make determination with 
respect to imposition of penalties in the area of cross-border transaction, but more 
particularly to those which have “cross-border effect”; but it does not define nor 
establish the extent of cross-border conduct to measure cross-border effect474.  
While the CARICOM Secretariat had issued draft model legislation for the 
implementation of competition regimes in Member States, there was no mandate for 
uniformity in establishing these legislative measures, so each Member States 
developed its regime based on its national needs and priorities. For example, in 
Jamaica the emphasis was on consumer protection, encouragement of small 
businesses and monitoring of monopoly conduct, but not to restrict their creation. In 
deed, while the international trend in anti-competitive regulations is to restrict mergers 
and also focus on the abuse of dominance, the approach adopted in Jamaica is to de-
emphasis merger controls but concentrate on the issue of abuse of dominance.  
While, the positions in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago differ and address the issue 
of merger control while Guyana has no provision dealing with mergers475. 
The linkages between the domestic regimes and the Caribbean Competition 
Commission (CCC) are mandated under Article 173.1 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, 
which specifically links the Caribbean Competition Commission to the Caribbean Court 
of Justice (CCJ) and the Council of Trade and Economic Development COTED by virtue 
of chapter VII. The Commission, however is not a rule making Authority, but exists to 
                                                        
474 Barbara Lee “CARICOM Competition commission: Enhancing competition Enforcement in the Caribbean 
Community” presentation to the 8th Annual ICN Conference Zurich, Switzerland June 3‐5, 2009.  
475 Fair competition Act of Jamaica (FCA) Fair competition Act of Barbados. 
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enforce the Competition rule of the Community. The rule making authority is the COTED 
which by virtue of Article 182 of the Treaty is mandated to develop” ..appropriate 
policies and rules of competition” while by virtue of Article 175 (12) “..a party that is 
aggrieved by a determination of the commission in any matter may apply to the Court 
for a review of that determination”. In addition, while the Caribbean Court of 
Justice(CCJ) may provide relief to an aggrieved party, who “..may apply to the court for 
an order” of enforcement by virtue of Article 175 (1) which stipulates that where an order 
of the Commission remains unsatisfied within 30 days of its issuance regarding anti-
competitive conduct. It is suggested that here lies the real challenge to implement the 
Competition provisions of the CARIFORUM EPA regime because the EPA regime 
seemingly has ousted the jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice and created a 
parallel system. 
4.9.1 EPA Competition regime 
Title IV, Article 125 (1) of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA defines “competition Authority” as 
the European commission and the EC party, and for CARIFORUM States it means the 
“Competition Authorities as appropriate” to include the CARICOM Competition 
Commission and the Commission National de defense de la competencia of the 
Dominican Republic.  
Sub section (2) of Article 125, defines “enforcement proceeding” as any “proceeding 
instituted by the competition Authority of a party” with respect to breaches of 
undertaking to “establishing and remedying anti-competitive behaviour” while sub 
section 3 defines the choice of Competition Law to be applicable. For the purposes of 
the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, Competition Law includes but not limited to the following: (1) 
for the EC party Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and their implementing regulation or amendments, (2)  for the CARIFORUM 
States, chapter 8 of the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, National Competition 
legislation and the National competition legislation of the Bahamas and the Dominican 
Republic are the relevant regimes, Bahamas being  not a Member of the CSME and  
274 
 
 
the DR is not a Member of CARICOM, but has a Free Trade Agreement with CARICOM 
and is a Member of CAFTA. 
The sections seem to inextricably bind the dispute Settlement Mechanism of the EPA to 
the Competition Authority through the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development 
Committee, by stating that “upon entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter, the 
enactment of such legislation should be brought to the attention of the EC party through 
the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee476. 
Article 126 sets out the principles of Anti-competitive practice and the effects on market, 
and Trade liberalization; and highlights the obligation of each party to take steps to 
address any “objects or effect” of activities which prevent or substantially lessen 
“competition in the territory of the other party “as a whole or in a substantial part 
thereof”.  
In the implementation of competition regime, Article 127 of the EPA mandates that the 
EU and the CARIFORUM State must ensure that within a period of five years of the 
coming in force of the EPA that they have in force the relevant anti-competitive law 
within their Jurisdiction and therefore established the body referred to in Article 125 (1). 
This is a fundamental obligation imposed by the Article which must be achieved in 
conjunction with the institutional framework of the Agreement more particular with the 
powers vested in the Joint CARIFORUM- EC Council and Committee for the Trade and 
Development. 
Article 127, therefore sets up two phases of the implementation process, the first  will  
take up to five years after the coming into effect of the Agreement, when Article 128  
becomes operational through the mechanism establish under Article 125 (1), and the 
second phase coming within six years of the implementation of Article 125. Therefore, 
after eleven years, there will be an overhaul of the entire regime. Article 128 addresses 
                                                        
476 Article 125 (3) (a) (b). CARIFORUM‐EU, EPA. 
 
275 
 
 
the condition and processes for exchange of information and enforcement of the 
competitive provisions. However the fundamental strictures on CARIFORUM States to 
employ their own national policy is imposed by virtue of Article 129 which states that 
“…nothing in this Agreement prevents a party or a signatory CARIFORUM State from 
designing or maintaining public or private monopolies according to their respective 
Laws”. However, with respect to such public or private  enterprise  which may be 
created, both the EC and CARIFORUM State shall ensure that the rules of competition 
do not run contrary to the provision of this Agreement; neither in law nor in fact. But, the 
derogation section allows for some special rules particular relating to the circumstance 
of the national regimes; which will not be bound by this provision477. Gradual 
adjustments can be made to the policies and law of each party without prejudice to its 
obligation under the WTO; to any State monopoly of a commercial nature with a view to 
make such entities satisfy the condition of competition in providing goods and services 
in either contracting party within the years of coming into force of this agreement “unless 
the discriminatory conduct of such state monopoly”, is inherent in the existence of the 
monopoly in question”478  Finally, either party shall report any derogation and 
“measures adopted to implement” the provision in article 129 (4).This is the extent of the 
EPA competition regime which affects the CARICOM Competition regime. The impact is 
as follows: (1) while one of the stated objectives of the EPA is to advance the interest of 
deepening regional integration, process, the preambular clause of the EPA express the 
desire “… of facilitating the implementation of the CARICOM Development Vision”. 
The provisions of the Competition chapter of the EPA seemingly has fundamentally  
offended  the tenets of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in some material respects, 
(a) by ousting the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) which is 
the sole Judicial Authority in the region to interpret and apply the provisions of the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas and  replaced it with the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council 
                                                        
477 Article 129 (3). 
 
478 Article 129 (4). 
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through the operations and function  the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development 
Committee, which is an administrative rather than Judicial Authority. Because, the 
decision of the Joint Council is binding and therefore not subject to any judicial review, 
and further a similar situation exists with respect to the decisions of the Joint Trade and 
Development Committee. There are circumstances where a private entity can seek 
relief in the CCJ against the decision of the Caribbean Competition Commission under 
the Treaty of Chaguaramas, but no such recourse seems to exist under the EPA 
regime. In this regard the next element of the inconsistency between both regimes 
seemingly surfaced, as the EPA regime sets up a parallel system of governance of 
Competition policy in the region. This is so, because there seemed to be no clear nexus 
between the EPA regime and that regime established under the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. 
Further, it seems that where a dispute arises, there are two possible routes to 
resolution. Firstly, the matter may be referred to the Joint Trade and Development 
Committee to be resolved within the administrative parameters of the dispute 
Settlement Mechanism provided therein; or in the alternative to take the route of going 
through the competition mechanism. This seems to require some clarity; because if the 
dispute follows the competition regime under CARICOM Treaty arrangements, but has it 
origins under the EPA provisions, then the matter could possibly find its way into the 
CCJ via the Caribbean Competition Commission. The CCJ however, has no Jurisdiction 
to hear matters arising from disputes under the EPA. The question may well be whether 
the CCJ has any such jurisdiction to hear matters arising under the EPA as it is a 
creature of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, with its main purpose to interpret the 
Treaty. In the alternative, any complaint arising under the EPA must take the path of the 
dispute settlement mechanism. But, there exist some further problem, because that 
mechanism it seems is designed to deal with state parties and not corporate entities of 
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a private character. However, it is arguable that the state may take the matter to 
arbitration on behalf of the private entity as permissible under the WTO regime479.  
The other area of great challenge in implementing the competition regime under the 
EPA has its origins in the existence of two other regimes in the region. First, there is the    
competition regime in the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas both of which exist 
independently of the CARICOM regime. Because the Dominican Republic as discussed 
previously in not a member of CARICOM, but it has  a Free Trade Agreement with 
CARICOM, while the Bahamas, though being a member of CARICOM is not a signatory 
to the CARICOM Single market and Economy; an institution on which the region’s 
competition is founded. In this regard,  serious  challenges will be encountered in 
implement the competition provisions of the EPA because, by its very characteristics, it 
forces a convergence of extremely complex situation. In that, it has to reconcile and 
bring together four different and independent regimes, namely, the European regime 
which is extra territorial, the CARICOM regime, the Bahamas and Dominican Republic 
regimes all of which touch and concern the administration of the EPA system. This 
seemly untenable  situation which now hovers over the collective of regimes need 
further examination and refinement to be able to deliver the anticipated benefit to the 
CARIFORUM States. 
4.10 Competition Policy Coherence and Harmonization of Law 
The intent and purposes of the CARICOM Draft Legislations for enactment into National 
Law is to create policy coherence and harmonization of the various national competition 
regimes. But, while the CARICOM Competition Commission is not a rule making body 
part of its function is to encourage the development of the law, practice and procedure 
for competition in the region. To the extent that the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
does not expressly confer Supra-national status upon the Commission, it indirectly has 
                                                        
479 The EC Banana cases brought by the U.S.A, Ecuador and Guatemala at the W.T.O. augment the EU Banana 
Regime which gave preferential and non reciprocal benefits to the ACP banana exporting countries between 
2003 and 2005 discriminated against them. 
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supra -nationality in its enforcement functions both at the level of hearing complaints 
and enforcing decision across the region. Even more so, when the enforcement is by 
virtue of an order of the CCJ, which is also a supranational Institution in the area of 
Trade disputes under the Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
The European Single Market regime, like the Caribbean Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) are not Free Trade Area, but indeed one single economic space and therefore 
their domestic competition regimes are geared to remove market distortion and anti- 
competitive conduct. The competition law in both regions are not similar in all material 
respects, however, Europe in ensuring that the CARIFORUM State bring their regime in 
line with Europe’s with in Eleven (11) years without any option for discretionary delays 
beyond that period is pushing the region to adopt an approach to competition consistent 
with the European model. This approach arguably has removed from the CARIFORUM 
State their policy space to determine their own regimes best suited for their needs as 
the Member State or the regional group in accordance with the spirit and dictates of the 
Cotonou  Agreement. 
Further difficulties will therefore surface, because the competition regime in Europe is a 
unitary system, administered under one body and questions of law are interpreted by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, the CARIFORUM States do not have a 
unitary system and notwithstanding a single court to adjudicate on matters of law at the 
regional level under the Treaty of Chaguaramas, this court has no jurisdiction over 
matters arising under the EPA. 
 This raises the further question as to the approach to be taken regarding the area of 
Other restrictive Regulations of Commerce (ORRCS), both of these are questions of 
law, which in the case of the national regimes within  the CARIFORUM States will be 
determine by the local courts, but at the regional level the CCJ has competence in these 
areas. 
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The EPA is a Free Trade Agreement with a non -judicial process for dispute settlement 
and therefore to get a pronouncement on issues of law, the costly procedure of dispute 
Avoidance and Settlement must be invoked. This route can be tailored because 
competition law can be viewed as Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce(ORRC) 
in terms of its main objectives which is to liberalize internal markets where they are 
inconsistent in the main with the core GATT provision for example in the case of the 
Most Favoured Nation or National Treatment480 regimes. There is also very little 
differences between the Other Regulations of Commerce (ORCs) and the Other 
Restrictive Regulations of Commerce (ORRCs) in their application and definition within 
the context of a Free trade Agreement, but it  will come down to a question of what had 
existed before the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement481. 
The operation of competition the provisions in the case of the Bahamas and the 
Dominican Republic is that, generally, where there is a commercial presence of an 
entity in a market, and such presence has caused distortion and anti-competitive 
activities, but there is a lack of judicial presence within that State in circumstances 
where the activities are taking place in a Member State of a Free Trade Arrangements, 
it become very important that there exist some means of cooperation to give effect to 
these anti-competitive violations482.  
Therefore, as is the case under the EPA where the Bahamas and the Dominican 
Republic (DR) are both signatories and neither of these States enjoys the economic 
space of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. However the DR claims that it 
                                                        
480 Delroy S. Beckford, “Enforcement of competition Law in CARICOM: perspectives and challenges to meet 
regional and multinational obligations” a paper presented at the Latin America and Caribbean Regional 
seminar on Trade and competition. Caracas Venezuela 20‐21 April 2009. 
www.sela.org/DB/RICsela/EDOCS/sRed/2009/04/T02360000425‐0‐
Enforcement_of_competition_Law_in_caricom.pdf (April 23, 2010).  
 
481 Ibid. 
 
482 Audel J. Cunnigham “competition Policy: Care Elements for CARICOM in the FTAA, unpublished paper. Feb. 
2004. (April 23, 2010). 
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deserves a right of comity with CARICOM, while. CARICOM seemingly is resisting the 
granting of such claim and is quite slow in according accession to CARICOM by the DR.  
In the Bahamian situation, it being a Member of CARICOM which has treaty obligation 
between itself and the DR. The EPA therefore envisage in its implementation, three 
levels of co-operation in sharing information in competition matters. The Bahamas 
regime would seek the co-operation of the CARICOM Competition Commission at one 
level while getting the benefit of co-operation from the DR, through the Commission 
National de defense de la competencia; at another level, and finally the Bahamas 
Commission will also have to seek the co-operation of the European regime under the 
EPA. In this regard the DR and the Bahamas are no different. 
Furthermore, because the EPA is a region to region agreement, the EC will only need 
co-operation of the CARICOM Competition Commission at the regional level, but would 
still require co-operation of DR and the Bahamas under their regime. But serious 
constitutional issue may arise, which cannot be dealt with by mere co-operation through 
the Dispute Settlement Provisions of neither the Bahamas, CARICOM, EC nor DR 
regimes. In this regard, the existence of a multiplicity of competition regimes across the 
region has posed some intricate problems.  
4.11 Constitutional issues and competition policy: The Right of Audience 
Under the Dispute Settlement procedure in the CARICOM Treaty Arrangements, the 
CCJ is the competent authority to adjudicate on trade disputes between Member States. 
The presence of natural persons or corporation is severely curtailed and in the case of 
cross-border trading activities which give rise to dispute involving competition issues, 
the CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC) would address those matters and 
appeal would go to the CCJ against the ruling of the CCC, through the aggrieved party’s 
Member State. However; an individual could petition the court directly in four specific 
circumstances identified as follows: (a) when the CCJ has decided that a benefit or right 
conferred by the Treaty on a Member State is designed to directly benefit these 
persons: (b) where these persons have established that they have been prejudiced in 
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the enjoyment of those rights or benefit, (c)where the Member State which should have 
brought a claim on the behalf of a person or company has declined or omitted to do so 
or has expressly consented to allow the persons concerned to bring the claim, and (d) 
where the CCJ has decided to allow the person to pursue the claim in the interest of 
justice483.These are important avenues for protection of right of natural or corporate 
citizens of CARICOM. But, because the court has no jurisdiction over constitutional 
issues in its original jurisdiction, where a breach in competition regulation results in 
constitutional rights being abridged; except for citizen of  Barbados, Belize and Guyana,  
all such injury to citizen in the other States of CARICOM must be heard through their  
national court system and finally to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council484. 
Another area of concern for the region in implementing the EPA, is that Article 129, 
seems to restrict the policy space of the Member State of the region to develop local 
laws which will address the national needs. The EPA therefore operate to drive national 
policy makers to develop policies best suited for developed countries and could take 
national and regional institutions to a level of anti-competitive legislative framework 
which surpasses their commitments at the WTO. 
Not only will this aspect of the EPA offends policy space, but also where permissible 
any special circumstances which may necessitate derogation must be reported to the 
Joint CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee; a point at which a 
challenge may commence against any special situation been prayed by a regional 
Member State. In this regard, the National Treatment Provision of the EPA seems to be 
at odds with the provision of Article 129 (1).The implementation of the Competition 
                                                        
483 Barbara Lee “Hemispheric Development in Competition Policy: Experience and Future Challenges. A paper 
presented at the EC/AC conference on Hemispheric Development in competition policy. Santiago Chile, May 
15‐16, 2002. unpublished.  
 
484Only Barbados and Guyana are full members of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in its original and 
appellate Jurisdiction. All CARICOM member States however, a subject of the court in its original Jurisdiction 
for Interpreting and applying the provisions of the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas‐see the Agreement 
establishing the CCJ. Belize has signalled its intention to join the Court later this year and abolish the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council as its final court of Appeal. 
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regime of the EPA will face grave challenges and will require far reaching adjustments 
both nationally and within the CARICOM to give effect to the calibration and 
harmonization of the competition regime in the region, the imposition of the EPA 
provisions will be quite problematic. 
4.12 Implementing the Public Procurement Provisions 
The public procurement chapter of the EPA is one of the most elaborate485the 
implementation of which will no doubt pose several challenges to the structure of the 
CARICOM internal mechanism for public procurement. This was one area of the 
negotiation which highlighted the Europeans great desire to include in the agreement 
and this was made clear to the CARIFORUM negotiators, who made concession as a 
trade off486. The problems that will be faced in implementing the EPA regime are the 
extent to which  the CARICOM mechanism  is consistent  with the provision for public 
procurement under the CSME in the context of the various national regimes. So, while it 
was the expressed intention of the CARICOM political leadership, that the extent of their 
commitment should only be limited to transparency in procurement, 487the breath and 
depth of the chapter seems to go further, than the commitments made under WTO, the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas and at the various national levels. Indeed government 
procurement is not of WTO’s rule based system as the agreement is not compulsory for 
developed countries and in reality pluralateral in nature; however developing countries 
for the most part have not signed it488. 
                                                        
485 Norman Given, “The effect of the Economic Partnership Agreement on the CSME’ The Fork in the Road” 
Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies vol.33. No. (2 June 2008), p. 63.  
 
486 Interview‐ Henry Gill, CRNM. Barbados June 10, 2009. 
 
487 Interview‐ Henry Gill, June 10, 2009. Barbados. 
 
488 EU EPAs: Economic and Social Development implications: the   case of the CARIFORUM‐EC Economic 
Partnership Agreement. TWN. Third World Network. Feb. 2009. www.downloaded (April 16, 2009). 
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Under the CARICOM-Dominican Free Trade Agreement the chapter dealing with 
government procurement  is quite nebulous. Indeed it makes the commitment in 
principle pending the establishment of the CARICOM’s procurement regime; without a 
specific commitment as to time. It states that “..the parties, consistent with the 
provisions of Article XI of the Agreement and the plan of action and recognizing the 
mutual benefit which can result from greater participation by their economic entities… 
arising from government procurement activities”489.  The parties agreed that as soon as 
the CARICOM States adopted a regional regime, then the DR and CARICOM would 
negotiate a competition regulatory framework.490 This in effect is an agreement to 
negotiate an agreement pending the development of the CARICOM regime. The 
CARICOM-DR Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1998.However,about eight years 
later in 2006, CARICOM established its Single Market and Economy (CSME) but still 
has not yet agreed a regime for government procurement. 
In this regard therefore, the EPA would not affect any procurement provision of the 
CARICOM-DR Free Trade Agreement; neither will it affect the CARICOM regime, as 
both regimes are in their infancy, and not yet developed. What the EPA has done is to 
push the CARICOM States and the DR to move their internal processes  at a much 
faster pace. It therefore has created some policy restriction for the states in developing 
their regime, independent of the influence of the Trade and Development Committee of 
the EPA. This is arguably, one specific area of the EPA in which the EC has a grand 
opportunity to influence the development of the regions national procurement regime, 
because the commitments are binding and immediate in terms of its impact on the 
National Treatment (NT) provision and to a lesser extent the competition provisions. 
 
 
                                                        
489 Article VII of the CARICOM‐DR Free Trade Agreement. 
 
490 Ibid. 
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4.13.   The role of the Regional Preparatory Task Force 
The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) has completed its own studies for the 
implementation of the procurement provisions of the EPA.. Even though the RPTF was 
not a formed structure within the ambit of the EPA, but was established to assist the 
process of the negotiation its work was carried over to the implementation phase. There 
is therefore no clearly defined pathway in the agreement as to how the work in these 
commissioned studies would be implemented. So, while Member State of the region will 
be expected to take legislative action based on the finding of the studies, the 
mechanism for the channelling of the reports is not clear. However, two possible 
approaches may be considered. First, these reports may be forward to regional 
governments to facilitate analysis and start the discussions at the national level to 
achieve consensus where possible or indeed to narrow the issue as much as possible, 
after which the recommendation should get to the special COTED for further 
deliberation and adoption before involving the Authority of the Trade and Development 
committee. This it would appear is the better approach because it creates an avenue for 
democratic legitimacy before implementation. 
The other approach is to await the inauguration of the Trade and Development 
Committee and the process of debating could start at that level. However, on reading of 
the EPA, there is no direct linkage between the EPA structure and governmental 
structures within the CARICOM Institutions. 
All Member States of the CARIFORUM  are required to introduce legislation to give 
effect to the procurement provisions of the EPA in terms similar to what has been 
agreed, notwithstanding that it is advisable that CARIFORUM State ought to have retain 
the right to have full autonomy and flexibility over its procurement policy491.  
                                                        
491 EU EPAs: Economic and Social Development implications: the   case of the CARIFORUM‐EC Economic 
Partnership Agreement. TWN. Third World Network. Feb. 2009. www.downloaded (April 16, 2009). 
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At the EPA institutional level, the procurement regime will create several legal difficulties 
and expose the democratic legitimacy of its decision, because the decision to apply or 
extend the rules of procurement will be made solely by the CARIFORUM-EC Council. 
Therefore, while the CARIFORUM Trade and Development committee is empowered to 
review the provisions of the agreement after three years of coming into being and make 
recommendation to the Joint Council; so also it can make recommendation on 
“cooperation in the procurement field492” 
There are other legal issues which may arise under the EPA regime. Firstly, the need to 
make challenges to contract awards or awards procedure  in circumstances where a 
bidder may feel that he was unfairly dealt with and therefore accommodating this 
problem in any procurement regime is important, not only to address the potential of 
State corruption, but also to ensure proper compliance. For example in Jamaica, there 
is the Office of the Contractor General (OCG) established under the Contractor General 
Act and the Secretariat of the National Contracts Commission (NCC).Which is a 
separate and independent body with responsibilities primarily to promote “..efficiently in 
the process of award and implementation of government contracts and ensuring 
transparency and equity in the awarding of such contracts”493 While, the OCG is also  
an independent anti- corruption commission which reports directly to Parliament. It has 
no prosecutorial powers, but through its finding it may refer a matter to the office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to review and can recommend criminal 
prosecution. The Contractor General does not sit on the National Contracts 
Commission494.However; it is the responsibility of the OCG to endorse contracts 
awarded by the NCC and to investigate any alleged impropriety or breach.  
                                                        
492 Article 181. CARIFORUM‐EC EPA. 
 
493 Contractor General Act 1999, Jamaica. 
494 General of Jamaica; who is the Head of state under the constitution of Jamaica order in council (1962) The 
NCC is a statutory commission composed of a panel of eight (8) members, appointed by the Governor. 
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The EPA regime appears to run counter to the establishment in Jamaica and Belize, the 
only two CARICOM Member States with similar anti-corruption regimes495. Under the 
existing regime in Jamaica, the NCC is obliged to provide information to an interested 
party after a bid process is completed, if so requested. The Access to Information Act, 
2002 of Jamaica provides for such request; and decisions of the NCC are subject to 
judicial review. The EPA provisions seem not to anticipate any challenge because of the 
broad approach employed in the establishment of the regime. In any event, the local 
courts and indeed the CCJ are not mentioned anywhere in the EPA as a Dispute 
Settlement Authority. This seems to be in direct conflict with the provisions and spirit of 
the CSME even though they are two different regimes operating in the same sphere. 
Further, the extent to which National Treatment (NT) is mandated to European business 
operating in the CARIFORUM Member States either directly or indirectly, the issue of 
competition in the area of public procurement is inextricably bound. National Treatment 
is a matter which is subject to the dispute Avoidance Settlement provisions of the EPA 
exclusively, but it seems that competition and procurement are not, as these give rise to 
legal and constitutional question which can only be dealt with under regional and 
National judicial systems. Potential suppliers of goods and services would want to know 
that they can challenge decision of the competent authority under the EPA because this 
is a very important measure of ensuring that the process is fair and compliance 
procedures are followed496.It is suggested that so far-reaching is this provision in the 
                                                        
495 McKoy, Derick. “Parliamentary oversight of executive procurement: Lessons from the Contractor‐General 
of Jamaica and Belize. Social Science Research Network, working paper series 
www.papers.sssrn.com/s013/papers.ctm?abstract_id=958098#268573 (April 26, 2010). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the area of Government Procurement see also McKoy, Derick:’Measuring the 
Utility of Institutional Reform in the Public Service” (2009) 58(1) Social and Economic Studies p11‐41. Also 
“Commonwealth Caribbean anticorruption strategies: the new institutional framework” (2009) 34(2) West 
Indian Law Journal, p77‐176. 
 
496 Stephen Woolcock: “Government Procurement provisions in CARIFORUM EPA and lessons for other ACP 
States” London school of Economics (LSE). 
www.2./se.ac.uk/internationalrelations/centresandunits/ITPU/docs/woolcockgovprocurement.doc (March 
15, 2010). 
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context of regional integration processes and development that before the 
implementation take place, there should be a thorough public discourse, throughout the 
region so that the public be allowed to impact the establishment of this particular 
regime.  
 
4.13.1 Implementing Intellectual Property, Innovation and Investment  regimes           
The existing CARICOM Intellectual Property and Investment regimes lag far behind the 
commitment the region made in the EPA. However, part of the problem which the region  
faces in implementing the EPA rests in the inherent dangers in crafting an agreement 
with provisions which are seemingly lifted from the realities of the European context and 
sought to be super-imposed onto another without due regard to practical implications497. 
For, because the region is replete with capital importing economies, the Investment 
landscape and existing regulatory framework is compounded with various incentive 
legislation498, all of which are skewed in favour of attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Some of these incentive laws have existed since the 1950s and even more so, 
after these Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the region became politically 
Independent as a matter of deliberate policy499in the 1960s and 70s.The existing 
regimes at the national level, bilateral and intra-regional levels are all discriminatory in 
character as they sought to give preference to foreign investors over local industries in 
                                                        
497 Francoise L.M. Hendy “Investment Harmonization: The State of Play and its potential impacts” 
www.ccmfuwi.org/files/publications/conference/911.pdf (April 13, 2010). 
 
498Examples of these are spread across the Region. In Jamaica list of Incentive Laws are as follows: Export 
Industry encouragement Act, Jamaica Export Free Zone Act, moratorium on Duties, Exchange control Act, 
Bauxite and Alumina Industries Encouragement Act, Hotel Incentives Act, Factory construction Law, and the 
International Financial companies Act, Resort cottage Incentives Act, motion pictures encouragement Act. 
CARICOM‐Venezuela (1993), CARICOM‐Colombia (1994), CARICOM‐DR (1998), CARICOM‐Cuba (2000) and 
CARICOM‐Costa Rica (2004). 
499 The Caribbean Territories adopted what came to be called the “Puerto Rican model” “of development 
based on The Lewis model of “Industrialization by invitation” which was the Industrialization strategy 
promoted by the Caribbean since the late 1940s. The core of the model is the development of Industries 
though the attraction of FDI and it should be export oriented. All the CARICOM States have investment 
incentives legislations as they compete in the same markets for investments. 
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many areas. The introduction of the Single Market and Economy has the potential to 
remedy this situation. However, the Investment regime cannot therefore develop without 
incorporating, market access, liberalization, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and the 
National Treatment (NT) provisions which are inextricable tied to the regime for 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Competition.  
The implementation of the EPA Investment regime cannot be done oblivious of the 
existing bilateral treaties between CARICOM and other regions and territories. It is in 
the context of the National Investment regime that CARICOM though the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas was attempting to establish a Harmonized approach to investment, 
without offending the various national regimes. The effect of the amendment to the 1973 
CARICOM Tax Treaty is instructive, as the region prepared for the introduction of the 
CSME on January 1, 2006. Because, there were crucial rates of with holding taxes in 
reach of the territories of the region, companies operating in Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago shifted their ownership structure and investment capital base of 
the pending Amendment. But while the region tries to settle its own Investment regime, 
the EPA has superimposed a different structure, which implies binding commitments 
beyond the CARICOM Internal regime and by application of the National Treatment 
Clause, most of the regimes in CARICOM State will have to be adjusted. In this regard 
even the proposed CARICOM Investment regime may well have to be re-visited, before 
it is implemented. Indeed, the EPA regime appears to supersede the CARICOM regime. 
The aim of the  investment regime is to promote cross-border investment within the 
region, and includes the mechanisms under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(CSME), the CARICOM Double Taxation Treaty  all of which fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Caribbean Court of Justice. The Bahamas is not a signatory to the CSME and so it 
is with the Dominican Republic, However, the Double Taxation Agreement replaced the 
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1973 Tax Treaty which covered the MDC’s and LDC’s500 in the region of which the 
Bahamas is a signatory State under the  Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
There are three aspects to the proposed CARICOM Investment regime; all of the States 
in CARIFORUM group except the Bahamas are Member of the WTO and have all 
adhered to the minimum obligations for FDI under the WTO regime. The EPA however 
is GATs plus; the implementation of which can have deleterious effect on the 
Investment and financial regimes of these small open and fragile economies of the 
CARIFORUM region. Notwithstanding that the Investment regime in CARICOM 
embraced a three- prong approach. There is the CARICOM Investment policy, the 
Investment Code and the Investment Incentives. The Investment policy and code have 
being developed and are currently undergoing review at the national level. All aspects of 
the regime will be affected by the EPA provisions as it appears that these are not able 
to co-exist in several material respects, because the EPA obligations will now be driving 
the development of the regime and not the provision of the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas or the Double Taxation Agreement.  
The EPA gives authority of the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council to deal with major 
issues, conflict or any other bilateral, multilateral or international development that might 
affect the implementation and functional operation of the EPA. It is arguable therefore, 
that the EPA has in significant ways offended the provisions of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas, the various regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements and 
taxation agreements because the decision of the Joint Council is binding on the parties 
and the signatory state of the CARIFORUM Group.  
The dispute which might arise under the EPA  may be cross-cutting within the 
provisions of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and more particularly within the context of the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The language of the EPA with respect 
                                                        
500 The MDCs are: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago and the LDCs are: Antigua, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla. 
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to the power of the Joint Council may in practical terms and in law expose grave  
conflict with the Treaty of Chaguaramas. In this regard, the question which the region 
should examine during the development of the rules of procedure is to identify how 
these issues which may have cross-cutting application on the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
should be resolved. 
The Caribbean court of Justice (CCJ) in its original Jurisdiction is the regional trade 
court established to interpret and apply the Treaty of Chaguaramas. However, as 
previously argued, the jurisdiction of the court is ousted by the EPA and the decisions of 
the Joint Council is binding and seemingly final. Further, the dispute settlement 
provision clearly defined the link between Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the 
Authority of the Joint Council. The Dispute Settlement procedure established under the 
EPA mirrors that which exists at the WTO for the most part, however, these cannot  run 
concurrently in matters of disputes resolution arising under the EPA. 
4.13.2 Restriction of policy space 
The CARIFORUM States are all capital importing economies and therefore they all 
compete in the same market for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and have retained for 
themselves the right to develop their own Foreign Investment Incentives regimes and 
also to protect local Industries and allow them to grow. This approach to industrialisation 
of the region is caught under the National Preference rules of the Free Trade 
Agreement. The region’s investment regimes and national competitive regimes have 
been operating under the Lomé, Cotonou and WTO arrangements which had allowed 
them their own policy space to develop regimes best suited for their stage of economic 
development. Therefore, it has become the accepted norm within CARICOM to create 
or grant monopoly status to investors as an incentive for making their investments. 
There are also instances where the private sector is slow to invest in a particular area of 
the national economy and the government has to take such responsibilities i.e. water 
supply schemes, port and airport facilities and public transportation, and in some private 
sectors area where businesses have failed and governments have has to rescue the 
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sector and take over those entities. For example, the financial sector collapse which 
occurred in Jamaica in 1992-1993. Interventions in the Hotel and Mining sector along 
with government holding in national airlines, where these conditions exist. It is argued 
that the EPA competition regime is designed to dismantle that approach to investment 
and where they do not already exist; the policy space to create them is restricted. 
 
4.14 Conclusions 
The implementation of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement is a 
work in progress which is scheduled to be completed in 2033. The process when 
completed will have a far reaching and fundamental impact on how the CARIFORUM 
States interact in the global political economy and also within their own domestic and 
regional markets.  
The costs of adjusting these economies and regional institutions will necessitate the 
mustering of the political will to first make the necessary legislative and policy changes, 
some of which run counter to the economic and business practices which are deeply 
embedded. The region will require financial and technical assistance to implement the 
provisions of the EPA, but it remains very tentative as the European’s commitments to 
assist is very slow in coming and in some instances may not be honoured as global 
economic and financial constraints take told in many European economies. 
The raft of adjustments which are required cannot all be undertaken at the same time, 
but the region must take steps to honour their obligations under the Agreement even 
where it involves financial commitments for which they are unable to meet from their 
own revenue base, because the Europeans have skilfully evaded making firm 
commitments for financing the EPA. This is so because it is arguable, that the 
commitments they have made are more in the realm of declarations of intent which are 
not legally binding, than clearly defined and assured funding. 
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The real challenge for the CARIFORUM States in implementing the EPA cannot be fully 
assessed in the short term, but the various approaches to the implementation 
processes in and of themselves are very problematic. This is so because, in many 
instances the region made commitments and the cost of implementing those 
commitments are only being assessed by the Regional Task Force after the completion 
of the Agreements. To date, the task force has completed less than fifty percent of the 
twenty studies which it had undertaken since the completion of the agreements. So, as 
the Task Force completes each study, it is then and only then that the true costs of 
implementing these arrangements can be fully appreciated. However, in some 
instances, the Europeans may not assist to the extent that the CARIFORUM States may 
harbour legitimate expectations in circumstances where the EPA implementation road 
map was held up for well over a year since the signing of the agreement as the EC 
seemingly “drags its feet” and the CARIFORUM States await their final positions. 
None of the Institutions established under the EPA is yet operational and therefore the 
region has been hampered in taking certain decisions which will impact the operation of 
those institutional bodies. Therefore the basic approach to the implementation of the 
CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement seems to be externally driven and 
so expose the extent to which the existing CARICOM institution, programs and 
mechanism may well have to be revamped, a situation which was never envisaged by 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the ACP States and the EC. That 
agreement was intended to guide the negotiating process to foster the reduction of 
poverty, build regional integration and integrate the ACP States into the global 
economy.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Ethics in Negotiating the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) 
5.1 Introduction 
The issue of  ethical considerations in the negotiations for the CARIFORUM-EC 
Economic Partnership Agreement is very relevant in the context of the wider trade 
policies and strategies of the negotiating parties, the asymmetrical power dynamics in 
the relationship and the global political economy. The EC is the more powerful of the 
two groups of States which have shared a long history of association. However, in the 
negotiating processes each side was duty bound to protect its vital interests because to 
do otherwise would be unethical. But within that exercise, the parties must also 
endeavour to avoid the temptation to act dishonestly and therefore build trust.501 
The concept of ethics is important in all negotiations, because even where there are 
conflicts of war, parties at the negotiating table are expected to build trust and it is 
argued that trust cannot be build on dishonesty, indeed dishonesty destroys trust. 
The art of negotiations therefore rest heavily on the negotiator’s honesty and belief that 
in the context of trying to achieve the best outcome for the party being represented, 
there is a duty to act fairly and justly in order to build trust and to foster a long term 
relationship. 
The question of morality though relevant in the context of fairness, seems not to have 
“pride of place” in the rigours of international trade negotiations and therefore may be 
discounted for the purposes of this analysis. However, the moral issue which arise may 
                                                        
501 Crompton, Peter.C and Dees, J. Gregory: Promoting Honesty in Negotiations: An Exercise in Practical 
Ethics; http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1990‐1994/93beq‐promoting‐honesty‐in‐negotiation.pd. 
Down loaded March, 12, 2010.   
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touches and concerns the overarching question of honesty and deception and so, in 
that regard the two seem inextricably bound  
The question of the ethics of the EPA negotiations will be analysed in the context of 
deception and honesty at the bargaining table and throughout the entire processes 
since the all ACP-EU launch in 2002. 
The CARIFORUM States are the only regional configuration of the ACP Group of States 
that signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the European 
Union by the 31st December 2007.The other configurations have signed goods only 
agreement502. To begin with, the fragmentation of the ACP Countries into regional 
configuration was at the insistence of the EU to satisfy its policy objectives to which the 
ACP had acquiesced. This policy position instituted by the EU signalled the  
formalization of the fragmentation of the ACP group of States as a functional group in 
the multilateral trading regime. The Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000, in Benin, 
                                                        
502 West Africa:15 members of ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea‐Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritania; Central Africa 
(CEMAC)8 Countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe; Eastern &Southern Africa (COMESA) 11 Countries: 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan (Horn of Africa) Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe (southern Africa) 
Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles (Indian Ocean islands); Eastern African 
Community(EAC)Countries: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda; Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa 
are negotiating their EPAs through the SADC EPA Group. The other six members of the broader SADC region – 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe ‐ are negotiating 
EPAs within other regional groups. Caribbean(CARIFORUM) 15 countries: All members of CARICOM  ‐ 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, except Dominican 
Republic & the Pacific (PACIFICFORUM)  14 island states: Cook Islands, Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.  
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is the successor agreement to the Lomé convention and it represented the last 
agreement which the EC party would have negotiated with the ACP states as a single 
unit and to have officially brought an end to the only non-reciprocal preferential trade 
and co-operation agreement in the multilateral trading system. 
Europe was never comfortable negotiating with the ACP as a group because it was 
seen as too large and unwieldy503, but for the Caribbean States the shelter offered by 
the group was very important to its strategy in confronting the Europeans. The 
opportunity to break up the coalition of the ACP States came after the fall of the Soviet 
System in 1989 when Europe began the process of reorganising itself and redefining its 
role in the wider global context. The lack of economic growth, the existence of 
stagnation in their economies and increased levels of poverty in several ACP States 
were recognised in the process of Europe’s re-defining its role in the global political 
economy. But, without any serious in- depth investigation, consultation or analysis of the 
causes of those conditions, the European Commissioned Green Paper504 
                                                        
503 Interview‐ PJ Patterson Kingston, Jamaica March 3, 2009, Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 8, 2009, Bridgetown, 
Barbados.   
 
504 The EU Commissioned Green Paper was published in 1997. The purpose of the Green Paper was to 
examine the achievement of the various Development Cooperation Agreements between the ACP‐EU and 
highlight the challenges in order to chart the way for the future of the relationship. Therefore, in the forward 
to the Green Paper, Professor Pinheiro, a member of the EU Commission summed up the position of the EU 
when he observed: “In view of the major changes that have taken place over the last 20 years, the time has 
come to take a fresh look at the future of the ACP‐EU relation. The world is now a different place. New 
challenges have arisen and both we and our partners have now preoccupations” In a world now multi‐polar 
the European Union must make its presence felt. He further posited the view that the union “is striving to 
forge its external identity through a more effective and a more global common foreign policy and security 
policy, and a multilateral trade policy designed to open up markets in accordance with negotiated common 
rules” This is a clear and unequivocal pronouncement of the direction of the EU, one which lay, no claim to 
preferential treatment for ACP and in which the ACP Group has no special status. The Green Paper highlights 
that the principle upon which the commercial preferences were given to the ACP states; stability, contractility 
and non‐reciprocity, there advantages have all been eroded over the years as under the general system 
preferences (GSP) other non‐ACP supporters were accorded similar preferences. The Paper also highlighted 
the failure of ACP countries to increase their share of the EU market though export and further lament the fact 
that they have failed to maintain their market share or diversify and expand their economies. In a 
comprehensive review of the relationship between the ACP and EU the paper emphasized the poor results of 
the ACP aid support over the years. It finds that aid is a major prank of the ACP –EU relations and aid has out 
flanked trade, but highlights a number of problems with the administration of aid and concludes that in the 
area of aid administration there has been “too little partnership and too much aid dependence”. In admitting 
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recommended changes to the structure of the relationship between the EC and the ACP 
States. So, by the time the mid-term review of the fourth Lomé came up, Europe was in 
a very commanding position to institute its policy initiative taken without the benefit of 
input or formal consultation with its long standings ACP partners in circumstances 
where its could not effectively mount any resistance, even though some Member States 
warned of the consequences of breaking up the group to facilitate Regional Trade 
Agreements505. However, some Member States of the ACP group felt that they would 
be better off if they negotiated in regional groups506.  
The Caribbean by then was not in a position to assert any great influence over the ACP 
group as was the case in the earlier years of negotiating the Lomé one. The European 
initiative was well crafted and passed off on the ACP with such diplomatic ease that  
seemed to have touched a deep sense of benevolence which rendered null, any real 
potential for resistance. So effective was the European initiative that the ACP agreed to 
make changes to the Georgetown Agreement507 which was the foundation and effective 
substratum of their very existence, in order to meet the requirement of a European 
driven fragmentation of the ACP Group of States. Some argue that ACP by then had 
lost its cohesiveness as a group, their sense of unity and solidarity was fractured due to 
the lack of political will and the deterioration in the quality of its diplomatic machinery508 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
that which there have been some bright spots in the area of aid for infrastructural development, the 1980 
have revealed efficiency rates of 70% for transport but as low as 30% in areas of agriculture and rural 
development. It also finds that the unique STABEX and SYSMIN aid was not suited for the present context. The 
reports which covered the state of affairs since the commencement of the formal trading and development 
cooperation up to 1997 found that the standard of living in the ACP countries had improved but the overall 
situation remained grim as 41 of the 50 poorest countries in the developing world are ACP countries. 
 
505 PJ Patterson of Jamaica warned of the danger of the EU’s proposals. Speech by Honourable P.J. Patterson, 
Q.C. M.P, Prime Minister of Jamaica to the 17th ACP/EEC Joint Council Meeting, Jamaica Conference Center, 
Kingston. Jamaica. May 21, 1992.  
 
506 Speech by Clement J. Rohee, Foreign Minister of Guyana, Barbados, February 14, 2009.  
 Some Francophone African States wanted to negotiate separately.  
 
507 Interview‐ KD Knight, Kingston, Jamaica, Nov. 14, 2008. 
 
508 Interview‐ Shirdath Ramphal “Sadness of a Statesman” Trinidad &Tobago Review.Nov.18, 2008. 
297 
 
 
and political leadership and representation which affected its standing in the “eyes” of 
the European and not the conduct or policies of the Europeans which accounted for the 
fragmentation. Therefore, the Cotonou Agreement was a manifestation of what had 
already existed within the ACP group, and not the cause of it509 as Europe knew what it 
wanted and fostered plants and policies best suited for its global agenda, and so, it was 
therefore left to its ACP partners to design their own plans and policies to promote and 
give effect to their development objectives. 
The Lomé Conventions from their very inception did not fit comfortably in the Global 
trading system as it discriminated against other developing countries which were not 
party to it. This was due to its one-way preferential and non-reciprocal trade 
arrangements between Europe and its former colonies. Lomé I, II, III and IV were 
allowed to exist in the Global Trading system even though it violated the MFN clause 
XXIV of GATT. But, it was never challenged as there was no consensus to enforce its 
removal. However, the Uruguay Round which concluded in 1994 saw the establishment 
of the WTO and with it came the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is the 
enforcement arm of the trade regime. This provided the opening for the successful 
challenges to the ACP-EU trade regime when the EU started to institute its internal 
market reforms in 1992. The ethics of the negotiations for the EPA must be viewed in 
the context of the relations between the parties and the shifts in the EU’s global agenda 
and changed socio-political and economic landscape driven by three main events, the 
first being the collapse of the soviet system and the need for reforms. Secondly, the 
advent of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement Body and thirdly, the emergence of 
Brazil, China and India as significant players in the global political economy. 
In these regards, the first legal challenge to the Lomé system came in 1993 from the 
Latin America “dollar” banana producers who questioned the EU banana regime and 
succeeded in having it declared incompatible and discriminatory, but the decision could 
not be enforced by the Special Group (SG) which heard the dispute. But, so soon as the 
                                                        
509 Interview– Sam Chandler, Barbados, June10, 2009. 
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WTO (DSB) was established in 1995, the matter was referred to it for its decision. 
Europe which was a signatory to the agreement had to adhere to the ruling, and this 
ruling sounded the “death knell” for the Lomé arrangements. So, by 1997, the EU 
published its Green Paper which outlined its new approach to the ACP trade and 
development and therefore. So by the time the mid-term review of Lomé lV was 
completed, it became clear that Lomé would to be replaced by a new trade and 
Development arrangement between the ACP and Europe and that the ACP’s 
cohesiveness and solidarity were deeply fractured510.By 2000, Lomé IV had expired and 
was replaced by Cotonou Agreement which outlined the new arrangements but kept the 
preferential one-way non reciprocal trade arrangement between the ACP and the EU 
which created great difficulties in getting the agreement accepted at the WTO. Indeed, it 
was not until the Ministerial in Doha in 2001 that the waiver for the implementation was 
granted. However, the EU paid a huge price to secure that waiver because, during the 
negotiation for the Cotonou Agreement to be accepted at the WTO, the EU had to make 
significant concessions in order to secure the waiver. Both the EU and ACP States were 
given until the 31st December 2007 to have a WTO compatible agreement in place and 
the EU vowed never to seek another waiver.  
Negotiation for the new Economic Partnership Agreement between Europe and the 
ACP were launch at the all ACP level on the 27th of September 2002, in Brussels and it 
lasted for one year. The second phase of the negotiations at the regional level was 
launched in 2003, beginning with the Central and Southern African configuration 
(COMESA) followed by the CARIFORUM Group on April 16, 2004. The CARIFORUM 
Agreement was signed on the 15th of October 2008 also in Barbados. During the 
negotiations the relationship appeared strained and the process was threatened, due to 
the Machiavellian approach and mercantilist posture of the EC negotiators511.   
                                                        
510 Interview‐ Dr. Anthony Gonzalves Port of Spain Trinidad &Tobago, June 15, 2009. 
 
511 Speech by Dame Billie Miller to ACP‐EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Vienna Austria, June 20, 2006. 
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This chapter analyses the contours of the negotiation and the ethical issues which 
surfaced and played a role in the outcome of the negotiations. It also explores whether 
the CARIFORUM EPA gives expression to the normative principles of equality, fairness 
and solidarity in the context of ethical standards of the Europeans system on the one 
hand, and the CARIFORUM approach on the other hand while emphasizing the region’s 
self interest in light of ACP’s cohesiveness and solidarity. Further, it examines the ethics 
and legitimacy of CARIFORUM’s  negotiating processes in the context of  involvement 
of the various stake holders to include; academics, Labour unions, professional and 
business associations and also the NGOs in the region. Some of the ethical questions 
that had arisen have their origins in the external trade policies formulated by DG Trade 
which were driven by internal protectionist tendencies and also the domestic economic 
interests and political machinations of  its various Member States512, and also, within the 
CARIFORUM mechanisms and institutions of governance. The critical ethical issues 
surrounding economic rights, fairness, solidarity and trust in the spirit of the long 
standing co-operation between the two sides. The treatment of banana and sugar 
raised some questions concerning economic rights and human rights in the context of 
Europe’s desire to protect its economic interest and facilitating its global trade agenda. 
The chapter also addresses the negotiation processes from the all ACP level, but 
focuses particularly on the events in the CARIFORUM-EC negotiations up to the formal 
signing of the EPA. 
5.2  Crafting the EC’s Mandate; Interpretation and application 
The deliberations for the EC mandate commenced in the EU with the draft 
recommendation prepared by Director-General for trade (DG).The document was 
couched in very vague language but followed closely to the objectives established in the 
Cotonou Agreement in terms of development concerns and WTO compatibility. The 
draft document was approved by the EC’s 133 Committee and designed to promote 
                                                        
512 Elgstrom, Ole and Pilegaad, Jess “Imposed coherence: negotiating economic partnership Agreement: 
European integration Vol. 30. No 3. (July 2008). p. 372 
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Global Europe and its policies toward the developing world as being open, liberal and 
friendly.513However, the draft document was so crafted to ensure safe passage through 
the political directorate of the EU’s system as it sought to satisfy the concerns of various 
Member States which were  either (1) not sympathetic towards the ACP States and their 
demands for development support, (2) Countries such as Spain and Portugal which 
wanted to protect their interests in tropical agricultural products and therefore had 
concerns about tropical products from ACP suppliers entering Europe,(3) France and 
the UK which had strong historical ties to the ACP States(4) Germany which had a 
tradition of free marketing philosophy and (5) the Nordic States which had no real 
interest in ACP exports but had been traditional aid donors to the ACP514.  
The final mandate issued in,2002515 was therefore an amalgam of political and 
economic interests of the various Member States in the context of their national 
interests. Having secured the mandate, the Director-General (DG) for trade had the duty 
to give expressions to the global trade policies of the EU and so, took final charge of the 
negotiations and formulated an approach which seemed to have relegated the 
development aspect of the negotiation by pushing the trade agenda in all its 
discourse516. For the next four years, the Commission gave its own interpretation to the 
mandate and to the meaning of development. It took the view that trade is the means to 
development and the Commission’s role was to negotiate trade and not development. 
They further took the view that technical and financial support for EPA was already 
provided for under Cotonou and the 9th EDF. This interpretation and application had 
frustrated the ACP States at almost every juncture of the negotiations until the 
CARIFORUM States decided to take action through the initiatives of Dame Billie Miller 
in Vienna, Austria in 2006. The Director-General for Development, Louis Michel who 
                                                        
513 Ibid.              
 
514 Ibid p. 372. 
 
515 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9.4.2002 SEC (2002) 351 Final. 
 
516 Ibid. 
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assumed office after Mr. Pascal Lamy left played a very low-keyed role in the 
negotiation at a later stage. The early signs of the DG Trade’s   intention to treat the 
negotiation as a process to open up regional markets and push European mercantilism 
surfaced during the all ACP level when the Europeans refused to agree on a binding 
legal framework at the all ACP level. 
The ACP having developed its mandate prior was left out on a limb during the 
negotiation at the all ACP Level as Europe refused every demand to negotiate a 
framework agreement to take the process into the regional phase. While the EU 
Member States at this stage, having issued their mandate, stepped back and allowed 
the Commissioner for Trade to conduct the negotiations517. The DG Trade therefore had 
the autonomy to develop policies in circumstances where the EC party did not resolve  
some of the issues which the ACP raised. However, the ACP States were slow to call 
upon the Article 133 Committee Members which could give guidance in some areas, 
because even though the Commission was negotiating the EPA, the 133 Committee 
was responsible for overseeing the negotiations, which suggests that the Member State 
had not surrendered their right of control518.But ,as time was running out for the close of 
the first phase  the Commissioner for trade Mr. Pascal Lamy, realizing the frustration of 
the ACP Membership and the lack of progress in the negotiations, made an open offer 
early in 2003 indicating that the EC would be willing to start negotiation with any region 
which felt it was ready , even before phase one all ACP was completed519. 
That offer, arguably facilitated the further opening- up of the divisions in ACP 
cohesiveness and solidarity as the Francophone African States which traditionally were 
perceived as the weak link in the Group, felt that they would have benefited more if they 
                                                        
517 Elgstrom, Ole and Pilegaad. Op.cit. 
 
518 Leal‐Arcas,Rafael; The EU Institutions and Their  Modus Operandi In The World Trading System,  The 
Columbia Journal Of European Law,Vol.12.No.1,(2005/2006) p. 135. 
519 Offer was made at the 4th ACP‐EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee (JMTC) held in ST. Lucia on the 1st of 
March 2003.  See also CRNM Update no.0303, March 18, 2003.  
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went early520 and therefore took the offer. This, it is argued undermined the efforts of the 
ACP to hold together and the negotiations therefore fell apart and for all intent and 
purposes the all ACP phase  came to a premature end. 
At the close of the negotiations, the ACP could only manage a Joint Declaration which 
outlined the areas in which the ACP and EC had agreed. These were merely on the 
broad framework, objectives and time schedule for the negotiation for the regional 
phase. So each region was now left to face the EC on their own. But was and hoping for 
some collaboration during the regional phase of the negotiations. The EC succeeded in 
imposing its policies and position on the ACP partners in a fundamental way when they 
refused to set up a Joint-ACP-EU steering committee on WTO negotiation in light of the 
linkages between the Doha Negotiations and the EPA, both of which were ostensibly 
development oriented521.  
 
5.2.1 The EU’s strategy  
Having achieved the waiver at Doha in 2001, to allow the non-reciprocal arrangement  
to run for a further period up to 31st of December 2007, the EU’s strategy was to push 
the ACP to establish a Customs Union as a means of preserving the non-reciprocal 
arrangement as envisaged under Cotonou, but was hoping that the ACP would have 
approved. However, both sides could not agree on the interpretation of WTO 
compatibility. The ACP refused to negotiate the so called “Singapore Issue” of 
Investment, Competition, Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation. In this 
regard, the Cancun Ministerial in 2001, brought to full light the developing countries 
displeasure with the “Singapore Issues” and the extent to which the developed countries 
were treating the legitimate concerns of the developing countries. The Cancun 
                                                        
520 Interview‐ Ambassador Henry Gill, June 10, 2009 Bridgetown, Barbados. NB. The Central African Common 
Market (CEMAC) was the first group to accepted Lamy’s offer.  
 
521 Byron, Jessica & Lewis, Patsy:  Formulating Sustainable Development Benchmarks for an EU‐CARIFORUM 
EPA Caribbean Perspective, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica (June 2007) p 
68.http://www.normangirvan.info/wp‐content/uploads/2007/11/development‐benchmarking‐the‐epa‐
byron‐lewis.pdf (January 10, 20009). 
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experience took place during the 1st phase of the all ACP-EU negotiations and so it sent 
a signal to the EU that developing countries were resolute on those issues. 
For the ACP Group, they were very concern about the extent of reciprocity, the Special 
and Differential Treatment application under Article XXIV of GATT, under which they 
had to achieve WTO compatibility. The divergences were great in this regard and 
Europe was not prepared to give in to the demands of the ACP522. 
However, the EU developed a strategy to guide its approach to the EPA so well crafted 
to force the ACP to adopt the EU’s model of integration notwithstanding the dictates of 
the Cotonou Agreement which states that each region must be allow to decide the form 
of integration which best suits its situation. Europe’s intention was to export its trade 
policies through the creation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA’s)523. These trade 
policies were therefore strategically placed in the EPA mandate to make Global Europe 
the center -piece of the negotiations between Europe and its former colonies as a good 
starting point to push the Global Europe initiative. So, the inclusion of the “Singapore 
issue” in the RTA’s was intended to influence the outcome of these issues at the 
multilateral regime524. 
So by the close of the all ACP phase, Pascal Lamy was well aware of the ACPs position 
on the Singapore issues and that even though the EU was expecting cooperation at the 
multilateral level from the ACP States, these States were not prepared to give their 
support because the EC was not prepared to agree to their proposals at the all ACP 
level. The EU seemingly had missed an opportunity to temper the ACP coalition at the 
                                                        
522 Ochieng, Cosmos, and Obute Milton “The EU‐ACP Economic Partnership Agreement and the Development 
Question: Constraint and opportunities posted by Article XXIV and special and differential treatment 
provisions of the WTO.” Journal of International Economic Law Vol.10. No. 2.364.   
 
523 Meur, Jean‐Christopher “Exporting Europe’s Trade Policy” 28 world Economy (2005) p. 1565. 
 
524 Thomas, Clive: CARICOM Perspective on the CARIFORUM‐EC Economic Partnership Agreement. Institute 
of Development Studies, University of Guyana, (May 2008) p.26.  http://www.normangirvan.info/wp‐
content/uploads/2008/05/clive‐thomas‐caricom‐perspective‐on‐the‐cf‐ec‐epa‐may‐2008.pdf (December 20, 
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multilateral level when it refused the ACP’s offer of a Joint ACP-EU steering committee 
on WTO negotiations. This refusal raised the question of the EC commitments and bona 
fide regarding the quality of the ACP-EU partnership and the need for co-operation at 
the multilateral level. But having refused the offer, the EC proceeded to include and 
pressed the ACP States to negotiate the “Singapore Issues”.  A powerful view taken on 
the EU’s conduct is that their approach exposed the “moral duplicity dishonesty and 
contradictions inherent in the EU’s” conduct towards its ACP partners525.  
 
Therefore, the parties went into the launch of the regional negotiations with wide 
divergence on issues pertinent to the ACP-development with the feeling among ACP 
States that the EU was being disingenuous. They felt also that the EC was only 
concerned with its self interests and was prepared to use its ACP partners to achieve its 
Global objectives without any concomitant commitments or indeed mutual recognition. 
Europe by adopting this policy and strategy had shown very little regard for the 
economic rights of the ACP States and also to the rights of their citizens to a livelihood. 
Even more so, in light of Europe’s unilateral denunciation of the Sugar Protocol, the 
dismantling of the banana and rice regime, the combination of which had caused 
immeasurable economic and social dislocation in the Caribbean Small Island States. 
The European attitude further pressured the Caribbean in grappling with these issues, 
while negotiating a new trade arrangement within a set timeframe in circumstances 
where Europe was threatening to impose higher trade tariffs were the CARIFORUM 
States failed to complete within time. 
The CARIFORUM States therefore were caught in a bind, because having committed to 
complete a comprehensive EPA, they found it extremely difficult to walk away from the 
negotiations fearing the imposition of higher tariffs and the consequential trade 
disruptions coupled with the potential loss of credibility had elected to stay the course to 
completion. Indeed the mandate of the region which had been continuously reiterated 
                                                        
525  Ibid. 
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by regional leaders was to complete on time because the CARIFORUM would be worst 
off without an EPA on the 1ST of January 2008 and the region would put itself at a 
disadvantage if the agreement was completed later526. 
 
5.3 Launch of the EPA negotiation: All-ACP Phase. 
In order to illuminate the extent of the ethical issues involved, it is important firstly, to 
expose the history of the relationship in the context of the global trading system and the 
colonial connections. 
When GATT was established, in1947, none of the ACP states were original signatories 
and therefore the arrangements put in place then was to deal with trade among the 
Industrial North primarily, the rules made very little reference to the colonies of Europe. 
By the time the Uruguay Round started many of the ACP State had become Members 
of the GATT; but their participation in the negotiations was vey limited, indeed even the 
CARICOM States which had some appreciation of the direction in which the global trade 
regime was heading did not coordinate its efforts as a group during those 
negotiations527. 
When the Lomé Convention was signed in 1975, it came about because of the demand 
of the developing world which had threatened the supply chain of raw material needed 
by the Industrial North both in terms of agricultural commodities and energy sources528. 
Europe was particularly vulnerable as they depended heavily on the former colonies for 
raw materials and in particular. Britain which needed sugar from the ACP states to keep 
its refineries going was particularly worried. Indeed, so badly was their need for 
                                                        
526 Bernal, Richard:  Globalization: Everything But Alms: The EPA and Economic Development Grace Kennedy 
Lecture Series 2008, GraceKennedy Foundation, Kingston, (April, 2008) p 20. www.grace‐lecture‐2008‐dg.pdf 
(December 12, 2008).  
527 Interview‐ Dr. Anthony Gonzalves Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago, June 15, 2009.  
528 Interview‐PJ Patterson, March 3, 2009. Kingston, Jamaica & Interview‐Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 9, 2009. 
Bridgetown, Barbados.  
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assurance of continued supply of raw sugar that the then UK Trade Minister, Mr. 
Geoffrey Rippon literally begged the Caribbean to guarantee supplies during the first 
Lomé negotiations529. Those concerns  laid the foundation for the Sugar Protocol being 
of a separate legal regime without an expiration date and was therefore mutually 
exclusive of the Lomé Convention as the Protocol for the purposes of meeting the 
needs of the UK had in effect replaced the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which the 
UK had with is Commonwealth suppliers generally. So it was also for bananas because, 
most of the Caribbean bananas entered Europe through the UK, while French Suppliers 
of both commodities were primarily from their former colonies and OCTs, Germany on 
the other hand was supplied from Central  America among other non ACP States.  
The integrity of the Lomé Agreement was seriously affected during the negotiations of 
the Uruguay Round, the ACP had placed some reliance on the Europeans to protect the 
integrity of the Lomé Agreement, but that reliance failed to mature for the ACP States530 
in the context of the dynamics of those negotiations. The ACP’s tacit reliance on the EU 
seemed either misplaced or a best was misunderstood, because in those negotiations 
the EC Party was duty bound to first secure its vital economic interests531. Therefore, 
the ACP States by placing such reliance on the EU had failed to protect their own self 
interests, because Europe had very limited options but to protect its vital interests. The 
facts remained that, those negotiations were by and large conducted among countries 
of the Industrialized North while the developing countries were indeed on the 
periphery532. By the time the Uruguay Round was completed Europe was reorganizing 
its internal market and also the Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) was being 
                                                        
529 Interview‐ PJ Patterson, March 3, 2009. 
 
530 Interview‐ P.J Patterson, & Sam Chandler, June 10, 2009. Barbados. 
 
531 Interviews‐ Americo Beviglia Zampetti (DG Trade) Belgium, May.2009, John Caloghirou DG DEV.) Belgium, 
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reformed. In those processes, the ACP States, being junior partners were never 
consulted, nor their interests taken fully on board by the EU even though the ACP 
States had called for consultations. Caribbean sugar and banana were severely 
affected by those adjustments. Therefore when the launch of the1st phase- all ACP-EU 
negotiations took place, the ACP States were in serious problems of economic 
dislocation. These factors were well known to the European’s and it was in this context 
that both sides had to complete their mandate for the EPA negotiations. 
While the ACP States were very proactive in preparing and agreed their mandate well in 
advance of the start of the negotiations the EU however, delayed presenting its 
mandate until close to the date of the launch which put pressure on the ACP State to 
properly prepare their counter positions with limited time to negotiate. This seemed to 
have been a deliberate strategy  as the course of the negotiations revealed that the EU 
was “playing for time” because they had no genuine intentions to negotiate with the 
ACP as a group, but rather to deal with each configuration of Member States. But ,the 
ACP States would have been naïve to have believed that the EU would have completed 
a framework agreement at the all ACP level and leave the regional specific issues for 
the negotiations at the regional phase. Because, were they to accede to this approach it 
would have undermined the real reason for dismantling the ACP coalition and shaped 
the new configuration in the first place It was during the preparatory stages for the 
mandate that the EU’s incoherent policy making had exposed aspects of the ethical 
issue which were to follow the negotiations throughout in some material respects533. 
Because, when the launch of the all ACP phase of the negotiations took place, the WTO 
arrangements were already in place and the EU had experienced the reaction of the 
developing countries at the Seattle (1999) and Cancun (2001) WTO Ministerial 
meetings, both of which failed, because the developing countries banded together to 
resist the Developed North on the so called “Singapore issues” and in several other 
areas. 
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The Cotonou Agreement made provisions for the ACP States to support the EU in 
International Trade arenas, yet the EU refused the request of the ACP State for the 
establishment of a Joint  Steering Committee at the Multilateral level to collaborate on 
positions and strategies at that level534 I order to achieve the expectation of the Doha 
Development Agenda. But, having secured the ACP’s cooperation in principle, the EU 
crafted a mandate for the EPA negotiations  which went beyond the stipulations of the 
Cotonou Agreement and included the “Singapore issues” which the ACP States had all 
rejected within the last three years at the multilateral level. The inclusion of these issues 
was done in circumstances where no new offers were made by the EU. This approach 
seemingly exposed the EU’s intention to use the EPA negotiations to achieve 
agreements through RTAs within the ACP States and thereby facilitate and promote its 
Global Agenda starting with its former colonies, most of which were already showing 
signs of discomfort in negotiating services and trade- related services including the 
“Singapore Issues”. Furthermore, the processes by which the mandate to negotiate the 
EPA was achieved is also reflective of the compromise within the EC to agree on the 
Cotonou Agreements as the mandate was in fact a continuation of the Cotonou 
principles. The Cotonou and the EPA processes however, set the tone for the entire 
negotiations and the difficulties which the ACP had to face. 
5.3.1     Launch of CARIFORUM-EU regional negotiations 
 
The Regional phase was officially launched in Brussels between the 4-6 of October 
2003, when the Council of Ministers of the ACP met with the European Union (EU) 
Commissioners for Trade and Development. The first Group to launch was the Central 
and Western African (CEMAC) Group535.The CARIFORUM States launched their 
                                                        
534 Byron, Jessica & Lewis, Patsy Op.Cit.                                               
 
535 The Central African community (CEMAC) launch Oct.4,2003, these include Cameroon, Central Africa 
Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic‐Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon+ Sao 
Tome’ and Principle. 
West Africa launched 6th October 2003 include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Ivory coast, Liberia, Mali; Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Eastern and 
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regional negotiations on the 16th of April 2004, in Kingston Jamaica and were the only 
configuration which had committed to negotiate a comprehension EPA within the time 
allowed under the WTO waiver536. The region had some experience gained from 
negotiating the Free Trade Area of the America (FTAA) which had been stalled since 
2001. The region had an established infrastructure for negotiations through the 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) which was set up specifically to 
negotiate trade agreements on its behalf 
After a year and eight months of the Launch of the regional negotiations, CARICOM 
established its Single Market and Economy Regime (CSME). However, it had previously 
entered a Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic (DR) which is a member 
of the EU’s construct, CARIFORUM Group but not a member of CARICOM. The EU 
grasped the opportunity to press ahead with the CARIFORUM Group even as problems 
surfaced early in the early stages of the negotiation because of the EC Trade 
Commissioner’s approach toward the development dimensions of the agreement and 
the problems of banana and sugar in the EU internal market reform.  
The Caribbean negotiators had to negotiate with the EU negotiators whom had gained a 
reputation of being amongst the best and indeed arguably, the most formidable in the 
world, being so experienced in tough negotiations both at the multilateral and bilateral 
levels in opening up markets and protect Europe’s economic interest537.They are 
supported by the vast economic resources of Europe and its very huge internal market. 
The CARIFORUM region therefore, was always at a disadvantage in almost all areas: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Southern Africa (ESA) launch Feb. 7, 2004. In Mauritius; include Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. East African community (EAC) launch 
include Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. South African development community (SADC) 
launch Dec. 2004. Include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and 
Tanzania. CARIFORUM launched April 16, 2004. Pacific Islands launched 10th of Sept. 2004. Include Cook 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Island, Nauru, Nine, Papua, Papa New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.   
 
536 Under the terms of registration (Waiver) of the Cotonou Agreement approved at the WTO Ministerial in 
Doha, in Nov.2001, the waiver granted to the EU would last to the 31st December, 2007, by which time a new 
WTO compatible agreement had to be in place. 
537 Laurent, Edwin: Understanding International Trade: A Caribbean perspective, (Ian Randle Publishers, 
Kingston, 2007). p. 22. 
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human and financial resources and vey limited exposure in negotiating Free Trade 
Agreements. Furthermore, CARIFORUM markets are relatively weak, and its institutions 
are supported by poor infrastructure. Their economies are agricultural in nature and 
heavily burdened by debts. In the circumstances of these negotiations, CARIFORUM 
markets are not of great value to EC exporters, nor are they very relevant as exporters 
to European markets.  
Therefore for the purposes of these negotiations the EC  seemed to have had three 
main economic and policy objectives: (1) push  the Global Europe Agenda in terms of 
the ‘Singapore Issues ” more so, the Government Procurement component , (2) to open 
up CARIFORUM markets by liberalization to achieve WTO compatibility, and (3) tie the 
region to Europe through the MFN clause so as to secure its interests with respect to   
competition from the emerging markets namely; China, India, Brazil and also from the 
developed countries such as  Canada and the USA, its main rival in the  Industrialised 
North. It is argued that in this regard, the CARIFORUM-EC negotiations was of 
significant interests to Europe because this region was the only Configuration which had 
committed to negotiate a comprehensive agreement which if succeeded, would have 
provided  Europe’s global agenda with a huge fillip. 
Therefore, from very early in the negotiations Mr. Pascal Lamy demanded that the 
CARIFORUM States should establish a Custom Union. The CARIFORUM States 
rejected the demand and argued that a custom union was inconsistent with the model of 
integration which the region was pursuing. This demand was made by the EC with full 
knowledge that the Cotonou agreement which was still in force had mandated that each 
region had the right to decide its own integration processes and at its own pace. Lamy’s 
demand was therefore in contravention of the letter and spirit of the Cotonou Agreement 
and he seemed to have been paying no regard for the dictates of the Cotonou 
Agreement. It is argued that this type of disregard for the Cotonou provisions had 
created the perception that the EU was not genuinely serious about honouring the 
provisions of the agreement which was intended to guide the processes. It exposed 
some aspects of Europe’s double standards which were even more evident throughout 
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each phase of the negotiations. Because, when it suited their cause, the EU 
endeavoured to rely on the provisions of Cotonou agreement, and then to disregard the 
provisions of the  agreement when they so desire. For example, in the all ACP phase, 
the EU rejected the ACP’s demand for a legally binding framework to take the parties 
into the regional phase, however, the EU rejected those demands arguing that the 
Cotonou Agreement already made provisions for the framework, a position which they 
have maintained throughout the negotiations at that level, while the EU’s  demand for 
the establishment of a custom union by CARIFORUM was not in keeping with the tenets 
of Cotonou which mandated that each region should determine its form of regional 
integration and  within its own time. In addition, the parties had agreed very early in the 
negotiations to set up a Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) and a regional 
network of non-state actors and source funding for their operation from international 
donors. The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) commenced its work to make the 
linkages between the parties to the negotiations and the needs which they have 
established. But the EC it was argued began to frustrate that body in its work538. So 
therefore, the EU was prepared to rely on the Cotonou agreement when it suited their 
cause and to abrogate its provisions as the needs arose. This discourse and posturing 
seemed to have permeated the entire course of the negotiations at the regional level 
even after Pascal Lamy left the EU and joined the WTO.  
5.3.2 Pascal Lamy demitted office and Peter Mandelson appointed  
Within weeks of Mr. Lamy’s departure from the EU’s, the new Commissioner Mr.Peter 
Mandelson539 in attempting to establish his footing in his new role and to impress the 
ACP States in building confidence in his stewardship, began to extol  the virtues of the 
EPA for ACP development and the ostensible benevolence of the EU540, while carefully 
                                                        
538 Speech‐ Dame Billie Miller to the Joint ACP‐EU Parliamentary Assembly, Vienna, Austria, June 20, 2006. 
539 Pascal Lamy demitted the office of EU Trade Commissioner to take up duties as the Director‐ General of 
the WTO in 2005, and was succeeded by Peter Mandelson, a British Politician from the British Labour Party’s 
Administration of Prime Minister Tony Blair.  
 
540See Mandelson’s speeches in the early stages of his appointment. Mandelson’s Speech to: 1) The Civil 
Society Dialogue Group in Brussels, Jan. 20, 2005. In setting out his vision of the EU’s development for ACP, he 
argued that development goal will not follow the “classical, hardnosed, free trade agreements” and that the 
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disguising the protectionist and mercantilist trade strategies and policies being pursued 
by the EU and how it had intended to use these negotiations to facilitate the Global 
Europe project, which was by then caught in the throes of the multilateral system and 
stalled. But within months of settling-in the, EU Trade Commissioner and the 
negotiators started to change their positions and began to pressure the ACP States in 
many areas of the negotiations by making demands which were contrary to the 
principles outlined in the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
Further, at all material times the EU negotiators were clear as to the authority and bona 
fides of their counter parts in the negotiations. However, the EU parties were thickly 
cloaked behind the veil of their compartmentalized Institutional Infrastructure and this 
had created problems, not only for CARIFORUM in the initial stages, but also for the 
rest of the ACP Groups541.For example, part of the early set back in the negotiations 
which the ACP States encountered was due to their understanding that when they 
negotiated with the DG Trade they were in fact negotiating with the EC, but they were 
made aware by DG trade that DG Trade could not bind the other DG’s within the 
structure of the EU system and so, for almost one year after launch of the regional 
negotiations, the ACP States were not really clear in their own minds as to whom they 
had been negotiating  and the differences in interpretations of the Cotonou Agreement 
and the development issues integral to the negotiations. Because, for the ACP States, 
the question of development financing for the EPA was very crucial, but the DG Trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
EU will not be going to the negotiations using the aid as a tool to get concessions and therefore be saying that 
“for every step we take, for every euro we grant in aid we insist on equivalent return to us in market access” 
He promised to set up a review mechanism to keep the EPA negotiations under continuous review. 
London School of Economics Feb.4, 2005 he said “Tangible support for developments is as important and 
tangible as good governance. Poor countries with good governance potential, and they did  exist, need tangible 
help with capacity building” and further that “Trade will not promote development without parallel investment 
in the supply side” 
 
541 The commission has many parts within the structure there is DG Trade who led the negotiations, DG 
Development Role is limited, Dg Taxus deals with issues of Rules of Origin, and DG SANCO deals with sanitary 
and phyto‐sanitory standards while the communication between the DGs is facilitated through the EPA‐Task 
Force which is controlled in DG Trade.  
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which led the negotiations argued that they had no competence to negotiate 
development issues. The approach of the Trade negotiators was to refuse to address 
the development issues, but the ACP States knew they could not commit to trade issues 
without getting commitment from the EU on  the question of development support. The 
problem took on monumental proportions under the new commissioner Peter 
Mandelson, who continued to ignore the claims of the CARIFORUM States for 
commitments on the development aspects of the EPA. The ACP States were also very 
sceptical about the EU’s record in meeting its financial commitments on time. 
The ACP States therefore had to find a way to temper the attitude of the trade 
negotiators under the leadership of Mr. Mandelson. The ACP States formed an informal 
alliance with the Non-State Actors and got the support of Oxfam which by then had 
formed a coalition to stop the EPA’s542. The Caribbean and African Diaspora in Europe 
and more so in the United Kingdom(UK) along with Oxfam decided to lobby the Labour 
Government which had just won the 2005 General Election in which these groups had 
supported certain candidates543, and Britain was in line to assume  the presidency of the 
EC. In this regard., the British Labour Party from which Peter Mandelson was a member 
was moved to establish a committee to investigate the negotiations of the EPAs. The 
                                                        
542 The Harare Declaration ‐ A global call for action to stop EPA’s: March 30, 2006. Umbrella Group of twenty 
nine (29) Civil Society Organisations namely; Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO), Zimbabwe, Third World 
Network‐Africa, Ghana, ACDIC, Cameroon, Alternative Information Development Centre, AIPAD TRUST, 
Zimbabwe, Alternatives to Neo‐liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA),Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, 
CECIDE, Guinea, Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), Ethiopia, Economic Justice ,Network, 
South Africa, ENDA, Senegal, GENTA, South Africa, GRAPAD, Benin, Interoffice Group, Ethiopia, Labour and 
Economic Development Research Institute (LEDRIZ), Zimbabwe, Malawi Economic Justice And Network, 
Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (SAPSN), SEATINI, Zimbabwe, Trades Centre, 
Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), Zimbabwe, Action Aid, ACORD, Both 
Ends, ChristianAid, ICCO, KASA/WERKSTATT OKONOMIE, One World Action (VIA Project),Oxfam 
International, Traidcraft  see for TEXT OF DECLARATION: 
Fhttp://www.twnafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=132:harare‐declaration‐a‐
global‐call‐for‐action‐to‐stop‐epas&catid=47:atn&Itemid=72 (January 12, 2008). 
 
543 Elgstrom, Ole and Pilegaad. Op.cit. 
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EC’s approach to the negotiations suffered its first major setback544 which the UK 
Parliament issued its report on the EPA.  
 
Based on the finding of the report, the UK Government decided to take action and broke 
ranks with its EU member States. The UK Development Ministries prior to the 
publication of the report of commons issued a Joint-Statement in which they were 
extremely critical of the Commission’s policy and challenged it  to change to take a non-
mercantilist approach and not pursue any offensive interest. It urged that the EU “should 
make an upfront offer to complete duty free and quota free market access to each ACP 
region Group to enable the ACP countries to benefit from trade reforms and build their 
export competitiveness”545. In taking its stance, the UK did not seek to obtain the views 
of the usually sympathetic countries such as Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, France, 
Belgium and Ireland, but acted independently. The UK’s position therefore shook the 
EC Institutions, while the Commissioner for Trade tried to downplay its impact. 
However, its reaction was swift and strong. The Commission dispatched a letter to all its 
offices across the ACP region. The British Statement was condemned by Brussels as “a 
major and unwelcomed shift” in the UK’s approach546. The Commission stressed that 
the British approach would not affect the EU’s negotiating positions. However, the 
British Government was not phased about the tone and context of the Commission’s 
letter which was leaked to the press. The UK’s Department of Trade and Industry took 
the position that their action was based on principle547. 
The statement was followed by the report which made specific recommendations to the 
Commission. Its demands were emphatic with respect to the slow progress in the Doha 
                                                        
544 The sixth report of the House of Commons International Development committee. It. C.68. “Fair Trade? 
The European Union’s Trade Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries. March 23, 2005. 
House of Commons London. Stationery office Ltd. April 6, 2005. 
 
545 Elgstrom, Ole and Pilegaad. Op.cit.    
546 Larry Elliot: “EU move to block Trade Aid for poor” (The Guardian UK, Thursday May 19, 2005). 
 
547 Ibid. 
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Negotiations and its impact on the ACP’s prospects. The report took the view that the 
EU was treating the negotiations like it was playing a “game of poker” and accused the 
Commission fostering ACP’s fear by refusing to state its position clearly. It stressed the 
lack of necessity for the EC’s approach to the negotiations and argued that it was 
unwelcomed and indeed more suitable when negotiating with countries of equal 
strength. It also lamented the that the ACP States were under duress and emphasized 
the unequal nature of the relationship and warned of the pending failure were the EC to 
have continued along those negative lines and worsened the fears of the ACP548. 
 
The detailed report and its demands left the EC very exposed to public scrutiny and 
brought pressure of the Commission to change its approach. The Parliamentary 
Committee called for less rhetoric on poverty alleviation and for the Commission to give 
more expression to fairer trade. It argued that it would reflect poorly on the EU if it were 
to fail to deliver on promises it made to the ACP States which could not be achieved at 
the WTO and committed the UK Government to work to alleviate the level of flexibility 
which will be needed to satisfy the interpretation of Article XXIV with respect to 
substantially all trade.549 
In an effort to influence the period of liberalization which the ACP States would need, 
the report drew on the suggestion of the Commission for Africa which stated that the 
period should be about 20 years and called upon the Trade Commissioner to implement 
the monitoring mechanism he promised and further demanded that the monitoring  unit 
should also address any negative aspects of the poverty reduction objective of the 
EPA’s. 
In a very explicit characterization of the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy on the 
economies of the ACP, the British Parliamentarians took the view that much of the EU 
Agricultural production and export is subsidized and that ACP markets will not be able 
                                                        
548 Sixth Report of House of Commons Op.Cit. 
549 Ibid p.8. 
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to withstand such competition. It stated categorically that the ACP States should never 
be requested to liberalise their markets until the EU take steps to cut agricultural 
subsidies which distort trade. It was emphatic in demanding that “the transition period 
for full reciprocity in the Agricultural sector should be explicitly linked to CAP reform”550. 
This was very encouraging to the ACP States as it supported what they have been 
expressing across European Capitals. The UK’s concerns seemed to have undergirded 
the need to progressively liberalize the service sector of the ACP States particularly the 
financial and Tourism sector consistent with GATT’s article V and also the politically 
sensitive mode 4.The sensitivity of the UK’s stance in distancing itself from the EC and 
the wider Membership of the EU was highlighted by its pledge of support for negotiating 
for movement of unskilled and skilled persons to benefit many developing countries. 
Indeed it made recommendations on all aspects of the negotiation and in doing so, left 
the EU’s mandate very vulnerable to the demands of the ACP States.  
The impact of the report had reverberated throughout the ACP States and among the 
Civil Society Group. The UK Parliamentarians not unlike Dame Billie Miller of Barbados 
brought great clarity to the currency of the situation when it charged that the EU ran the 
risk of jeopardizing the EPA if it failed to listen to the ACP States and that EU was 
abusing its dominance in the partnership to pressure the ACP States to accept positions 
which would be detrimental to their long-term development551 and contrary to Cotonou. 
The EU was not comfortable with the UK’s decisions and criticisms in light of the agreed 
European mandate. However, the mandate itself did not instruct that these negotiations 
should be focussed primarily on the trade liberalization regime to pry open the markets 
of the ACP States to their detriment. The fact that the mandate expressly required that 
the agreement be WTO compatible did not confine the discussions to only matters of 
trade and the EU’s agenda should overshadow the needs of the ACP States during the 
negotiations. 
                                                        
550 Ibid p.10. 
551 Ibid p.13. 
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5.3.3    The British Intervention: What difference? 
The British position had placed the EC in a mode of reflection, because it exposed the 
depth of the double standards and “double talk” of the Commission and the corrosive 
approach that was being allowed by the Trade Commissioner. However, the 
Commission continued to push its agenda; without any change; and the ACP continued 
to take its case publicly with the support of the Non-state Actors. But even though the 
British had made their position known, by November 2005 the Commission produced its 
own staff working paper in response and emphasized  development552 during the UK 
Presidency of the European Council. The problem however, for the ACP States was 
that the British Parliament never followed upon the matters it raised after the publication 
of the report and the issuing of the statement from the Trade and Development 
ministries. The UK Presidency of the European Council made no difference to the 
ACP’s cause, because Mr. Mandelson continued to push the trade agenda to open up 
the ACP’s markets while refusing to address the supply side constraints. Seemingly 
oblivious of the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement on the question of the development 
dimensions of the EPA, Mr. Mandelson pressed the case with the UK Parliamentarian, 
Patricia Hewitt to try and get the British government to moderate their line553  
The staff policy paper ostensibly was produced in response to the critics and the British 
position and also the concerns of the non-states Actors. But the ACP States were 
sceptical, because they saw no change in the attitude of the Trade Commissioner 
during the negotiation. The EC continued to apply pressure on the CARIFORUM on the 
question of the MFN clause demanding equal treatment be given to the EU by 
CARIFORUM States if they offer better treatment to emerging such as Brazil, China and 
India554. 
                                                        
552 The Trade and Development aspects of the EPA Negotiations, commission staff working document, 9 
Nov.2005.SEC. (2005)1459.www.tes.de/cotonou/downloads/official/ACPEU/EU+TRADOC_ACP+Nov.+2005.  
(Match 22, 2010). Downloaded April 10, 2010. 
553 Elliott, Larry E U moves to Block trade aid for poor The Guardian UK.Op.Cit. 
554 Cronin, David “Not Such A brilliant job.” (The Guardian UK. Wed. Oct.15, 2008). 
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So by the end of 2005 as the ACP and the EC prepared for the Hong Kong Ministerial in 
December, the staff working paper published by the  Trade Commissioner highlighted 
the need to the greatest visibility of Global Europe and Member States were therefore 
requested to complement the sums available in the 9th EDF for EPA support in order to 
facilitate “Coordination and Coherence” to the EPA process555. 
 
However to the great disappointment for the ACP States and also the Non-State Actors 
was that at the end of the British Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the 
British Government had done nothing further on the issues raised in the report and the 
UK seemed to have fallen in line with the demands of the Commissioner for Trade556.  
The failure of the UK to carry the matter any further left the ACP to devise other 
strategies to get support for their positions as the Trade Commissioner continued to 
ignore their calls for resources to be committed for the EPA, before they are asked to 
commit to open up their markets for goods and services. The European Governments 
continued to passively support the Commissions pursuits; while publicly pronouncing 
the need for trade reform to benefit Africa and also announcing large Aid packages for 
the Continent. The Caribbean’s needs were never so publicly articulated and supported 
by neither the EU nor its Member States because arguably, these small states were not 
of any significant economic or trade prominence in the EU global trade outlook.   
 
Indeed, at the launch of the Commission for Africa then chancellor of the UK Exchequer 
Mr. Gordon Brown, in reference to poor economic and social conditions in African 
States that “Justice promised will forever be justice denied unless the greatest tragedy 
of our time is met by the boldest financial plan for our time, bolder than the Marshall 
                                                        
555 Ibid p. 31. 
 
556 Tom Sherman: “Trade Escape: WTO Rules and Alternatives to Economic Partnership Agreement”. Action 
Aid International, Johannesburg, South Africa. www.actionaid.org.downloaded 19.7.2006. 
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plan for Europe in the 1940’s”557. He gave support to the finding and recommendations 
of the report on Africa and called for “a lasting deep seated trade justice that would 
mean that Europe and the richest countries be honest about and address the scale of 
the waste and scandal of Agricultural protectionism, unfair rules of origin and much 
criticized economic partnership agreement and address, infrastructure needs-transport, 
power, water, telecommunications and technical and vocational skills-to build the 
capacity African countries need to trade”558. But, although the EU had not adjusted its 
mandate, nor changed its position on the EPA, the EU’s stated position had exposed 
the incoherence in its policies toward the ACP States, a situation in which the 
Commission had full charge. However, the frustration of the ACP States continued to 
heightened, so much so that the then trade minister of Kenya Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi, 
remarked that the promise on which they had started the negotiations on the EPA, was 
that when the Cotonou Agreement expired no country would be worse off than under 
the Cotonou” but the current application being pursued by the EU went “beyond the 
contemplation of Cotonou”559. In light of the subsequent developments, it seemed 
therefore that the UK’s position expounded by the Parliamentary Committee and the 
statements of the Trade Ministries was only intended to appease the NGO’s which 
brought pressure to bear on the parliamentarian and were hoping that Prime Minister 
Blair would use his position as President of the EU to influence changes to the 
mandate. It is argued that Britain’s inactively was seen as not surprising because it was 
the British Government that was pushing African countries to accept the free trade 
agreement in services at the WTO as John Hilery of Action Aid International  pointed out 
                                                        
557 Remarks by the Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown MP. On the launch of the commission for Africa report. London. 
UK. PM Brown has become Prime Minister of the UK, since June 2007. www.hm‐
treasury.gov.uk/speech_110305.htm downloaded April, 12, 2009. 
 
558 Ibid. 
 
559 Interview‐ Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi: with Paul Mason of the BBC, Monday 27, June 2005, reported in Trade 
escape: WTO Rules and Alternatives to Free Trade Economic Partnership Agreement. Action and 
International p. 11. 
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that the UK played or “double hand”, so that in the event the ACP States had to accept 
the reciprocal arrangement the blame would be laid on Brussels560. 
 
There was indeed a great variance between the approach of the EC Trade 
Commissioner, Mr. Peter Mandelson toward the negotiation at the time which he took 
office and up to the middle of 2006. However the ACP continued to search for a counter 
position, failing which the negotiations would stall. The CARIFORUM State had 
committed to complete a comprehensive agreement and they were not prepared to 
allow the Trade Commissioner to further frustrate their efforts and caused them to suffer 
further delays which no doubt would  have affected them as the closing time for the 
negotiations drew nearer. The Region therefore took a decision to take its case to the 
European Parliamentarians; through the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly, which 
had scheduled a meeting in Vienna Austria, June 20, 2006, fifteen months after the 
British had issued their statement. As discussed in depth in Chapter two, the Barbadian 
Minister, Dame   Billie Miller who addressed the Assembly had exposed the ‘double talk’ 
of the Trade Commissioner and the serious ethical questions which his conduct had 
raised and suggested how these could be rectified in the best interest of the ACP 
regions. 
 
5.4  The Reform of CAP and the banana regime 
The EU banana regime and the ACP export of the products are indeed deeply 
connected to the region’s political, economic and historic ties, as the Banana Industry in 
the Anglophone had been connected to the UK banana interests, and when the UK 
joined the EEC in 1973, it guaranteed its market and suppliers by ensuring that Banana 
export from the Caribbean was not disturbed and so, in the Lomé Arrangements a 
separate protocol was signed to deal with ACP banana entering Europe.561The EU had 
                                                        
560 Simon Jeffery “Blaming Brussels” Guardian UK. May 19, 2005. 
561 There are twelve ACP countries which export Bananas to the EC. Latin America Region is the largest 
supplier of banana to the EC. The EC is the largest importer of Banana worldwide.  
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given an assurance to the ACP in 1989 when Lomé IV was agreed that its banana 
exporters would not be harmed when the reforms were completed. But that was a 
promise which was never kept as Britain and France came together to protect their 
interest in the dispute over regulation 404/1993, but by 1995 they reneged on their 
commitment and bananas had been the leading agricultural export of the Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS), Jamaica and Belize contributing significantly to GDP and 
employment in these States was severely injured under the EU internal market reforms. 
 
In 1992, Europe decided to reform its internal market under the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and the Latin American producers by 1993 had challenged the EC 
framework agreement for banana. The EU had negotiated with them to avoid the issue 
being taken to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. This brought pressure on the 
banana exporting countries of the ACP Group, but in the efforts to settle the problems 
the Caribbean States were marginalized. So much so, that by 1994, it became quite 
obvious that the Caribbean would be prevented from being a party to the dispute even 
though they had been requested to join the action. Their 3rd party Status made it not 
possible for them to have had any impact on the outcome of the dispute. The US 
brought pressure on the EU which it resisted for sometime. But in 1995, the US Trade 
representative Mickey Kantor announced that it would seek to resolve the issue at the 
WTO. The Caribbean at that stage began to question the extent of Europe’s 
commitment to trade co-operation, because by 1996, the EC had published its 
Commissioned Green Paper and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary assembly, took the 
view that the proposal put forward by the Green Paper threatened the partnership and 
the joint approach to the management of the relationship. 
In the steps taken by the EC to manage the changing relationship, the ACP States 
became sceptical as the genuineness of the EC in maintaining the integrity of the 
relationship. It seemed that the Green Paper was only meant to give effect to changes 
which had already started to take shape in Europe which had grave implication for the 
ACP. However, the ACP States were not consulted nor their views ever considered. It 
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was therefore not surprising to the Caribbean when it’s requested to be consulted in the 
CAP reform under the Single European market (SEM) regime was denied by the EU. 
 
Since the introduction of the Single European Market (SEM) and the subsequent 
challenges by the “dollar” banana producers in Latin America and the U.S.A, the 
banana industry in the Caribbean has declined dramatically. Indeed, by 2008, the 
largest producers of banana for the export and domestic markets in Jamaica had closed 
some of their farms indefinitely562. This had significantly affected the livelihood of entire 
rural communities in the Eastern Parishes of the Island a similar situation resulted in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Banana as a contributor to Agricultural GDP in the Eastern Caribbean was very 
dominant. In 1995 at the height of the dispute it contributed 33% in St. Lucia, 23% in 
Dominica, 26% in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It was a main contributor to 
employment in rural communities in these Island States; and it represented a 
substantial source of foreign exchange inform from exports in Dominica, St. Lucia , and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 563.  Bananas were not being negotiated as part of the 
EPA, as the protocol for the banana regime still existed under the Cotonou Agreement 
but the CARIFORUM States wanted to include it in the negotiations. However, the EU 
resisted. The decline and the eventual demise of the banana industry across the region 
came as a result of the adjustment in the EU’s internal market (SEM) and the 
subsequent challenges under the WTO as the EU sought to protect its interest at the 
detriment of its  ACP partners. 
The ACP states and more so the small and vulnerable Island States (SIDs) of the 
Caribbean paid the ultimate price in the global trade dispute between powerful  these 
global actors and although the Caribbean had a very legitimate interest to protect  in the 
                                                        
562 Interview‐ Dr. Marshall Hall retired Managing Director of Jamaica Producers Ltd.  March 3, 2009. Kingston 
Jamaica.  
 
563 Derné, Marie‐Claude & Nurse, Keith: “Caribbean Economies and Global Restructuring”, Ian Randle 
Publishers, Kingston (2002). pp.52‐53. 
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outcome of the dispute, they were not allowed to join  the dispute notwithstanding their 
application to participate. They were however permitted to have  a third party status and 
therefore could not affect the outcome. It is felt across the region that the banana 
dispute and its out come was not only unfortunate for the region, but was an injustice 
because the region’s legitimate interests were subverted in a dispute between two 
major transatlantic trading partners564 while the party which stood to suffer the greatest 
economic injury was not allowed to join the dispute and thereby denied the right to 
protect it’s vital interests. The region came out on the losing end with devastating effect, 
economically and socially, because even though both sides to the dispute had given 
some assurances to the Caribbean that they would not do anything to harm the regions 
interests, both had reneged on their undertakings565, which in effect raised ethical 
questions on the part of the EU, the USA and to a lesser degree, the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
It  has been a widely held view in the region that the EC had not done all it could to 
have the Caribbean States joined the dispute in their own right because of EU’s self 
interests. It is argued that had the EU pressed hard enough to have the Caribbean 
States joined the dispute, then the Caribbean could have achieved for them selves an 
out come which the EU could not. The Caribbean wanted to apply to have banana 
treated as a ‘sensitive” product, but the EU seemed not to have supported such an 
initiative. But, it was further felt that were the Caribbean allowed to join and made its 
case for special treatment of its banana export, then, that would have had implications 
for the question of sugar which was to come later.  And this therefore was the real 
reason for the EU’s lukewarm support the region in their application to fully participate in 
the banana dispute. Furthermore, any negotiation to settle these issues with the USA 
                                                        
564 Interview ‐ PJ Patterson March 3, 2009. 
565 The US President Bill Clinton had promised the Caribbean at the 1994 summit of the Americas not to raise 
a challenge, even though the US was against the preferential agreement with the ACP, but instead were not 
happy with the treatment meted out to the Latin American countries under the EU Banana Regime. The EU 
had given assurances also when they were about to legislate the CAP reforms in tandem with the new internal 
market arrangements under the SEM. 
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would involve the Caribbean, had they been allowed to join and the EU did not want 
such a situation to have taken place as it would have created a greater difficulty in 
managing the settlement processes and the implications for CAP reforms which were 
on going. The Caribbean had several meetings in Washington to get the US to support 
their cause to have them join the respondents in the Banana dispute566, 
But these too were not fruitful. 
In the end, the region was forced to settle for aid to assist in diversification of farms and 
retraining of farmers and other employees in their banana industry. However, in most 
cases the aid support is very difficult to access or woefully inadequate at best. Indeed, 
the Jamaican experience is a prime example of how local groups which have sought 
funding have failed to meet EU criteria to access funding under the “Rural 
Diversification and Enterprise Development”567. Established by the EU to give support to 
displaced farmers. Investment in the Industry has also shapely declined and the leading 
producers of bananas in Jamaica had taken a wait and see approach regarding the 
extent of the price adjustment which the EU will make after 2015568, before deciding 
their final position in the banana export business.  
The extent to which the EU disregarded the Caribbean, and the rest of the ACP’s calls 
for the EU to pay greater regard to the banana industry and the plight of the workers 
and the decay of rural communities which were affected by the Trans Atlantic Banana 
Dispute, has illuminated the view that the EU was more concerned about its domestic 
interest569 as it is indeed quite instructive, that the manner in which the EU dealt the 
various commodities of the ACP States because while the EU denounced the Sugar 
                                                        
566 PJ Patterson had meetings with leading political figures in Washington including the Congressional Black 
Caucus seeking their support in the Caribbean cause. Interview – P. J. Patterson March 3, 2009. 
567 Majorie Stair, “Groups fail to meet EU criteria” Sunday Gleaner, Jamaica, Nov. 23, 2008. 
 
568 Interview‐ Dr. Marshall Hall, Managing Director of Jamaica Producers (Retired) March 3, 2009. Kingston. 
Jamaica. 
 
569Statement by Dr. The Ralph Gonsalves Prime Minister of St. Vincent & Grenadine to The High‐Level Plenary 
Of The United Nations General Assembly, New York, 16 September, 2005. 
http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements16/stvin050916eng.pdf  (December 12, 2008). 
325 
 
 
Protocol which was a separate and legally binding Agreement of indefinite duration, it 
treated banana, rice and rum differently. What seemed clear from the EU’s action in 
dealing with the commodity protocols was that while sugar is produced in Europe and its 
OCTs, banana is not. But Europe only has commercial interests in the trade of the 
product and not a primary agricultural interest as in the case of beet sugar producers in 
Europe and cane sugar producers in its OCTs. 
Furthermore, sugar production in Europe was captured under the CAP and was 
subsidised, while banana being tropical product , not produced in Europe and therefore 
was not captured under the CAP subsidies. It was therefore in Europe’s interest to 
denounce the Sugar Protocol and compensate its domestic producers as they were so 
entitled under the CAP, while there was no such obligation to ACP producers existed 
even though the ACP States had called for equal treatment because of legal and 
political  obligations. In the end the EC paid a paltry sum to be shared by all ACP sugar 
producing States when compared to the vast sums which were paid out to its sugar 
producers. This treatment, it is also widely felt in the Caribbean was a betrayal of their 
special relations with Europe over the years and a breach of a contractual obligation 
which it unilaterally abrogated at will570. 
What therefore emerged from the banana crisis seemed a classic expression of how the 
EU’s policies have served to undermine the economies of the ACP region and in 
particular, the Caribbean State without the EU showing any compulsion to pay just 
compensation. In the case of banana, the dispute was in effect between the US and the 
EU and their large multination co-operation involved in the production and export of 
Europe’s most consumed fruit, though not produced in Europe. 
 
The bananas from Africa, most of which is from the Cameroon entered Europe through 
France. Both France and the UK enjoyed the protection offered under the Lomé & 
Cotonou preferential arrangement for banana from ACP. Chiquita banana entered 
                                                        
570 CRNM UPDATE.  Jamaica, Cote d′ lvoire and ST Kitts and Nevis had criticized the WTO Ruling arguing that 
it would eliminate well over 30,000 banana industry jobs in these countries.  
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Europe principally through Germany, a member State which is an advocate of free 
trade, and was therefore supportive of the liberalized market regime in Europe under 
the CAP reform and the (SEM).The original ACP Banana Protocol Countries therefore 
exported  bananas  principally to the country with which they had colonial ties571 ,so the 
continuation of the colonial export arrange continued to a large extent under Lomé. 
The US sought to protect the interests of its multinationals in penetrating the European 
market under the reformed CAP. So, in as much as the US commercial interest was the 
pressure point to take dispute to the WTO; diplomatic initiatives were undertaken to 
resolve the issues and avoid the WTO ruling. The US had initiated the move to resolve 
the matter diplomatically, but there was a “stalemate”572, because the EU would not 
relent on its internal reform commitments. Indeed, the banana case seemed to have 
exposed another aspect of EU’s policy incoherence because several Member State 
were not in favour of the regulations. However, but the Commission nonetheless 
pressed for a resulting in which the Caribbean paying the ultimate price of the demise of 
its banana industry 573. In the end however, the real issue was never about market 
share or tariff, instead it had at its core, European protectionist policies and therefore 
the consequential damage to the Caribbean interest was merely collateral. The other 
ACP producers of bananas were not as affected as the Caribbean because they are 
beneficiaries of the Everything But Arms (EBA) special regime. The Caribbean took its 
case to the United Nations seeking the intervention of the UN Secretary-General to 
assist their cause.  
                                                        
571 The original 12 ACP Exporters of banana to EU: Belize, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Ivory 
Coast, Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Somalia and Suriname. Dominican 
Republic and Ghana started exporting bananas since 2000s.However, Cape Verde, Madagascar and Somalia 
stopped exporting in the 1990s Jamaica stopped in since the new EU regime was put in place. 
572 Charon Devereaux et al, “case study in US Trade Negotiations”. Vol.2. Resolving Disputes. Institute of 
International Economics. (Washington DC. 2006). P.112. 
 
573 Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland and Sweden openly opposed regulation 401. 
However, the European commission was very reluctant to make changes due to the highly controversial 
nature of the matter. 
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In pleading its case to the Secretary-General, Dominica’s Prime Minister, Edison James 
speaking on behalf of the Windward Islands argued that the future of these islands 
remained uncertain and this instability threatened peace in the region. He stressed that 
the peace in the region “ …and peace in the world depend so much on humanitarian 
dispensation of justice, and the action which has been taken against us in the WTO is 
not justice” The OECS leader invited Mr. Kofi Annan to visit the Islands to see first hand 
the extent of the devastation facing the windward islands on account of the WTO 
Ruling574. The Caribbean States were visibly upset at the turn of events in the banana 
dispute and it is felt that the EU wanted this outcome to get rid of the thirty- odd years of 
the non reciprocal preferential trade deal with the ACP States as this out come could  
Europe with more leverage to deal with the USA at the multilateral level575. 
These are issues with which the CARIFORUM States had to grapple while negotiating 
the EPA in circumstances where Europe was pressing for liberalization in trade for up to 
95% of all trade and also for the region to make far reaching commitments without being 
provided with the requisite financial and technical support demanded by the region. The 
European approach to the problem appeared quite out of line with the spirit of the 
Cotonou Agreement and the partnership which had existed since 1975.The EU with full 
knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the ACP States sought to extract from them what it 
would expect from its economic equals in the Industrialised North. 
 
5.5  ACP sugar and the CAP reform  
The problem of sugar  was another area in which the conduct of the EU raised concerns 
for the ACP and exposed the quality of the partnership between them. Production of 
sugar for the European market has had a history well in excess of three hundred years, 
the UK being the main importer of Caribbean sugar through the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement since 1925. At the time of its entry into the EEC, the UK guaranteed its 
                                                        
574 “Dominica says Caribbean banana‐growers face disaster.” (REUTERS, Oct, 2, 1997).   
575 WTO Bananas: Suspense Builds on EU’s Next Steps.  It is felt that the EU wanted to find best approach to 
comply which would give it more leverage when negotiating with the U.S. in working out the final deal 
http://www.bananas.org/f9/wto‐banana‐eu‐arbitration‐1721.html (December 12, 2008). 
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Sugar suppliers that they would be able to continue supplying Sugar even after their 
entry. The 1975 Sugar Protocol between the ACP and the EEC was of indefinite 
duration and it guaranteed prices to the suppliers. Britain in particular wanted to be 
assured of supply of raw sugar from the Caribbean States, which at the time were 
principal suppliers of the product to the UK576.  
 
Similar to the case of bananas, Caribbean sugar entered Europe through the UK. 
However, unlike the situation with bananas, the UK had neither commercial interest nor 
investments in the Caribbean at the time of the denunciation of the Sugar Protocol 
except for the involvement of Tate & Lyle577. But similar to banana, the region’s sugar 
was a key contributor to GDP, Employment and Foreign exchange in flows578. Indeed, 
the guaranteed price for supplies of sugar was bankable and was used as collateral to 
secure financing for its production579.   
 
Europe decided in 1992 to reform its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and introduced 
the single European Market (SEM). However, it was not until 2003 that they agreed on 
the content of the policy580.The internal agreement which was reached through a 
compromise of the French-German reform bench mark was bound to have an impact at 
the upcoming WTO Ministerial later that year because of the subsidies on Agricultural 
                                                        
576 Interview‐ P. J. Patterson March 3, 2009. See also the Lancaster House Statement: Consultations with 
developing Member Countries of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.2‐3 June, 1971. 
 
577 Tate & Lyle operates in Trinidad &Tobago dealing in Caribbean Bulk Storage and Trading in Molasses 
which is a bye‐product of sugar. 
http//www.tateandlyle.com/TateAndLyle/our_business/main_subsidiaries/default.htm#Overseas 
(December 12,2008) 
 
578 Give break down of contribution in each country. 
 
579 Interview‐ Ambassador Derrick Heaven, Chairman of the Sugar Industry Authority, Jamaica.  May 22, 2009. 
 
580 On the 26, June 2003, in Luxemburg, the European commission Farm Ministers agreed a compromise deal 
on the European common Agricultural Policy (CAP). International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development Vol.7. No. 24. 3rd July 2003. 
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production which were already agreed at the WTO. Among the Member States of the 
Industrial North, as the issue  has  had a substantial domestic agricultural constituency. 
  
The EU was very keen to have the Doha Development talks re started and so merely 
four months before the conclusion of the al ACP phase of the negotiations and only 
three months before the Cancun WTO Ministerial scheduled for September 10-14th 
2003 and a further, within one month of its decision on CAP, the EU granted the new 
EBA which had serious implications for the non-LDC sugar producers and blocked a 
request by Australia, Brazil and Thailand seeking to establish a WTO panel to rule on 
complaints against the EU sugar regime. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) met 
on July 21, 2003 and there, the delegations from the aggrieved countries were quick to 
stress that they were not against the preferential treatment given to ACP  States, but to 
remove the distortion which give protection to EU producers which were inconsistent 
with the EU’s commitments to reduce subsidies under the Uruguay Round. They argued 
that the removal of the subsidies would assist competitiveness on the world market 
which be better for developing countries. 
 
So, while the trio made no promise not to hurt Caribbean sugar producers, it seemed 
clear that they appreciated that their action would in fact hurt the ACP States, 
particularly the Caribbean which had only one LDC among its Members. Similar to the 
case of the banana dispute with the USA, the EU again promised to protect the 
Caribbean sugar producers but reneged on those commitments. It is suggested that the 
action taken by the trio, though it might have been unintended, it signalled the 
commencement of the demise of the ACP Sugar Protocol and was precipitated by EU’s 
self interests and protectionist policies in re-organising its internal markets. This is so 
because by the 4th of August 2004, the WTO panel ruled in favour of the trio on the 
complaint brought by them. The panel ruled on the basis that the subsidies exceeded 
the WTO reduction commitment; levels on sugar under the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA). The EU’s response to the finding of the panel which was confirmed by the WTO 
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appellate body on the 28th April 2005, cast a very long shadow over the prospects of the 
ACP non LDC sugar exporters.  The first casualty in the Caribbean was the island of St. 
Kitts & Nevis which closed down its sugar industry. This continued throughout the 
period of the negotiation of the EPA, with the ACP sugar producing States grappling 
with a continuous state of uncertainty concerning their sugar industry. 
 
The CARIFORUM reacted sharply to the WTO ruling as the regions spoke person on 
sugar, Guyana’s Foreign Trade Minister Clement Rohee expressed disgust with the 
European on the issue of the Millennium Development Goals by pointing to the reform 
of the EU’s sugar regime and argued the extent of how it undermined some gains made 
in the Millennium Goals. The minister drew attention to the Commission’s alacrity in 
moving to press for ACP action plan for the sugar Industry, but in doing so, it glaringly 
ignored the demands of the ACP for a fair and equitable deal on sugar. The ACP’s 
called for consultation with the EU seemed to have fallen on “deaf ears” in the 
Commission as the Caribbean States were expecting a less onerous reduction in the 
price of sugar and for the price to be adjusted over a longer period. 
 
So, even as the CARIFORUM States were locked into very challenging EPA 
negotiations, they had to confront the sugar problems along with the fall- out in the 
banana industry across the region. The Caribbean leaders tried to get the EU to put 
sugar on the negotiating table, the EU flatly refused. The region then found itself in a 
real dilemma and had no particular answers to the difficulties being faced. The EU was 
firm on keeping its regime intact, and then dictates the terms on which the ACP banana 
sugar and rice can enter its markets; these were was not up for negotiations. The ACP 
must either, take the offer and get out of the production of these commodities or 
become efficient in production in order to stay in the business. 
 
The Guyanese Minister called upon the EU Commissioner Mr. Peter Mandelson to 
honour his words and not reneged on his promise to support the Caribbean sugar 
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industry. But the EC’s non-response meant that the ACP’s calls could not materialise 
and the region was very displeased about the EU’s unilateral price cut which in their 
view had violated the spirit and basic tenets of the Sugar Protocol. The Caribbean 
contemplated legal action against the EU, but failed to pursue that course  as some 
Member States of CARICOM were not in support  as they felt it would be too costly and 
there was no  guarantee of success581.  
The CARIFORUM States were so concerned about the development that the nineteenth 
meeting of the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) endorsed the 
need to explore legal action and requested that the matter should go to the next meet of 
the CARICOM Heads of Government scheduled for July 2005. However the Caribbean 
lobby which was mounted in the European Capitals582 to effect change to the formula 
used in the reformed regime for sugar had failed to produce the desires results. It 
seemed that the Caribbean States were just short of being naïve to believe that the EU 
would have relented on such a fundamental policy issue regarding the protection of the 
interests of their farming constituents in order to meet the needs of a region which was 
of no great economic value to  Europe. 
So, the Caribbean decried the action of the EU in the Sugar Plan which it unveiled on 
June 22, 2005 to overhaul the Single European Market for sugar. The Commission in 
that plan made cuts to ACP Guaranteed prices by 39% on the price of refined sugar 
over 4 years costing ACP Producers an estimated loss of €400 million per annum of 
which losses to the Caribbean was approximately €100 million per Annum. The region 
was most disappointed in the EU’s petty offer of a mere €40 million in assistance for the 
period 2006 to be shared among all the ACP sugar producing countries583 while offering 
a package of almost €2 billion to its domestic producer. Both the Caribbean and the rest 
of the ACP reacted sharply. 
                                                        
581 Interview ‐ P.J. Patterson, March 3, 2009. 
 
582 Ibid. 
 
583 RNM update 0510. 
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The Caribbean spokesperson for sugar, Clement Rohee at the 81st session of the ACP 
Council of Minister on the 20th June 2005 summed up the region’s concerns thus: “it is 
impossible to overstate the devastating impact the price cuts and timescale proposed by 
the Commission will have on ACP countries.  As far as the ACP is concerned, the 
proposed reform is too fast, too deep, and too soon.”  He concluded that “Under these 
conditions the sugar industries in many countries will be simply unable to survive, while 
in other producing countries the so-called reform will inevitably lead to severe cutbacks 
with disastrous socio-economic consequences”584.  
 
 The ACP States had realized the danger to which ACP sugar was exposed following 
the claims brought of the WTO by Australia, Brazil and Thailand in light of the EC’s 
council Regulation (EC) No.1260/2001dated June 19, 2001 and the organization of the 
EC market for sugar. The ACP at its 70th session of the Council of Ministers held in 
Brussels on September 27th to 28th 0f November 2003, made a very important call for 
the EC to protect the integrity of the Sugar Protocol. It further called upon the European 
Union to: defend, maintain and honour the legal obligation and political commitment 
established in the Cotonou Agreement particularly the Sugar Protocol. The ACP 
seemed concerned that the EU may have wanted to make changes to the Sugar 
Protocol it therefore warned the EU that the mandated “review” referred to in Article 36 
(4) of the Cotonou Agreement did not in any way imply a ‘renegotiation’ of the Sugar 
Protocol and that the revision provisions was to ensure WTO Compatibility of the sugar 
regime and to safeguard the benefits derived. The ACP States pressed to “further 
ensure that such a review did not entail any deeper shifting of the burden of internal the 
Europe’s CAP reforms and its wider trade liberalization initiative onto the small and 
                                                        
584 RNM update 0510. Others also reacted for e.g. Some Non‐governmental organisations Non‐governmental 
organizations and groups representing various industries also reacted sharply to the decision of the 
Commission by denouncing it as antithetical of the interests of the industrialized North.  
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vulnerable economies of the ACP Sugar supplying States”585. Indeed, this was a very 
heavy burden for these vulnerable island states to bear, even more so as they 
negotiated the EPA and faced the EU’s flat refusal to engage the region in discussing 
the new sugar arrangements under the EPA. In this instance ,the ACP States had 
invited the Commissioner to consult with them on a regular basis with respect to 
continuing  the undertaking regarding sugar. However the EC disregarded those 
concerns and refused to consult with ACP States on sugar reforms in the SEM. 
 
Having accepted that the EC was determined to carry out its stated plans regarding the 
sugar reform notwithstanding the ACP’s concerns, the group accused the EU of causing 
serious injury to the ACP sugar producing economies. The ACP group highlighted the 
EU’s double standards and policy incoherence which it argued was the manifestation of 
its protectionist and mercantilist trade strategies which seemingly  had been the 
hallmark of the EU’s ‘Global  Project” which had been linked to the EPA negotiations in 
a very fundamental way586. The inconsistency and incoherence exposed in the EU’s 
policies were not of necessity directed at the ACP’s  non LDCs, but was caused from 
the competing interests within the EC and among its Member States and their domestic 
protectionist policies coupled with the trade strategies of the Commission587.  
 
These factors  however, seemed to have caused the EU to disregard the call of the 
ACP States for the EU to honour its legal and political Commitment under the Sugar 
Protocol and the Cotonou Agreement notwithstanding the EBA initiative, to maintain an 
adequate level of remunerative price for the ACP’s LDCs sugar supplying States 
thereby safeguarding the benefits that these States had derived from the export of 
sugar to the EU.  The ACP had further requested that in light of the domestic re-
arrangement of the EU market, the sugar protocol States should benefit along similar 
                                                        
585  Resolution on Sugar 78th session of the ACP council of Ministers, Brussels. Nov‐27‐28 2001. 
586 Thomas, Clive Op.Cit. p. 22. 
 
587 Elgstrom, Ole and Pilegaad. Op.cit.  
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lines as the EU farmers through an appropriate and dedicated beneficiary line, or the 
European Agricultural Development Guarantee Fund. The group further urged the EU 
should expeditiously establish a fund for modernizing the ACP Sugar Industries through 
research projects, not limited to, but include other ongoing support for research in 
Science and Technology or Capacity Building.588 These requests were “sidelined” and 
the EU instead was being perceived by some as using the mandated ‘review” of the 
Cotonou agreement to undermine the legitimate interest of the ACP States by arguing 
the justification for the denunciation of the long standing Sugar Protocol589. 
 
The review of Cotonou Agreement by virtue of Article 95 was due during the negotiation 
of the EPA Phase two, being May 1st 2004 to February 28th 2005. The ACP’s Sub-
Committee on Sustainable Development had endorsed the proposals for review of the 
Cotonou Agreement to cover the areas of social sector, youth, Information and 
communication technologies, protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Humanitarians 
and Emergency assistance, and Island states of the ACP group590. 
 
The EU responded with their proposals by the 25th February 2004. However, the 
Circumstances did not allow the ACP sufficient time to further respond and agree upon 
procedure in time to commence and complete the review. The position of the ACP on 
the timeframe of the review was made known at the 7th session of the Joint ACP-EU 
parliamentary Assembly 16th -19th Feb. 2004, in Addis Abba, Ethiopia where by 
resolution they agreed with the EU Parliamentarian to postpone the review until 2006591. 
                                                        
588 ACP /25/015/05. Cer. 1.  June 23 2005.Brussels.  
 
589 Interview‐ Ambassador Ellen Bogle, former Jamaican High Commissioner to London and consultant to 
Lascelles Demercado Ltd. Exporters of Jamaican Rum. She participated in the EPA negotiations representing 
the Jamaican Rum Manufacturing Interests. March 23, 2009. Kingston, Jamaica. 
 
590 ACP/84/002/04 Rev.1. 
 
591 Article 37 (6) states that “in 2004, the Community will assess the situation of the non‐LDC which, after 
consultation with the community decided that they are not in a position to enter into Economic partnership 
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The ACP’s Committee of Ambassadors was charged with the responsibility of 
conducting the review with the European Commission which had indicated its 
willingness to delay the review exercise until 2006.592  
 
At the meeting of the 85th session of the ACP Council of Ministers held in Port Moresby 
(Papua New Guinea) May 28th-31st, 2006. The Council of Ministers took the position on 
the question of sugar from the LDC’s that these States 
 “…intended to use the EBA sugar quota to the full, in accordance with the European 
Union legislation in particular council Regulation (EC) No.318/2006 on the common 
organization of the markets in the Sugar sector” and therefore it called upon the EU for 
the “abolition and suspension in full of all additional duties referred to in Article 27 of the 
Regulation (EC) No-318/2006593 as proposed by the European commission so as to 
leave only the common custom Tariff duties as imports of products of tariff heading 
1701 originating in a least Developed country reducing by 20% on 1st July 2006 by 50% 
on 1st July 2007 and by 80% on 1st July 2008 all customs duty being entirely suspended 
as from 1st July 2009594.” 
 
The group insisted that the 2006/07 marketing year was like any other and therefore 
further called “on the European commission to implement regulation (EC) NO. 980/2005 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
agreements and will examine all alternative possibilities, in order to provide these countries with a new 
framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with W.T.O rules.” 
592 ACP/26/018/04/Rev.3. Report from the committee of Ambassadors to the 79th session of the ACP council 
of Ministers, Gaborone, Botswana 3rd ‐5th of May 2004. 
 
593 Article 27 of the Regulation states that “for the most part, the customs duties applicable to Agricultural 
products under the W.T.O agreements are laid down in the common customs tariff. However, for some 
products falling within the scope of the Regulation; the introduction of additional mechanism makes it 
necessary to provide for the possibility to adopt derogations.” 
 
594ACP/26/018/04/Rev.3. Report from the committee of Ambassadors to the 79th session of the ACP council 
of Ministers, Gaborone, Botswana 3rd ‐5th of May 2004.  
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595 in full and increase the quota by 15% per annum as specified and not as proposed 
on this would result in a retrogressive tendency and caused negative consequences for 
the orderly management of LDC raw cane sugar suppliers in this period”596.  
 
The group was well aware of the impact the reform market would have on ACP sugar 
exported particularly the LDC’s and also the difficulties of accessing the EDF source for 
funding adjustment in the sector and therefore called on the European Union “…to give 
consideration to all the instruments and means of directing resources from the 
European development fund and the European budget towards providing national and 
sector specific support for the sugar for the LDC’s including  non-committed or 
uncommitted funds that might result from the end-of-term  review of the 9th EDF”597.  
 
The ACP States were also concerned that the EU was on a path of restricting the 
benefits of the EBA by implementing Article 27 of Regulation 318/2006; and therefore 
undermines the intention of Regulation (EC) NO.980/2005 the spirit of which was to 
allow certain developmental assistance to countries classified by the World Bank as 
being least developing countries598. However, the ACP sugar producing States had their 
greatest fear realized when the EU adopted EC regulation 266/2006 indicating the 
measures to be applied to the 18 ACP sugar producing States and more particularly 
with respect to the concerns expressed by these States in terms of adjusting to the 
reformed sugar sector. The European Parliament passed a resolution earlier in January 
                                                        
595 This regulation established the G.S.P for the benefit of the LCDS. 
596 ACP/26/018/04/Rev.3. Report from the committee of Ambassadors to the 79th session of the ACP Council 
of Ministers, Gaborone, Botswana 3rd ‐5th of May 2004. 
 
597  Ibid 
598 The special incentive are provide to the these State based on “an integral concept of sustainable 
development as recognized by international conventions and instruments such as the UN declaration and the 
right to development of 1986, the Rio declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, the ILO 
declaration on Fundamental principles and Rights at work of 1998, The UN millennium Declaration of 2000 
and the Johannesburg Declaration on sustainable developments of 2002” Paragraph (7) Preamble Clause of 
council Regulations (EC) NO. 980/2005. 
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2006 which underscored the need for the EU to make available a sum not less than 
€200 million available to the ACP sugar producing States on an annual basic to help 
them to adjust to the fallout from the reformed regime599. 
 
This resolution was preceded by the decision of the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary 
Assembly in November 2005 which pointed to the need for adequate resources should 
be made available to support ACP sugar protocol States affected by the reformed. Each 
set of Parliamentarians recognized the extent to which the EU’s sugar reforms would 
seriously affected the sugar industries in the sugar producing ACP non LDC States and 
the consequential effect on socio-economic condition of millions of their population. The 
group agreed with justification  that the burden of the reform was disproportionately and 
unfairly passed out to them, because of all the concerned parties involved in the sugar 
problems, the non LDC’s of the ACP Group were the least able to survive the shock. 
 
The ACP group further argued that the loss they would suffer by 2013/14 would be 
approximately €1.77 billion and with the support of civil society they lobbied the EU at all 
levels with respects to their cause and legitimate expectation resulting from the fall out 
of the sugar regime, more so the economic, social and environmental consequences 
even then, the European Union pressed on with the reforms. The group called for no 
lesser treatment to be accorded to them, than what the EU would offer to their farmers 
in terms of support to adapt to the reform successfully.  
 
In this regard, the ACP Council of Ministers set out a ten point demand on the European 
Union and the European Commission which exposed the gravamen of the issue they 
faced particularly in light of the EU’s unilateral decision on the sugar regime. They 
called on the EC to: (1) “…Ensure that the same logic and principles, which led to the 
approval by the EU Agricultural council in November 2005, of an adequate package of 
                                                        
599 ACP ,Decisions, Resolutions and Declarations of the 83rd session of the ACP Council of Ministers May 28th ‐
31st, 2006. 
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support-and commensurate resources to enable the various EU stakeholder to adopt to 
the reform be applied to the traditional ACP sugar suppliers through a timely and 
adequate support package to enable them to adopt to the reform successfully…”600 (2) 
“… urgently honour its commitment for adequate and timely support for Sugar Protocol  
countries by allocating for the period 2007-2013 at least €510 million actually on a 
predictable and ring-fenced basis under the EU 2007/2013 financial perspective in order 
to enable the ACP Countries concerned to successfully implement their multi-annual 
Adaptation strategies and plans; (3)… adopt a fast track delivery mechanism  of funds 
for the timely implementation of their respective multi-annual strategies… (4) 
“…Urgently re-allocate any unused funds from the €40 million earmarked for 2006 to the 
ACP Sugar Protocol countries that have submitted multi-annual adaptation strategies 
(5) … supplement EU funds proposed to meet the adjustment needs of the sugar 
protocol countries by any unallocated and re-committed resources arising from the end 
of term review of the 9th EDF; (6) increase within the €1.5 billion being proposed for 
allocation to the European Investment Bank (EIB) for the investment facility of the 10th 
EDF, the €400 million as interest subsidy to €500 million with the commitment that the 
additional €100 million be earmarked to finance interest on loans to the private sector 
and other stake holders of ACP sugar protocol countries contractual with the EIB in the 
context of their respective multi-annual adjustment strategies and plans.; (7) “.. Provide 
a written confirmation that they will fully honour the guarantees and provisions of the 
Sugar Protocol, in Article 1,3,5 and 6 in the context of the new EU Sugar regime’ (8) “.. 
to confirm the principle that totality of the raw sugar requirements of the full-time refiners 
will be supplied within the complementary quantity (CQ) by the ACP Sugar protocol 
countries to the extent that they are able to supply’ (9)… “Adopt a new approach 
towards the 2006/2007 and subsequently ACP guaranteed price negotiations which is 
fully compliant with the negotiating framework established in the Sugar Protocol and 
which takes into account all relevant economic factor…”  and (10)... “Ensure that in the 
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context of the ongoing Doha Development Round negotiation that: 1. the erosion of 
preference is limited to the minimum possible extent, 2. Sugar is classified as a 
sensitive product. 3. The special Safeguard Clause is maintained; and 4. In line with the 
WTO undertakings contained in Para 44 of the July 2004 framework agreement, the 
sugar Protocol is bound in accordance with Article XIII of GATT”601.  
The ACP Ministers convened in May 2006, and expressed deep concern over the offer made by the EU 
on sugar which amounted to an abolition of the Sugar Protocol as of October 2009 and as such was 
“tantamount to a unilateral remuneration of the longstanding trade and development instrument and 
as such is totally unacceptable”602 The ACP States argued that under Article 36 (4) of the Cotonou 
Agreement, the ACP and the EU have affirmed the importance of commodity protocols and the need to 
review them in the EPA negotiation with a view to safeguard the benefits derived. Therefore bearing in 
mind the special legal status of the sugar Protocol, the ACP Council of minister were deeply upset at 
the EU’s unilateral action on the Sugar Protocol arguing the incompatibility of the EU’s sugar regime 
and the Sugar Protocol and called on the EU to immediately compensate the ACP Sugar Protocol 
States603. This proposal seemingly did not move the EU to respond favourably to the ACP States, 
because, by the time the ACP Council of Ministers met in December 2006, the EU on the 13 October 
2006 approved the sum of €1.244 billion to finance the accompanying measures for the sugar protocol 
countries for the period 2007-2013. This sum was less than the estimated revenue loss of €1.77 billion 
under the new sugar regime; and the CARIFORUM State of St. Kitts and Nevis had decided to stop the 
production of sugar; and the European commission, the council of the EU and the European Parliament 
had agreed to provide €165 million for 2007 to assist the ACP Sugar producing States. This sum was 
way below the anticipate sum of €500 million and €250 million per year. The Group repeated its call 
on the EU to “make available on a predictable and ring-fenced basis to the ACP countries concerned 
adequate resources for the financing of the accompanying measures for 2006”604. It passed a thirteen 
point resolution in which it ,among other things, called for the EU to support the efforts of the ACP 
countries by stressing the need for the resumption of the negotiations of the  Doha Development 
Agenda, the preservation of the long-standing preferences, the maintenance of the special safeguard 
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clause and the Declaration by the EU of sugar “as a sensitive product”605. The EU disregarded the 
ACP’s call. 
The LDCs Sugar Ministerial Committee presented a report to the 85th session of the 
ACP Council of Ministers on the 23rd May 2007 in which it argued that the EU market 
access offer for LDC sugar in the EPA in which it proposed three phase of liberalization 
of trade in Sugar. The 1st phase being January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2009 under 
the existing sugar protocol regime, October 1, 2009 to September 30th 2015 for the 
second phase of transition and October 1, 2015 for the 3rd phase liberalization. They 
took the view that the offer lacked adequate information in addition,  that the proposed 
safeguard limit of 1.3 million tones for ACP sugar is far too low  also “that the ACP could 
be  further squeezed on quantities by  EU growers unless the restructuring plan takes 
out a minimum of 6.2 million tones’606.  
What became clear to the ACP States was that the EU was not prepared to negotiate 
the sugar protocol under the EPA, neither was it prepared to negotiate a new protocol 
after the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU through Regulation (EC) 
318/2006 and Regulation (EC) 980/2005 effectively brought the Sugar Protocol to an 
end. The EU’s justification for holding it position rest in it having defined the parties to 
the EPA’s and acknowledged that agreement would be signed bilaterally. The parties to 
the EPA would then be governed by GATT Article XXIV obligations along with the 
treatment of the Sugar Protocol itself. The effect of this interpretation therefore was to 
circumvent Article 5 (4) requirement of the Sugar Protocol without negotiation or 
consultation with the ACP States. This was done by completely disregarding the 
decision of the European Parliament’s on the sugar regime adopted in January 2006; 
which called for allocation of at least €200 million annually to ACP sugar exporting 
States and expressed concern that the “European Commission’s proposal were inferior 
to the funds agreed both by the EU Parliament and the Council for the period 
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2007/2013.The Proposals for sugar in fact were “back loading” rather than “front 
loading” thereby placing the requests by the ACP States for” front loading” the 
payments to enable them to effectively and successfully implement their strategies in 
order to operate in a post reform situation607.  
The Group again called upon the EU and the EC to “fully honour its obligation under 
Article 36 (4) of Cotonou and to urgently engage in a joint review of the sugar protocol 
with a view to safeguarding its benefits bearing in mind its special legal status”608; and 
to “honour the provisions of Article 5(4) of the Sugar Protocol which called for the taking 
into account of all relevant economic factors in the determination of the ACP sugar 
guarantee price and hence improve the offer for 2006/2007 in such a way as to provide 
the ACP with an adequate level of income comparable to the treatment afforded to EU 
best growers”609. The EU again, paid very little regard to the call of the ACP Ministers. 
But by then, negotiations for the EPA was quite advance and the EU was not offering 
any new proposal, holding steadfast to its internal regulation on sugar regime. This 
approach left the CARIFORUM States with very little space to manoeuvre  as they were 
particularly hard hit by the EU’s decision on the Sugar Regime. Guyana which is a 
borderline non-LDC was particularly hurt because it could not benefit under the EBA, 
but could at the same time ill afford the injury to its sugar Industry caused by the reform. 
Guyana, therefore reacted sharply to the conduct of the EC describing it as being 
unjust. The ACP found itself in a bind due to the EU’s incoherent policies and regime for 
sugar, because the EU wanted to include sugar in the EPA by offering duty free access 
without quantitative restriction to non-LDC, but this would have affected the LDC’s offer 
and the EBA initiative. So, the EU sought to infuse sugar into the EPA and offered 
protection to the LDCs while satisfying WTO rules, by unilaterally renunciation of the 
Protocol.  
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This objective, they had hoped to achieve through negotiations within the EPA 
framework. However such approach would leave open the possibility for a mutual 
renunciation of the 1975 Sugar Protocol which was of indefinite duration by making 
sugar part of the trade arrangement under the EPA610.Within that context, the Pacific 
Ministers had reacted swiftly by statement dated May 18, 2007, in which they sought 
clarification from the EU. They wanted the EU to adequately address their concerns 
over sugar611.But, while the ACP States fully understood the need for the adjustment of 
the sugar regime for it to be compatible with the WTO, it felt that the Commission was 
duty bound to negotiate a successor agreement 612 instead of treating sugar as parts of 
all trade liberalization. The EU however, no longer wanted a separate regime for sugar.   
The EU justified the denunciation of the Sugar Protocol arguing that it could not fit into 
the changed world of today, because one set of the developing countries namely the 
ACP States were trading on one set of terms and the others by a different set of 
terms613. However, the EC down played its own role in undermining the Sugar Protocol 
systemically after it had been benefiting since 1975 through earnings on the 
international and internal markets, which only came to an end when it had to reform the 
CAP and the subsequent challenges to their regime at the WTO. What is unquestioned 
is that for the EU, there was no fear of cartelization of commodities which could affect 
supply and prices in the new international commodity regime as was the case in 1975. 
Part of the ACP’s problem is that as partners with the EC they had expected that there 
would be consultation on the question of the various commodity protocols. So while 
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Commissioner Boel argued that there was “no Alternative” to this approach to reform 
the sugar regime.614 The EU seemed more concerned about the efficiency of its internal 
market than with the fall out the reform would have on the domestic economies of its 
ACP partners. Even the UK which had been the main beneficiary of Caribbean sugar 
supplies gave its approval for the Council’s position, by welcoming “. the Council of 
Ministers decision to reform the EU sugar regime” because as it stated “to have left the 
regime unchanged would have signalled a distorted and wasteful use of resources 
within EU Agriculture”615. The Caribbean was offended by the EU’s treatment meted out 
to ACP Sugar suppliers arguing that it treated the European farmer’s far superior to 
ACP Sugar suppliers and the EU’s conduct was tantamount to a betrayal of trust.  
Arguably, the disingenuousness of the Europeans in dealing with the sugar issues can 
be argued from three perspectives, Firstly, that Europe had intended to undermine the 
Sugar Protocol to justify denouncing it. Secondly, in doing so, it wanted to avoid paying 
just compensation to the ACP States and thirdly, it wanted to cast the blame for the 
negative out come on the multilateral system. This is so because the EU, on its own 
initiative, created preference erosion among the ACP States by offering the EBA, shortly 
after the close of the all ACP phase of the negotiations in circumstances where more 
than fifty(50%) percent of the ACP States are LDCs616. Europe then moved to re-
organise its internal market, but refused to consult with the ACP states or indeed to 
have them joined as participants in the sugar dispute at the WTO as they had 
requested. This refusal, therefore kept them out of the negotiations or discussions to 
resolve the problems and finally, Europe by relying on its internal policies and the 
institutionalised political dynamics of protectionism to paid hefty compensation to is beet 
sugar farmers for the fall out caused by the new sugar regime, and indeed, all but 
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walked away from its commitment to its ACP partners. It is arguable that this conduct on 
the part of the EU was unjust, discriminatory and unethical in the context of the 
longstanding partnership. 
The Commission, during the negotiations and the reorganisation of the EU’s internal 
markets, seemed to have applied the “carrot and stick” approach in an unconventional 
manner to secure compliance in meeting its objective. The stick being the 39% 
reduction in guaranteed sugar price it allowed ACP States while the carrot was offered 
to the EU farmer as 60% compensation to only EU producers who voluntary left the 
market. No such generous offer was  made to any Member States of the ACP, instead 
the EU offered €40 million to all ACP sugar exporting states, in 2006/2007 on a take it 
or leave it basis. The cut in price of sugar by 39% was never discussed with the ACP 
partners which was a severe blow for the ACP sugar Industry617. The region felt the EU 
reneged on its legal, moral and political obligations to the ACP and requested that the 
phasing in be staggered over a period of eight years. It argued that the EU has moved 
away from the original agreement and that the EC needed to get to a position which is 
more reasonable, fair and equitable618in its treatment of the ACP States. 
The Heads of government of CARCOM States at their twenty-seventh meeting 
reiterated the urgent need for the EU to provide adequate funding for Sugar under the 
2007-2013 and agreed that the President of Guyana, By the time the 28th Heads of 
Government meeting of the CARICOM Member States was held in 2007, the EU had 
moved to tariff liberalization and managed to tie sugar as an agricultural product to be 
treated under the general liberalization mechanism being negotiated. The Caribbean 
vigorously protested, but the irony of the political economy of sugar is that the EU 
although resisting the request of the CARIFORUM States to include sugar as part of the 
EPA negotiations so as to secure a new protocol was also moving to have sugar 
liberalised as an agricultural product The CARIFORUM States under pressure from the 
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fall out of the new EU sugar regime however, was trying to transfer the benefit of the 
sugar protocol into the EPA619. This initiative failed to materialise because the EU would 
not allow the Sugar Protocol to be re-introduced in the EPA as a separate commitment   
 
5.6 Negotiating financial and technical support in the EPA 
 
The need for funding was extremely critical to the effectiveness of the EPA, indeed, as 
discussed in chapter two, it seemed that the decision of the Francophone African States 
to accept Pascal Lamy’s offer to start regional negotiations even before the close of the 
all ACP phase was influenced by the feeing that adequate funding would be in place for 
the EPA. In order to highlight the European  antithetical benevolence  extolled in 
promoting the EPA, it is imperative to explore the ethics of the use of aid funding to 
achieve the EC’s Global Project and explain its role in the negotiating processes. 
Firstly, the European Development Fund (EDF) is an extra-budgetary allocation which is 
managed to meet the objectives of the EU under the Cotonou Agreement and is the 
principal source of European International Development aid. However, while the 
Cotonou agreement stressed the importance of, equality in partnership, ownership, 
mutual obligation and dialogue, the EC had taken full control of the EDF ,contrary to the 
common understanding  and agreement as to how the funded were to be handled by 
the partners. The EC tried to used the aid factor to influence the outcome, but the 
Caribbean States pushed to deal with the question of financial commitments quite early.  
The funding for the EDF is determined by the European community and the EU is the 
world’s largest aid donor and as a donor it has tremendous clout in the decision as to 
who gets aid. Therefore, while part IV of the treaty of Rome is the genesis of the 
European Development Aid Regime, administered mainly through the EDF since the 1st 
Yaounde’ Convention, through Lomé I-IV, 1975-2000, it has always been the call of the 
EU as to how much funds will be allocated to the (EDF) or indeed for investment 
purposes, made available through the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
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During Lomé IV, the European Union in preparing for the mid-term review  
commissioned the “Green Paper” which became the “driving force” behind its external 
relations with the ACP Countries and other developing countries. However, apart from 
making the case for changes in the trading relation between the ACP and the EU it also 
championed the need for changes to its aid structures and programs. 
 The paper prefaced that “the debate on the future of ACP-EU relations must first take 
account of the new Global Environment’. It argued that “..not only does the new Global 
landscape offer the EU’s objective interest and those of its development partners; it also 
involves increased responsibilities for a player of EU’s size”620.   
It further articulated the point that “for European Community faced with the difficult task 
of adjusting its economic and social systems and having to frame its political actions to 
fit a multi, rather than a bipolar world and prepare for eastward enlargement, there is 
now a new dimension for development cooperation, particularly with the ACP 
countries”621. It continues by stressing that “as the 21st century dawns, relationship 
between the EU and the ACP countries should be put on a new footing to take account 
not only of changed political and economic conditions for development  but also of 
changed attitudes in Europe. The document argues the decoupling of Aid from trade 
and that the Aid policy must be in keeping with European values and political systems. 
The approach is therefore to engage Aid support as an integral part of the New Global 
perspective of European development. Cooperation is not what it was in 1957 or 1975. 
It took the view that the EU now has cooperation links within a large number of 
countries and is present in all Regions of the world. Essentially, it laid down the 
responsibilities of each partner less ambiguously on the question of aid funding and 
clearly pointed the direction on the new paradigm of aid application as a matter of 
policy.  
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 The EU adopted new policy positions by the mid-term review of Lomé IV and so without 
the benefit of consultation with the ACP partners, the EU moved to link the Caribbean 
with Latin America for the purposes of Global Europe and aid became a major pillar of 
its external relations. The EU by a unilateral policy initiative pressed to remove some 
ACP States out of the category of LDC’s. This it achieved with the support of and 
through the IMF and the World Bank. In this regard the rhetorical question as to the 
attitude of Europe on the question of aid support was put by Hon. Clement J. Rohee, 
Guyanese Foreign Minister thus: “why is it that whenever a developing country makes 
some degree of progress either on the social or economic front, they are invariable 
penalized by being “graduated” out of or disqualified as a recipient country in need of 
foreign Aid or development assistance?”622. Because the EU used the mid-term review 
of Lomé IV firstly to give effect to its new approach to aid and trade with its ACP 
Partners and secondly to push to remove some ACP States from the LDC status. The 
EU and ACP entered the mid-term review negotiation very divided and the rancour 
persisted even up to the signing of the Agreement in Port Louis; Mauritius, the ACP 
exhibited deep acrimony623 further fuelled by the EU’s insistence on graduating five 
Caribbean States out of the EU’s designated LDC624. 
This was an EU’s driven position to which they were not prepared to make any 
concession, notwithstanding the pleas for reconsideration in light of the ensuring 
consequences of withdrawal of their status as LDC. The conduct of the EU in this 
regard was very chilling to the Caribbean even more so because as the EU moved to 
reduce the number of LDCs in the CARICOM Region, there was a simultaneous move 
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to graduate more African countries in the States of LDC625.The EU was relentless in this 
effort and in the end their policy to divide and rule prevailed.626Europe was well aware of 
the ramification of this initiative (1) The Caribbean could not resist the delisting of its 
States, (2) African States being entered would not resist the offer of inclusion because 
of the benefits; and (3) that the Caribbean States carried the brink of sacrifices to keep 
the ACP solidarity over the years and that Francophone Africa was always the weakest 
link in the African configuration, The Francophone African were the most difficult to get 
on board during the early years of the ACP negotiations and renounced throughout the 
ensuing years as the Group least likely to remain firstly with the solidarity of the 
Group627.  The real intention of the EU in taking that step became clear later as they 
moved to establish the enhanced offer of the EBA initiative. 
It had been the case that the Aid program established in 1957 for countries which were 
former colonies of Europe was meant mainly for French Colonial Territories, who in 
1973 felt that they would be called upon to share their Aid programs with Anglophone 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States; these are some of the same States which stood to 
gain from being listed as LDC’s. The objective seemingly was to give more to Africa and 
lay the foundation for the fragmentation of the ACP and a breach of ACP solidarity, 
coherence and unity. Europe sided with the recommendations of the mid-term review 
and focussed its attention to Africa, shifting from the Caribbean because as it argued 
poverty was greatest in the Africa so the commitment to development of ACP States as 
a special group of developing States had waned in Europe as Global Europe took 
precedence628.   
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 The experience of the mid-term review negotiations placed extensive strain on the ACP 
EU relations and heightened the extent to which the EU was prepared to use the its 
massive Aid program to get its policies through, notwithstanding the objectives of the 
ACP States generally. Not only was Lomé as a premiere progressive development 
agreement, but even its very existence was threatened.629 
 
Europe was relentless in pushing its policies and after Eighteen months of negotiation 
the mid-term was agreed. Although trade reference remained on essential feature of the 
ACP-EU relation both in Lomé and under its success or the Cotonou Agreement the 
relationship was radically transformed in five material respects. Namely (1) end of non-
reciprocal preference and to attain WTO compatibility (2) a greater emphasis on political 
dialogue to include Human Rights and Good governance Issues (3) Greater 
involvement of N.G.O’s and wider private sector and civil society (4) As focus on policy 
declaration and (5) The formal rationalization of Aid and financial instruments, the State 
having been set for the negotiation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
 
Within Eight months of the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, and even before the 
Agreement was ratified by all the EU member States the European Union made a signal 
move without any consultation with the ACP, announced the “everything but arms” 
initiative which significantly benefited 48 of the ACP States mostly in Africa to include 
the five which were recently “graduated” into this category in the mid-term Review 
process which it had initiated in the Port Louis Mauritius in1995630. 
The experience of Seattle seems to have been fresh in the minds of the EU and this 
move was geared to avoid a repeat in Qatar in November 2001. However the hand 
played by Europe in this regard had seriously affected the Banana, Sugar, and Rice 
exporting committee of the CARIFORM States in relation to the LOC. Within the ACP 
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Group even which Caribbean Rum which once enjoyed a privilege position in the EC 
market was being undermined by the EU/US “Zero For Zero” agreement which in effect 
result in a phasing out if preferences for the product which now has to compete with 
cheaply produced rum from Brazil, Columbia and the Philippines.631 
Rohee argued that the Commission was not giving an indication on to its plan for the 
sugar regime but was in fact way playing a “cat and mouse” game with regard to the 
future of the sugar regime. However the depth of cynicism prevailing in the region as to 
the conduct of the EC is significantly highly as Minister Rohee supported Minister 
Anthony Hylton’s characterization of the EU conduct as possible “sneak attack 
Nickodemus style” with respect to the Sugar Protocol632. These views were expressed 
no less than four years before the EU unilaterally denounced the Sugar Protocol. 
It is argued that Europe has set out on a path since 1997,not just to reorganise the trade 
and cooperation arrangements which existed since  the first Lomé 1975, but to eliminate 
the Sugar Protocol which was legally binding and of no fixed duration. Europe wanted to 
keep faith with its international commitments to give special treatment to LDCs, so it 
moved early to eliminate many of the leading producers of sugar from its lists of LDCs 
to include six Caribbean States and Fiji, and Mauritius so that their plans to initiate the 
EBA regime would not benefit these countries which were de-listed and therefore the 
impact on the quantities of sugar entering Europe duty free would be less. The EU then 
issued the regulations on the Everything But Arm(EBA) initiatives without any 
consultation with the ACP States633.This move was arguably done in time to avoid the 
problems faced in Seattle from recurring in Quatar held in November 2001,but  it had 
very serious implications for sugar producers in the wider ACP group634.   
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For the EU to have “graduated” five Caribbean countries out of the LDC category and 
“graduate” more African countries into the LDC’s, then penalize the Caribbean by 
restricting their Rum had prompted one Caribbean official to declare that “.. Irrespective 
of how you turn or twist it, something is not only inherently wrong with this approach; it 
is morally and ethically unacceptable”635.    
But not withstanding the increase in the number of LDC’s and the Aid and Trade offers 
made to them under EBA, which assisted the EU and ACP to obtain the waiver for 
Cotonou at the W.T.O. Ministerial, the ACP states in the main was still opposed to the 
commencement of a new round until the developing countries take steps to deal with 
their concerns therefore they saw it fit once more to bond together to stop the concern 
W.T.O. ministerial in 2003. This was viewed as a victory for the developing countries, 
which posed very challenging issues for the EU, which now had to find a way to get the 
talk going and keep the Doha Agenda alive but linked to the Global Europe Initiative to 
include the so called “Singapore Issues” on the WTO agenda. The negotiation of the 
EPA would be an ideal forum. The EU approach to the negotiation of the EPA seemed 
to support the position that it was more driven by EU’s policy to extend its soft power, as 
a Global player or indeed as a serious development tool636. 
 
5.6.1 The Caribbean’s response and EU’s appeasement 
During the negotiation for the EPA, the Caribbean faced peculiar challenges, mainly in 
the area of capacity building and infrastructure difficult. The region had by then 
accepted the reality that in a hostile global trade environment that it had to face those 
realities, but, however it was prepared to stand up in its own cause.  
 
The Caribbean was therefore well aware that aid and donor fatigue coupled with the 
demands of an enlarged Europe were forces which had contributing to the decline in aid 
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636 Katharina Ann Serrano “Economic Partnership Agreements; Machiavellian Instrument of EU Trade Policy 
of Samaritan development tools?” International Journal of Private Law. Vol.2 No.3/2009.p.290. 
352 
 
 
sources. This was fuelling the posturing of the developed countries from meeting their 
commitment to allocate.07% of their GDP as development assistance to developing 
countries by the year 2020. In all of this however, the region’s receipt of grant aid, soft 
loans and concessionary financing had steadily declined since the 1990’s. In the 
circumstances it had not been lost upon the Caribbean that aid has been a significant 
factor in developing the economies of the region, though there is no right to Aid. 
Ambassador Bernal pointed out that for the CARIFORUM region there is a great need 
for funding to address the implementation cost of the EPA, which justifies the call for EC 
development but certainly not as an entitlement637.    
 
But while appreciating the context for Development Assistance, there seem to be 
different approach to the question of Aid at the highest political level. The then 
CARIFORUM spokesperson at the WTO. argued that the “search for Aid should not be 
seen as mendicancy or as a search for handout from the industrial countries” he made 
the case that “if countries in the south are to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered, and deal with the challenges posed by trade liberalization and globalization, the 
need help both at technical and financial nature.”638 However, the conclusion of the EPA 
by the CARIFORUM States was created by severe criticism from academia, Labour 
Unions and N.G.O. and Politian and Diplomats639which prompted the Jamaican P.M to 
repudiate the attitude and appeased to the region to “purge” the type of “Mendicancy 
which seemed to have emerged in the region”640.  
 
                                                        
637 Bernal, Richard “Globalization”: Everything But Arms. The EPA and Economic Development. Grace 
Kennedy Foundation Lecture 2008 p.8. 
638 Clement Rohee. “the little you have will be taken away” Presentation May 18 2001, Georgetown, Guyana. 
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Dr. Bernal in defence of the EPA agreement pointed out that the Aid component of the 
EPA was necessary and does not in any imposing upon or is substituted for the existing 
EC aid package for the Region. He stressed the point that in the negotiation, the Region 
had long passed the “Supplication of Ex-colonies” in their response to former colonial 
countries for Aid, and preferential treatment expressed in special quotas and pricing 
mechanism. The confounded that the Region’s diplomacy was not based on 
“mendicancy” but by “hard bargaining to extract every gain from a group of more 
powerful countries with little real need for CARIFORUM Markets, most especially the 
minute CARICOM Markets”641.   
 
By the time the EPA came to be negotiated in the Region, the EU Trade policy under 
the Prodi Commission 1999-2004 was well established, and the ACP had embraced the 
economic imperative of the EU’s policy to collectively take the transaction cost into 
account when dealing with the effect of market opening. However, Europe has a trade 
policy which is Global in nature and its institutions are is highly compartmentalized 
based on Region’s, therefore in its attempt to bring coherency to this policy, Europe 
shifts position from time to time leaving its ACP partners behind. 
 
The EC’s policy, it is argued was articulated to have taken “a principled position in 
support of multilateralism but one of responsibility in seeking to complete each of the 
bilateral and regional negotiations already launched and not yielding to pressure to 
open-up new Free Trade Area (FTA) vistas at the expense of ongoing W.T.O 
negotiation.”642 This allowed the EU to confirm itself as the “greatest supporters of 
multilateralism, while keeping an extensive network of FTA’s”643. 
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643 Ibid. 
354 
 
 
It is further argued the Caribbean has been part of that network of FTAs, however, it 
realized the importance of that network to the EU Global Trade Policy and its linkages at 
the WTO with respect to the Development Agenda and the need to both open-up 
market in Trade and Services. This is an EU initiative to protect its vital Interest in terms 
of the “Singapore Issues” and the impact on their domestic and other Internal Trade 
Policy. The Negotiation for the EPA presented the Caribbean with the an opportunity to 
negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU in order to extract concession 
in light of EU’s Global Agenda and to make maximum gains and to create the Global 
precedent among developing countries which the EC wanted to use as a template for 
future FTAs, as it moved to influence in a significant manner, the WTO Negotiations. 
The EU’s global agenda was the driving force behind its negotiations with the ACP 
States, because if it were to succeed in getting the ACP States to cooperate at the 
regional level to produce the kind of EPAs which committed them to certain obligations 
which have direct implication for the multilateral system, then it would have without 
doubt add to their overall benefit. He EU needed to have settled with the region on a 
way forward in the areas of trade in services in a comprehensive agreement. 
 
5.6.2 EU’s strategy in negotiating cooperation 
The EU has developed and has protected the strategy of keeping the question of 
Development Aid financing until the very last leg of negotiations with the ACP. The 
negotiation for the EPA was no different. So while the Cotonou Agreement addressed 
the question of financing for development cooperation, the Caribbean was very vocal in 
its call for support to give effect to the EPA and to address attendant burdens on the 
region. The Caribbean carried its line of argument forcefully by explaining that the EU 
was making demands for liberalization and there is a legal and moral obligation to make 
funds available to support the reform necessary and the anticipated fallout during the 
transition period. So, while the Caribbean was expecting development support, it knew 
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that if it did not demand it, then it would not be automatically made available644. The call 
for such support must be justified in an atmosphere where Aid support is diminishing 
and has no real tradition in a Free trade Agreement. The Region argued and relied upon 
its uniqueness to justify their demands for Aid support to implement the EPA, and for 
support for the Sugar and Banana sectors645.  
By the close of the negotiation the Region had made significant gains in development 
support for the implementation of the EPA. The final and most significant  break-through 
for the CARIFORUM Region at the Montego Bay meeting between the Heads of 
Government of CARICOM and the EU Commissioners Peter Mandelson and Louis 
Mitchell, in early October 2007. The Commissioners had convinced the CARIFORUM 
Political Leaders as to their commitments and source of funding to deal with the 
implementation of the EPA in the region. The EU issued its Aid-for-Trade strategy for 
the region very soon after that meeting as it seemed to have been quite pleased that the 
region had agreed to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2007646.   
 
The Caribbean bargained hard for the Aid package outlined by the European Union, 
indeed the CARIFORUM States made it very clear to the European Union that without 
the assurances of the funding they were prepared not to sign the EPA as it would be for 
too burdensome and beyond their capacity to implement. Therefore the assurances 
must be forth coming in order to bring the negotiations to a conclusion to the relief of 
both sides. Between 2002 and 2007 the Regions received £76 million for Regional 
cooperation under the 9th EDF for capacity building, supporting regional integration, 
enhancement of competitiveness and to facilitate transition in certain Agricultural Areas 
to include Banana, Sugar and Rice.  
Provisions were made under the 10th EDF for the region to receive €165 million for 
Regional Integration and the EPA. Provisions are also in place for National Indicative 
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Program which is tied to the EPA, to include areas such as competitiveness, good 
governance and public administrative reform and Infrastructural enhancement, in the 
sum of €454 million or 75% of €600 million up to 2020. A third financial Protocol to go 
beyond 2013 was proposed. In addition, the European Member States have agreed to 
commit a share of their Aid for Trade budget which is expected to reach annual amount 
of €1 billion by 2010, for trade related assistance. CARIFORUM States will share in the 
50% which will be allocated to ACP States. The EU has also committed to lobby other 
donor for support for CARIFORUM Aid support,647 of the €165 million was allocated 
under the 10th EDF to the Caribbean States of €132 million will be used in the 
CARIFORUM Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP) and €33 million for EPA 
implementation. However, from the €132 million Regional Governments have agreed to 
allocate 30% of that sum for the EPA implementation. The total sum for EPA 
implementation related activities is €72.6 million. There is also a further amount of €2.7 
billion in the 10th EDF for all ACP facilities for EPA application648. 
 
5.6.3 Negotiating within Time Constraint 
Unlike, all pervious negotiations with the EC and ACP States negotiating the EPA had 
to be completed within the scheduled, because of the WTO waiver. The agreement had 
to be in place on or before the 31st December 2007; when the waiver granted by the 
WTO for the Cotonou Agreement in 2007 would expire. Both the ACP and the EU were 
well aware of the consequences of not meeting the deadline.  
The EU wanted to meet the deadline because of two reasons: (1) Its international 
prestige as a global actor and (2) to have a template to re-start the Doha Round of 
W.T.O talks. For the CARIFORUM States, what was at stake was mainly (1) their 
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economic future and stability and (2) strengthening their place in the global political 
economy649 Having agreed to the mid-term review of the Lomé IV convention which 
precipitated the Cotonou Agreement, meant that these countries were but bound as 
Member State of the WTO to abide by the rules of the global trade regime in order to 
maintain credibility. 
It is argued that to have agreed to the fragmentation of the ACP into Regional Trade 
Association (RTA) to negotiate the EPA created a monumental challenge to the lesser 
partners who had always negotiated with Europe collectively. However, this aspect of 
the agreement was infused at the insistence of Europe which found it extremely difficult 
to achieve its objectives at the multilateral level, firmly believed that the way forward to 
achieve multilateral arrangement for trade regime which reflect European value was to 
negotiate at two levels to established agreement. Firstly, to negotiate at the multilateral 
level to set the Global Agenda and secondly to negotiate that said Agenda at the 
bilateral level through RTA and country to country bilateral agreements. 
 
The timing of the EPA agreement therefore became very important to Europe because 
for the entire period of the EPA negotiation, the talks at the multilateral level were 
stalled, indeed negotiation at the regional level for various Free Trade Agreement 
involving other global competitors were very slow650 Therefore the negotiations for the 
EPA’s had taken central stage in Global Trade negotiations. Europe had an opportunity 
to influence the atmosphere for the resumption of Global Trade talks. 
 
So while  at the conclusion of the all ACP State negotiations, the EC was well aware the 
apart from the CARICOM States, the rest of the ACP configurations neither had the 
level of regional integration nor did they have for the most part, the financial nor 
infrastructural capacities to successfully accomplish that task within the time limitations. 
South Africa had a free trade agreement with the EC negotiated in Indeed, of the entire 
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Six ACP regional configuration, only the Caribbean had a stable, albeit weak regional 
infrastructure to undertake such negotiation. But the regions were caught up into an 
international trade regime from which they could not resist or refuse to participate. So, 
what the ACP and EU had set out to achieve collectively, and also for their individual 
self interest would therefore influence how the negotiations would precede and 
ultimately impact the deadline. 
From the very outset, there was a move on the part of the ACP states to delay the 
negotiating process. Some State within the ACP, felt that the negotiations presented an 
opportunity to extract addition Aid Funding from the EU and therefore to “drag” out the 
process would be a tactical advantage to meet their objective of achieving more Aid 
from the EU651.  
 
The CARIFORUM States however did not share those views and saw the process in an 
entirely different perspective. They viewed these negotiations seriously to protect their 
interest in the wider Global Trade regime652 was severely threatened because; of the six 
regional configuration only the Caribbean had a majority of non-LCD’s both in numerical 
and percentage terms within the ACP group. Indeed, Haiti is the only LDC among the 
fifteen member CARIFORUM configuration. This meant that the EPA would be very 
challenging but a realistic option for the region and therefore to craft a new agreement 
which offers  better alternative than the GSP and be W.T.O. compatible within the time 
would be a “win-win” for the region. So at all levels, the region was committed to 
complete the negotiations within time. 
 
The CARIFORUM States had an early appreciation as to the direction in which the 
European’s trade and aid policy were pointing and had warned the ACP as to the 
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potential dangers of negotiating separately653. The political pendulum and economic 
imperative had changed since 1975, and time was of essence for both sides, but for 
different reasons, and each could not afford to fail in that regard.  
 
The position of Europe in terms of its outlook towards the CARIFORUM Region was 
aptly put by Baroness Young of the United Kingdom as early as 1996,during the mid-
term review of Lomé in a speech given at the University of the West Indies (UWI) in 
relations to the future of the relationship between both sides she said “It follows that 
whatever happens after 2000 will have to be negotiated against a back-ground of a 
changed world in which many EU member States question every aspect of EU 
development policy, let alone ask why there should be a special relation with a limited 
group of nations. The message is clear; the scenario will be bleak for any ACP nation 
unable to adapt to their new reality. These issues are no longer about morality. The 
conclusion is now almost certainly the defining truth about ACP/EU relations.”654  
Two years later, the Hon. Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados, recognizing the 
direction in which both the EU and the Global imperative were pushing the developing 
countries of the ACP in defining the level of cooperation between the North and the 
South, had remarked at the 23rd ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting in terms “there is 
clear intention in the draft directives [of the EU] to split the ACP into three or even six 
parts for the trade negotiations which are to begin in 2000’655. He argued that this is “not 
the regionalization of which the ACP speaks in the Libreville Declaration; indeed it is 
precisely the opposite. The commission had been repeatedly told of our determination 
to maintain ACP solidarity and the integrity of the ACP as a negotiating partner. This 
should be the fundamental basis for the future negotiations. But it will be jeopardized 
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from the onset were we agree to the negotiating structures that the EU is now 
contemplating”656. He further explained the regions position and said that it is 
“convinced that the present agreement which exist between 15 European and 71 ACP 
is worthy of a more enlightened succession in the mutual interest of all other countries 
concerned”657.  
Europe seemed well aware that many of the ACP regions were not ready to negotiate, 
but with support of the Francophone African States in particular and the LDCs which 
had no real incentives to negotiate an EPA, nor the structures so to do agreed to 
negotiate separately with Europe, but not only were these countries not possess the 
capacity to negotiate singularly, their decisions placed grave pressure on the non-LCD’s 
to negotiate the best agreement they could craft within the limited time. 
 
The compression of time limitation further compounded the options available to the 
CARIFORUM States because, even though the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 
2000, it was held up in a lengthy negotiation process at the WTO. and was only settled 
at the Ministerial in Qatar in November, 2001. By then almost eighteen months were lost 
leading into the negotiation for the EPA, because the waiver obtained was scheduled to 
expire on the 31st December 2007. Phase one of the negotiation; the All ACP launched 
in September 2002, and ended October 2003 did not achieve much, not merely 
because of the ACP insistence on getting a binding legal framework but because the 
EU was not prepared to bind the agreement of that level, because to create a binding 
framework at that level, would leave the EU very little room to have wheeled their 
influence on the group of 79.  
The All ACP level was not a success from the point of view of the objectives of the ACP 
States so some groups went into the regional phase disillusioned, confused, ill prepared 
and indeed time disadvantaged. The EU was not so affected. Therefore, when the 
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CARIFORUM-EU Negotiations were launched both sides were aware of the challenges 
ahead but the CARIFORUM had more to lose if not completed in time, in short the result 
would be economically disastrous. The CARIFORUM was not the first to accept Pascal 
Lamy’s offer, but was obliged once another region had accepted. From then onwards 
the EU was no longer under any real pressure, because the impetus to complete was 
basically a matter for those who wanted a better deal than what the GSP offered, and 
therefore had to negotiate to meet the time line. The Caribbean was the only region to 
have shown the desire and commitment to negotiate a comprehensive agreement 
because of the calibrations of the ACP group and their various stages of economic and 
infrastructural development. 
Between 2004 and mid 2006, the CARIFORUM lost valuable time because of the way in 
which the EU was carrying the negotiation, by placing great emphasis on the trade 
aspect of the arrangement and not focused on the development dimension. 
What the EU tried to do was to separate the two dimensions of the negotiation by 
arguing that the development dimensions were already settled and are provided for in 
the Cotonou Agreement. The CARIFORUM state took a different view and argued that 
the Cotonou provisions are wide enough to engage the European’s on the question of 
development Aid, beyond its narrow confines of the EDF and other existing medium. 
The Caribbean viewed question of development in a wider context and believed that the 
EC interpretation of development. The EC took the view that the issue of development 
was firmly dealt with in the Cotonou agreement. This divergence of views was only 
narrowed late in 2006; after a relentless campaign by the NGO, and the Caribbean 
political negotiator Dame Billie Miller of Barbados with support from the British 
Parliament and the wider ACP group. 
In order to move the process along, the EU offered Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) 
access for all products exported to the EU from ACP States except for Banana, Rice, 
Sugar, Rum and boveen meats, but this hardly affected the Caribbean State, most of 
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which were already benefiting from the Lomé and the Cotonou Agreements for non-
reciprocal trade Arrangements, but only to the extent that this offer placed the region on 
the same footing with the LCD’s under EPA initiative. However, the CARIFORUM 
preferred this offer in a trade Agreement than through the GSP or EBA which was more 
susceptible to policy changes and the regions global trade. The region felt it better 
taking the DFQF offer in a binding than under a policy directive which is subject to 
change. 
By the beginning of 2007, it became clear to both sides that time was of great 
importance if an Agreement is to be reached within the deadline. So while the European 
rhetoric echoed across ACP, that the European would accept no less than a 
comprehensive EPA, it was clear to the other five configurations that a comprehensive 
agreement was not possible, indeed other than the CARIFORUM configuration no other 
had shown any interest and under mounting pressure from within and external to the 
EU, the negotiators had to change their stance on pressing for a comprehensive EPA 
across the wider ACP Group. However, only the CARIFORUM States continued on 
course to complete. The Caribbean stance caused some disgust among its other now 
LCD partners, but by then the region had gone too far to retreat. The EU began to press 
the region to stay on course to complete on time knowing that the Caribbean is among 
the least valuable in terms of EU exports and sources of its imports and the 
CARIFORUM Stated needed and agreement and was so committed658.   
The region felt it had leverage, because the EU would be left without a comprehensive 
EPA to show after five years of negotiation. This would of course be unprecedented in 
bilateral trade agreement with a singular block of former colonies and the EU. So as the 
EU stepped up the pressure for the Caribbean to stay on course to complete a 
comprehensive agreement, the EU became concerned about emerging opinions that 
the region should not enter a comprehensive agreement, arguing for the region to sign 
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an interim goods only agreement. The EU threatened consequence first, if there was no 
agreement and secondly expressed its displeasure about “a goods” only agreement 
with the CARIFORUM states659.  
As late as September 2007, a mere three months before the deadline in a speech to the 
European Parliament’s International Trade Committee  the Trade Commissioner argued 
that if the EU and the ACP had  “no new trade regime in place by the end of this year 
the Commission has no legal option but to offer the region concern GSP preference. 
This deadline is not a bluff or some negotiating tactics invented in Brussels. It is an 
external reality created in the WTO in Geneva”660 He emphasized that the EU is 
“committed to replace Cotonou trade preference with a new trade Regime that does not 
discriminate against non-ACP developing countries “and that continued by expressing it 
must be done by January, 2008”661. 
A powerful signal was sent to the ACP States by Mr. Mandelson when he addressed the 
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament on the 11th of September 
2007. There in his assessment of the state of the negotiation across the entire ACP 
Regional Configuration beginning with the CARIFORUM states he argued that over two 
thirds of the text was agreed, but market access was a big problem, he left the door 
wide open for the CARIFORUM to place their offer when he stated that if the EC 
“receive the CARIFORUM offer within the next two weeks, then the parties would be 
able to finish the negotiation on time to meet the entry date of January 1st 2008. But if 
the parties failed the Caribbean will be “serious difficulty662”.  
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The Caribbean was therefore placed in a very precipitous but unique situation, while the 
Pacific’s States difficulties were treated as particular, and accordingly the Region’s 
position was emitting “confused and conflicting messages”663 other than Sugar and 
Fisheries, the Pacific had no real trade interest for Europe, as most of their trade was 
done with Australia and New Zealand. Africa was of vital interest to Europe and had to 
be dealt with so much according to the dictate of Europe especially among the none-
LDC of the continent of the 47 ACP states in Africa, 33 designated LDCs by Europe at 
the time the EPA was being negotiated. Therefore only fourteen (14) of the African 
States664 were in the similar position as the CARIFORUM fifteen except Haiti; all of the 
Pacific States were among the LDCs of the ACP Group of States. LDCs had no real 
impetus to negotiate on EPA because of the EBA initiative.  
Nigeria on the other hand, decided to settle for “a goods” only agreement. By then 
Europe had given up on any hope of getting a comprehensive deal from neither the 
African nor the Pacific Forum of ACP states, within less than a month to the Montego 
Bay meeting held on the 7th of October 2007, the EC had thrown open the door for 
conciliation to reach an agreement with the Caribbean when Mr. Mandelson reiterate 
before the European Parliament International Trade committee that although WTO 
compatible cannot be circumvented “reciprocity will be strongly Asymmetrical, in form of 
the ACP. It can be flexible enough to allow the ACP to protect their sensitive sectors 
and it can be phased in over many years665.” 
In his final charge to the region, the EC trade commission bearded open the EU’s case 
and pleaded for success of the EPA negotiations when in closing the Address to 
Committee he said “let me be clear in the time we have available the [EU] will do 
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everything [it] can to ensure the ACP regions get the best legally secure EU market 
accessible… the EPA, remain attainable for every region and [the EU] will continue to 
work for success.” But, he argued that the EU cannot negotiate with itself and in 
appealing to the ACP region he expressed the hope that “those in a position to do so 
will encourage this negotiation to take place in a sensible and responsible way”666. This 
was the most experimental and convincing utterance to have come from the trade 
commissioner, but he avoided the issue of development supported need to give effect to 
the EPA, though committing the EU to implement rapidly the legislative and procedural 
steps to avoid possible WTO challenge. This statement was very encouraging to the 
CARIFORUM States in light of the outstanding issues and the pending visit to the 
Region by commissioners Mandelson and Louis Michell DG Trade and Development 
respectively.  
That was the Atmosphere in which the CARIFORUM States were hoping for by the end 
of the negotiation. The EU had now publicly committed itself to doo all it could to assure 
success in closing the EPA negotiations and have an Agreement in place by Dec. 31st 
2007. It was now not just the Caribbean which could not risk failure, both the EU and 
the CARIFORUM States were vulnerable to the possibility of failure; in light of the least 
likelihood of an application for an extension of time to complete. By then it was virtually 
impossible to given the time left to complete and the period necessary for approval of 
any waiver. In any event the EU would prefer to apply the GSP than to take the 
humiliating and otherwise very costly step of applying for waiver. The option of a waiver 
was definitely not on the table; for either side667. “Therefore, for the CARIFORUM in 
particular the necessity for meeting the deadline for the completion of the EPA was 
pragmatic and did not emanate from pressure from the EC”668. Indeed, when the 
Montego Bay meeting was completed October 4-5th 2007, it was clear that both sides 
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had made significant breakthrough in many areas669. CARICOM had tabled its proposal 
on market access, but wanted assurances of aid support to secure the viability of the 
regions sugar industry and also sustain the Banana Industry. The Region also received 
further guidance on market access and the MFN Arrangements, and the EU laid out its 
development assistance programs for the region to include Aid for trade and their 
support670.The EC wanted to get an agreement by end of October and pressed the 
CARIFORUM States, but they resisted, the regions had a lot of concerns, more so 
because of the EC’s unilateral denunciation of the Sugar Protocol. Even then the some 
Caribbean leaders want to take legal action against the EU671.   
The Head of CARIFORUM State, again meet in Georgetown Guyana on the 7th of Dec. 
a mere nine days before the agreement was initialled to prepare its final W.T.O 
compatible offer to the EC; a meeting in which Host President H.E. Bharrat Jagdeo of 
Guyana was quite pivotal, in his role as host to have the region closed the negotiation 
on time. Interesting, some of most ardent critics of the CARIFORUM EPA were present 
and participated, not only at the Prime Ministerial and political levels, but as civil society 
and academia. So clearance was given by the region to conclude the negotiation. 
Therefore, Prime Minister Bruce Golding, in his capacity as the chairman of the Prime 
Ministerial Sub-committee on external trade wrote to the President of the European 
Commission on the 10th of October, 2007, giving him the assurance that the region will 
present its final offer by the 31st of December, 2007.  
The CARIFORUM States were in a state of cautious optimism as Prime Minister 
Golding stated in his letter that the region appreciated “…the substantial services offer 
                                                        
669 Interview‐ Sam Chandler, Barbados and Henry Gill, Barbados. 
 
670 RNM update 0713, October 11, 2007. 
 
671 Owen Arthur PM of Barbados & Barras Jagdeo, President of Guyana. See Sir Sanders, Ronald “ACP and EU 
should seek waiver to complete EPAs”, Caribseek, Caribbean News Oct.12, 2007. 
367 
 
 
made by the European Community and its member State”672 and also that “…in order to 
conclude a service agreement it is critical that the European Union provide market 
access in a sector that is of fundamental importance to [Region] stakeholder, namely 
Entertainment and Recreation”673 He pointed to the fact that notwithstanding the special 
protocol on cultural cooperation imbedded in the text some EC member States were 
resisting the ‘terms of temporary entry (mode 4) for contractual service suppliers and 
independent professional in a Entertainment and Recreation, notwithstanding 
CARIFORUM’s submission of various proposal in this regard” 674. He argued that while 
in other areas of the EPA, service suppliers will need to build capacity over time, in the 
area of the regions artist and entertainers; the benefit would be immediate increasing 
“greater trade and economic interaction between the two regions”675. The P.M. 
succinctly place the potential blame if there were to be any failure to complete on time 
squarely within the area of the EU, within days the response was forth coming on the 
Caribbean had decided that this proposal was a quid pro quo at the instance of 
Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur.  
The EC then made further concessions arising from the CARIFORUM late demands 
and therefore when the both sides met in Barbados for the final negotiation session, the 
EC had made all the concessions it could, but the CARIFORUM negotiators need the 
final positions of all the States through their Heads the MFN treatment was the last 
issue to be agreed in the early hours of the morning of the 16th December, 2007. 
The negotiations were concluded with the concurrence of all the regional leadership on 
the night of December 16, 2007 in Bridgetown Barbados. The leadership of the region 
proclaimed that the deal was the best they could have had given the realities of the 
                                                        
672 Letter from Prime Minister Golding to the President of the European Commission December, 10, 2007. 
 
673 Ibid. 
 
674 Ibid. 
 
675 Ibid. 
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current global political economy and the value of the region in terms of the volume of 
their contribution to World Trade. The CARIFORUM was the only region to have 
completed a comprehensive EPA on time.676   
These CARIFORUM State had an interest in the outcome which went beyond just 
getting an agreement in place, indeed the region wanted and outcome which would 
satisfy its constituents, would not be offensive to the solidarity of the wider developing 
world especially the ACP States and at the same time would not undermine the tenor 
and spirit of the approach of the developing countries in the multilateral system in light 
of the Doha Development  Agenda and the demands of the and experiences of Seattle 
and Cancun. But, most of all it wanted to maintain it international credibility. 
5.7      The Role of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) 
The CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery was established in 1998 by Regional 
Policy Agreement of the Regional Heads of state. The organization though having no 
legal status within the Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), and the Single Market and Economy (CSME), it was the thinking of the 
Region that it needs to develop specialist negotiating skills and experience because of 
the technicality involved with negotiating trade in a very hostile global political economy. 
But, while the CRNM did not fall within the formal structure of CARICOM Institutions, it 
was held in place by Policy and Consensus of the Regional Head with the intention that 
it would become an arm of the Regional Secretariat.677 The policy position was that the 
CRNM would be reporting to the COTED and the COTED would make 
recommendations to the Heads of Government. The Financial Structure and Regimes 
                                                        
676 By 31st December 2007 deadline for the EPAs to be signed. A number of States‐including Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire‐initialled interim EPAs before the deadline. However countries like 
Senegal refused to sign until development concerns were seriously addressed. In 2008, negotiations had 
continued As at October 2009. The following was the position with the EPA’s across the ACP Region. 
 
677 Interview with Dame Billie Miller May 22, 2009 Kingston Jamaica. 
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for operating the office of the CRNM was not made a part of the CARICOM Secretariat 
establishment. These two areas were to become a major source of regional politicking c 
for “turf” within the rank of both the Secretariat and CRNM678.   
This was so because these were direct channels of communication opened to the first 
Head679 of the CRNM because of his status and personal interaction and exposure to all 
the Regional Heads which was viewed as an affront to the Trade Ministers in the 
COTED to whom the CRNM should report, and secondly the question of remuneration 
between the two organization were of major concerns. The extent to which the EPA was 
Negotiations were conducted along ethical traditions had become a matter for great 
public debate and the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery was in charge of 
developing policy positions for negotiation and to coordinate the negotiating processes.  
However the real problem did not rest with the CRNM, but indeed the Political 
Directorate. The CRNM did carry out its mandate and widen the consultative process, 
however when it submitted its reports and findings, these were either not read or the 
technical teams failed to communicate what they had observed in any structured way to 
their constituents. There seems to have been a clear failure of the political directorate to 
communicate to the people of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the institutions of Caricom 
and the CRNM. This failure was laid at the heart of the public criticisms of the 
agreement which almost derailed its signing680.  
The Caribbean Community was established in 1973 by The Treaty of Chaguaramas and 
the Conference of the Heads of Government is the highest political Authority and the 
Secretariat is located in Georgetown, Guyana. The CARICOM Head establish the 
Caribbean Regional Machinery to take charge of and lead the processes of developing 
                                                        
678 Interview‐ a Representative of the CRNM. 
 
679 Interview‐ Dame Billie Miller, May 22, 2009. Kingston, Jamaica. 
680 Interview‐ Ricky Singh June 22, 2009. Barbados. 
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external trade strategies, coordination and execute the external trade negotiations on 
behalf of the region. Established in February, 1997681, the organization was never 
meant to nor designed to function as a supra-national Institutions. It existed 
independently of the CARICOM formal institutions under the treaty and it has only been 
placed under the CARICOM Secretariat as a specialized unit in 2009. 
The organization from its inception had reported directly to the regions political heads 
and the Prime Ministerial Sub Committee (PMSC), but could only do so through the 
formal organs of the CARICOM arrangement; of which it was not a part of, 682 by policy 
directives, it also reported to the COTED but not to the Secretary-General of CARICOM. 
This factor became a source of disquiet in some areas of the formal Institutions. So also 
was its level of autonomy in managing its own affairs and seeking funding for projects it 
wish to undertake. At the launch of the CARIFORUM EPA, this organization was 
unique683, because of its authority to oversee the external trade negotiations on behalf 
of the region, although it operated only on the basis of a policy decision of the regional 
heads and with-out formal legitimacy under in the Legal order of the CARICOM 
establishment. It also had no status within the ACP regime and formal Institutions684 
neither was it recognized in the W.T.O formal regime685, but that notwithstanding it was 
allowed to participate in all the trade for a in which the Caribbean is active. 
 
                                                        
681 The RNM was established through two‐sub Prime Ministerial committees the PMSC and Bureau which 
forwarded their proposals to the Heads of Gov. at their Inter sessional meeting in February 1997 which they 
were adopted. 
 
682 Cedric Grant. “An experiment in Supra‐national Governance: The Caribbean Regional Negotiation 
machinery.  
 
683 San Biler Op.Cit. 
 
684 Ibid p. 50. 
 
685 Ibid p.53. 
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5.8 The CARIFORUM’s  EPA Mandate 
Having commenced the Negotiation for the FTAA, the RNM had developed 
competencies in negotiating Free Trade Agreement for which a mandate had to be 
given by the Heads of Government of the CARIFORUM States. The CRNM had 
problem in shaping the mandate for the All-ACP for the EPA, because the organization 
was not reorganized by the ACP-Forum Structure686which for the purposes of 
Negotiations with the EU, only the Committee of Ambassador were empowered to 
negotiate and the Council of Ministers issue directive and provide political guidance.  
The difficult task of managing the negotiation process from development of the mandate 
to the actual initialling of the Agreement was a historic process of the dynamism of 
Caribbean regional ability to have joint action but preserve sovereignty. The CRNM was 
therefore responsible for removing the ad hoc methods of trade negotiations and 
regional decision and to develop trade strategies and policy coherently and to oversee 
all external trade negotiation processes. 
The question of the efficacy and ethical conduct of the negotiations for the EPA find its 
resolved in the various mix and ebb and flow of the decision making processes, agenda 
setting and final outcome of the negotiation to include formulation of negotiating 
position, the directives of the `political head and to address the extent of the Gaps and 
disconnection in the process from formulation to execution on the mechanism to 
facilitate those processes. 
5.9      EU’s strategies and the CARIFORUM response 
By introducing the Aid for Trade and the Doha Development Agenda at the Doha 
ministerial, November 2001, and also the “everything but Arms” (EBA) Initiative which 
precede that meeting, the EU had intended to influence the ACP Partners and other 
developing countries into supporting the new round of negotiation. The EU tried 
                                                        
686 Cedric Grant Op.Cit. p.47. 
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unsuccessfully to get the multilateral trade talks started; having been stalled for months 
took the opportunity presented by the EPA negotiations to get some trade discussions 
moving. Indeed, the FTAA was also stalled, so the EPA negotiations were the only trade 
discussions which were in progress.   
So having rejected the ACP’s proposal for a joint ACP-EU steering committee on the 
WTO Negotiation, the EU was expecting, notwithstanding, that the ACP would have 
supported their agenda at the multilateral level on the basis of the Development agenda 
which should benefit the ACP States. This expectation was not fulfilled, indeed the EU 
was left quite exposed that it had to make a last ditch effort to savage the Cancun 
Ministerial. In the end the ACP States would not give its support until the interests of the 
developing South were addressed. To this position they held steadfast.  The developing 
countries position was summed up by the Belizean Minister when he stated in the 
aftermath of Cancun that “no deal is better than a bad deal.”687  
The efforts to negotiate on the Singapore issues were sternly resisted by the more 
influential Developing countries of Brazil, and India, Malaysia and Pakistan, but got 
support from other third world countries, which the EU and Japan were the main 
proponents. A Group of Developing country had long expressed their opposition to 
negotiating these issues at the multilateral level, but were pressing their case for special 
and differential treatment for developing countries especially the LDC’s.  
The leadership role played by Brazil, China and, India in  the  emergence of the group 
of 22 and the determination of the ACP/LDC, the African Union and the alliance of the 
small economies were very pivotal to the outcome of the Cancun Ministerial. The EU 
had to take stock of its position in the multilateral negotiations in light of the divergences 
between itself and the US on Agricultural Subsidies. The US had to begin focusing on 
bilateral and RTA to effectively re-engage at the multilateral level, but this could only 
                                                        
687 Richard L. Bernal “The Doha Development Agenda after Cancun: An insider view presentation at the 
second CEPII‐IDB Conference “Economic Implications of the Doha Development Agenda for Latin America 
and the Caribbean.” Inter American Development Bank Washington DC. 
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take shape after the Presidential Elections of 2004. However, the EU had an advantage 
in time and clientele over the US as it was already in the midst of negotiation with 79 of 
the World’s Developing countries of the South to craft a free Trade Agreement 
compatible with the Rules of the WTO to replace the non-reciprocal Trade arrangement 
under the Cotonou Agreements. 
The CARIFORUM States recognized the opportunity to engage the EU, because the EU 
itself wanted a partner to make the break-through to re-engage at the multilateral level. 
By then it was quite clear to the CARIFORUM States that the FTAA negotiation were at 
standstill and was basically laid to rest by the Bush Administration and therefore the 
EPA negotiation had to take center stage . 
How the CARIFORUM and the EU managed the negotiation to craft a comprehensive 
EPA was a testament of their creative skills and diplomatic manoeuvring in opening up 
markets while protecting vital interests on both sides. It was an exercise of economic 
state craft of enormous proportions and unprecedented in the CARIFORUM regional 
history  of trade negotiations as none of the opposing party wanted to fail, but for  each 
to meet their objectives of gaining as much and conceding as little as possible. The 
question of moral fortitude not being a relevant issue, as the EU took a Machiavellian 
approach in pursuing their mercantilist trade policy as a Global player at all cost688. The 
CARIFORUM States though small and vulnerable were not prepared to “give-in” without 
extracting as much as it could from the EC. The role of the CRNM in this regard was 
very testing, but for the region, Europe had understood that what they were negotiating 
was free trade with development dimension, not a non-reciprocal agreement with aid 
support689.  
 
                                                        
688 Katharina Anna Serrano “Economic Partnership Agreement: Machiavellian Instruments of EU trade policy 
or Samaritan development tools? International Journal of Private Law 2009. Vol. 2 No. 3 p. 290. 
 
689 Interview‐ Sam Chandler, Barbados, June 10, 2009.  
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5.10 Sources of funding for EPA negotiation 
From its very inception, the first head of the CRNM, Sir Shirdath was quite emphatic in 
maintaining that the primary responsibility for financing the RNM should be that of the 
member States of CARICOM, but that the business community should also be called 
upon to assist690.It is without doubt therefore that even though Regional Government 
supported the CRNM Budget, international Institution and bilateral donor’s have 
significantly support the funding of the CRNM’s work. 
Realizing the severe difficulties in designing donor programs in order to assist trade 
negotiation, the CRNM was very clinical in its reliance and use of external support, 
knowing very well possibilities of donor bias. Therefore while it welcomes donor 
assistance, it aimed to achieve maximum benefit by involving its permanent staff to a 
large degree in preparation of discussion papers than upon short-term employees and 
consultants and external expertise.691 
The EU and Member States provided financial support to the CRNM, but it was the 
CRNM in the main which selected the expertise to provide the services it need. So even 
though as a matter of principle accepting financial and technical assistance from those 
parties on the other side of the negotiating process is dangerous and possible very 
compromising and not to be avoided, the reality is that the CARIFORUM States through 
the CRNM had very little choice but to accept the assistance, but had to be determined 
to walk away from an offer of assistance when it does not meet the region’s 
expectation692. 
The EU’s privileged position as a donor created a kind of paradox which the Caribbean 
was determined to minimize and to a large extent reconcile in the negotiation process in 
                                                        
690 Cedric Grant Op.Cit. p. 36. 
 
691 Interview– Henry Gill, Barbados June…2009. 
 
692 Ibid. 
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its attempt to secure an equal and balanced agreement because as the EU attempted 
to exert its influence as a provider of resources the CARIFORUM States made it very 
clear that what they were negotiating was a Free Trade agreement and not a non-
reciprocal Trade arrangement and they were not prepared to negotiate out of fear or on 
bending knees with Cap in hand693.So, while the CARIFORUM States accepted the 
EU’s support in financing negotiators attendance at negotiating meetings and for 
national and regional consultation, the region was equally conscious of the need to 
resist any EU’s attempt to use such offers as potential sources to influence the outcome 
of the negotiations, or consultations.  
The CRNM took charge and directed its activities consciously independent of donor’s 
bias in the dynamics of the negotiation process. For example the EU having done its 
research in tax governance and demanded to negotiate a tax governance regime to 
which the region flatly rejected694. 
The CARIFORUM States had to use their opening and offers to foster and facilitate its 
own agenda and trade strategies, fully cognizant that what was agreed though subject 
to review in the future, was in fact a onetime negotiation arrangement which will impact 
the future of its trading relations not only with Europe but North America, and indeed the 
global political economy. It therefore could not allow itself to be left exposed on the altar 
of expediency and donor handout.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
693 Interview‐ Sam Chandler. Barbados. June. 2009. 
 
694 Bernal, Richard. “Globalization: Everything But Arms” Op.Cit. p. 28.  
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5.11    EC threatened CARIFORUM States  
It is a commonly held view that the EU uses its own tactics to get the Caribbean to initial 
the agreement before 31st Dec. 2007 and also in getting them to sign. 
It is widely believed that the EU’s threat of imposing GSP or higher tariff to force the 
CARIFORUM States to initial the Agreement; and after the Agreement was initialled it 
wanted the signing  to be done as quickly as possible to avoid  any embarrassment. 
The first secretary of the European commission in Jamaica had stated publicly695 that 
the preferential treatment offered to Caribbean Countries would expire on the 31st Dec. 
2008. This was later denied by the EC, which stated that the Council Regulation 
1528/2007 OJL348.31.12.2007 has no expiry date and only the council can repeal it.696  
While CARICOM Heads struggled to come to a consensus to sign the EPA a special 
summit meeting was called in Barbados in Sept. 2008, to agree on appropriate date for 
signing with the EC pressing the CARIFORUM States to sign. 
By then Guyana which had refused to sign had a national consultation prior to signing a 
“consensus statement” was issued following the meetings of stakeholders in time for the 
Barbados meeting which would take the decisions to sign. The mandate was for 
Guyana to sign a “goods only” agreement and await a further review of the EPA. 
Guyana action threatened the unity of the CARICOM States but it was prepared to sign 
a goods only agreement, by itself which the rest could sign a comprehensive 
agreement. 
The Barbados Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade  Chris Sinkler, was not 
phased with the stance of Guyana and commented that it was “passing strange” that 
having mandated the CRNM to complete the negotiation for full EPA it now raising 
                                                        
695 See Gleaner 29th August 2008. 
 
696 Sir Ronald Saunders “Europe’s ploy to secure EPA signing coming to light” Caribbean 360. com October 3, 
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criticisms it”.697 However, even the Barbadian Foreign Minister seemed to have been 
speaking in a manner which amounted to ‘double talk”, because he was a leading critic 
of the EPA, while he was an opposition spokesperson and a member of a Caribbean 
based N.G.O, which were very vocal against the EPA, but as soon as he became the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade following the election in Barbados January 
2008, he embraced the EPA seemingly wholeheartedly.. 
In 2005, when he took office Mandelson had given assurance that the benefits under 
the Sugar protocol would be safeguarded in the EPA but late he reneged on those 
assurance and on the 4th April 2007, he made the EU’s market access offer; which 
provide duty free quota free export to All ACP States except South Africa and that the 
Sugar protocol be effectively be replaced by Sept. 2009. Without granting the ACP an 
opportunity of a joint review as required under Cotonou and at the same time 
Mandelson and the Commission applied pressure on the 17 ACP Sugar protocol States 
to mutually consent to the denunciation. Not only that the commission denounced the 
Agreement, it pressured the sugar protocol states to accept the minimum price paid by 
EU importers.698  
The Guyana stakeholders had rejected the EPA arguing that it undermined the C.S.M.E 
and they were opposed to the including of the Singapore Issues at their consultation on 
the 5th September 2008, they mandate president Jagdeo to advise CARICOM Heads at 
their forth coming meeting in Barbados September 10th,that Guyana would only sign a 
goods only agreement. They urged President Jagdeo to send a delegation to the ACP 
meeting in Ghana October 2-3, 2008 and expressed alarm at the CARIFORUM signing 
and agreement on the eve of the Ghana meeting. 
                                                        
697 Ricky Singh “EPA nightmare” Jamaica observer Sept. 8, 2008. 
698 Phil Pascal. “EU’s “About‐Face” on sugar protocol. A betrayal for ACP producers. Guyana Chronicle, July 16, 
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The group felt that EU was exerting pressure and threats and persons at the meeting 
were visibly offended when Karl Falkenberg of the EU indicated that hen expected 
Guyana and the rest of the Caribbean Governments to sign the agreement without 
further discussion.699 
Ms. Gleny’s Kinnock, Labour M.P. for Wales. E. Parliament member argued that strict 
sanitary and phytosanitary rules in Europe could, may cause problems for ACP 
exporters and put them at a disadvantage.700 “The negotiations were conducted in a 
positive and cooperative spirit”701 The EC rejected the suggestion that CARIFORUM 
were forced into the Agreement.702 
The Caribbean wanted an Agreement so was the EU. But as the time was running out 
the parties were deadlock in Nov-Dec. 2007, the first deadlock developed over Sugar, 
the second deadlock was caused by France refusing to allow Regional entertainers to 
work in Europe, but the area was very important to CARIFORUM. The Barbadian P.M 
Owen Arthur insisted that the Region was “prepared to draw a line in the sand” and walk 
away without an agreement in cultural workers were not allowed free entry into Europe, 
only Austria and Germany has placed restriction.703 Louis Michel and Peter Mandelson 
described the deal as “an innovation and ambitious package704” 
                                                        
699 Stakeholder’s consensus statement. 5th Sept. 2008. Georgetown, Guyana. 
 
700 Sankey, Pete. EC rejects view CARIFORUM forced into EPA. Jamaica Observer (April 28, 2008). 
 
701 Interview‐ Americo Belriglia Zamfifti. EU Headquarters, Brussels, May 5, 2009. 
 
702 Ibid. 
 
703 Williamson, Bert: Caribbean/EU: Pact sets timeline for Trade liberalization. Global information network. 
New York Dec. 24, 2007 p.1.  
 
704 Jessop, David. “All or nothing the Caribbean EPA” Trade Negotiations Insight. Vol.6. No. (8 Dec. 2007 and 
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At this meeting in Guyana on the 7th December, 2007, the CARICOM Heads of 
Government in an effort to avoid confrontation with Europe in light of the possibility of 
being slapped with higher tariffs or GSP, to protect sugar, banana, low priced rum and 
rice being subject to tariff, the region yield to Europe’s demand on liberalization of over 
80% of substantially all trade; and agreed to continue negotiation on the 14th December 
to conclude agreement.705While the region could have signed off them, if sought to 
continue on Dec. 14th to use the time as leverage to secure further improvement on the 
development dimension:706The CARIFORUM had resolved all the outstanding issues at 
the Guyana meeting on the 7th, but were very adamant about the question of cultural 
workers entering Europe to work freely.707 
From time to time the EU was at adds with the EC on several issues. For example, so 
strong were they on opening up ACP market and intellectual property protection that the 
European Parliament had to urge caution to the EC, and demanded that the EC 
refrained from making excessive demands on ACP, and requested that provision be 
made for them to protect local industries from surges in EU imports more particularly for 
farm products.708 
Brazil and India had objection to the MFN Clause in the EPA; Brazil in a settlement 
issued through its representative in Guyana, at the General Council meeting on the 5th 
Feb. 2008, arguing that the M.F.N clause in the EPA’s are restrictive of developing 
                                                        
705 Ibid. 
 
706 Ibid. 
 
707 Issues resolved: (1) Setting a formulation to achieve intra‐CARIFORUM cumulation (2) wanted a quota for 
sugar to be above 30, 000 tonnes (3) Retain safeguard cause against French OCTS. (4) secure a change in the 
percentage for calculating banana export tonnage (5) obtain greater clarity on funding and source of funds for 
EPA implementation and (6) gain concession on mode 4 for Entertainers and Cultural workers. 
 
708 EU, ACP determines to meet end‐of‐year deadline for EPAs. ICTSD Bridges weekly trade News Digest Vol.11. 
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countries in entering into meaningful trade arrangement with countries of the South as it 
place restrictions on access to the market by other non ACP developing countries.709  
The EU had been pressing for urgent implementation of the provisions of the 
CARIFORUM EPA, soon after it was a signed seemingly unconcern about the views of 
the CARICOM countries more so the LDCS of the Region. 
 In a statement issued by Dr. Mareika Meyn, the EC was urged to reduce the pressure 
being exerted but the EC arguing that “Given the complexity of the agreement and the 
lack of time, countries have had to reflect on its implication it is recommended that the 
EU exercise due restraint in enforcing its provisions” and hinted that if further analysis 
shows that post-signature revision is desirable this should be made possible”710. 
 
5.12    Conclusions 
The CARIFORUM States entered the negotiation very clear as to what they wanted to 
achieve and the kind of concession were wanted to make to secure the deal and also, 
where they were not prepared to concede. This strategy was offensive and defensive in 
this regard. Their advantage was the asymmetries which they exploit and used the 
negotiating structure to open up the EU’s stance and achieve their regions objectives. 
The structure and processes of the negotiations had advantages for the region, though 
these were very complex in nature and operationally. The consultation process which 
was executed through the Technical Working Group (TWG) which met before and after 
each session had served a useful purpose. The National consultation however, was 
less effective and involved in some territories. Indeed the consultation is some States 
                                                        
709 Statement by Brazil made to the General Council meeting of the W.T.O. 5th Feb. 2008. 
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were poorly attended.  However the CRNM was never daunted by the extent of its task 
to negotiate an Agreement of such magnitude within the limited time and with such a 
formidable opposition. The outcome of the negotiation can only be expressed or bench 
marked in terms of what the region had achieved in light of its stated goal; in order to 
determine how ethical the process had been. 
The Caribbean in negotiating this EPA had maintained the highest ethical standards in 
keeping with the expectation of its domestic, regional and International Reputation.711 It 
had set out to achieve the following: retain preferential accesses and minimal 
preference erosion, to protect the interest of its LDC’s under the regional umbrella, 
maximize market access to the EU market and to improve access in term of service in 
the European market to impact immediate returns, promote inward investments which 
are environmentally friendly and to improve the region’s competitiveness and impact 
economic diversification of the regional economies through investment and innovations. 
It was also mandated to protect small and Medium size enterprises (SMEs) engaged in 
the domestic markets of the region, promote regional integration, economic cooperation 
and good governance and to craft an agreement which was development friendly to the 
region and finally to secure additional funding outside of the EDF for EPA related 
implementation, capacity building and integration support. All these objectives were met 
in varying degrees notwithstanding the uneven Economic Status between both sides in 
terms of resources in the areas of Human, technical and financial. The Caribbean had 
clear and definite positions as to why it needed to get an agreement within the time. In 
the main the region was motivated to negotiate and complete an agreement before the 
expiration date to avoid disruption of the Regions export to the European Union (EU) as 
a number of products would be subject to tariff come the 1st January 2008. So also, 
having settled the negotiations on trade in services, it became clear that if the region 
could secure an agreement on market access for good even at the very late stages of 
the negotiation, then it was possible to sign a comprehensive agreement. 
                                                        
711 Interview ‐ A. Zampetti. May 5, 2007. Brussels. 
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The region saw the EPA as a unique package of Trade arrangement complemented by 
a development cooperation dimension and therefore to separate trade in goods, trade in 
services and trade related issues would not be to their advantage and diminish the 
regions ability to leverage in one area to gain in another in which it had a more offensive 
interest. But the region wanted to maintain its integrity and avoid fragmentation which 
could create a situation where the EU may be inclined to negotiate separate bilateral or 
sub regional Trade and Development agreement. It is within this context that the Ethical 
dimensions of the negotiations are highlighted on the part of the CRNM in coordinating 
the negotiation processes so as to facilitate the CARIFORUM States to maintain its core 
principles while achieving its objectives in keeping with its mandate. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Although the Yaoundé Conventions and the Lomé allowed the former European 
colonies in Africa Caribbean and Pacific regions to benefit from preferential one way 
non reciprocity trade with a cooperation component this was never meant to last 
forever. These  arrangements were a mere ‘pause”  in time to stave the threats posed to 
the global North which needed assurances for raw material from the South to keep their 
industries going and the South felt that the development was one way and they were 
not benefiting. The political thinkers of the global South along with the intellectual 
support of radical economic and development thinkers began to reject the traditional 
and well settled thinking of the global North and challenged the orthodoxy and status 
quo. The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) found favour with 
developing world development Strategy and the movement to create that order got the 
full backing of the Group of 77 of which the Caribbean played a lead role in the 1970s. 
The Caribbean sought to place the Lomé negotiation in the wider context of the global 
objectives of the developing world for a new trade and financial arrangements. 
However, the break-through of Lomé was lost as shortly after the agreement was 
entered world economic crises ensued which engulfed the ACP States which became 
deeply indebted and turned to the multilateral institutions for assistance. From that, they 
never fully recovered as conditionalities imposed by these institutions paved the way for 
Europe to slowly reinstitute the reciprocity in trade arrangements that they have always 
craved. Cotonou was therefore the vehicle which provided smooth passage to the 
desires of the multilateral system. 
In the 1980s, as the global crisis compounded the ACP’s financial constraints, the IMF, 
World Bank and the EU institutions consolidated their positions and imposed conditions 
of market reforms, adjustments in financial management of national resources coupled 
with adjustments in tariffs rates all of which contributed to the decline in the fortunes of 
the ACP State. Lack of investments in the national economies of the ACP State in 
general, both from local savings and FDI , declined in export earning from commodities, 
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coupled with  world inflation due to the shocks of oil price movements in the late 1970’s 
further affected the ability of the ACP States to take advantage of the potentials of the 
Lomé system. Foreign Direct Investment flowed rapidly to the Asian Tigers at a rate 
which later lead to a collapse in their financial system and the ACP States further 
suffered from that fall out as the global financial system adjusted and international 
financial capital became very expensive. 
Due to the world crisis of the 1970’s and 1980’s, the ACP were never able to develop 
their “Flag Ship” strategy to align the South into a position to compete with the North, 
over time in terms of industrialization. This was a design and objective of the New 
International Economic Order being pursued by the Group of 77 Developing Countries. 
It was the intention of the Developing Countries to establish its own financial institutions 
and regimes to foster development and move away from being suppliers of raw material 
to the North and importers of finished products from the North. Their inability to 
establish the financial regimes as a basic foundation to finance development and 
industrialization was a major failure and disappointment of the Group of 77712.   
However, Europe cannot be blamed for taking steps to protect its vital interest and 
promote its global policies. Indeed, they are duty bound so to do. Because, during the 
Uruguay Round the ACP States failed to agitate to protect their interests and allowed 
the economic powers a free reign to set the rules of global trade. Those States had the 
numbers to make a difference at the multilateral level in the Uruguay Round, but failed 
to use it, indeed they allowed themselves to be marginalised. They could not expect that 
Europe would jeopardise its interests to protect the ACP States in light of the global 
threats from Europe’s main trading partners and emerging markets. 
The demise of the Lomé and Cotonou regimes was long in coming and its credibility as 
a way forward for developing countries was not even being supported by the European  
which granted it in the first instance.   
                                                        
712 Interview P.J Patterson, March, 3, 2009.Kingston Jamaica. 
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It is therefore argued that the basis of Lomé was indeed a response to the frustration 
faced in UNCTAD by ACP states which seem to have had political “clout” but no real 
economic power.  A factor that they have failed to apply in the Uruguay Round. This, 
coupled with the fear of Soviet influence of the 1970’s and the threat of Commodity 
cartels made it imperative for the North to seize the opportunity to open up a different 
type of relationships with their former colonial territories at a time when the North had 
had no real answer to the urgency of an evolving political militancy of the developing 
world in search for economic reforms of the global trade arrangements and therefore 
found it convenient to negotiate than to confront.   
The constant whittling away of the ACP States when they signed Lomé I coupled with 
the level of economic decline in almost all of the economies of the ACP countries points 
to the marginalization of the importance of ACP in the context of global political 
economy. The marginalized institutional framework and cooperation apparatus of the 
ACP-EC has been used by the EU to provide support for its global profile of the 
institutional importance in the global political economy. So therefore, as the EU grew in 
strength and importance globally Lomé and the ACP have become less and less 
important to the EC. It is without doubt that there was a need to better administer the aid 
aspect of the Lomé Agreement. However, the conflicts of economic and moral interest 
which occupies the national interest of some European states seemed to have 
overflowed into their eagerness to enforce sanction against states of the ACP or 
regimes deemed guilty of human rights violation are more easily accommodated in 
multilateral or bilateral agreements and so the Lomé became a convenient instrument of 
European political interest in human rights issue. It is therefore not surprising that the 
EU took control of the implementation of its aid projects in ACP states, contrary to the 
spirit and intent of the Lomé Conventions.  
The political dynamism of the Lomé regime lost its impetus with the fall of the Soviets 
system as many ACP State could no longer be allowed to conduct their affairs in any 
manner inconsistent with the political agenda of the EU. The EU’s policy on political 
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governance was outline in the Green Paper published in 1997, which further opened up 
the avenues for the reconfiguration of the ACP States in the relations to the EU. 
 The negotiations of the Lomé Agreements since 1975 has exposed the weaknesses  
and the strengths in the trade and diplomatic strategies of both the ACP states and the 
EC and therefore the institution cannot be seen as a total failure but a fault of the will of 
each side to advance their interest in a very hostile global economy. Since the 
negotiations of the second Lomé, the ACP States were showing signs of weakness 
which the EC found as avenue to pull back on some of its commitments, or to re-order 
their implementation. The EC’s approach to the partnership followed those lines up until 
the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements. However, the CARIFORUM 
State felt that it has to make a signal change to the EU’s basic approach to the 
negotiation of the Trade Agreements as the EPA was not of the same character as the 
Lomé regime. 
The EPA negotiations with the Cotonou states and the EU were launched on the 27th 
September 2002 to define a new set of arrangements and focus on WTO compatibility 
the substratum of which is to achieve removing of the barriers to trade and enhance 
cooperation in trade related areas to impact growth and deal with the new development 
objectives of Cotonou.  
The Cariforum states entered the negotiation for a new EPA with the EU to replace the 
Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 and for the new arrangement which came into 
effect on the 1st January 2008, while the aid aspect of Cotonou will continue separately 
until 2020. The Agreement was signed on the 16th of October, 2008 in Bridgetown, on 
the Caribbean island of Barbados. 
The EPA was never requested by the ACP States, they resisted but Europe and the 
WTO wanted reciprocity and the ACP had to give in. Europe had changed since 1975 
so, has been the relationship between the two sides. Many of the more recent Member 
understanding or sympathies. But the Caribbean knew the issues at hand and the 
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monumental task of negotiating with Europe; but was equal to the task. The Caribbean 
knew that their strength States of the EU had no affiliation with the Caribbean and 
therefore no colonial was in unity and the value of being small Island State and the 
effect of appealing to the emotions and conscience; and they use this combination to 
gain advantage. 
 
Europe had made a decision in the context in the dynamism of negotiation at the WTO 
that the non-reciprocal trade arrangement had to be discontinued.  CARIFORUM State 
accepted the realities. So in negotiating the EPA the question had to be answered as to 
how the region would negotiate a deal with Europe for itself in the context of the new 
and emerging trends of world trading arrangements. The issues to be negotiated were 
formidable, and in some areas were never negotiated in a free trade agreement before. 
The Region realized however, that to maximize their position of weakness as offensive 
and defensive approach to those negotiations were appropriate strategies.  
The region did its research and drew upon its knowledge of the EU, based on the 
longstanding relationship and was well prepared to negotiate with Europe. 
In the negotiation, the Caribbean knew that Europe, though the economically and 
politically they were stronger partners, CARIFORUM  was not prepared to be dictated to 
by Europe and so when Europe tried to push its brand of development and the types of 
regional economic arrangement that should be put in place under the EPA, the Region 
resisted. 
At the all ACP level the EU’s stance seemed to have frustrated the ACP’s strategy for 
the regional negotiation. The EU’s strategy succeeded because the ACP States had 
become fragmented and the unity had waned over the years. The EU’s well used 
strategy of “divide and rule” had succeeded at the all ACP level, but the Caribbean was 
determined not to allow it to succeed in the regional negotiation for the EPA. 
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The region spoke with one voice through the regional negotiating machinery with the full 
authority and support of the political directorate at the ministerial and the Heads of 
Government levels.  
The regional had its own policies for development clearly defined and a philosophy for 
its own development and was not prepared for it to be replaced by European 
understanding of development. The Caribbean had to draw on the lessons of the 
Uruguay Round and the experiences of negotiating the FTAA to inform its approach to 
negotiating the EPA.  
From as early as 2003 when Pascal Lamy made an offer that Europe was willing to 
commence negotiation with the Region that it’s ready to negotiation even before the All 
ACP level was concluded, suggests that the Europeans had no interest in a successful 
conclusion of all ACP talks.   CARIFORUM also recognized that when the Central and 
Southern African configuration accepted the offer made by Lamy that the ACP was 
fractured and the Caribbean had to go it alone 
The Caribbean knew that they were more prepared than any other configuration but did 
not take up the EU’s offer, but would not take the EU’s offer and therefore waited to see 
the response of the others. At that time, the regional knew that with the stalling of the 
Doha round and the problems at the multilateral level, the EU wanted some success 
especially on the so called “Singapore issue”, more so in light of the Seattle and Cancun 
experience. Europe wanted to get those issues restarted and to that extent the 
Caribbean would be prepared to negotiate with them meant that global Europe would 
get some momentum. 
The Caribbean also appreciated the importance of those issues to the European Global 
trade strategy and sought to capitalize on that. The Caribbean realizing that the EU 
mandate issued in 2002, placed some emphasis on trade in service and the trade 
related issues, so also that the EU’s mandate once given is very inflexible and difficult to 
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change; or renegotiate. The Region was prepared to use that inflexibility to its 
advantage instead of trying to get it to be more flexible. 
And so, when the European’s responded to issues rose by the Caribbean and argued 
that they had no mandate to negotiate, CARIFORUM appealed to the emotional 
sensitivities of Europe by going to the political directorate to get answers. 
The regions knew the historical tradition of Europe democracy and used the network of 
N.G.O. to its advantage, the press and media was a medium which the region used to 
get its way in the various European Capitals. 
The CARIFORUM States wanted to negotiate a free trade agreement with Europe and 
were aware of the implication and what it would take to implement the agreement and 
were determined not to be draw into the free trade arrangements with Europe without 
the assurance of the concomitant development support to succeed in the new 
arrangements. Europe had a need also to promote Global Europe. 
 Caribbean during the negotiations relied upon the influence of the European Parliament 
to get concession by appealing to them through the ACP-EU joint Parliamentary 
assemble. The region’s decision to take the initiative  and created the opportunity for its 
chief spokesperson Dame Billie Miller to address the meeting of the Joint ACP-EU 
Parliamentary Assembly in Vienna in June 2006, still remains as one of the most 
masterful piece of diplomatic feat carried out by the ACP and particularly the 
CARIFORUM State during the EPA negotiations. That was the opportunity which 
created the breakthrough which ended Peter Mandelson’s “divide and rule “double 
taking approach to the negotiation. That change in attitude towards the negotiation and 
the CARIFORUM regions augured well for the ACP as a whole, up to the end of the 
negotiation as Mr. Mandelson was kept in check by the European Parliamentarians and 
the European press to a large extent. Because while the mandate to negotiate the EPA 
was specific, it did not speak to the manner of how the negotiations should be 
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conducted in terms of tactic, strategies nor personalities, nor the issues for the 
negotiations and the D.Gs involved.  
When Mandelson took over as Commissioner for trade he sought to find his “footing” 
among the Region and in doing so, had made several speeches outlining his intentions. 
The CARIFORUM used those utterances of policies and directions to extract 
concession in the end and forced an end to his public and private posturing regarding 
the EPA. The CARIFORUM State was prepared to take the issues which concerned 
them to the international level through the Group of 77 and effectively stalled the 
Cancun Ministerial of the WTO. Europe had to take the Caribbean quite serious, 
because of the potential of the region to upset the global agenda of Europe if the 
negotiations were to have failed.  
There were no specific areas in which the EU did not compromise, their main concern 
was to get a degree of liberalization of 90% or above but, settled for 85%. When the EU 
tried to get CAFTA parity from the Dominican Republic (DR) they settled for an 
undertaking for future arrangement. When they sought to get the Caribbean States give 
90% liberalization, the Regions offered the defence of “Variable Geometry” and the 
existence of its own internal market arrangement. The liberalization formula was only 
achieved through regional solidarity and unity. Because, it was the offer made by the 
Dominican Republic to the other States which brought the region’s offer up to WTO 
compatible level. The fact is no other country in the Region could have done what the 
DR did without suffering severe economic injury and loss of revenue. 
What was made clear to the Europeans by the CARIFORUM States is that as a Region 
they were not prepared to go to Europe with “Cap in hand “as the basis of the 
negotiating strategy. The region knew the age-old strategy of the European to hold the 
question of funding as a matter for discussion towards the end of the negotiation, where 
can be used more effectively to extract concessions. But the Region was well aware 
that this negotiation was not in the same realities as the old Lomé’ type agreements.  
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 The EPA is a free trade agreement which was demanded and had to be negotiated in a 
very serious way and therefore the CARIFORUM States wanted guarantees of 
development assistance, not in the form of hand out Aid packages, but as an integral 
part of process to move the Region to grow itself out of poverty and take its pride of 
place in the Global trading arena and other forum. 
So when the EU pressed on the issues of Intellectual Property, the Caribbean put the 
issue of Innovation on the table. This was a Caribbean concept, so innovative and 
carefully presented and analyzed; that in as much as the European negotiators said 
they had no mandate to negotiate it, left the European’s with no room to reject it.  
The Caribbean came under pressure from the applications of the European Union 
Common Agricultural Policy and the reform of their internal market. The Regions 
banana, sugar and rum industries were being affected by the approach to the reforms. 
Europe however, refused to engage the region in any meaningful discussion, but the 
region would not give in easily, and use every opportunity during the negotiations to 
convey a sense of European “betrayal” of their historic and legal commitment to the 
ACP partners.  
The EU’s unilateral denunciation of the Sugar Protocol which had been in place since 
1975, left a bitter taste in the CARIFORUM Region and was read by the Region as a 
signal of the changing Europe on which they could not rely as much as they did in the 
past. While the CARIFORUM States fully understood, that Europe had to be cognizant 
of  competition from China, India, NAFTA and Brazil, and also the need for it to shape a 
relationship with the developing countries of Asia and North Africa which are not 
Member States of the ACP, it expected the EU to do what it sees as being in its best 
interest  and they could not be faulted .The Caribbean accepted that services and trade 
in services is the emerging trend in the region’s trade pattern as its agricultural base is 
being diminished, and so that it was in the region’s best interests to negotiate a 
comprehensive EPA and not just an EPA to for trade in goods.  
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In ward flows of investment is very crucial to the Regions development and so it was 
important to negotiate the so call” Singapore issues”. However, both parties wanted this 
agreement, but for different reasons and so in the end this was a pivotal factor which 
drove the negotiation as each side knew the consequences of not having an agreement 
in place by December 31, 2007. 
The manner in which the CARIFORUM States prepared themselves for the negotiations 
of the EPA exposed a model of inclusiveness, coordination, vision and a sense of the 
maturity of its diplomacy within the region and externally. The level of preparation and 
the breath of activities which informed the preparation underlie both the legitimacy and 
competence of the process. It was a model of success in terms of structures, processes 
and the outcome. In a very frank presentation to the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary 
Assembly in Vienna in June, 2006, Senior Barbadian Minister and political spokes 
person for the CARIFORUM EPA, Dame Billie Miller left the European Union knowing 
that the CARIFORUM and the ACP state felt about their positioning and the reality of 
their conduct and questioned their political will to give meaning to their verbal 
expression on development.    
The region’s approach to the negotiations was focused and was driven by their desire to 
stand on their own and develop its resources and resist being dictated to. In the end 
both sides made compromises and the negotiations have further bonded the region as 
group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) for a better understand of their own 
aspirations. The CARIFORUM region got a deal which is not perfect, but one they are 
prepared to work with. The critics however, think otherwise.   
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership is a comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement, the terms of which have far reaching effect on future regional or bilateral 
Free Trade Agreement between the Global North and Developing South, or indeed 
between developing countries themselves. Critics of the agreement argues that it has 
gone too far in terms of commitments made, which have not yet been agreed at the 
multilateral level and it has therefore left other third world developing countries little 
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policy space or indeed negotiating space at the multilateral level more so in the areas of 
the so called “Singapore Issues” of competition Investment, Government procurement 
and Trade facilitation. But the terms of the Agreement cannot be seen in a single 
dimensional confine, as it is designed to take the region into the emerging Global 
political economy of Trade and to fit into the Trade Architecture and Regime which non 
define how the global trade structure is managed.  
The real measure of the success of the CARIFORUM State in achieving their objective 
in negotiating a comprehensive agreement is the extent of use of its offensive and 
defensive approach to craft the best deal which they could have achieved given the 
circumstances of the conditions which they faced during the negotiation process. There 
have been gains and concession on both sides with each side believing that the terms 
of the agreement represents the furthest each was prepared to make concessions.  
The agreement on the face of it provides some hope for the future of Trade in Goods 
between CARIFORUM States and Member State of the European Union. On the issue 
of border restrictions, the EU has provided Duty-Free, Quota Free (DFQF) access to 
CARIFORUM Goods entering European markets as at the 1st of January 2008, subject 
to conditions on importation of Rice and Sugar which are dealt with under different 
Protocols; The Region is allowed up to twenty-five years to liberalize. However, the 
exclusion list of Goods is problematic because of the commitment to eliminate all non 
Tariffs barrier on the entry into force of the agreement and such non tariff barrier 
commitment apply also to the products in the exclusion list. This would have an 
immediate negative impact on the revenue on CARIFORUM States. However, it does 
not seem from the tenor of the agreement that if such difficulty were to arise from fall out 
in revenues, whether these can be addressed by the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and 
Development Committee, as that committee will only in this regard deals with fall-out 
having to do with Tariff reductions. However, the power of the Trade and Development 
committee could prove disadvantageous to the CARIFORUM States as the Member 
States of the EU out number those of the CARIFORUM States by far. 
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On the question of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, the agreement is 
restrictive on CARIFORUM’s policy space in terms of its ability in future trade 
arrangements especially with developing countries. Because by committing themselves 
to give to the EC the right to demand similar treatment of in any future Free Trade 
Agreement it negotiated, were it to give better treatment to a third country’s exports is to 
give the EU some degree of command over the region’s trade policies.  This provision is 
unique and it has caused concerns to some developing countries such as Brazil and 
India. The Region is of the view however, that the concerns are only in “theory” as in a 
practical sense, it is not foreseeable that the Region will enter into any Free Trade 
Agreement with a developing country in which its trading relationship would be of such 
great magnitude that it will be forced to give any better treatment to it than what the 
Regions has committed to the EC in the EPA. 
The Rules of Origin (RoO) is also another area which has potential for development of 
the Regions Industrial base, because it offer better terms than what previously existed 
under the Lomé and Cotonou Regimes. However, it restrict the input of sugar in 
processed foods to be exported to the EU, in terms of the Sugar Regime which will be in 
place to monitor the importation of Sugar into the EU. 
The treatment of Sugar is of particular importance to CARIFORUM as this is an area 
where the Caribbean has lost significantly following upon the denunciation of the long 
standing sugar Protocol of 1975. The reform of the EU internal market and its impact on 
the Sugar Regime establish with the ACP since 1975 come under severe challenge 
from other Sugar producers namely Brazil and Thailand. There has been a 36% 
reduction in price for ACP Sugar which has significantly affected revenue for the region  
The only area in which the Caribbean seemed to have gained any benefit under the 
Sugar regime is to be reallocated any short fall under the quota given to a member 
State. However, after 2009, there will be no quota, but the price will be subject to the EU 
price mechanism which will be lower. 
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Further, CARIFORUM sugar will be competing with sugar produced in the French 
overseas Territories in the Caribbean, whose producers are being paid €2 billion 
between 2007 and 2013 for an output of 280,000 tonnes of sugar which will put them in 
a more advantageous position in the European market when compared to the 
CARIFORUM States. The region’s problem is further exaggerated by the fact that, it will 
have to compete with Sugar producers under the EBA regime whose product will enter 
the EU DFQF automatically and independently of any EPA Arrangement across the 
entire ACP configuration.  
In the Area of Trade in Services, the region made significant gains. However, its 
willingness to negotiate a service agreement which surpasses that which has been 
agreed at the multilateral level was of great concern to other A.C.P States. But, the 
region felt it very important to negotiate a service agreement which best suits its own 
Trade policy. The service agreement negotiated was mutually desirable but for different 
reason. The Europeans wanted to use the services agreement to further its Global 
Trade policy by “kick starting” the stalled Doha Development Round. The fact the 
CARIFORUM was eager to negotiate services had to do more with the emerging trends 
in the Regions trade direction, and the trade Economic diversification policies. To have 
negotiated an agreement which include the controversial Singapore issue was a bold 
but necessary move by the CARIFORUM States, one in which they knew they would 
suffer losses in order to make gains, so they prioritize. For example, the Region knew 
that getting an agreement on Procurement was vital to the interest of the Europeans 
and they had to concede something to the Europeans in order to achieve their priorities 
in the areas of Innovation and cultural diversity which some European state have 
vigorously opposed. So, while the commitment in the services sector is vital to both 
sides, they leave very little room for flexibility, although being asymmetrical. The rules 
are of binding nature and are subject to the dispute settlement and avoidance 
procedures of the Agreement. This EU’s objectives have been met equally in these 
areas of the agreement further under-scored by the EU’s willingness to fund the 
Implementation of the arrangements. 
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The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership is one of the most innovative and far- 
reaching Free Trade agreement ever entered into with the north-South Relation indeed, 
so unique and innovative is the arrangements that it now the evidence of a new 
paradigm and model for future Free Trade agreement, not just between Europe and the 
rest of the developing world but among developing countries themselves. It also has 
implications for the multilateral system in the context of the Doha Round of negotiation. 
The Agreement embraced innovative arrangement both in terms of giving meaning to 
special and differential Treatment Innovation in Service and Trade-related Issues, in 
some areas of Services and the so-called  “Singapore Issue” it exceeds what have been 
agreed at the Multilateral level without infringing the main objectives and thrust of 
Caribbean Regional Trade  and Development Policies, Philosophical and ideological 
thinking. It reflects pragmatism and boldness on the part of CARIFORUM States to 
conform the realities of the global political economy and carve for itself both offensive 
and defensive shields, However, while the CARIFORUM States have made positive 
achievements and gained, there are also serious challenges and in the short medium 
and long term when the provisions of the EPA are viewed in their entirety. 
The implementation of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement is a 
work in progress which is scheduled to be completed in 2033. The process when 
completed will have a far reaching and fundamental impact on how the CARIFORUM 
States interact in the global political economy and also within their own domestic and 
regional markets. The costs of adjusting these economies and regional institutions will 
necessitate the mustering of the political will to first make the necessary legislative and 
policy changes, some of which run counter to the economic and business practices 
which are deeply embedded. The region will require financial and technical assistance 
to implement the provisions of the EPA, but it remains very tentative as the European’s 
commitments to assist is very slow in coming and in some instances will not be 
honoured as global economic and financial constraints take told in European 
economies. 
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The raft of adjustments which are required cannot all be undertaken at the same time, 
but the region must take steps to honour their obligations under the Agreement even 
where it involves financial commitments for which they are unable to meet from their 
own revenue base, because the Europeans have skilfully evaded making firm 
commitments for financing the EPA as the commitments they have provided are more in 
the realm of declarations of intent which are not legally binding. 
The real challenge for the CARIFORUM States in implementing the EPA cannot be fully 
assessed in the short term, but the approach to the implementation processes in and of 
it is problematic. This is so because in many instances the region made commitments 
and the cost of implementing those commitments are only being assessed by the 
regional task force after the completion of the Agreements. To date, the task force has 
completed less than fifty percent of the twenty studies which it had undertaken since the 
completion of the agreements. So as the Task Force completes each study, it is then 
that the costs of implementing these will be fully appreciated and the Europeans may 
not assist to the extent that the CARIFORUM States are expecting. 
None of the Institutions established under the EPA is yet operational and therefore the 
region has been hampered in taking certain decisions which will impact the operation of 
those institutional bodies. Therefore the basic approach to the implementation of the 
CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement seems to be externally driven and 
so expose the extent to which the existing CARICOM institution, programs and 
mechanism  may well have to be revamped, a situation which was never envisaged by 
the Cotonou  Partnership Agreement between the ACP States and the EC which was 
intended to guide the negotiating process to foster the reduction of poverty, build  
regional integration and integrate the ACP States into the global regime.  At the 26th 
meeting of COTED in Georgetown, the DR circulated a declaration with respect to the 
implementation of the Institutional Arrangement. The DR contends that the CARICOM 
Secretariat lacks the capacity to assume coordinating role to implement the EPA. 
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The DR advocated the creation of a New CARIFORUM-EPA Implementing Authority. 
However there is a deeper suspicion that the DR and the EC had established a “soft” 
relationship during the negotiations of the EPA which is consistent with Europe’s wider 
economic interest in Latin America. However, the slow pace of implementation has 
become a source of problem for some countries in the region In a statement issued by 
the CRNM on the 10th December, 2008 the Dominican Republic at the 5th meeting of the 
CARIFORUM Council of ministers on external trade negotiations, had objected to the 
CARICOM Secretariat taking responsibility for implementation the EPA. The DR called 
for a CARIFORUM entity to be given the responsibility as the CARICOM secretariat was 
not capable of effective undertaking those responsibilities. The resolution to these 
challenges calls for political action at the highest levels of the region. Because the DR 
participated fully in the discussions and by policy they are part of the special COTED, 
they wished to be treated equally in the decision making and implementation processes. 
The CARIFORUM States entered the negotiation very clear in their minds as to what 
they wanted to achieve and the kind of concession were wanted to make to secure the 
deal and also, where they were not prepared to concede. This strategy was offensive 
and defensive in this regard. Their advantage was the asymmetries which they 
exploited and used the negotiating structure to open up the EU’s stance and achieve 
their regions objectives. The structure and processes of the negotiations had 
advantages for the region, through they were complex in nature and operationally. The 
consultation process which was executed through the Technical Working Group (TWG) 
which met before and after each session had served a useful purpose. However the 
CRNM was never daunted by the extent of its task to negotiate an agreement of such 
magnitude within the limited time and with such a formidable opposition. The outcome 
of the negotiation can only be expressed or bench marked in terms of what the region 
had achieved in light of its stated goal; in order to determine how ethical the process 
had been. 
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The Caribbean in negotiating this EPA had maintained the highest ethical standards in 
keeping with the expectation of its domestic, regional and International Reputation. It 
had set out to achieve the following: retain preferential accesses and minimal 
preference erosion, to protect the interest of its LDC’s under the regional umbrella, 
maximize market access to the EU market and to improve access in term of service in 
the European market to impact immediate returns, promote inward investments which 
are environmentally friendly and to improve the region’s competitiveness and impact 
economic diversification of the regional economies through investment and innovations. 
It was also mandated to protect small and Medium Size enterprises (SMEs) engaged in 
the domestic markets of the region, promote regional integration, economic cooperation 
and good governance and to craft an agreement which was development friendly to the 
region and finally to secure addition funding outside of the EDF for EPA related 
implementation, capacity building and integration support. All these objectives were met 
in varying degrees notwithstanding the uneven Economic Status between both sides in 
terms of resources in the areas of Human, technical and financial.  
The Caribbean had clear and definite positions as to why it needed to get an agreement 
within the time. In the main the region was motivated to negotiate and complete an 
agreement before the expiration date to avoid disruption of the Regions export to the 
European Union (EU) as a number of products would be subject to tariff come the 1st 
January 2008. So also, having settled the negotiations on trade in services, it became 
clear that if the region could secure an agreement on market access for good even at 
the very late stages of the negotiation, then it was possible to sign a comprehensive 
agreement. Because, the region saw the EPA as a unique package of trade 
arrangements complemented by a development cooperation dimension and therefore to 
separate trade in goods, trade in services and trade related issues would not be to their 
advantage and diminish the regions ability to leverage in one area to gain in another in 
which it had a more offensive interest. But the region wanted to maintain its integrity and 
avoid fragmentation which could create a situation where the EU may be inclined to 
negotiate separate bilateral or sub regional Trade and Development agreement. It is 
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within this context that the Ethical dimensions of the negotiations are highlighted on the 
part of the CRNM in coordinating the negotiation processes so as to facilitate the 
CARIFORUM States to maintain its core principles while achieving its objectives in 
keeping with its mandate. 
The problems of the region in moving  forward seems to rest squarely in their historical 
past dating from the demise of the West Indian Federation which has left a degree of 
insularity even more pronounced than before. The region is therefore very slow to act 
politically to implement it’s the decisions and recommendations of the West Indian 
Commission713 which warned of the dangers to the Caribbean of being left behind in 
light of the changes in Europe’s Single Market, the demise of the Soviet System and the 
emergence of Free Trade in the Americas. It called for the Establishment of an 
executive arm of the regional Integration movement to facilitate a higher level of 
functionalism and a deeper degree of policy coherence and management and also 
remove the lethargy which undermines the implementation of regional decisions.  
Indeed, there seems to be a deep-seated fear for lost of power and control at the 
political level were some decisions be taken outside of national borders. The findings 
and recommendations of the West Indian Commission are very instructive for the closer  
cooperation and coordination of the region’s political and administrative initiatives, 
undertakings and programs714. For even so, in the establishment of the Caribbean Court 
of Justice as the region’s final Court of Appeal is finding resistance from within, 
notwithstanding that by Treaty the regional governments have agreed to establish and 
indeed are financing the court. But, while the Court is sidelined in the EPA as a dispute 
settlement Mechanism, the region has gained in confidence and prestige from these 
negotiations. 
                                                        
713 Time For Action Report of the West Indian Commission, The West Indian Commission, 1992. p.3  
714 Ibid. See Recommendations of the West Indian Commission. 
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In the end, the CARIFORUM States have made the paradigm shift in global trade 
negotiations by effectively taking on tough issues which even more powerful States 
have avoided at the multilateral level for example the Government Procurement and the 
full breath of the so called ‘Singapore Issues”, the region has shown that it has the will 
and   temerity to negotiate with some of the World’s leading trade negotiators and gain 
concessions which seemed against the odds.  
The region lead in the initiatives for the First Lomé and was the first to complete a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement which surpass the WTO and GATT and 
requirement in services and trade relates issues. Further, the arguments advanced that 
ACP States are reactive and also the added assumptions that the European Union’s 
negotiators are so experienced in prying open other markets by use of their superior 
market strength and technical competences in trade negotiations seemingly is hanging 
in the balance, because the CARIFORUM States have demonstrated that even in 
circumstances of limited financial resources, they possessed the technical capabilities 
to negotiate and were prepared not to react but to be proactive. They came away from 
the negotiations with significant gains in light of their development strategies and 
policies, indeed the European were pushed to their optimum in these negotiations by a 
group of former colonies which the EU had unilaterally graduated from the category of 
Least Developed Country (LDC) except for the United Nations designated Haiti which is 
now the only LDC in the configuration. However, the constraints that faced the 
CARIFORUM States during the negotiations were very daunting and indeed 
challenging, but the region was not prepared to give the appearance that it was 
negotiating a benefits package of aid.  
The region wanted to ensure that its best interests were protected as far as it could, 
because what was at stake for them was far greater that getting aid. Instead it was the 
very viability of the region and its survival in a rapidly changing global markets place 
where services out strip production of goods. 
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Finally, notwithstanding the levels of economic disparity between the two sides, the 
Caribbean accepted the unequal nature of the partnership for its value in a pragmatic  
and constructive sense and used the Asymmetry in power dynamism  of current global  
trade inertia to carve a way forward for itself and   thus give a rebirth to the realist theory 
of international relations by illuminating a  direction to new era for small vulnerable 
states to become proactive in order to protect their vital commercial interests. 
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
NAMES DATE VENUE POSITION 
Ambassador 
Federico Cuello* 
May 15, 2009 New York, 
United States of 
America 
Former Dominican Republic to Brussels. 
Lead Negotiator for EPA. 
Ambassador 
Derrick Heaven* 
May 22, 2009 Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Chairman of the Sugar Industry Authority 
of Jamaica 
Ambassador Edwin 
Laurent* 
July 2, 2009 Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 
London 
St. Lucian Diplomat to Brussels 
Ambassador Ellen 
Bogle* 
March 23, 
2009 
Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Former Jamaica’s High Commissioner to 
Trinidad during the Establishment of 
CARIFTA and CARICOM, now a Trade 
Representative for a leading private sector 
entity who sat in at the preparatory 
meetings for negotiating the EPA. Private 
representation in EPA negotiation. Retired 
High Commission to London 
Ambassador Errol 
Humphrey* 
 
June 12, 2009 Bridgetown, 
Barbados 
Former Barbadian Ambassador to 
Brussels and Vice Dean of the College of 
Negotiators in Negotiating EPA.  
Ambassador Henry 
Gill* 
June 10, 2009 CRNM  
 
Bridgetown, 
Barbados. 
 
Former Director-General. Caribbean 
Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM). 
Oversight responsibility for negotiating 
CARIFORUM EPA.  
Ambassador Owen 
Singh^ 
May 13, 2009 London, United 
Kingdom 
Former Jamaican Ambassador to Brussels 
and Ethiopia.  He participated in 
negotiating Lomé II 
Americo.Beviglia-
Zampetti* 
May 5, 2009 Brussels,  
Belgium 
DG Trade. He Negotiated Trade in the 
Cariforum EPA. 
Anand Persaud* June 25, 2009 Georgetown, 
Guyana 
Editor in Chief of Starbok News in 
Guyana. Gave very wide coverage to the 
EPA 
Anthony Hylton* Feb. 20, 2009 Kingston, Former Jamaican Minister of Foreign 
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Jamaica Affairs and Foreign Trade of Jamaica who 
negotiated the EPA 
Branford Isaacs* June 18, 2009 
& April 15, 
2010 
Bridgetown, 
Barbados/Telep
hone Interview 
Consultant to Caricom Secretary General. 
Lead Negotiator for market access in EPA. 
Coordinator for CARIFORUM 
implementation of EPA 
Carl Greenidge* June 22, 2009 Bridgetown, 
Barbados 
CRNM Staff, Former Deputy Secretary 
General ACP, CRNM. Wrote- New 
Perspective on European Development 
Cooperation ed. Lister, Marjorie Return to 
Colonialism? The new orientation of 
European Development Assistance 
(Westview Press, 1999) 
Clement Imbert*  June 15, 2009 Engineering 
Dept UWI St. 
Augustine. 
Trinidad & 
Tobago    
Participated in the negotiations of the 
EPA. Service Sector.  
Dame Billie Miller* May 22, 2009 Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Former Barbadian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs & Foreign Trade. Lead Political 
Negotiator for CARIFORUM EPA. Former 
Chairman of ACP Council of Ministers. 
Dav-Ernan 
Kowlessar* 
June 16, 2009 Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad  
Business Development Consultant 
David Hayles* June 24, 2009 Georgetown, 
Guyana 
CARICOM Secretariat 
David Jessop* July? 2009 United Kingdom Of the British based Caribbean Council, 
Expert on Caribbean Trade Issues. 
Director of Commentator on Caribbean 
Trade Issues. Written extensively on 
Caribbean issues.  
David Prendergast* April15, 2010 
& March 14, 
2008 
Kingston, 
Jamaica  
Former Jamaican Diplomat in Brussels. 
Attended all negotiating sessions for EPA. 
In charge of EPA implementation. Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade, EPA 
implementation Unit.  
Dr. Anthony 
Gonzalves* 
June 15, 2009 Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad 
&Tobago 
Former Consultant to ACP, 1977-1982. 
Consultant to CARICOM, CRNM. Worked 
at W.T.O and was Consultant/ FTAA 
negotiation. University Lecturer.  
Dr. Henry  Jeffrey*    June 26, 2009 George Town, Former Guyanese Minister of Foreign 
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Guyana, South 
America        
Affairs & Int’l Cooperation involved with 
EPA. negotiations 
Dr. Marshall Hall* March 3,2009 Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Retired Managing Director of Jamaica 
Producers Ltd. Exporters of bananas to 
the EU. 
Dr. Kusha 
Haraksing* 
June 15, 2009 UWI ST. 
Augustine 
Trinidad & 
Tobago         
Consultant, Lead Negotiator for legal and 
constitutional issues. Chairman of 
Caribbean  Competition Commission 
Elsa  Fenet* June 12, 2009 EU office in 
Barbados 
Head of Trade in the EU Delegation in 
Barbados. Participated in the EPA 
Negotiations. 
Gregory Downs* May 6, 2009 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Coordinator, Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), Brussels 
Greg Lockey* June 16, 2009 Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad 
President of the Trinidad & Tobago 
Manufacturers Association: A Group which 
participated in all the negotiations 
sessions of the EPA.  
Joel Richards* June 23, 2009 Bridgetown, 
Barbados 
Caribbean Trade Team (Barbadian Private 
Sector Grouping). He attended the 
negotiation.  
John Caloghirou* May 4, 2009 European 
Commission, 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
DG-Development, Negotiated the 
Development provisions of the 
CARIFORUM- EC EPA 
Junior Lodge^ November 11, 
2008 & May 7, 
2009 
Geneva, 
Switzerland/Tel
ephone 
Interview 
Of the CRNM, coordinator in Brussels 
during the negotiations for EPA, now the 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating 
Machinery CRNM Representative in 
Geneva. 
Mr. Achille 
Bassilekin III* 
May 5, 2009 Brussels, 
Belgium 
Assistant to the Head of the ACP 
Madame Hélène 
Massan Fiagan* 
 
April 30, 2009 ACP 
Headquarters, 
Brussels 
Expert Customs Cooperation ACP 
Brussels. Consultant to ACP Secretariat. 
Market access. 
Morgan Githinji* April 30, 2009 ACP 
Headquarters, 
Brussels 
Expert, Multilateral Trade Matters, ACP 
Brussels 
Natallie Rochester^ May 2009 CRNM/Telepho
ne Interview  
Of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating 
Machinery (CRNM) 
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Neviller Totaram* June 25, 2009 Georgetown, 
Guyana 
Ministry of International. Participate in 
negotiating EPA. 
Nigel Durrant* June 25, 2009 
 
Georgetown, 
Guyana 
Head Negotiator for Agriculture. College of 
CRNM. Negotiator CRNM 
Philip Williams* 
 
June 22, 2009 
 
Hastings Main 
Road, Christ 
Church, 
Barbados    
Executive Director 
Caribbean Export Development Agency 
 
P. J. Patterson* March 3, 2009 Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Former Prime Minister of Jamaica and an 
Architect of the 1st Lomé Convention and 
lead Sugar negotiator for the ACP 
Group.1973-1975. 
Professor Norman 
Girvan* 
June 15, 2009 UWI ST. 
Augustine 
Trinidad & 
Tobago          
Professor. Leading Caribbean Economist, 
author. University Lecturer and former 
Secretary General of OAS. Critic of the 
EPA. Attended the Guyana Summit, 
December 7, 2007 on the EPA.  
Ricky Singh* June 22, 2009 Bridgetown, 
Barbados 
Leading Caribbean Journalist & Writer. 
Over 30 years of writing on Caribbean 
issues. Covered the negotiations of the 
EPA 
Sam Chandler* June 10, 2009 Bridgetown, 
Barbados 
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade. Participated in 
EPA Negotiation. 
Senator Keith. D 
Knight* 
November 14, 
2008 
Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trader of Jamaica, and former 
chairman of ACP Council of Ministers 
(2001-2006) 
Sir Alister McIntyre* November 14, 
2008 
Kingston, 
Jamaica 
A venerable Caribbean integrationist 
Celebrated West Indian, economist, 
academic and intellectual, and considered 
one of the great social thinkers of his time, 
he piloted the movement for integration as 
Secretary-General of CARICOM from 
1974-1977, and as Vice Chairman of the 
432 
 
 
West Indian Commission. University of the 
West Indies as Lecturer and Vice-
Chancellor from 1988 and as Director of 
the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research (ISER) between 1967 and 
1974.He worked in UNCTAD from 1977 to 
1987, first as director of the Commodities 
Division and then as deputy secretary-
general and officer-in-charge.  Served at 
the Caribbean Community, was assistant 
secretary-general. He Led the Technical 
team for the Caribbean During the 
Negotiations for Lomé l and visited Africa 
in the preparatory stages for the 
negotiation of Lomé. 
Sir Shridath 
Ramphal* 
June 9, 2009 Bridgetown, 
Barbados 
Ramphal previously served as the Foreign 
Minister of Guyana from 1972-1975. Her 
was responsible for Negotiating the Trade 
Regime in the First Lomé 1973-75. 
Leading Caribbean Personality and 
Retired Diplomat and a prolific Writer on 
Trade and Diplomacy. An Authority on 
Caribbean Economic and political issues. 
Thomas Millar*  March 
20,2009 
EU Delegation 
Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Economics, Trade and Politics, 
Information Delegation of the European 
Union in Jamaica. 
Viwanou 
Gnassounou* 
 
 
Virgina Paul April 
12, 2010 Castries 
St.Lucia. I/C of EPA 
Implementation at 
OECS Secretariat. 
April 30, 2009 ACP 
Headquarters, 
Brussels 
Expert in charge of Protocols and 
Commodities ACP, Brussels 
 
Key: * Face-to-Face recorded interviews. 
        ^ Telephone interviews. 
 
APPENDIX I 
ACP MEMBER STATES 
 Country Capital Area – sq.km Population 
1 Angola    Luanda 1,246,700 13,068,161 
2 Antigua and Barbuda Saint. John’s 443 86,754 
3 Barbados* Bridgetown 431 285,653 
4 Belize Belmopan  22,966 314,522 
5 Benin* Porto-Novo 112,620 9,056,010 
6 Botswana* Gaborone 600,370 2,029,307 
7 Burkina Faso* Ouagadougou 274,200 16,241,811 
8 Burundi * Bujumbura 27,830 9,863,117 
9 Cameroon * Yaoundé 475,440 19,294,149 
10 Cape Verde Praia 4,033 508,659 
11 Central African Republic * Bangui 622,984 4,844,927 
12 Chad * N’Djamena 1,284,000 10,543,464 
13 The Commonwealth of The 
Bahamas * 
Nassau 13,940 310,426 
14 Comoros Moroni 2,170 773,407 
15 Congo(Brazzaville) * Brazzaville 342,000 4,125,916 
16 Cooke Island Avarua 240 11,488 
17 Cote d’Ivoire* Yamoussoukro 322,460 21,058,798 
18 Cuba Havana 110,860 11,477,459 
19 Democratic Republic of 
Congo* 
(Kinshasa) 
Kinshasa 2,345,410 70,916,439 
20 Djibouti Djibouti 23,000 740,528 
21 Dominica Roseau 754 72,813 
22 Dominican Republic Santo 
Domingo 
48,730 9,794,487 
23 East Timor Dili 15,007 1,154,625 
24 Equatorial Guinea * Malabo 28,051 650,702 
25 Eritrea Asmara 121,320 5,792,984 
26 Ethiopia * Addis Ababa 1,127,127 88,013,491 
27 Federated States of 
Micronesia 
Palikir 702 107,154 
28 Fiji * Suva 18,270 957,780 
29 Gabon * Libreville 267,667 1,545,255 
30 Gambia * Banjul 11,300 1,824,158 
31 Ghana * Accra 239,460 24,339,838 
32 Grenada * Saint George’s 344 107,818 
33 Guinea * Conakry 245,857 10,324,025 
34 Guinea-Bissau * Bissau 36,120 1,565,126 
35 Haiti Port-au-Prince 27,750 9,203,083 
36 Jamaica * Kingston 10,991 2,847,232 
37 Kenya * Nairobi 582,650 40,046,566 
38 Kiribati Tarawa 811 99,482 
39 Lesotho * Maseru 30,355 1,919,552 
40 Liberia * Monrovia 111,370 3,685,076 
41 Madagascar * Antananarivo 587,040 21,281,844 
42 Malawi * Lilongwe 118,480 15,447,500 
43 Mali * Bamako 1,240,000 13,796,354 
44 Marshal Islands  Majuro 181 65,859 
45 Mauritania * Nouakchott 1,030,700 3,205,060 
46 Mauritius * Port Louis 2,040 1,294,104 
47 Mozambique Maputo 801,590 22,061,451 
48 Namibia Windhoek 825,418 2,128,471 
49 Nauru No official 
capital 
21 14,264 
50 Niger * Niamey 1,267,000 15,878,271 
51 Nigeria * Abuja 923,768 152,217,341 
52 Niue Alofi 260 1,354 
53 Palau Koror 458 20,879 
54 Papua New Guinea Port Moresby 462,840 6,064,515 
55 Republic of Guyana* Georgetown 214,970 748,486 
56 Republic of Togo* Lome 56,785 6,199,841 
57 Rwanda* Kigali 26,338 11,055,976 
58 Samoa(formerly western 
Samoa)* 
Apia 2,944 192,001 
59 Sao Tome and Principe Sao Tome 1,001 175,808 
60 Senegal* Dakar 196,190 14,086,103 
61 Seychelles Victoria 455 88,340 
62 Sierra Leone* Freetown 71,740 5,245,695 
63 Solomon Islands Honiara 28,450 609,794 
64 Somalia* Mogadishu 637,657 10,112,453 
65 South Africa Pretoria2  1,219,912 49,109,107 
66 St. Kitts and Nevis Basseterre 261 49,898 
67 St. Lucia Castries 616 160,922 
68 St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Kingstown 389 104,217 
69 Sudan* Khartoum 2,505,810 41,980,182 
70 Suriname Paramaribo 163,270 486,618 
71 Swaziland* Mbabane 3 17,363 1,354,051 
72 Tanzania* Dar es Salaam 945,087 41,892,895 
73 Tonga* Nuku’alofa 748 122,580 
74 Trinidad and Tobago* Port-of-Spain 5,128 1,228,691 
75 Tuvalu Fongafale 26 10,472 
76 Uganda* Kampala 236,040 33,398,682 
77 Vanuatu Port-Vila 12,200 221,552 
78 Zambia* Lusaka 752,614 12,056,923 
79 Zimbabwe Harare 390,580 11,651,858 
Source: ACP Secretariat. http.acpsec.org/en/acp-states.htm. Download. March 17, 2010 
Population: source: World Fact Book July 2009 
Note.1: due to a volcanic eruption in 1997 an interim government seat is establish at 
Brades. 
Note.2: Pretoria is administrative capital; Cape Town is legislative capital; Bloemfontein is 
judicial capital. 
Key: * Original 46 Members of ACP States. (African States: 37, Caribbean States: 6 Pacific 
States: 3)
 APPENDIX II 
EU MEMBER STATES 
BELGIUM  BULGARIA  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:Founding Member 
:Brussels 
:30 158 Km2 
:10 200 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2007 
:Sofia 
:110 993.6 Km2 
:7 970 000 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
 DENMARK  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Prague 
:78 866 Km2 
:10 285 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1973 
:Copenhagen 
:43 094 Km2 
:5 300 000 
GERMANY  ESTONIA  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:Founding Member 
:Berlin 
:356 854 Km2 
:82 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population
:2004 
:Tallinn 
:45 226 Km2 
:1 440 000 
GREECE  SPAIN  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1981 
:Athens 
:131 957 Km2 
:10 500 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1986 
:Madrid 
:504 782 Km2 
:39 400 000 
FRANCE  IRELAND  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:Founding Member 
:Paris 
:550 000 Km2 
:60 400 000 
Year of entry 
Political system 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1973 
:Republic 
:Dublin 
:70 000 Km2 
:3 700 000 
 
ITALY  CYPRUS  
Year of entry 
Political system 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:Founding Member 
:Republic 
:Rome 
:301 263 Km2 
:57 600 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Nicosia 
:9250 Km2 
:865 000 
 
LATVIA  LITHUANIA  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Riga 
:64 589 Km2 
:2 400 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Vilnius 
:65 200 Km2 
:3 700 000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: EU MEMBER STATES CONT’D 
LUXEMBOURG  HUNGARY  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:Founding Member 
:Luxembourg 
:2 586 Km2 
:429 200 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Budapest 
:93 030 Km2 
:10 070 000 
MALTA  NETHERLANDS  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Valetta 
:316 Km2 
:390 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:Founding Member 
:Amsterdam 
:41 864 Km2 
:15 800 000 
AUSTRIA  POLAND  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1995 
:Vienna 
:88 945 Km2 
:8 100 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Warsaw 
:312 685 Km2 
:38 655 000 
PORTUGAL  ROMANIA  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1986 
:Lisbon 
:92 072 Km2 
:10 800 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2007 
:Bucharest 
:238 391 Km2 
:21 700 000 
SLOVENIA  SLOVAKIA  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Ljubljana 
:20 273 Km2 
:1 985 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:2004 
:Bratislava 
:48 845 Km2 
:5 395 000 
FINLAND  SWEDEN  
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1995 
:Helsinki 
:338 000 Km2 
:5 100 000 
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1995 
:Stockholm 
:450 000 Km2 
:8 900 000 
UNITED KINGDOM   
Year of entry 
Capital city 
Total area 
Population 
:1973 
:London 
:242 500 Km2 
:58 600 000 
 
 
Source: Europa 
In order to become a member of the EU, a country must meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 as defined the criteria as:  
• The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities (political criterion) 
• The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (economic criterion); 
• The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union (criterion concerning adoption of the 
community acquis) 
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THE GEORGETOWN AGREEMENT 
 
As amended by Decision No.1/LXXVIII/03 
of the 
78th   Session of the Council of Ministers, 
Brussels, 27 and 28 November 2003 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES, 
hereinafter referred to as “the ACP States”; 
 
DESIROUS OF CONTRIBUTING through continuous and concerted endeavours to 
the reinforcement of the process of solidarity of developing countries; 
 
HAVING  REGARD  to  the  ACP  -  EEC  Lomé  Conventions  and  the  ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement signed on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, hereinafter referred to 
as the ACP-EC Partnership Agreements; 
 
HAVING REGARD in particular to the Suva Declaration, the Montego Bay Plan of 
Action and the Harare Declaration on intra-ACP Cooperation; 
 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the conclusions of the Summits of Heads of State and 
Government of  ACP States held at Libreville on 6 and 7 November 1997 and at 
Santo Domingo on 25 and 26 November 1999; 
 
AWARE  of  the  profound  changes  in  the  international,  political  and  economic 
environment; 
 
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the respect for human rights and the rights of 
peoples, democratic principles and the rule of law; 
 
DESIROUS of consolidating and reinforcing the existing solidarity and unity of the 
ACP States, and of promoting improved cooperation between their peoples on the 
basis of interdependence, complementarity and mutual interest; 
 
DETERMINED to promote and develop greater and closer trade, economic, political, 
social and cultural relations between the ACP States; 
 
RESOLVED to ensure a firm foundation in their respective countries for human- 
centred, equitable and sustainable development; 
 
RECOGNISING the importance of regional integration, intra-ACP cooperation and 
cooperation among ACP and other developing countries as a means of promoting 
the socio-economic development of the ACP States; 
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CONVINCED that the realization  of  sustainable  development, the eradication of 
poverty, illiteracy and disease as well as the gradual and smooth integration of the 
ACP  States  into  the   global  economy  are  legitimate  objectives  reflecting  the 
aspirations of our peoples; 
 
DETERMINED to ensure that the ACP-EC Partnership Agreements contribute to the 
realization   of   the  common  aspirations  of  developing  countries,  to  self-reliant, 
endogenous and self-sustained development based on their systems of cultural and 
social values; 
 
COGNISANT of the need to maintain and expand multifaceted relations with other 
States, groups of States and international organisations; 
 
RECOGNISING the importance of solidarity and unity in cooperation among the ACP 
States; 
 
DESIROUS of enhancing the political identity of the ACP Group to enable them to 
act and speak with a single voice in all international fora and organisations, and 
 
RESOLVED to establish  the  African,  Caribbean  and Pacific Group of States to 
achieve  common objectives so as to contribute towards the realization of a new, 
fairer and more equitable world order; 
 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
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CHAPTER I 
 
MEMBERSHIP AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ACP GROUP 
 
Article 1 
 
The ACP Group 
 
1. There  is hereby established the  African, Caribbean  and  Pacific Group  of 
States, designated “the ACP Group”. 
 
2. The Members of the ACP Group shall be the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States party to this Agreement or to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. 
 
3. Accession to the ACP Group shall be in accordance with Article 28 (1) of this 
Agreement. 
 
4. The ACP Group shall be organised on the basis of six geographical regions, 
namely   Central   Africa,  East  Africa,  Southern  Africa,  West  Africa,  the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. 
 
5. The ACP Group shall have legal personality. It shall have the capacity to 
contract,  acquire, and dispose of movable and immovable property and to 
institute legal proceedings. 
 
 
 
Article 2 
 
The Objectives of the ACP Group 
 
The main objectives of the ACP Group shall be to: 
 
a) ensure  the  realisation of the  objectives  of  the  ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreements   in   particular,  the  eradication  of  poverty,  sustainable 
development and the  smooth and gradual integration of ACP States 
into the world economy; 
 
b) co-ordinate the activities of the ACP Group in the implementation of the 
ACP-EC Partnership Agreements; 
 
c) promote and strengthen unity and solidarity among the ACP States, as 
well as understanding between ACP peoples; 
 
d) consolidate, strengthen and maintain peace and stability as a 
precondition  for  improving  the  well-being  of  ACP  peoples  in  a 
democratic and free environment; 
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e) contribute to the development of greater and closer economic, political 
social and  cultural relations among developing countries and, to that 
end, cooperation between the ACP States mainly in the fields of trade, 
science  and  technology,   industry,  transport  and  communications, 
education, training and research,  information and communication, the 
environment, demography and human resources ; 
 
f) promote policies especially in the areas of the environment and the 
rational  management  of  natural  resources,  in  pursuit  of  sustainable 
development ; 
 
g) promote and reinforce intra-ACP regional integration so as to enable 
ACP  States   to   increase  their  competitiveness  and  to  meet  the 
challenges of globalization; 
 
h) strengthen relations with the European Union with the aim of speeding 
up the development of ACP States; 
 
i) define a common stand for the ACP vis-à-vis the European Union on 
matters covered by the ACP-EC  Partnership Agreements  and on the 
issues tackled by international bodies likely to affect the 
implementation of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreements; 
 
j) aim for the promotion of a fairer and more equitable new world order; 
 
k) strengthen the political  identity of the ACP Group  to enable it to act as 
a coherent political  force in international bodies and to ensure that due 
regard is accorded its specific interests; 
 
l) promote and reinforce political dialogue within the ACP Group so as to 
consolidate ACP unity and solidarity; 
 
m) engage in effective and meaningful political dialogue at the appropriate 
levels  with   the  European  Union  in  order  to  strengthen  ACP-EC 
Partnership; 
 
n) contribute to strengthening regional mechanisms for the prevention, 
management and peaceful settlement of conflicts and by pursuing and 
developing cooperation between ACP States and third States, and; 
 
o) establish contacts and relations with other States and groups of States. 
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CHAPTER II 
ORGANS OF THE ACP GROUP 
 
Article 3 
 
The decision-making bodies of the ACP Group shall be: 
 
a) the Summit of Heads of State and Government, hereinafter referred to 
as the Summit, which shall be the supreme organ; 
 
b) the Council of Ministers; and 
 
c) the Committee of Ambassadors. 
 
 
 
Article 4 
 
There shall be a Secretariat of the ACP Group which shall be headed by a Secretary 
General. 
 
Article 5 
 
An ACP Parliamentary Assembly may, in due course, be established. 
 
Pending the establishment of the aforesaid Assembly, the provisions of Article 18 of 
the  Georgetown Agreement as revised in November 1992 shall, mutatis mutandis, 
continue to apply. 
 
Article 6 
 
The  Council  of  Ministers  may  propose  to  the  Summit,  the  creation  of  other 
consultative organs whenever necessary. 
 
Article 7 
 
The Summit 
 
1. The Summit of Heads of State and Government shall consist of the Heads of 
State or Government of the ACP States or their designated representative. 
 
2. The Summit shall meet on the initiative of its Bureau or on the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers. 
 
3. The Summit shall be presided over by the Head of State or Government of the 
host country. 
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Article 8 
 
In the inter-sessional period, the Summit shall be coordinated by a Bureau composed 
as follows: 
 
a) The President-in-office; 
 
b) The out-going President; 
 
c) The in-coming President, if already designated. 
 
 
 
Article 9 
 
The Summit shall lay down the general policy of the ACP Group and issue the 
Council of Ministers with the directives relative to its implementation. 
 
 
 
Article 10 
 
The Council of Ministers 
 
The Council of Ministers shall consist of a member of the Government of each of the 
ACP States or its designated representative. 
 
 
 
Article 11 
 
The Council of Ministers shall determine the modalities for the implementation of the 
general  policy  referred  to  in  Article  9  of  this  Agreement  and  shall  periodically 
evaluate its state of execution. 
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Article 12 
 
Bureau of the Council 
 
1. There shall be a Bureau of the Council of Ministers which shall co-ordinate the 
work of the Council. 
 
2. The Council shall appoint the members of its Bureau at the end of each 
ordinary session. 
 
3. The Bureau shall be composed of nine Members and its composition shall be 
as follows: 
 
a) the President of Council, designated on the basis of rotation among the 
six regions  identified in Article 1 (4) in conformity with arrangements 
agreed on by the ACP Group. 
 
b) one member from each of the four regions of Africa, one from the 
Caribbean  and  one from the Pacific, with the region which holds the 
Presidency being represented by another country from that region; 
 
c) the out-going President and the in-coming President, in an ex-officio 
capacity. 
 
4. The President of Council together with the outgoing and incoming Presidents 
shall comprise the Troika of the Bureau. 
 
Article 13 
 
1. The Council of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session every six months. 
 
2. In addition, the Council may decide to meet in special session on its own 
initiative or on the decision of the President after consultation within the Troika 
and with the representative of each of the regions on the Bureau. 
 
3. Furthermore,  the  Council  of  Ministers  shall,  as  the  need  arises,  convene 
meetings  of  ACP  Ministers  responsible  for  the  various  aspects  included 
among the objectives of the ACP Group. 
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Article 14 
 
The acts of the Council of Ministers may take the form of a decision, resolution or 
recommendation. 
 
Article 15 
 
Decision-making within the Council 
 
1. The acts  of  the Council of  Ministers  shall  be  adopted on the basis of a 
consensus of its members. 
 
2. However,  under  special  circumstances,  and  after  consultation  among  its 
members, the Council of Ministers may decide on the matter by a majority of 
four-fifths of its members. 
 
3. In the event of such a majority not being obtained after voting in the course of 
two meetings  of a session of Council, the matter shall be postponed to the 
next session, at which the Council shall decide on the matter by a majority of 
two-thirds of its members. 
 
 
 
Article 16 
 
The Council of Ministers shall adopt its rules of procedure. 
 
 
 
Article 17 
 
The Council of Ministers may delegate any of its attributions to the Committee of 
Ambassadors. 
 
 
 
Article 18 
 
The Committee of Ambassadors 
 
The Committee of Ambassadors shall consist of an Ambassador or other designated 
representative of each of the ACP States. 
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Article 19 
 
1. The Committee of Ambassadors shall assist the Council of Ministers in the 
performance of its functions, and shall carry out any mandate entrusted to it by 
the latter. 
 
2. In particular, the Committee of Ambassadors shall monitor the implementation 
of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement with a view to achieving the objectives 
set out therein. 
 
3. The Committee of Ambassadors shall present a report on its activities to each 
regular session of the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 20 
 
1. There shall be a Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors which shall co- 
ordinate its work. 
 
2. The Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors shall comprise nine members 
and Article 12 of this Agreement shall apply mutatis mutandis in relation to its 
composition. 
 
 
 
3. The members of the Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors shall be the 
representatives of the same States as those which comprise the membership 
of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 21 
 
The acts of the Committee of Ambassadors shall be in the form of a decision, 
resolution or recommendation and shall be adopted on the basis of consensus of its 
members. 
 
 
 
Article 22 
 
The Committee of Ambassadors shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE  SECRETARIAT OF THE ACP GROUP 
 
 
 
Article 23 
 
1. The Secretariat of the ACP Group shall be located in Brussels, Belgium. 
 
2. The Secretariat of the ACP Group shall be managed by a Secretary General 
vested with Executive powers. 
 
3. The Secretariat of the ACP Group shall: 
 
a) carry out all tasks as may be assigned to it by the Summit of Heads of 
State  and  Government,  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  Committee  of 
Ambassadors and the ACP Parliamentary Assembly ; 
 
b) contribute to the implementation of the decisions of these organs; 
c) monitor the implementation of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement; and 
d) service the  organs of the ACP Group and, as appropriate, the joint 
institutions established under   the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. 
 
 
 
Article 24 
 
1. The Secretary General: 
 
a) shall ensure that good quality  technical  and  administrative  support 
and services are provided by the  Secretariat to the members and the 
organs of the ACP  Group; 
 
b) is the Authorising Officer for the Budget; 
 
c) manages the personnel, the projects and programmes; and 
 
d) shall be the designated representative of the ACP Secretariat. 
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2. The Secretary-General may present proposals to the Committee of 
Ambassadors for the effective achievement of the objectives set out in Article 
2. 
 
3. The Secretary-General shall through the Committee of Ambassadors, present 
a report to each regular Session of the Council of Ministers on the activities of 
the Secretariat. 
 
Article 25 
 
1. The Council of Ministers shall determine the organisational structure of the 
ACP  Secretariat, and lay down its staff regulations, on the proposal of the 
Committee of Ambassadors. 
 
2. The Council of Ministers shall, appoint the Secretary-General of the ACP 
Group  on  the  basis  of  merit,  qualifications,  professional  competence  and 
integrity. 
 
3. The Secretary-General shall appoint Assistant Secretaries-General in 
accordance with the Staff Regulations on the basis of merit, qualifications, 
professional  competence  and  integrity  of  the  proposed  candidates  after 
consultation with the regions. 
 
4. The appointments to the most senior positions of the ACP-EU joint institutions 
that fall to the  ACP Group shall be made according to the same criteria of 
merit, qualifications, professional competence and integrity. 
 
5. The principle of rotation shall be applied to all these appointments so as to 
ensure that account is taken of the need to ensure an equitable and balanced 
representation of the regions as identified in Article 1 of this Agreement. 
 
6. The  Secretary-General  shall  recruit  staff,  in  accordance  with  the  staff 
regulations  of  the  ACP  Secretariat,  on  the  basis  of  merit,  qualifications, 
professional competence and integrity. In addition, the staff complement shall, 
to the fullest extent possible, reflect an equitable and balanced representation 
of the Member States of the ACP. 
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Article 26 
 
1.  In the event of duly certified incapacity of the Secretary General, or whenever 
it is clear  that his  resumption of duties shall be  unexpectedly delayed in such 
a manner as to  impair the smooth and efficient running of the ACP 
Secretariat, the President of Council shall authorise the Assistant Secretary- 
General who is the most senior by virtue of his date of assumption of office, to 
temporarily  perform the duties of Secretary General. 
 
2. The temporary performance of the duties of Secretary General by the 
Assistant Secretary General  shall  cease  on  the  day  before  the  date 
specified by the incumbent to the President of Council and the Assistant 
Secretary-General  in writing, as the date  that he will resume his duties. 
 
3.  In the event of the Secretary-General not resuming duty after the expiry of 
sixty days from the date of the commencement of the temporary performance 
of duties by the Assistant  Secretary-General, the Council of Ministers shall 
decide at its next session on how to resolve the situation. 
 
4.  If the next session of Council is not held before the expiry of an additional 
period of thirty days, the President of Council shall consult within the Troïka 
and with the representative of each of the regions on the Bureau, with a view 
to seeking a temporary solution pending a Council decision at its next session. 
 
 
 
Article 27 
 
1. The  Council  of  Ministers  shall  establish  the  financial  regulations  and  the 
Budget of the ACP Secretariat. 
 
2. Each  ACP  State  shall  contribute  to  the  Budget  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions established by the Council of Ministers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
NEW MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS 
 
Article 28 
 
1. The Council of Ministers may take a decision to admit a State as a member of 
the ACP Group: 
 
a) by virtue of its location within the geographical regions of the ACP 
Group,  and/or 
 
b) if it accedes to  the  ACP-EC Partnership Agreement currently in force. 
 
2. In  either  case  the  Council  of  Ministers  shall  determine  the  modalities  for 
admission. 
 
3. The new member shall assume all the rights and the obligations arising from 
this Agreement. 
 
Article 29 
 
On the recommendation of the Committee of Ambassadors, the Council of Ministers 
may grant Observer Status in the ACP Group to: 
 
a) independent states within the ACP geographical regions which express 
their intention to seek membership of the ACP Group or to accede to the 
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement currently in force; 
 
b) regional bodies of the ACP states; and 
 
c)  international organisations that pursue development objectives similar to 
those  of the ACP Group, on the basis of reciprocity. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
FINAL  PROVISIONS 
 
Article 30 
 
1. The provisions of this Agreement may be amended by a decision of the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
2. A proposal for an amendment shall be submitted in writing by any Member 
State  to  the   ACP  Secretariat.  It  shall  be  accompanied  by  supporting 
documents. 
 
3. The proposed amendment and supporting documents shall be communicated 
by the ACP Secretariat for the consideration of the Member States of the ACP 
Group. 
 
4. The proposed amendment shall not be included on the Agenda of a meeting 
of the Council of Ministers unless a period of at least six months from the date 
of its communication to the Member States has elapsed. 
 
5. The amendment shall enter into force when it is approved by a decision of the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 31 
 
1. The official languages of the ACP Group shall be English, French, 
Portuguese, Spanish and any  other  language as  may be decided by the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
 
 
Article 32 
 
The ACP Secretariat is the  depository  of  the  Georgetown Agreement and shall 
ensure its publication. 
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The preceding text is a certified true copy of the Georgetown Agreement as 
amended  and  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Secretariat  of  the  African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, in Brussels, which entered into force 
on the 28 November 2003, the date on  which it was adopted by Decision 
No.1/LXXVIII/03 of the ACP Council of Ministers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brussels, 1st December 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jean-Robert GOULONGANA 
Secretary-General of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
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SUVA DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiji, 14 April, 1977
THE ACP COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: 
 
RECALLING the declaration of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Government Ministers of 
ACP Countries manifesting the political will of the ACP States to strengthen cooperation among 
themselves for their individual and collective benefit; 
 
CONSIDERING the steps already taken to consolidate and strengthen the existing solidarity of 
the ACP Group in the conclusion of the Georgetown Agreement formally establishing the ACP 
Group;  
 
MINDFUL of the need to translate into practical action the principles of collective self-reliance 
and of self-determination by the ACP countries to reinforce their unity and capacity for joint 
action; 
 
HEREBY DECLARES THE ADOPTION OF THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME OF 
ACTION. 
  
The Action Programme for Intra-ACP Cooperation 
The Action Programme deals with six major sectors of cooperation among ACP countries, viz: 
1) Transport, communications and other services; 
2) Trade; 
3) Development of Intra-ACP Enterprises and Cooperation in production; 
4) Development finance; 
5) Technology, Know-how, and technical assistance; 
6) Cultural, Scientific and Educational Cooperation; 
 
1. TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATION AND OTHER SERVICES 
An essential complement to the development and strengthening of trade cooperation, 
as well as to the development of intra-ACP enterprises and cooperation in production, is the 
implementation of appropriate measures in the service sectors, particularly shipping, air and 
land transport, communications and banking, insurance and credit. 
In respect of shipping and shipping services, the ACP would need to examine and to 
identify the particular measures necessary for assisting the following main areas: 
(i) The expansion of trade between the ACP countries; 
(ii) Intra-ACP Cooperation in production; 
(iii)  The stimulation of exports from ACP countries to third countries; 
(iv)  Cooperation in import policy and practice among ACP countries. 
 
Related studies on alternative means of transport and the creation, improvement, or adaption of port 
facilities, will also have to be undertaken. 
 
The question of transportation is fundamental to the development of intra-ACP 
Cooperation. With regard to new trade flows between the ACP countries, much will depend on the 
availability and cost of the transport services. Thus the ACP will need to determine to what extent 
the lack of these services or their cost constitutes a barrier to the expansion of trade in ACP 
commodities. The ACP would also need to examine the existing and potential trade routes and the 
cargo flows estimates to determine the traffic demands in relation to the existing shipping tonnage 
owned by the ACP States. 
With respect to the stimulation of exports from ACP to third countries, and the coordination 
of export policies and practices by ACP States, studies will initially centre around the considerable 
savings that might be made by ACP countries from cooperative efforts in the bulk handling of 
homogenous cargoes moving on large quantities and the aggregation of mixed liner cargoes on a 
regional or sub-regional basis. Such investigations should also illustrate the economic feasibility of 
establishing or strengthening regional shipping lines serving the different area of the ACP. 
The importance of communications networks between the ACP countries as a basic 
precondition for development of intra-ACP cooperation in trade production, is all but equaled by 
that of the services such as insurance, banking and credit. The machinery for increased functional 
cooperation between these sectors of the ACP States should therefore be considered at an early 
stage. 
 
2. TRADE 
 Having regard to the need for a fair distribution of the benefits of such a programme 
among the regions of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, measures in this area must be designed 
with view to: 
(i) The strengthening of the collective bargaining power of the ACP countries in their 
export and import trade with the industrialized countries and their ability to exploit 
more fully available opportunities in the markets of those countries; 
(ii) The liberalization of trade among the ACP countries and between the ACP 
countries and other developing countries. The mechanism for such trade 
liberalization would be the adoption of an ACP-wide scheme for the provision of a 
distinct margin of advantage in favour of ACPs and other developing countries’ 
supplies from developed countries care being taken to ensure an equitable 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the scheme among the individual 
participating countries. The scheme need not necessarily aim at full trade 
liberalization but could be restricted to immediate and realistic targets; 
(iii) The full utilization of those measures in the Lome’ Convention (eg. As in Article 7 
(2) (b) of Title I) which offer direct support to the expansion of ACP trade, of the 
GATT protocol of December 8, 1971 relating to Trade Negotiations among 
Development Countries and other international arrangements providing special 
support for intra-developing countries’ trade. 
(iv) The adoption of active measures of trade cooperation between the ACP States such 
as the conclusion of medium and long- term contractual arrangements as a means 
of directly expanding intra-ACP trade flows and of developing new trade flows. 
These arrangements can involve commitments to supply and purchase specific 
commodities within mutually agreed price ranges over given periods of time; 
(v) The strengthening of cooperation between ACP producers for joint action aimed at 
improving and stabilizing prices, at cooperation in processing, at product 
improvement, at providing technical support and at direct marketing distribution 
and shipping. Such efforts would have the result of reducing the traditional 
dependence on the marketing systems and distribution channels of the developed 
countries, especially those organized through the intra-firm transactions of 
transnational   corporations and through commodity markets and exchanges 
controlled by the developed countries; and of increasing the share of the value-
added retained by ACP countries. Joint ACP marketing and market intelligence 
services should also be contemplated in this regard; 
(vi) The full exploitation of the provisions of the Lome’ Convention relating to the 
accumulation of processing and cumulative treatment in respect of exports to the 
European Community; 
(vii) The identification of the possibilities for the production of and trade in 
goods deriving from the particular specialization of ACP States and the scope for 
complementarity between various sectors of different ACP countries; 
(viii) The identification of specific obstacles to the initiation and expansion of 
trade between the ACP countries and taking the necessary steps to overcome the 
obstacles; 
(ix) The initiation of effective intra-ACP cooperation in developing a system of 
payments arrangements for trade, by means of a network of clearing arrangements 
at the regional and sub-regional levels, by the development of closer linkages 
between these arrangements, and by the development of closer links between the 
central banks of ACP countries with a view to furthering the principle of collective 
self-reliance. 
 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTRA-ACP ENTERPRISES AND COOPERATION IN 
PRODUCTION  
Central to the strategy for the achievement of the objectives of intra-ACP 
cooperation is the development of multinational intra-ACP Enterprises for production. The 
development of such complementary productive capacity is a major precondition for the 
satisfactory development of the resource endowments of many ACP States, for the 
expansion and diversification of intra-ACP trade, as well as for the enhancement of the 
position of ACP trade in the markets of third countries. 
Article 8 (a) of Protocol No 2 of the Lome’ Convention makes basic provision for 
financial support in the setting up of “regional and inter-regional enterprises”, such initial 
impetus as represented by these resources should be fully utilized in the achievement of this 
major objective. 
The process of identifying opportunities for establishing such enterprises should be 
given immediate expert attention so that there can be early initiation of intra-ACP 
collaboration and negotiations for the establishment of appropriate intra-ACP enterprises in 
the fields of natural resources, technology, management, finance, markets etc. The 
balancing of the interests of participating countries should not be overlooked and emphasis 
might be more wisely placed on factor complementarity rather than on equity financing in 
the creation of these enterprises. 
Collaboration should also be strengthened in relation to the development of 
infrastructure and services such as hydro-electric plants, road networks, 
telecommunications, water development, airline and shipping services, insurance, finance 
and banking institutions and technological and research services. Special concern for the 
benefits of the least developed, Islands and land-locked countries should continue to be a 
major preoccupation of such collaboration. 
Regional and sub-regional plans for the production of food for home consumption 
should also be the subject of exchanges and collaboration between ACP countries. 
As a first step, inventories of possible intra-ACP enterprises in all these fields 
should be drawn up in cooperation with regional and sub-regional financial institutions-and 
if possible with national development banks. The gathering of technical data essential to 
this exercise must be undertaken immediately, together with the organizing and updating of 
relevant data available in U.N. Agencies and financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
Group. 
 
4. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
In the field of development finance, provisions already exist in the Lome’ Convention 
under which direct financial support is available for the furtherance of intra-ACP 
cooperation. Apart from this, an early start should be made within the ACP Group to ensure 
greater collaboration and cooperation in respect of the individual aid programme now being 
established under the Lome’ Convention. In addition, machinery can be instituted within 
the ACP Secretariat for maximizing the benefits to ACP enterprises arising out of the 
provisions of the Convention relating to invitations to tender in respect of EEC-financed 
projects. 
Other measures aimed at improving the availability of capital on terms more 
favourable to the ACP countries might be contemplated, and whenever possible, with the 
cooperation of other developing countries. Intra-ACP cooperation, in the context of 
cooperation with other developing countries, could;  
(i) Provide for balance-of-payments adjustments assistance, 
(ii) Support stabilization of commodity export prices at equitable and 
remunerative levels and, 
(iii) Serve as a framework for long-term development finance. 
Experience regarding monetary and financial measures now in existence or under 
contemplation in various regions or sub-regions of the ACP could be shared on a systematic basis 
with a view to their deepening and widening for the benefit of the ACP States jointly and severally. 
 
5. TECHNOLOGY, KNOW-HOW AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Intra-ACP technical cooperation projects are a vital part of intra ACP cooperation. They are already 
envisaged under the Lome’ Convention and this can be used as a basis for the development and 
expansion of technology transfer among the ACP States. The measures to achieve this could 
include: 
(i) Increased flow of technologies and know-how evolved within the ACP or other developing 
countries; 
(ii) Exchange of information and expertise in respect of available technologies; 
(iii) Technical assistance, in particular through the exchange of experts, advisory services and 
training courses; 
(iv) The utilizing of the services of engineering designing and consultancy firms in ACP or 
other developing countries which could provide the appropriate technology and ensure the 
maximum component of indigenous equipment; 
(v) Collective efforts at joint projects for the acquisition and development of technologies for 
utilization in more than one country; 
(vi) The elaboration of preferential arrangements for the development and transfer of 
technology among themselves and the establishing of regional and sub-regional centers for 
development and transfer of technology  which could serve as essential links with centers in 
other countries. 
A start can be made by preparing files on available expertise within the ACP 
countries, such files drawn up with the assistance of the regional and sub-regional groups as 
well as the information now available in regional and international organizations. 
 
6. CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION 
The development of programme and the establishment of machinery within the 
ACP Group for educational, scientific and cultural exchanges must be contemplated at an 
early date.. In this regard, the ACP Secretariat, in collaboration with appropriate regional 
institutions, might initially be used as a clearing house for the exchange of information as to 
possibilities in this field. 
As far as practicable, the initial steps in the realization of these measures should 
give emphasis to and be built on regional cooperation. 
In all undertakings in the context of the Action Programme, the problems of the 
least developed, landlocked, semi-landlocked and island countries must continually be 
borne in mind and therefore efforts must be made to define the measures which would be of 
benefit to those countries within the action programme of intra-ACP Cooperation. 
 
THE ACP STATES ACCEPT THE ABOVE AREAS AND METHODS OF COOPERATION AS 
CONSTITUTING THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR EFFORTS AT COOPERATION AND SELF 
RELIANCE, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH THEY WILL STRIVE TO BUILD A STRONG 
AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF NATIONS. 
 
 
APPENDIX V 
  
CARIFORUM‐ EPA College of Negotiators 
 
DEAN 
H.E. Ambassador Dr. Richard l. Bernal 
Director‐General 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery(CRNM) 
VICE‐DEAN
H.E. Ambassador Errol Humphery 
Ambassador of Barbados to Belgium and the EU 
SPECIAL ADVISOR ON CSME 
Mr. Ivor Carryl 
Programme Manger, CSME 
CSME Unit 
MARKET ACCESS
LEAD 
Mr. Branford Issacs 
Consultant 
ALTERNATE
Mr. Nigel Durrant (Agriculture) 
Agriculture Trade Specialist 
Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery 
 
Roberto Despradel (Market Access) 
 
Luis Ramón Rodriguez (Agriculture) 
Vice Minister of Agriculture 
Dominican Republic 
 
Mr. Norris Breedy (Rules of Origin) 
Deputy Programme Manager, CSME 
CARICOM Community Secretariat 
 
Mr. Calixte Leon 
External Trade Advisor 
Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade & Civil Aviation 
St.Lucia  
SERVICES & INVESTMENT
LEAD 
H.E. Ambassador Fedrico Cuello 
Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to Belgium and the EU 
ALTERNATE
H.E. Ambassador Errol Humphery 
Ambassador of Barbados to Belgium and the EU 
 
Mr.Ramesh Chaitoo 
Services Specialist 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
 
Mr. Lawrence Placide 
Director, international Trade Negotiations Unit 
Trinidad & Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce. 
 
Dr. Maurice Odle 
Economic Advisor to the Secretary General 
CARICOM Community Secretariat 
 
TRADE RELATED ISSUES
LEAD 
Mrs. Patrice Pratt‐Harrison 
Technical Advisor and Government Procurement Specialist 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
ALTERNATE
Mr. Malcolm Spence  
Technical Adviser Intellectual Property/Agriculture (SPS) 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
LEAD 
Dr. Kusha Haraksingh 
Legal Consultant 
University of the West Indies 
 
ALTERNATE
Ms. Elma‐Gene Issacs 
Senior Legal Officer 
CSME Unit 
Mr. Audel Cunningham 
Legal Advisor 
Caribbean regional Negotiating Machinery 
 
  
 
